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Silver tides sweep the Chinese tributary system 
Before the Western countries forced China and its vassal countries under 
duress to join the nation-state system in the nineteenth century, the political 
relations of the Chinese empire in East Asia were regulated within the 
framework of the Sino-centric tributary system. This balance of power was 
an extension of the domestic political structure which sustained the Chinese 
empire for almost two thousand years.1 ‘Barbarian’ rulers in the countries 
surrounding China acknowledged the superior status of the Chinese emperor 
and in return for this recognition the Chinese court guaranteed the legitimacy 
of their position. Sometimes it could even initiate substantial interventions to 
come to their rescue. How strong this intervention would be depended on the 
actual physical force available to be deployed by the Chinese empire at that 
moment.2 In comparison with the other political entities in the region, the 
sheer size of the Chinese empire exerted remarkable psychological pressure 
on its neighbours. Leaving these various pressures aside, the economic 
rewards bestowed on the vassal states in this tributary system were very 
attractive since membership articulated with the operation of the 
monopolistic crown trade between vassals and overlord. When China was 
compelled to proclaim the Hai-chin or maritime prohibitions in a desperate 
attempt to stabilize the social order along its coast, these new regulations did 
not disrupt the arrival of the tributary embassies from overseas rulers which 
                                                          
1 John King Fairbank, ‘Tributary Trade and China’s Relations with the West’, The 
Far Eastern Quarterly, 1/2 (1942), 129-149 at 131-33. 
2 Ibid., 137; For a more comprehensive and thorough description of the Ming tribute 
system and its relation to overseas trade cf. Chang Pin-ts’un, ‘Chinese Maritime Trade: 
The Case of Sixteenth-Century Fu-chien’(Diss., Princeton: 1993), 8-11.   
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continued to arrive regularly and formed the only legal channel for trade in 
the first half of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). 3     
As much as the tributary system was an extension of Chinese domestic 
political strength, domestic turmoil in a vassal state as the result of the 
collapse of central authority might also exclude it from the tribute system. 
Japan joined the Ming tributary system after its shogun, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, 
was recognized as a subordinate with the status of ‘King of Japan’ by the 
Ming emperor in 1408. 4  Almost sixty years later, the Muromachi 
Bakufu[Japanese, hereafter J.] lost its authority after disputes arising from the 
shogunal succession in 1467 and central authority in Japan began to fall 
apart.5 When the daimyos of Hosokawa and Ouchi separately dispatched 
tributary embassies to China in 1523, both of them claimed to be legitimate 
envoys authorized by the shogun and tried to vitiate each other’s claims. 
Their conflict which degenerated into a series of continuous raids caused 
large-scale disarray to proliferate along the Chinese coast. Rather than 
become involved in the fighting between the two factions by choosing for 
one of the parties, the Chinese court eventually decided to cease any contact 
with Japan in 1547.6       
                                                          
3 Fairbank, ‘Tributary Trade and China’, 138-9; Hok-Lam Chan, ‘Chinese Barbarian 
Officials in the foreign Tributary Missions to China during the Ming Dynasty’, 
Journal of the American Oriental Society, 88/3(1968), 411-18 at 417; Chang, Chinese 
Maritime Trade, 11-36. 
4  Ronald P. Toby, State and diplomacy in early modern Japan: Asia in the 
development of the Tokugawa bakufu, ( Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 
1984), 24; Richard von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in 
China, (Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc., 1996), 90. 
5 Marius Berthus Jansen, The making of Modern Japan, (Cambridge: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 4. 
6 John Whitney Hall, James L. McClain (eds), The Cambridge History of Japan, 6 
vols, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1991), IV, 67; Toby, State and 
diplomacy in early modern Japan, 24; Moreover, because of the financial burden 
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At more or less the same time, a silver-mine in Iwami in Japan was put 
into full production. Using the silver it provided, Japanese merchants 
continued their quest to obtain Chinese goods via the Korean Peninsula, but 
their plan was thwarted. The Korean government became worried about the 
destabilizing effect the sudden increase in the silver flow could have and 
banned the trade in 1539.7 Nevertheless, the silk yarn produced in the 
Chiang-nan area around Su-chou and Hang-chou in China continued to be in 
great demand in Japan. The high profits to be obtained in the silver-for-silk 
trade created waves of smugglers who rushed to China from Japan. Without 
formal channels between the two countries which could maintain security, the 
smugglers often collaborated with the pirates or even turned to piracy 
themselves. This second wave of piracy is referred to in Chinese sources 
simply as ‘Wo-k’ou’, namely ‘Japanese pirates’. In complete contravention of 
the nominal goal of the Sino-centric tributary system, Japanese pirates 
escaped scot free at home and continued to plunder their Ming victims. The 
Chinese Ming court was not in the position to restore the central government 
in Japan which would have enabled the traders to obtain the silver it 
desperately required by this time through legitimate trade. The inability of the 
Chinese court to take adequate measures to respond to this wave of piracy 
along the Chinese coast was a consequence of the long decline to which its 
military defence system had been subjected ever since an unrealistic military 
farming programme was introduced to the military colonies (Wei-so) along 
the border in 1371.8 This system was devised so that the soldiers in the 
garrisons could be self-supporting by working as farmers and simultaneously 
be ready to keep the enemy at bay. This farming programme transformed the 
                                                                                                                             
placed on the Ming court in this tributary exchange, the court had discouraged 
tributary missions since 1430s, cf. Chang, ‘Chinese maritime trade’, 39-45.  
7 Von Glahn, Fountain of furtune, 114-5 
8 Ray Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance in Sixteenth-Century Ming China, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1974), 65-7. I followed the author to 
translate ‘Wei-so’ as military colony. 
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hereditary soldiers into peasants and in the result was the withering of the 
garrisons during the century-long peace that followed. By the middle the 
fifteenth century soldiers were even selling or mortgaging their farmland.9 In 
most of the military colonies along the coast, the numbers of residential 
troops had declined to less than half of what they had been when the Wo-k’ou 
first launched their raids. In Fu-chien the numbers of the Wei-so soldiers 
declined to only 20 per cent.10 In some extreme cases, the numbers of 
soldiers who continued to live in the colonies amounted to only 2 or 3 per 
cent of the original quota.11 In comparison with the bellicose ‘Wo-k’ou’ who 
had earned their spurs in the interminable rivalry in the ‘warring states’ of 
Japan, the Ming coastal defence force had little fighting experience.12 The 
upshot was that the Ming court had to rebuild the coastal defence force before 
it could really contemplate regulating the coastal commerce and diplomacy 
with Japan within or without the tributary system.         
 
The emergence of the Chinese privateers 
In 1554, as Supreme Commander of Chiang-su (Tsung-du) Chang Ching was 
dispatched by the Ministry of War to carry out this mission of military 
reform. 13  His recruits included mountain aborigines from Kuang-hsi, 
                                                          
9 Ibidem. 
10 Fan Chung-I, T’ung His-kang, Ming-tai Wo-k’ou shih-lüeh [A Brief History of 
Wo-k’ou during the Ming Dynasty], (Peiking: Chung-hua Shu-chü, 2004), 202; Two 
different reports written by the Fu-chien officials which point out two different 
percentages and that actually the numbers were only 18.5% and 42.8% of the original 
quotas of the coastal defence of Fu-chien around 1547, see: Chang, ‘Chinese 
Maritime Trade’, 204-8.  
11 Ray Huang, 1587: a year of no significance : the Ming dynasty in decline, (New 
Haven : Yale University Press, 1981), 160. 
12 Ibid., 169. 
13 The Chinese official titles in this dissertation are translated according to : Charles 
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salt-smugglers from South Chih-li (Nanking or Chiang-su) and Buddhist 
monks from Shan-tung. In the other words, he formed an army of 
mercenaries. Although the hereditary soldiers in the military colonies were 
still liable to be called up for duty, they were no longer able to play any 
meaningful part in engagements with the enemies.14 In 1557, in a hasty effort 
to build up some military pressure, the Supreme Commander of 
Chê-chiang-Nan-chili-Fu-chien, Hu Tsung-hsien, also devised plans to recruit 
a navy from among the Chinese pirates and smugglers who used to 
co-operate with Japanese. This came to naught as Emperor Chia-ching 
(1522-1566) rejected his proposal and eventually the most prominent 
smuggler and potential naval commander, Wang Chih, and his followers were 
trapped and sentenced to death.15 Meanwhile, the mercenaries were soon 
spreading alarm among the local elites along the coast who were horrified by 
their ill-discipline.16 Disoderliness was not the only problem they presented.  
The cost of maintaining the mercenaries in the intervals between the pirate 
                                                                                                                             
O. Hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China, (Taipei, Southern 
Materials, Inc.:1988).  
14 Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance, 292; Fan, Ming-tai Wo-k’ou shih-lüeh, 
244-8. 
15  T’ai-wan yin-hang ching-chi yen-chiu shih[hereafter, TWYH, The economic 
research department of the Bank of Taiwan](ed.),Ming shih-lu min-hai kuan-hsi 
shih-liao[Historical Materials about Fu-chienese Coastal Waters Selected from the 
Veritable Records of the Ming] T’ai-wan wen-hsien ts’ung-k’an [hereafter TW, 
Taiwan Historical Documentary Collectanea] no. 296, (1971), 29; Huang, 1587: a 
year of no significance, 164; John E. Wills Jr, ‘Maritime China from Wangchih to 
Shih Lang’, in Jonathan D. Spence and id. (eds), From Ming to Ch’ing, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1979), 204-38 at 211-13. Hsü Kuang-ch'i insisted Hu 
Tsung-hsien had made a sincere attempt to recruit Wang Chih for the court camp. The 
Emperor did not allow this and demanded the death penalty. Cf. Hsü Kuang-ch’i, 
‘Hai-fang Yü-Sso[A General Discusion of Coastal Defences]’, in TWYH (ed.), Ming 
ching-shih wên-pien hsüan-lu[Selections of Political Comments in the Ming Dynasty], 
2 vols, TW 289, II, 211-23 at 212.  
16 Fan, Ming-tai Wo-k’ou shih-lüeh, 189. 
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raids also proved too high to bear for longer periods.17 In short, these 
mercenaries were more trouble than they were worth and so the recruitment 
of mercenaries from the local civilian population seemed to offer a more 
practical solution. 18 The Wei-so Regional Military Commissioner, Ch’i 
Chi-kuang, attempted to turn the farmers and miners into more unified, stable 
brigades after 1559.19 As a reward for good behavious, he promised each 
soldier at least as much pay as he would obtain from a day-labour and 30 
ounces of silver for each enemy head taken in battle.20 As it combined low 
costs with better disciplined troops, this solution proved very practicable; Chi 
Chi-kuang’s troops became the backbone of the Chiang-su and Chê-chiang 
coastal defence forces and he gradually forced the pirates out and drove them 
towards the coastal waters of Fu-chien and Kuang-tung.21         
Table 1-1: The Wo-k’ou raids along the Chinese coast from 1552-1565 
 Chiang-su Chê-chiang Fu-chien Kuang-tung
1552-1557 89 61 14 2
1558-1565 6 7 65 12
 Source: Fan Chung-I; T’ung His-kang, Ming-tai Wo-k'ou shih-lüeh [A brief History of Wo-k’ou 
during the Ming dynasty], (Peiking: Chung-hua Shu-chü, 2004), 140;158 
                                                          
17  Lin Jen-ch’uan, Ming-mo ch’ing-ch’u Ssu-jên hai-shang mao-i[Private Trade 
during the late Ming and Early Ch’ing Dynasty], (Shang-hai: Hua-tung shih-fan ta- 
hsüeh, 1987), 76-7. 
18 Chang, ‘Chinese Maritime Trade’,247-8.Chang Pin-tsun referred to these recruited 
soldiers as ‘volunteers’. He also pointed out their status was different to that of the 
Wei-so soldiers.   
19 Huang, 1587: a year of no significance, 260. 
20 Ibid., 172. 
21 Chang, ‘Chinese Maritime Trade’, 70-1. 
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In the struggle to restore peace along the coast during the continuing 
pirate raids, the Supreme Commanders and Grand Co-ordinators were 
awarded the power to take autonomous command of their armies, this was a 
privilege which had never been granted so frequently in previous times. 
Vested with this authority, they could even issue orders to local commanders 
without having to consult the generals first. They were also put in charge of 
provisioning the army. Since the military colonies had by then dwindled to 
mere skeletons, this measure integrated the troops into the budget of the 
provincial administration.22 To finance the newly recruited local mercenaries, 
the Supreme Commanders and Grand Co-ordinators were also granted rights 
to levy new taxes and spend the resultant sums without the ratification of the 
central court in Peking. These local taxes were not even listed under the 
provincial revenues submitted to the court.23 Such conveniences allowed the 
Supreme Commanders and Grand Co-ordinators to exert unprecedented 
military and financial autonomy at the provincial level. The story below 
reveals that these authorities also played a role in the carrying out of the 
institutional reforms of the Ming maritime policy.    
Even before the Wo-k’ou ’s raids on the Chinese coast began, for a long 
time Yüeh-kang (Moon Harbour) in the estuary of the Chiu-lung River had 
long been a popular lair for smugglers. After the Ming court gradually rebuilt 
the coastal defence force in Chê-chiang and northern Fu-chien, the Japanese 
pirates turned up there once again.24 As they did not have the requisite naval 
                                                          
22 Huang, 1587: a year of no significance, 162; Hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles, 
80. 
23 Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance, 291. 
24  Li Chin-ming, ‘Ming-ch’ao chung-yeh fu-chien chang-chou yüeh-kang te 
hsing-ch’i yü fu-chien tê hai-wai i-min[The Rise of Yüeh-kang in Chang-chou during 
the Middle of Ming Dynasty and Fu-chienese Oversea Immigrants ]’, in: Tang 
Shi-yeoung(ed.), Chung-kuo hai-yang-shih fa-chan lun-wên-chi[Essays in Chinese 
Maritime History], (Taipei: Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences 
Academia Sinica, 2008), Vol. X, 65-100 at 72-6; Chang, ‘Chinese Maritime Trade’, 
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vessels, the Fu-chien officials were not able to eject the smugglers. An essay, 
‘Opinions about Pacification or Appeasement’ written by a local member of 
the gentry, Hsieh Pin, in 1562, mentions that: 
‘The groups which flocked there were no fewer than several tens of thousands, 
and the illicit junks constructed with double masts were no fewer than one or 
two hundreds. They sailed through the turbulent waves as far as Japan and as 
near as Siam and Pahang. They can visit any place. They have robbed 
traders and civilians along the borders for such a long time. When they heard 
that an official force was on its way, they fitted out their junks to carry 
evacuate their families and take refuge on islands like P’eng-hu (the 
Pescadores). They might just linger at some distance from the estuary and 
return after the official forces retreat again.’25       
In the same piece, the writer also suggests that some of the smugglers 
should be recruited into the coastal defence troops and allow them the 
opportunity to become lower-ranking officers. The new recruits should 
register their vessels so as to take turns to be on duty. Junks which were not 
on duty should be allowed to pursue their own business.26 About the same 
time, the Ming court also entered into negotiations with the most notorious 
smugglers in the area, namely: the twenty-four generals of Yüeh-kang,’ who 
had occupied the harbour since 1556. 27  Later in 1564, the Grand 
                                                                                                                             
251-7. 
25 Liang Chao-yang, ’Hai-ch’êng hsien-chih[Local Gazette of Hai-ch'êng District]’, 
in Lin You-nien (et al. comp.), Jih-pên ts’ang chung-kuo han-chien ti-fang-chih 
t’ung-k’an[Rare Chinese Local Gazettes Preserved in Japan], 24 vols, (Peking : 
Shu-mu wên-hsien, 1992), VI, 526. 
26 Liang, ‘Hai-ch’êng hsien-chih’, 527. 
27  Li, ‘Ming-ch’ao chung-yeh fu-chien chang-chou yüeh-kang tê hsing-ch’i yü 
fu-chien tê hai-wai i-min’, 76; Ch’ên Tsung-jên, ‘Wan-ming yüeh-kang k’ai-chin tê 
hsü-shu yü shih-chi’[The Narrative of and the Reality behind the ‘Lifting of the 
Maritime Ban’ in Yüeh-kang during the Late Ming Period], in: Tang Shi-yeoung(ed.), 
Chung-kuo hai-yang-shih fa-chan lun-wên-chi[Essays in Chinese Maritime History], 
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Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, T’an Lun, sent a letter to Emperor Chia-ching, in 
which he requested that the junk traders be permitted to sail and trade in the 
coastal waters on condition they did not sail to Japan: 
‘Now, the solution is that, although the trade with Japan should [continue 
to]be prohibited, the fishing junks, and those used for the rice transport trade, 
for the purchase of [Nan-yang] pepper and sandalwood in Kuang-tung, and 
for the distribution of white sugar from Chang-chou, should be allowed to 
sail in coastal waters on condition that all junks should be registered and 
monitored by each other.’28     
The motivation for legitimizing the traffic in coastal waters was to 
ensure that the coastal defence troops were provided with enough seaworthy 
vessels. At that moment the Fu-chien force was poised to confront the 
Chinese pirate Wu P’ing, who was cruising Fu-chien and Kuang-tung waters 
with a sizeable fleet.29  In 1564, Wu P’ing even successfully occupied 
Hui-chou and Ch’ao-yang with a fleet of 200 junks.30 The troops of the 
Regional Commander of Fu-chien, Ch’i Chi-kuang, were skilled in fighting 
on land, but they did not have the skill to engage the pirates on the water. A 
shortage of sufficient war-junks was the reason the Fu-chienese coastal 
defence troops had failed to capture Wu P’ing after they defeated him at 
Nan-ao in 1565.31 Ch’i Chi-kuang therefore seriously considered enlisting 
                                                                                                                             
(Taipei: Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences Academia Sinica, 2008), 
Vol. X, 101-42 at 122. 
28 T’an Lun, ’Tiao-ch’ên shan-hou wei-chin shih-i i-pei yüen-lüeh i-chih chih-an 
shu’[A Letter regarding to a Long-term Policy after the Battles to Maintain Order and 
Improve Later Coastal Defences]， in: id, T’an-hsiang-min tsou-i[The Official 
Correspondence of Tan Lun], (Peking: Hsien-chuang shu-chü, 2004 ), 24-5, cited 
from Ch’ên, ‘Wan-ming yüeh-kang k'ai-chin tê hsü-shu yü shih-chi’, 120. 
29 Ch’ên, ‘Wan-ming yüeh-kang k’ai-chin tê hsü-shu yü shih-chi’, 133. 
30 Lin, Ming-mo ch’ing-ch'u Ssu-jên hai-shang mao-i, 107. 
31 Ch’ên, ‘Wan-ming yüeh-kang k’ai-chin tê hsü-shu yü shih-chi’, 134. 
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fishing and trading junks from Yüeh-kang to assist his forces.32 In 1567 the 
Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, T’u Tsê-min, actually put this suggestion 
into practice. Trading junks were registered and assigned to different 
localities at which they would act as a support force for the war-junks. They 
were paid from the budget of Chang-chou prefecture. If they actually 
engaged the pirates in skirmishes, the civilian junk traders would also be 
given cash rewards. 33  This arrangement promoted the Yüeh-kang junk 
traders to the formal status of ’privateers’, that is, in an officially sanctioned 
war action, they had the right to use violence. 
The Portuguese merchants in Macao were also incorporated into this 
pattern of privateering. In 1564, when a group of Chinese navy soldiers 
mutinied in Ch’ao-chou, the Portuguese volunteered to assist the Regional 
Commander of Kuang-tung, Yü Ta-you, to put down the rebellion. He 
enlisted 300 Portuguese soldiers and added some of the junks of local 
privateers to his fighting force.34 Four years later in 1568, when the Fu-chien 
Grand Co-ordinator, T’u Tsê-min, had assembled a sufficiently large naval 
force including privateers from Yüeh-kang, Yü Ta-you planned to mount an 
expedition from Fu-chien to Kuang-tung, in a concerted effort to annihilate 
the pirate Ts'êng I-pên, Wu P’ing’s successor.35 In the meantime, Ts’êng 
I-pên attacked Kuang-chou, but was defeated by a joint force of the 
                                                          
32 Ibidem. 
33 Ibid., 126. 
34 Huang Hung-chao,‘ P’u-t’ao-ya-jên chü-liu Ao-mên k’ao-lüeh’[A Brief Study of 
the Beginnings of the Portuguese Settlement in Macao], Wên-hua tsa-chih[Revista de 
Cultura], 66 (2008), 171-180, at 176; Tang K’ai-jian (T’ang K’ai-chien), Zhang Zhao 
(Chang Chao), ‘Ming Chung-hou-ch’i p’u-jên pang-chu ming-ch’ao ch’ao-ch’u 
hai-tao shih-shih tsai-k’ao’[Historical Examination of the Assistance of the 
Portuguese of Macao to the Ming Government in the Eradication of Pirates in the 
Mid- and Late Ming Dynasty], Journal of Hubei University (Philosophy and Social 
science), 32/2(2005), 192-197at 195. 
35 Ch’ên, ‘Wan-ming yüeh-kang k’ai-chin tê hsü-shu yü shih-chi’, 125-6. 
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Portuguese in Macao and local Chinese privateers.36  Ts’êng I-pên was 
eventually defeated in 1569 by Yü Ta-you with his combined fleet from 
Fu-chien and Kuang-tung.37        
Although a few pirates still raided the Chinese coast in later years, 
peace had basically been restored along the Chinese coast. The coastal traffic 
between the different provinces was re-opened. In a ingenious solution, 
privateers were available when needed and tax revenues were obtained to 
support the coastal defence vessels.38 Most sources confirm that, between 
1567 and 1574, the customs revenues from Yüeh-kang/Hai-ch’êng emerged 
as an important source of income which bolstered the Fu-chienese provincial 
budget.39 
One side-effect of the re-organization of the coastal defence troops 
was that a specially designated harbour was opened up to cater for the 
overseas traffic bound for foreign ports, with the exclusion of Japan. Most of 
the overseas destinations were recorded in the ‘Tung-His-Yang K’ao 
(Authenticated Knowledge of Eastern and Western Oceans)’, a work 
compiled by a local scholar Chang Hsieh and published in 1617.40 This book 
provides a bird’s eye view of the commercial map of the Fu-chienese junk 
traders in the East and South China Seas. The destinations were split into two 
groups, namely, the Compass Needle Route of the Western Ocean (his-yang) 
and the Compass Needle Route of the Eastern Ocean (Tung-yang). Leonard 
Blussé has given a brief sketch of this commercial map: 
’The eastern route ran from Mount T’ai-wu in the Bay of Amoy via the 
                                                          
36 Tang, ‘Ming Chung-hou-ch’i p’u-Jên pang-chu ming-ch’ao ch’ao-ch’u hai-tao 
shih-shih tsai-k’ao’, 195. 
37 Lin, Ming-mo ch’ing-ch’u Ssu-jên hai-shang mao-i, 108. 
38 Ch’ên, ‘Wan-ming yüeh-kang k’ai-chin tê hsü-shu yü shih-chi’, 135-9. 
39 Ibidem. 
40  Chang Hsieh, Tung-hsi-yang k’ao [Authenticated Knowledge of Eastern and 
Western Oceans], (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1981), 7. 
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P’eng-hu Archipelago to Luzon, from where it continued all the way to the 
Moluccan islands; while the western route from the same starting point 
followed the western perimeter of the South China Sea, running via Champa, 
Cambodia, Siam, the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra to the north coast of 
Java, from where it branched out to Timor, which in turn was connected with 
the terminus of the Eastern route, the Spice islands. The Eastern trunk route 
contained some 46 branches, most of them situated in the Philippines and the 
Sulu Archipelago, while the Western route had as many as 125 possible 
stop-overs.‘41    
The presence of Portuguese in Macao was tolerated by the Ming court 
during this period, although their residence there was never officially 
authorized and was frequently questioned until the 1620s.42 The Portuguese 
were able to survive in Macao because of their unwavering co-operation with 
the feudal lords of the island of Kyushu in Japan, which made them reliable 
go-betweens in the Sino- Japanese trade, and to the Chinese and Japanese 
smugglers. As Blussé has pointed out: 
‘It is remarkable that the European maritime powers which managed to 
capture a share of the China Sea traffic in this particular period, all adjusted 
themselves to this existing transport situation: they either tried to link up 
their own shipping to the Tung -his yang network or turned the absence of a 
direct Asian navigation link between China and Japan to advantage by 
providing such a link, the Macao-Nagasaki connection being a case in 
point.’43  
Besides the Portuguese who had settled at two terminals along the 
Western route, Malacca and Macao, the Spaniards established their 
                                                          
41 Leonard Blussé, ‘No Boats to China: The Dutch East India Company and the 
Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635-1690’, Modern Asian Studies, 
30/1(1996), 51-76 at 59. 
42 Huang,‘P’u-t’ao-ya-jên chü-liu Ao-mên k’ao-lüeh’, 179. 
43 Blussé, ‘No Boats to China’, 59. 
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headquarters in Asia along the Eastern route in Manila in 1571.44 Because 
the Spaniards could provide the Hai-ch’êng junk traders with silver from 
Peru in Manila, the silks-for-silver trade soon forged a firm link between both 
parties.45 After the last groups of Chinese pirates who had tried to establish 
themselves outside China, either in Taiwan or in the Philippines, were 
annihilated at the end of the 1570s, the Manila trade went ahead by leaps and 
bounds.46 At least after 1589, the Chinese junks returning from Manila 
carried silver pieces-of-eight almost to the exclusion of any other valuable 
goods.47   
Table 1-2: Estimates of Philippine Silver Exports to China, 1586-1615 
Year 








Source: Pierre Chaunu, Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques[The Iberian 
Philippines and Pacific: 16th-18th century] (XVIe,XVIIe,XVIIIe siécles ), (Paris: S.E.V. 




                                                          
44 Ibid., 60. 
45 Von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune, 118-9. 
46 Lin, Ming-mo ch’ing-ch’u Ssu-jên hai-shang mao-i, 108-111. For example, Lin 
Tao-ch’ien tried to set foot in Taiwan and Lin Fêng tried to occupy a site in Luzon. 
47 Chang, Tung-hsi-yang k’ao, 132. The Ming taxation reform of ‘one single whip 
system (I-t’iao-pian-fa)’ had also contributed to this huge demand. The reform was 
introduced into Fu-chien in 1578. Chang, ‘Chinese Maritime Trade’, 222-4.  
INTRODUCTION 
 14 
The maritime mercenaries step onto the stage 
While order was gradually being restored along the Chinese coast in the 
1580s, the domestic strife which had divided Japanese society for almost one 
century also gradually petered out and a real effort to achieve unification was 
made. In 1560s the warlord Oda Nobunaga enjoyed a meteoric rise to power 
and occupied Kyoto, the nominal capital of Japan. By 1568, he was no longer 
satisfied to be merely a supporter of the Muromachi Bakufu but made a 
concerted effort to unify all of Japan under his own sway. When he was 
betrayed and murdered by his subordinates in 1573, the territory under his 
control, about one-third of Japan, fell into the lap of his most trusted ally 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Hideyoshi took up the torch and carried on with Oda’s 
ambitions to unify the country.48 In 1587 he pacified the southernmost island 
of Kyushu and in the following year issued orders to eradicate piracy.49 This 
was the moment at which the movement to subordinate the coast of Japan to 
central authority, the necessary prerequisite for initiating once again formal 
diplomatic negotiations with China, began.  
In the 1580s as Peruvian silver poured into China via the 
Hai-ch’êng-Manila corridor and the Japanese silver stream was channelled to 
Macao through Portuguese hands, the Sino-Japan smuggling trade became 
more risky than the legitimate routes and was a less attractive option for 
Japanese investors.50 However, when he noticed the great potential offered 
by this business, Hideyoshi personally stepped into this lucrative trade in 
                                                          
48 Jansen, The making of Modern Japan, 11-17. 
49 Hall, The Cambridge History of Japan, IV, 68; 264; Iwao Seiichi, Shinpan shuinsen 
bōeki shi no kenkyū [Studies in the History of Trade under the Vermillion-Seal 
Licenses of the Tokugawa Shogunate, Revised and enlarged edition], (Tokyo: 
Yoshikawa kombunkan, 1985), 57; Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic 
Continent: A Study in the History of Japan with Special Reference to her International 
Relations with China, Korea, and Russia, 3 vols, ( Berkeley, University of California 
Press: 1937), I, 124-5. 
50 Iwao, Shinpan shuinsen bōeki shi no kenkyū, 9-10. 
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1589 and became its biggest investor.51 As self-declared ruler of Japan, 
Hideyoshi decided to set about acquiring tribute from neighbouring countries. 
He challenged the traditional manner in which Japanese rulers had 
participated in the Sino-centric tributary system in the past. Hideyoshi’s 
move might have seemed a puzzling one at the time, but his diplomatic 
measures suggest a consistent mindset. He sent a diplomatic embassy to 
Korea in 1587 and with the same purpose in mind dispatched three embassies 
to the viceroy of the Portuguese Estado da India in Goa, the Spanish 
Governor-General in Manila and the King of Ryūkyū in 1591.52 The junks 
carrying the envoys were provided with letters of marque and reprisal 
(henceforth Letter of Marque) to prove their status. On the strength of 
employing these tactics, Hideyoshi obtained an almost monolithic authority 
in regulating all Japanese traders abroad.53   
In an attempt to improve relations the Korean king, Yi Kong, sent a 
envoy to Hideyoshi but he could not agree with Hideyoshi’s ideas of creating 
a Japan-centric tributary system. Upon this rejection, Hideyoshi decided to 
invade Korea and challenge the primacy of Ming China in the region.54 He 
set up a ship-building programme using the most recent technology to 
provide the vessels to carry his troops across the sea strait.55After the first 
invasion in 1592, he expanded the trade with Macao, the Philippines, 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Siam in his search for military supplies like lead and 
saltpetre.56 Japanese navigation was improved immensely by synergizing the 
Portuguese and the Chinese technology. After some 158,000 Japanese troops 
had landed in Pusan, Seoul was seized within two months. A large Ming army 
                                                          
51 Iwao, Shinpan shuinsen bōeki shi no kenkyū, 14-15. 
52 Hall, The Cambridge History of Japan, IV, 68-9; Jansen, The making of Modern 
Japan, 19; Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent, 143-5. 
53 Iwao, Shinpan shuinsen bōeki shi no kenkyū, 49-54. 
54 Hall, The Cambridge History of Japan, IV, 68; 70. 
55 Iwao, Shinpan shuinsen bōeki shi no kenkyū, 24-5. 
56 Ibid., 16-7. 
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was dispatched to succour the Korean king but, after several rounds of battles, 
the three camps entered into long protracted negotiations. Hideyoshi 
proposed a revision of the Sino-centric tributary system and requested a Ming 
princess to be the consort of Japanese emperor, subtly insinuating an equal 
status between China and Japan. The Ming court was not prepared to go 
farther than investing him with the title of the ‘king of Japan’, as it had done 
with Ashikaga Yoshimitsu in 1408. The negotiations were broken off and 
another 140,000 Japanese troops were dispatched to Korea in 1597. 
Eventually, the Korean adventure came to a sudden halt because of the 
unexpected death of Hideyoshi in 1598.57 Since Hideyoshi had not arranged 
his succession, his death created a power vacuum in Japan. The fragile 
balance of power among the daimyos collapsed and a new round of contest 
for power began. The Japanese challenge to the Sino-centric tributary system 
also unobtrusively faded away.  
Although Hideyoshi’s plans had been doomed, not to come to fruition, 
bolstered by strong domestic demand the expansion of Japanese foreign trade 
did not flag. In 1595 a Jesuit father predicted to the Governor-General of 
Philippines, Gomes Perez Dasmarinas, that Chinese silk imports destined for 
Japanese junks in Manila would cause the silk price to drop.58 Although 
official contacts between China and Japan had been terminated completely 
after the Japanese retreated from Korea, the silk-for-silver transit trade 
between Fu-chienese and Japanese merchants in Manila did not falter, 
apparently condoned by the Ming court.59  
 
 
                                                          
57 Hall, The Cambridge History of Japan, IV, 72-3.Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the 
Asiatic Continent, 160-70. 
58 Iwao, Shinpan shuinsen bōeki shi no kenkyū, 12-3. 
59 Ibid., 30; Hsü Kuang-ch'i, ‘Hai-fang Yü-Sso’,213. 
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Table 1-3: Chinese and Japanese junks visiting Manila between 1577 and 
1612 
 
Year 1577 1578 1580 1581 1582 1588 1591 1596 
Chinese junks 9 9 19 9 24 46 21 40 
Japanese junks  1 1 
 
1597 1599 1600 1601 1602 1603 1604 1605 1606 
14 19 25 29 18 16 15 18 26 
2 10 5 4 3 1 6(4) 3(4) 3 
 
1607 1608 1609 1610 1611 1612 
39 39 41 41 21 46
3(4)  3 (2) (2) (1)
Source: Chaunu, ibid., 148-150; Iwao Seiichi, Nanʾyō Nihon-machi no kenkyū, (Tōkyō : 
Iwanami Shoten, 1966 ), 10-11. 
Five years after Hideyoshi’s death, one of his generals, Tokugawa 
Ieyasu , climbed to the summit of power and was appointed Shogun in 1603. 
Throughout the following years, he continued to strengthen the base of his 
new regime and turned Hideyoshi’s aggressive diplomacy into a more 
moderate direction. In 1601, he sent separate letters to the Governor-General 
of Philippines and the Viceroy of Annam, in expressing his goodwill. In 1606, 
Ieyasu also sent a letter to the Siamese king. Formal trade relations were 
established soon after. 60  Ieyasu requested the recipients to protect the 
Japanese junk traders in possession of a licence with his vermillion seal 
(Goshuin [J.] ) and to ban Japanese traders who tried to do business without 
                                                          
60 Iwao, Shuinsen to Nihon-machi, 22-5. 
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it. 61  In the letter to the Governor-General of the Philippines, he also 
promised to punish any Japanese criminals if foreign authorities appealed to 
him to do so.62 Between 1604 and 1607 Ieyasu also issued licences to junks 
sailing to Macao . The visits of these junks indicated that an almost direct 
commercial trade channel to China had been opened.63 
Ieyasu also made efforts to repair the Korean-Japanese relationship. The 
lord of Tsushima, an island situated between Kyushu and the Korean coast, 
exploited his traditional middleman position and sought to renew relations 
with the Korean king. After King Yi Kong had informed the Chinese court of 
the Japanese request to re-establish friendly relations, he sent envoys to visit 
Ieyasu in 1604.64 To prove his sincerity about re-establishing friendship, 
Ieyasu returned 1,300 Korean prisoners-of-war the following year.65 When 
the Chinese court decided to leave this matter in the hands of King Yi Kong, 
in 1607 the latter decided to dispatch a 500-strong embassy to Japan to 
negotiate the restoration of a formal relationship. 66  Because Shogun 
Hidetada,who had succeeded Ieyasu in the meantime, was not willing to 
accept the Sino-centric tributary system as the basis of Japanese-Korean 
relations, a formal relationship was only concluded between the Daimyo of 
Tsushima and the Korean court two years later in 1609. This arrangement 
allowed all further trade between Tsushima and the Korean port of Pusan to 
ignore the tributary issues.67 During the negotiations, envoys from Tsushima 
even suggested the Korean king allow them to send an envoy to China via the 
                                                          
61 Iwao, Shinpan shuinsen bōeki shi no kenkyū, 60-1 
62 Iwao, Shuinsen to Nihon-machi, 22; 28-9; Iwao, Shinpan shuinsen bōeki shi no 
kenkyū, 64. 
63 Iwao, Shuinsen to Nihon-machi, 10. 
64 Toby, State and diplomacy in early modern Japan, 27. 
65 Ibid., 30. 
66 Ibid., 32-34. 
67 Ibid., 38-9. 
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Korea network.68  
Another way of re-opening the negotiations between Japan and China 
was to seek the help of the king of Ryūkyū as an intermediary. The Ryūkyū 
kingdom occupied a firm position in the Sino-centric tributary system. 
Hideyoshi had urged the king of Ryūkyū to pay him tribute, but this request 
was ignored. Tokugawa Hidetada harboured the same ambition and he 
authorized the lord of Satsuma in Kyushu to send an expeditionary force to 
Ryūkyū in 1609 and occupy its capital Naha. The following year the king of 
Ryūkyū was forced to pay tribute to Hidetada in Edo, but he also continued to 
do so as a vassal of the Chinese emperor.69  
When the Tsushima envoys visited Pusan and spoke of the plan to send 
an envoy to China, they were seeking a way to rebuild the formal commercial 
channel with China. Without beating about the bush, they asked for a tally 
trade licence ‘k’an-ho[J.]’ which was normally used by tributary envoys to 
gain admittance to Chinese ports.70 In 1610 a merchant from Nanking, Chou 
Hsing-ju, visited the shogunal capital and suggested to the Japanese 
authorities that they request the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Ch’ên 
Tzu-chên, to issue a tally trade licence. Hidetada ordered Honda Masazumi to 
write an official letter to have this arranged.71 Masazumi mentioned nothing 
about tribute-bearing in this letter, but simply asked for a licence for the tally 
trade. He requested the protection of the Chinese court for Japanese trading 
junks carrying official passes, if they were forced to anchor off the Chinese 
coast to take on essential provisions.72 Before the letter reached Ch’ên 
                                                          
68 Ibid., 39.  
69 Ibid., 45.  
70 Hayashi Fukusai (comp.), Tsūkō ichiran [Overview of All Foreign 
Communications],8 vols, (Tōkyō : Kokusho kankōkai, 1912-1913), V, 340. 
71  Hayashi, Tsūkō ichiran, V, 340-44; Hayashi Razan, Hayashi Razan bunshū 
[Collected Works of Hayashi Razan], 2 vols, (Tōkyō : Perikansha, 1979), I, 130.  
72 Hayashi, Tsūkō ichiran, V, 340-44; Hayashi, Hayashi Razan bunshū, I, 131. 
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Tzu-chên, he was informed that some Fu-chienese junk traders had just 
broken the ban on visiting Japan because the silk price there was double the 
price in Manila.73 He was alarmed. Therefore, even if the letter had been 
delivered to Ch’ên Tzu-chên, he would not have deigned to reply. Both 
Chinese and Japanese sources confirm that more and more Chinese junks 
began to sail secretly to Japan during this period.74  
Meanwhile, the Ming court began to harbour suspicions about whether 
the Japanese were plotting another expansionist move after it was discovered 
that the Japanese were allowed to trade in Pusan and the king of Ryūkyū had 
been captured by the lord of Satsuma in 1612.75 After messages were 
received from Korean court and a Ryūkyū tributary embassy arrived in 
Peking,76 the Ming court correctly surmised that the Tokugawa Bakufu had 
no intention of returning to the fold of the Sino-centric tributary system, but 
was only seeking to establish some sort of trade relationship. The court also 
realized that most of the piracy along the Chinese coast was the work of 
Chinese not Japanese pirates, and hence the Tokugawa Bakufu had nothing to 
do with it. Since the Chinese court refused to adjust its tributary system to 
accommodate the Japanese request for equal relations, its only option was to 
reinforce the coastal defences in case Japanese aggression should happen to 
undergo a resurgence.77 In the following year, in an attempt to undermine the 
smuggling trade the Ming court banned the coastal trade in the provinces of 
                                                          
73  TWYH, Ming shih-lu min-hai kuan-hsi shih-liao[Historical materials about 
Fu-chienese waters selected from the Veritable Records of the Ming]TW no. 296, 
(1971), 103.  
74 Fan Chin-min, ‘Fan-fan fan-tao ssu fang-hsiu’[Foreign Trade Only Stops when the 
Trader Dies], Tung-wu li-shih hsiao-pao[Soochow Journal of History], 18(2007), 
75-112 at 80. 
75 TWYH, Ming shih-lu min-hai kuan-hsi shih-liao, 106.  
76 Hayashi, Tsūkō ichiran, V, 344. 
77 TWYH, Ming shih-lu min-hai kuan-hsi shih-liao, 109-110. 
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Chiang-su and Chê-chiang.78 About the same time, the Japanese inhabitants 
in Macao were expelled by the Kuang-tung authorities.79  
When the Japanese attempts to seek access the Ming court via Korea 
and Ryūkyū misfired, some Japanese junk traders tried to make direct but 
informal contact with the local Chinese authorities. In 1616 Murayama Tōan 
of Nagasaki had plans to establish a base in Taiwan which would serve as a 
transit harbour in the vicinity of China. His flotilla consisting of twelve junks 
ran into a typhoon near Taiwan and was blown onto the coast of China. A 
Fu-chien coastal defence officer, Tung Po-ch’i, was sent to investigate what it 
was doing, but was captured by the Japanese sailors and taken home with 
them to Japan. In 1617 Tung Po-ch’i was brought back to Fu-chien 
accompanied by Japanese envoys carrying a tributary letter ‘Piao/Pau[J.] ’ 
which was an overture towards the opening up of the tally trade. The 
Fu-chien authorities refused to accept the letter because its contents ‘did not 
adhere to the correct style’.80 However, the dialogue between the Japanese 
leader, Akashi Michitōmo, and the Hai-tao (Coastal Defence Circuit), Han 
Chung-yung, is recorded in different sources. The exchange of words shows 
that the Chinese side was concerned about the question of whether the 
Japanese intended to occupy Taiwan. In an attempt to allay their anxieties, 
Michitomo emphasized he was only interested in promoting trade. He also 
expressed the hope that the Fu-chien authorities would at least respect his 
legal status and would not treat him and his crew as pirates. By making this 
first move, he hoped to avoid falling victim to hostile treatment. In reply, Han 
Chung-yung requested the Japanese junk traders give up their idea of 
occupying Taiwan because any such move would cause alarm at the Chinese 
court. Nevertheless, he took the opportunity to imply that the Ming court 
would not consider the transit-trade between Fu-chienese traders and 
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Japanese traders in Manila illegal. To quote his words: ‘ In fact sixteen junks 
have been granted licences to trade annually in Manila. Is it really possible 
that such large amounts of Chinese goods are all consumed by the limited 
population there?’ He also said frankly that the Chinese court would not 
prevent its subjects trading with Japan if they happened to be living abroad. 
To quote his words: ‘For these miserable people living in some faraway 
corners who take the risk of trading in your country, we have relaxed our 
restrictions and tolerate their behaviour’. Since the attitude of the Chinese 
court to the trade was now explicit, Han Chung-yung warned the Japanese 
against occupying Taiwan. Were they to do so, the Chinese court would have 
no choice but ban all silk exports, including the transit trade.81      
In the meantime, the Fu-chien Grand Co-ordinator, Huang 
Ch’êng-hsüan, had been deeply shocked by the Japanese appearance off the 
coast of Fu-chien in 1616, because when the Michitōmo’s flotilla arrived on 
Quemoy no Chinese coastal defence troops were strong enough to confront 
them if necessary.82 In order to remedy the situation, Huang Ch’êng-hsüan 
immediately launched a series of measures to reform the coastal defence 
system.83 He discovered that the Wei-so soldiers were not trained to fight at 
sea: ‘ Some of them turned pale when on board, hiding behind the hull when 
under attack. When they were expected to give assistance, they fled away.’ 
The way to strengthen the coastal defences in the short run was to hire 
maritime mercenaries. He said: ‘ Even soldiers who are hired temporarily are 
stronger than weak soldiers. We should bend the rules and allow the 
mercenaries to join the official troops if they prove to be brave soldiers. 
Incompetent soldiers should be disbanded.’84      
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The newly recruited maritime mercenary force consisted of 300 
soldiers in twelve war- junks. They were enrolled into a flotilla of thirty-two 
war-junks which patrolled the waters between Wu-yü and T’ung-shan and the 
P’eng-hu Archipelago (the Pescadores), 85  precisely the spot where the 
Michitōmo’s ships had anchored in the summer of 1616. Twenty war-junks 
would be anchored off the Pescadores to back up the residential troops on 
land and the other twelve war-junks were to cruise the water between the 
Pescadores and Wu-yü.86 All the clues point to the fact that this maritime 
mercenary force was assigned to this area as a counter-force to prevent the 
Japanese fleet from again anchoring in the same coastal waters.  
A local member of the gentry, Chao Ping-chien, was appointed 
Assistant Squadron Leader to lead the mercenary flotilla. His task was to 
curb the smuggling between the Chinese and Japanese.87 It seems that, 
having been presented this opportunity on a plate, Chao Ping-chien lost no 
time in making himself the boss of a smuggling network, whose members 
included the naval lieutenants in Amoy and on the Pescadores and a 
prominent Chinese smuggler, Lin Chin-wu, hiding out in Taiwan.88 This 
flotilla rapidly grew into the most powerful force the area and harried any 
other junk traders who happened to be passing by. In 1618 when the new 
Grand Co-ordinator, Wang Shih-ch’ang, arrived in Fu-chien, all the 
complaints which had been piling up about Chao Ping-chien were reported to 
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kou-ch’ên’[A Historical Source concerning Taiwan in Chang-hsieh’s “Fei-yün-chu 
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him. Later, when he had obtained further evidence from the interrogation of a 
pirate which brought to light details of Chao Ping-chien’s illicit 
correspondence, he lured Chao Ping-chien to Amoy, where the latter was 
arrested and executed.89 Because Chao Ping-chien had not rebelled outright, 
it is hard to judge whether he had really committed treason. According to a 
letter sent by the Chiang-su-Chê-chiang Regional Commander, Wang 
Liang-hsiang, to the Shogun in 1619, Michitōmo’s claim gained credit at the 
Ming court which loosened up the restrictions set forth in the maritime ban 
and allowed the trading junks to sail abroad again. 90  Perhaps Chao 
Ping-chien was removed from his post only because the Fu-chien authorities 
were convinced that the Japanese had no malicious intentions and hence 
judged that Chao Ping-chien and his mercenary gang had become superfluous, 
even harmful.  
In the middle of the sixteenth century, when Regional Commander 
Ch’i Chi-kuang had recruited and trained mercenary troops to defend the 
Chinese coast against the Wo-k’ou invasions into Chê-chiang on land, and 
Regional Commander, Yü Ta-you had hired the privateers from Hai-ch’êng, 
Japanese vessels were still less well equipped than Chinese junks.91 This 
situation changed after Hideyoshi’s seven-year expedition to Korea. His 
requirements improved Japanese ship-building technology enormously. 
Japanese junks were now constructed as skillfully as their Chinese 
counterparts which they matched in size and weaponry. 92  This is the 
explanation of why Huang Ch’êng-hsüan had to hire maritime mercenaries to 
                                                          
89 Ibid., 77. 
90 Hayashi , Tsūkō ichiran, V, 557. This letter requested the Japanese shogun to arrest 
some pirates raiding the Fu-chien coast. Because the letter was addressed to Shogun, 
the Japanese authorities decided it was not appropriate for them to accept it and hence 
no formal reply was forthcoming. 
91 Huang, 1587:a Year of no significance, 169-70. Yü Ta-you argued that the best 
way to eradicate Japanese pirates was to attack them at sea. 
92 Iwao, Shinpan shuinsen bōeki shi no kenkyū, 24-7. 
CHAPTER ONE 
 25 
be the core force in his proposal, and of why Chao Ping-chien had no 
problem in gaining supremacy over the other coastal troops. Since 1615, 
between one and four Japanese goshuin junks had visited Taiwan every year 
and this pattern continued until 1633.93 After Michitōmo vouchsafed the 
peaceful intentions of his country in 1617, the Fu-chienese authorities 
decided to turn a blind eye to Taiwan as a de facto Sino-Japanese transit 
trading harbour, on condition that the Japanese promised to relinquish their 
plan of settling in Taiwan. Although Chao Ping-chien was removed from his 
post, the positions of the T’ung-shan and Wu-yü, Assistant Squadron Leaders 
in the Pescadores, were still open to the other maritime mercenaries. They 
took over the role of the intermediaries of the Fu-chienese authorities in the 
latters’ attempts to manage the ‘stateless’ space in between the existing 
Chinese and emerging Japanese world orders.94 In this regard, the maritime 
mercenary force in Fu-chienese waters fulfilled a similar function to that of 
Tsushima or Satsuma under the rule of the Japanese Bakufu, with the vital 
difference that it could be more easily removed whenever the Fu-chien 
authorities should happen to change their minds.  
If the Japanese menace had continued, the Fu-chienese authorities 
could have relied more heavily on the newly recruited maritime mercenaries. 
However, this was the last attempt by the Tokugawa Bakufu to seek some 
sort of formal relationship with the Chinese Ming court. After 1617, the 
interest of the Tokugawa Bakufu in obtaining Chinese recognition gradually 
cooled, because the Korean king, Yi Hon, dispatched an embassy of 428 
persons to visit Hidetada to congratulate him on his conquest of Osaka Castle 
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and the further unification of Japan. To the wider audience attending the 
meeting, this embassy signified the triumph of the new Japan-centric 
tributary system, since in reality the Korean king ‘came to pay tribute’ to the 
Japanese shogun, even though the Korean envoys insisted they were not 
doing so.95 This event offered sufficient grounds for the Tokugawa Bakufu to 
legitimize its rule over Japan and occupied by this project, it gradually lost 
most of its desire to pursue further overtures with China.     
When the Dutch East India Company (VOC) dispatched a fleet from 
Batavia to sail to the coast of China to seek permission to open up free trade 
in 1622, the initial move of the Dutch was to attempt to seize Macao from 
Portuguese but after this plan failed they were forced to move to the 
Pescadores. This defeat just happened to coincide with the arrival of another 
group of go-shuin junk traders organized by a Chinese merchant Li-Tan, who 
was based in Hirado, Japan, and his mercenary partner Hsü Hsin-su. They 
were in the process of acquiring a monopoly in the transit trade in the waters 
around Taiwan and the Pescadores. After confrontations with the Ming army 
in 1623, on the advice of Li Tan the Dutch governor, Martinus Sonck, 
retreated to Taiwan in 1624. The conflict between the Dutch and the Ming 
troops provoked the Fu-chien authorities to promulgate another ban on 
overseas Chinese shipping, which suddenly interrupted the Sino- Japanese 
transit trade. Ironically just a year earlier, in 1622, the Grand Co-ordinator of 
Fu-chien had just sent an official letter to the regent (Daikan[J.]) of Nagasaki, 
Suetsugu Heizō, in which he requested Japanese co-operation to arrest 
Japanese pirates. This move seems to hint that China was making overtures to 
Japan. Heizō replied that in that case the Chinese Ming court should send a 
formal envoy as would befit a state-to-state relationship. Heizō expected the 
Chinese court would allow the Japanese junks to visit China, but nothing 
more was mentioned about the tributary system.96   
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King Yi Kong of Korea had consulted with the Ming court about the 
delicate question of whether he should reply to a Japanese invitation to send 
an embassy in 1606, but the Ming court left this decision up to him. The 
Korean court had little choice because it could not afford to risk Japanese 
hostility in the south just at a time the Manchus had begun to attack its 
northern borders.97 Neither China nor Korea was able to keep the Manchus 
at bay in the years which followed. The Manchus inflicted a serious defeat on 
the Ming troops in the battle of Sarhu in 1619 and thereafter began their rapid 
territorial expansion.98 While the Japanese silver exports might have been 
the prime reason for Hideyoshi to invent a Japanese tributary system 
alongside its Sino-centric counterpart, the rise of the Manchus was actually 
the most important reason the Sino- and Japan-centric tributary systems were 
kept apart after 1607. The Japanese silver and the expansion of the Manchus 
were the two elements which created this ‘stateless space’ which remained 
open to Chinese, Japanese and later Dutch traders until 1624, and also deeply 
influenced the later development of the Fu-chienese maritime mercenaries as 
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CHAPTER TWO 
NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627 
Shadow over the Sino-Japanese transit trade in Manila after 1617 
Although they had served for a long time as the backbone of Spanish and 
Portuguese maritime expeditions, after the Spanish king declared an embargo 
against Dutch shipping in 1580 Dutch mariners now set sail into the 
Iberian-dominated waters in Asia and the Caribbean seas under their own flag. 
Two decades later, after intermittent attempts by various companies to gain a 
share in the spice trade of the Indonesian Archipelago, the Dutch authorities 
decided to establish one unified East India Company in order to concentrate 
forces and find a more efficient way to exploit the long-distance trade to Asia. 
In 1602 the Dutch United East India Company (Verenigde Oostindische 
Compagnie, VOC) was granted a charter which allowed it to operate in the 
hemisphere between the Straits of Magellan and the Cape of Good Hope.1  
When the Dutch arrived in the Indonesian Archipelago in the last 
decade of the sixteenth century, their primary goal was to procure spices. 
Once they had arrived in the Moluccan Archipelago, they sought an ally in 
the Sultan of Ternate, the local rival of the Sultan of Tidore who was 
supported by the Portuguese. Because the Portuguese feared that they would 
not be able to ward off the Dutch menace on their own, they called in the 
assistance of the Spaniards in Manila. They considered them natural allies 
because, since 1580, Portuguese and Spain had been ruled by the same 
monarch.2 Not until the spring of 1610, after the Dutch had gained a real 
foothold on Banda and Ternate, did they feel that they could retaliate against 
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this aggression and began to blockade Manila Bay.3 On 22 September 1609, 
while he was sailing with a squadron of four ships from Ternate en route to 
Manila Bay, actually in sight of his goal, François Wittert successfully 
captured twenty-three richly loaded junks which were also making for the bay. 
Just over half a year later, on 25 April 1610, he himself was attacked a 
Spanish fleet of eight ships and totally defeated.4 Since eventually all the 
booty the Dutch had captured was retrieved and returned to its original 
owners, this blockade barely caused a ripple among the Chinese and Japanese 
traders there. However, this defeat embarrassed the Dutch so much they 
returned to consolidate their position in the Moluccas until 1614 when the 
governor of the Moluccas, Laurens Reaal, felt confident enough to strike 
another blow at the Iberian enemy. His attempt was doomed to failure 
because, caught by the turn of the monsoon, his fleet was not able to reach 
Manila Bay.5 As he face this new Dutch threat, the governor of Manila, Don 
Juan de Silva, called for assistance from both Mexico and Goa. His plan was 
to assemble a large force with which to drive the VOC out of the Spice 
Islands once and for all. On 7 February 1616, he sailed at the head of a 
spectacular fleet consisting of ten galleons, three yachts and four galliots 
towards Malacca where he planned to rendez-vous with a relief fleet from 
Goa. Once this large Armada was merged, his first plan was to crush the 
Dutch base in Bantam in Java and, once this had been accomplished, to 
sweep away the remaining Dutch garrisons in the Moluccas.6 On 9 February 
1616, a Dutch fleet under the command of Joris van Spilberghen arrived in 
Philippine waters. Assuming the presence of the large Spanish fleet 
somewhere in the vicinity, before launching an attack, he decided to sail to 
the Moluccas first and gather a bigger fleet, composed of seventeen vessels 
there. Only on 12 October did he find out that about half the original force 
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had been left behind in Manila: namely eight big ships, three big galleons, 
and five to six frigates. When this news was received, the admiral of the 
newly joined fleet, Jan Dirksz Lam, decided to blockade Manila Bay in the 
winter of 1616 and the early spring of 1617. In that period the Dutch captured 
four richly loaded Chinese junks as well as two Japanese junks, but failed to 
capture the Spanish silver galleons from Mexico. Lam sailed his fleet a little 
to the north along the west coast of Luzon, expecting to capture more 
Chinese junks sailing for Manila in March 1617.7 After the fleet had been 
dispersed to intercept the Chinese junks, the Spanish fleet suddenly sailed out 
of Manila Harbour and sank the Dutch admiral’s ship, the Nieuwe Son, and 
burned two more ships in a sea battle on 18 April 1617. The remainder of 
Dutch ships were able to escape and still managed to hold onto the five 
captured Chinese junks. Later, they were able to waylay the Spanish 
vice-admiral’s ship and plunder all its cargo. When the main Spanish fleet 
returned from Malacca, the new governor of Manila, Geronimo de Silva, 
( Don Juan de Silva had passed away in Malacca) immediately dispatched 
seven ships to Ternate to hunt down the Dutch fleet. Unfortunately, this 
escadre ran into a serious gale in October and never reached its destination.8  
The prolonged struggle between the Spaniards and the Dutch cast a 
long shadow over both the Sino-Japanese transit trade and the Sino-American 
trade in the Manila emporium, because many Chinese junks which sailed 
between China and the Spaniards in Manila, in the island of Luzon, with 
goods and provisions were intercepted. It was not long before the Dutch 
expanded the scope of the blockade when Commander Lam gave orders to 
the ships cruising in Macao waters not only to capture Portuguese carracks 
but also to seize any Chinese junks sailing to or back from Manila.9 One of 
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these ships, the Oude Son, captured one big and six small Chinese junks in 
the waters between Macao and Cochin-China in May 1618 and the booty was 
sold in Japan soon afterwards.10  
The Chinese merchants in Hai-ch’êng, who were the principal 
investors in the Manila trade, must have had inklings of this Dutch-Iberian 
strife before 1618. When a local scholar Chang Hsieh published his book 
‘Tung-His-Yang K’ao’ in 1618, he mentioned, ‘in the 45th year of Wan-li 
(1617) [the Dutch] attacked and wantonly plundered Chinese merchants 
outside the ports of Luzon. The ship owners were distressed’.11 In May 1619, 
when the Dutch captured three more big Chinese junks near Manila Bay, they 
were informed that seven of the Chinese junks which visited Manila annually 
had delayed their voyage on account of a Spanish warning.12 In Japan, one of 
the principal Chinese merchants residing in Hirado, Li Tan, requested the 
chief merchant of the English East India company, Richard Cocks, to issue 
him ‘letters of favour’ or passports for his and his friends’ junks which were 
due to sail to Cochin-China and Taiwan. Apparently he secured these 
documents to avoid possible capture by Dutch ships. Eventually in the spring 
of 1618, Cocks issued nine ‘letters of favour’and six English flags.13 
This generous English assistance to Chinese traders in Japan was not 
continued into 1620 because the English and Dutch had signed a common 
resolution in Bantam on 28 April 1620 to form a collegial ‘Council of 
Defence (Raad van Defensie)’. Under its auspices, on 31 May 1620, two 
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Dutch ships and two English ships were dispatched from Bantam to cruise 
the waters between China and Japan. They carried instructions to capture not 
only any Iberian vessels, but also to take any Chinese junks sailing to and 
from Manila they happened to come across.14 As it sailed north, the fleet was 
joined by more ships on the way. By the time it arrived in Hirado, the fleet 
consisted of ten sturdy ships. When it departed to execute its mission in the 
spring of 1621,15 most of the junk skippers decided to not to venture out of 
the harbours of Japan, as Richard Cocks reported, ‘Because the Dutch mean 
of war have closed off their trade, only a few dare to look ahead and make 
any plans.’16 The Hai-ch’êng merchants in China had also been forewarned 
by the Spaniards and postponed the sailing date of their seven richest 
Manila-bound junks in the spring of 1621 to avoid possible losses. Despite all 
these precautions, another five junks were captured by the united 
Dutch-English fleet.17 In sum, the Dutch-Iberian rivalry in the Moluccas 
gradually shifted to Philippine waters and the East and South China Seas. 
Those who suffered most from this conflict were the Chinese junk traders 
who depended on the Sino-Mexican and Sino-Japanese transit trade in 
Manila. Seizing the opening which presented itself when Manila was 
temporarily removed from the list of suitable transit trading harbours, it was 
proposed that the foreign coasts of Cochin-China and Formosa be used as 
replacements. 
Although the Chinese merchants knew the Dutch had been wrestling 
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with the Iberians in the Moluccas for years, they had not expected that they 
would have their fingers burned by the fire too. Since the Chinese court, 
which was increasingly preoccupied with the growing threats posed by the 
Manchus on the northeastern border, could not be possibly intervene, the 
merchants’ only option was to look for other transit ports from which to 
continue their business. As mentioned before, the island of Formosa, a 
‘stateless’ area, was seen as suitable replacement. In 1617-1618, the maritime 
mercenary Chao Ping-chien, who was based in P’eng-hu (the Pescadores 
Archipelago), attempted to set up a monopolistic trade network connecting 
Amoy- P’eng-hu- Taiwan(Formosa) and Japan. Chao’s chief collaborator in 
Taiwan, Lin Chin-wu, was a merchant who had lived among other Chinese 
merchants in Japan. Richard Cocks’ diary records that in 1616 he was asked 
by Li Tan to put up the money to bribe the Chinese authorities through Li 
Tan’s servant ‘Liangowne’.18 It is a matter of recorded history that in 1617 
the captured coastal defence officer from Fu-chien, Tung Po-ch’i, was 
brought back to Fu-chien on a richly loaded Japanese junk by Akashi Michi- 
tōmo. Obviously Li Tan’s investment had something to do with this 
enterprise. Therefore, it can be inferred ‘Liangowne’ should be identified as 
the above-mentioned ‘Lin Chin-wu’. According to a recently discovered 
tomb inscription found in Ikura Harbour in Higo, a Chinese merchant named 
Lin Chün-wu was buried there in 1621. In Southen Fu-chienese dialect, the 
pronunciation of his name is identical to that of Lin Chin-wu, hence Lin 
Chün-wu would be the correct transliteration of the same name.19  
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Even though Chao Ping-chien and his network were destroyed in 
1618, the smuggling transit trade in Taiwan did not suffer the same fate 
because Lin Chün-wu was still alive and active in it. Ironically, after Chao 
Ping-chien was removed by the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Wang 
Shih-ch’ang, in 1618, the same Grand Co-ordinator recruited yet another 
maritime mercenary, Yüan Chin, also of ‘piratical’ origin in 1619. 20 
Obviously, since the Ming court treated Taiwan as a ‘stateless area’, Chinese 
and Japanese merchants-cum-smugglers were free to bring capital and goods 
to the island. By now, the growing numbers of smugglers from the coast of 
Fu-chien who were rushing to the safe haven of Taiwan generated a security 
risk. No authorities had been appointed to settle the disputes between the 
investors and dealers fairly and in no time at all the quarrels among the 
smugglers degenerated into outright piracy. A retired Fu-chien official, Shên 
Yen, perceived this lack of order and discipline as a much more serious 
breach of the peace than were the random acts of piracy,  
‘ Although the pirates are very fierce when they suddenly burst upon 
the scene, they cannot sustain [their attack for] long and are easy to 
eliminate. The real worry is the transit trade in Pei-kang[Taiwan] managed 
by Lin Chin-wu. It is an exact repetition of the Wang Chih incident. Although 
it is impossible to blockade the trade with Japan, it is possible to ban 
smuggling. As long as somebody continues to bring Japanese silver to 
Pei-kang[Taiwan], the smuggling will continue, even were we to put several 
smugglers to death every day. Why? Because it is so profitable.’21  
Because of their known involvement in the smuggling trade, the 
Fu-chienese authorities distrusted the maritime mercenaries they recruited, 
                                                          
20 TWYH, Ming shih-lu min-hai kuan-hsi shih-liao, TW no. 296, (1971) , 125. 
21  Shên Yen, Chih-chih chai-chi, vol.55, 20. recited from Ch'ên Tsung-jên, 
Chi-lung-shan yü Tan-shui-yang: tung-ya hai-yü yü t’ai-wan tsao-ch’i-shih yen-chiu 
(1400-1700) [ Chi-lung Cape and Tan-shui Bay: a study of the early history of Taiwan 
in the East Asian oceanic region], (Taipei: Lien-ching, 2005), 172. 
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but they could find no other solution to combat the rampant piracy. As Shên 
Yen also commented,  
‘Too many people carried their goods to Pei-kang [Taiwan] after they 
had been handed Japanese capital. It is proper neither to arrest nor to recruit 
them. If we push them too hard, they might escape to Japan in the same way 
as [the pirates did] sixty years ago.’22 
On the other hand, without the support of the maritime mercenaries, 
the risk of collecting goods procured with the money already dispensed by 
traders in Japan became too high. In 1618, just after Chao Ping-chien’s death, 
the three junks belonging to Li Tan which returned to Japan from Taiwan 
carried only deerskins and sappanwood, but no Chinese silk,23even though he 
had already handed his capital over to the smugglers who had taken the 
monetary advance and fled away to China: 
‘The Chinese themselves rob each other at sea, thinking to lay all the 
blame on the Dutch and English. However, some of them have been 
intercepted in some provinces in Japan and have paid dearly for it. Other 
Chinese traders dispatched from Nagasaki by their own countrymen to trade 
for silk in Taiwan have been absconding to China with all the money, and 
have left their countrymen in Japan in the lurch.’24  
Without the guarantee of a stable trading channel, after 1621 the 
                                                          
22 Shên Yen, Chih-chih chai-chi, vol.56, 32-3. recited from Ibid., 173. note 86.  
23 Diary of Richard Cocks, II, 53. 12 July 1618. 
24 Ibid., 321. A letter from Richard Cocks to the E. I. Company in London, 13 Dec. 
1620. Here I revised the original text to fit the current English style. The original text 
is.’ The Cheenas themselves robb one another at sea, thinking to lay all the fault on 
the Dutch and English; but some have byn intersepted in some provinces of Japan and 
paid dearly for it. And other China shipping, being sett out of Nangasaque by their 
owne cuntremen to goe for Isla Fermosa (called by them Tacca Sanga) to trade for 
silke, are run away for China with all the money and left their cuntremen in japan in 
the lurch.’ 
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transit trade in Taiwan grew more risky than ever. By chance Li Tan’s brother, 
(Li) Whaw, died in 1619,25 and Lin Chin-wu passed away in 1621. Hence, by 
the spring of 1622, Li Tan was not only recognized by most Chinese 
merchants in Japan as their leader,26 he was also faced with the task of 
organizing a reliable smuggling channel via Taiwan on his own, without 
being able to fall back on the assistance of Lin Chin-wu. The necessity to do 
something about the situation became urgent because, under the pressure of 
the Anglo-Dutch fleet blockading Manila and Cochin-China waters, the 
transit trade in Taiwan augered well under the protection of the vermillion 
passes or Goshuin issued by the Shogun. This assumption was confirmed 
when the Anglo-Dutch fleet captured four Chinese junks and one Portuguese 
ship loaded with silks outside the Manila Bay in 1622. The booty was sold in 
Japan for no less than 262,912:12:5 guilders. The success of the Anglo-Dutch 
fleet represented a tremendous loss to the Japanese and Chinese investors.27 
Possibly Li Tan avoided this loss by fitting out three junks to sail to Taiwan in 
1621.28 At this moment, he must have sensed the unique importance of his 
Taiwan corridor because he urged his Japanese protector, the lord of Hirado, 
Matsuura Takanobu, to secure a Goshuin pass from the bakufu in the summer 
of 1622, so that he would be able to monopolize the Taiwan trade the 
following season.29 
The Dutch presence and the revival of the maritime mercenaries in 1624 
Although the Anglo-Dutch fleet terrorized the Chinese and Japanese junk 
traders and the blockade of Manila cut off supplies to its citizens, the Iberians 
                                                          
25 Ibid., 309. 10 Mar. 1619 
26 Ibidem. 10 Mar. 1619 
27 Sloos, De Nederlanders in de Philippijnsche wateren, 72-3. 
28 Seiichi Iwao, ’Li Tan: Chief of the Chinese Residents at Hirado, Japan in the Last 
Days of the Ming Dynasty, Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko, 
17(1958), 27-83 at 44. 
29 Iwao, ‘Li Tan: Chief of the Chinese Resident at Hirado’, 41-4. 
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still maintained a far richer trade in the pan-Asian region than any the 
Anglo-Dutch alliance could have managed at that moment. Governor-General 
Jan Pieterszoon Coen said that the Iberians circulated about 50 million rials 
in it at a time in which all the VOC could make was a paltry 5 to 600,000 
rials, only 1 per cent of what its hated rivals were hauling in.30 Even if the 
VOC continued to blockade the Iberian harbours and seize booty, it was 
realized that it would not be able to strengthen its position until it gained 
access to the sources of income of its Iberian enemy. Since the bulk of the 
Iberian trade in Manila and Macao relied on the Chinese silk exports, one 
effective strategy it could adopt to achieve this aim was to force the Chinese 
to change trading partners. If the Dutch could push the Portuguese out of 
Macao and take over the export of Chinese goods in their place, the Chinese 
would probably not object, but should they fail to occupy Macao, they would 
have to force the Chinese into co-operation. In the summer of 1622, 
Governor-General Coen put his plan into action. He appointed Commander 
Cornelis Reyersen head a fleet to seize Macao. If this attempt should fail, 
Reyersen would have to change tactics and have to put pressure on the 
Chinese to gain a share of the trade. He chose P’eng-hu (the Pescadores) as 
the foothold from which to initiate his parleys with the Chinese authorities 
while he continued to blockade the Chinese junk traffic to Manila and the 
sailings of Portuguese ships to Japan.   
When Reyersen arrived on P’eng-hu, on 10 August 1622 he sent an 
official letter addressed to the watch officer at the entrance of the bay of 
Amoy, the Defender of Wu-Yü Island, Wang Mêng-hsiung. In this letter he 
requested the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Shang Chou-tso, to grant the 
Dutch Company a trading port where it could trade in silk and silk goods 
with the Chinese. He also asked the Co-ordinator to forbid his subjects to 
trade with the Iberians because they were the enemies of the VOC.31 After 
                                                          
30 Sloos, De Nederlanders in de Philippijnsche wateren, 77. 
31 VOC 1077, Translaet van hetgene wegen de commandeur Cornelis Reijersz. aen de 
NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627 
 38 
his demands were officially refused by Shang Chou-tso on 29 September, 
Reyersen took up arms against China. In the following month he dispatched 
eight ships, under Cornelis van Nieuwenroode, to attack Chinese junks in the 
bay of Amoy. After they had run into heavy weather, only five ships still 
managed to stick together. With their number reduced, they decided not to 
sail to Amoy but raided the roadsteads of Liu-ao and T’ung-shan instead. Not 
until 26 November did they really begin to carry out their mission to seize 
Chinese trading junks and paralyse the coastal commerce.32 When the Dutch 
fleet equipped with more advanced artillery arrived in the roadstead, the 
garrison of Amoy was not able to return fire. Chinese records say that the 
Chinese troops ’ had to borrow some firearms from the junk traders living in 
Amoy before they were able to fight back’.33 On 30 November, with only a 
few casualties, the Dutch invaders retreated to their ships laden with booty .34 
The term of office of the Regional Commander of Fu-chien, Hsü I-min, had 
already expired before the Dutch raid began. Nevertheless, he did his duty 
and led his troops on land, but probably left Fu-chien after the Dutch had 
retreated with their spoils.35 The Regional Deputy-Commander of Fu-chien, 
Chang Chia-ts’ê, then assumed charge while the arrival of the new Regional 
Commander was awaited. He busied himself preparing a large number of fire 
junks to repel any further encounters. In the initial Dutch raids, 
                                                                                                                             
regenten van Chianchieu, in Chinees geschreven is, in het tweede jaer van de 
regieringe van de coninck Tchiencke, de vierde dach van de sevenste 
maendt[Translation of the Letter written from Cornelis Reijerszoon to the Regents of 
Chanchou written in Chinese in the second year of the reign of the T’ien-ch’i Emperor, 
the fourth day of the seventh month(10 Aug. 1622)], Pescadores,7 Aug. 1622, fo. 227r.   
32 Groeneveldt, De Nederlanders in China, 127-8. 
33 Ch’ên Mêng-lei (Comp.), Ku-chin t’u-shu chi-ch’êng [Complete Collection of 
Illustrations and Writings from the Earliest Days to the Present], 10,000vols, (Taipei: 
Han-chên t’u-shu ching-hsiao, 1726), vol. 1110, 5-7.  
34 Ibidem. 
35 Ibidem. It is irrefutably proven that Shu had been the commander in the battles, but 
when he left Fu-chien was not clearly recorded. 
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Nieuwenrode’s squadron had destroyed fifty junks loaded with rice and salt 
and thirty small fishing wankans. One of the coastal defence officers, 
National Squadron Leader, Fang Yü, (Hongsintson[Dutch, hereafter D.], 
Fang Ch’ien-tsung ), alleged that the five Dutch ships had not been issued 
orders by Commander Cornelis Reyersen in the P’eng-hu Islands, but had 
acted on their own rash judgement. He pleaded with the Grand Co-ordinator 
to inform Reyersen about the mutinous behaviour of his subordinates and to 
promise him to dispatch Chinese trading junks to other VOC settlements, if 
he would leave P’eng-hu immediately.36 The Grand Co-ordinator, Shang 
Chou-tso, did indeed write a letter and ordered the Coastal Defence Circuit, 
Ch’êng Tsai-i, to deliver it.37 When the four Dutch ships at anchor near 
Amoy received the intelligence in December38 that a Chinese mandarin who 
was intending to open new negotiations about to come, Merchant Hans van 
Meldert was sent to Amoy, where he was received by the Regional 
Deputy-Commander of Fu-chien, Chang Chia-ts’ê. Chang sought to reach a 
truce which would be valid pending the return of two Chinese envoys who 
were to be sent to Batavia with two trading junks to obtain Governor-General 
Jan Pieterzoon Coen’s orders for the retreat from P’eng-hu.39 Meanwhile, 
Commander Chang promised he would provide sufficient commodities if the 
Dutch were to demolish their fort on the P’eng-hu and retreat to some other 
place.40 He also handed over the Grand Co-ordinator’s letter to Van Meldert, 
                                                          
36 Groeneveldt, De Nederlanders in China, 137. 
37 Ch’ên Mêng-lei, Ku-chin t’u-shu chi-ch’êng, 5-7.When the Dutch arrived, the 
Hai-tao was Kao Ing-long who seems to have left this position when the truce began. 
Therefore, I infer that Ch’êng Tsai-i, who later was accused of taking a Dutch bribe, is 
the correct incumbent in this position. 
38 Groeneveldt, De Nederlanders in China, 134. 
39 Leonard Blussé, ’De Chinese nachtmerrie: Een terugtocht en twee nederlagen’, in: 
Gerrit Knaap and Ger Teitler (eds), De verenigde oost-indische compagnie tussen 
oorlog en diplomatie, (Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 2002), 208-37 at 216-7. 
40 Groeneveldt, De Nederlanders in China, 379. 
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for delivery to Reyersen on the P’eng-hu.41 Upon receipt of it, Reyersen 
decided to meet Grand Co-ordinator, Shang Chou-tso, personally in Fu-chou. 
Four days before Reyersen met Shang Chou-tso, the Deputy- Commander, 
Chang Chia-ts’ê, and a certain Squadron Leader, Fang Yü, came to see 
Reyersen and begged him to tell to the Grand Co-ordinator that he had 
already begun to demolish the fort. In exchange they promised to smuggle as 
much silk as they possibly could to Taiwan for the VOC.42 In his meeting 
with the Grand Co-ordinator on 11 February 1622, Reyersen held his peace 
about the original VOC requests to establish a port from which it could 
conduct monopolistic trade with China and also about the matter of 
demolishing the fort.43  
All the previous battles in October and November 1622 are recorded 
in Chinese sources, including the names of the four Dutch delegates who 
visited the Grand Co-ordinator in February 1623. A Chinese official named 
Fang Yü is mentioned. He can be identified in the Dutch sources as 
‘Hongsintson’.44 When the Japanese merchants kidnapped a coastal defence 
officer, Tung Po-ch’i, in 1616 and took him to Japan, this same Fang Yü had 
proposed to undertake a mission to Japan to bring Tung back.45 In 1617 
when Tung Po-ch’i was brought back to Fu-chien by Japanese merchants, 
Fang Yü served as one of the pilots who guided the Japanese junks to their 
anchorage.46 At the time the maritime mercenary Chao Ping-chien was 
                                                          
41 Ibid., 135, 378 
42 Ibid., 156. 
43 Ibid., 157-158. 
44 Ch’ên Mêng-lei, Ku-chin t’u-shu chi-ch’êng, 5-7. Dutch ‘Hong’ refers to his family 
name, ‘Fang’; and the Dutch ’sintson’ refers to his official title, Ch’in-tsung or 
National Squadron Leader.  
45 Tung Ying-chu, Ch’ung-hsiang-chi hsüan-lu [Selections of the Works of Tung 
Ying-chu], TW, no. 237, 1967, 16. 
46 Huang Ch’êng-hsüan, ‘Appendix: a report to the emperor about the Japanese junks’ 
in: TWYH (ed.), Ming Ching-shih wên-pien hsüan-lu, TW no 289, 1971, 251-60 at 
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accused treason in 1618, he held the position of Squadron Leader at P’eng-hu 
and was also arrested.47 Since he was still active and had been promoted by 
1622, he must have been able to absolve himself and was pardoned, probably 
because he was not a mercenary hired by the Grand Co-ordinator but a 
National Squadron Leader who had acquired his position either by formal 
examination or because it was an inherited rank and therefore an imperial 
appointment.48  
During the truce, on 2 April 1623 a junk commanded by Li Tan sailed 
from Japan to the Taiwanese port of Wan-kang carrying 140,000 rials of 
silver to trade with the Chinese smugglers.49 On 11 April, four smuggling 
junks arrived in Taiwan. When they sailed to the P’eng-hu Islands, two of 
them were arrested by Squadron Leader Fang Yü.50 This incident scared 
away the other smugglers,51 but Li Tan had to ask Dutch protection to 
dispatch small vessels to the Chinese coast in June.52 The VOC force on the 
P’eng-hu was unsuccessful in its bid to acquire any silk goods. Although 
Fang Yü had successfully opposed Li Tan’s smuggling trade, he was not able 
to organize an alternative smuggling channel fast enough to provide the 
Dutch with goods. On 2 June, Grand Co-ordinator Shang Chou-tso found out 
                                                                                                                             
255. 
47  Ch’ên Hsiao-ch’ung, ‘Chang-hsieh “Fei-yün-chu hsü-chi shê-t’ai shih-liao 
kou-ch’ên’,77. 
48 The Squadron Leader who was hired personally by the Grand Co-ordinator was 
called ‘Ming-sê Pa-tsung’ or ’ Sê-tsung ’ abbreviated version. The rank of Squadron 
Leader was acquired either by passing formal exams or was the inherited status’ 
Ch’in-i Pa-tsung’, abbreviated to ‘Ch’in-tsung’. Cf. Chou K’ai, Sha-mên Chih [The 
Gazatte of Amoy] , TW, no. 95 (1961), 80. 
49 Groeneveldt, De Nederlanders in China, 171-2; Iwao, ‘Li Tan: Chief of the 
Chinese Resident’, 52. 
50 Groeneveldt, De Nederlanders in China, 172; Iwao, ‘Li Tan: Chief of the Chinese 
Resident’, 52. 
51 Groeneveldt, De Nederlanders in China, 392. 
52 Ibidem, 176; Iwao, ‘Li Tan: Chief of the Chinese Resident’, 52. 
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that the Dutch had not demolished their fort on P’eng-hu. Meanwhile, as he 
waited about there, Reyersen was losing hope of receiving any formal orders 
from Governor-General Coen to retreat from the archipelago.53 That summer 
the new Grand Co-ordinator, Nan Chü-i, arrived in Fu-chien. 54  He 
announced that both parties had been cheated by Squadron Leader Fang Yü 
and threw him in jail.55 On 23 September 1623, Chang Chia-ts’ê was also 
dismissed for arranging the truce with the Dutch.56 After this happened, 
another Dutch merchant, Christiaan Franckx, was sent to Wu-yü with four 
ships to open a new round of negotiations. When they had been lured to a 
sham reception, this envoy and some of his comrades were ambushed and 
arrested by the Chinese officials.57 On 8 February 1624, the new Regional 
Deputy-Commander of Fu-chien, Yü Tzu-kao, began to transport troops to 
P’eng-hu from the mainland.58 The first camp the Chinese troops built was at 
Ma-kung, facing the Dutch fort across the bay. While they were stationed 
there, the Chinese gradually built up their forces on land and on water.59 
Faced with their vastly superior strength and plagued by the knowedge that 
                                                          
53 Groeneveldt, De Nederlanders in China, 401-2. Bijlage V, Journaal van Reijersen 
[Journal of Reijersen], 26 July 1623.They arrived in Batavia in the spring of 1624, cf. 
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geheel Nederlands India[ Diary kept in Castle Batavia concerning circumstances 
occurring all over the East Indian Area, hereafter Daghregister Batavia], 31 vols., ed. 
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54 TWYH , Ming shih-lu min-hai kuan-hsi shih-liao, 133. 
55 Groeneveldt, De Nederlanders in China, 200. 
56 TWYH , Ming shih-lu min-hai kuan-hsi shih-liao, 133. 
57 Groeneveldt, De Nederlanders in China, 226-30. 
58 Ibid., 278; Blussé, ’De Chinese nachtmerrie: Een terugtocht en twee nederlagen’, 
218-9. 
59 Iwao, ‘Li Tan: Chief of the Chinese Resident’, 55. 
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three of his ships would soon have to leave for Japan, Reyersen’s successor, 
Martinus Sonck, decided to retreat.60 Reviewing what hopes there were for 
the Chinese trade, he could only hope that, through the mediation of Li Tan, 
he could obtain certain promises from Yü Tzu-kao.61 This attempt failed and 
Sonck eventually had to demolish the fort unconditionally and retreat to 
Taiwan on 18 August 1624.62                    
Li Tan, who was seriously in debt because he could not collect from 
the Chinese smugglers, now had a heaven-sent opportunity to visit Amoy to 
act as mediator between the Dutch and Chinese. Meanwhile, a rural officer in 
Chao-an District, Shên T’ieh, discovered that Li Tan was indeed organizing a 
smuggling ring under the following pretext: 
‘Li Tan, the blackguard, is one of the gang of Hsü Hsin-su, an agent 
of Holland. Since his earliest days, Li has been in communication with Japan, 
but has lately been making overtures to the Western barbarians. At present he 
is in Amoy under the pretext of settling his private debts and performing 
religious rites in honour of his ancestors. But the real aim of his visit is 
nothing to do with this at all. I believe his purpose is to purchase prohibited 
raw silk and silk goods to sell them to the Dutch, and to put out feelers about 
the situation for the benefit of the Dutch.’63    
The most important key person whom Li Tan absorbed into this 
network was the Regional Deputy-Commander Yü Tzu-kao. The latter stated 
that he had tried to employ Li Tan as a spy in an attempt to monitor the 
actions of the Dutch in Taiwan: 
‘Li Tan, a man from Ch’üan-chou, has lived in Japan a long time, 
                                                          
60 Groeneveldt, De Nederlanders in China, 279. 
61 Iwao, ‘Li Tan: Chief of the Chinese Resident’, 58. 
62 Groeneveldt, De Nederlanders in China, 282. 
63 Iwao, ‘Li Tan: Chief of the Chinese Residents’, 62. Note. 140. (Iwao’s translation 
slightly revised).  
NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627 
 44 
[and is constantly] cooking up some scheme or other. Hsü Hsin-su, with 
whom Li was on intimate terms, is now in jail. Therefore, we might take Hsü’s 
child hostage, and dispatch Hsü to Li to try to persuade him to return his 
allegiance[to us]’.64   
Just at this time, the local gentry of Fu-chien were endeavouring to 
revive the policy of employing semi-self-financing maritime mercenaries. On 
23 September 1623, an official You Fêng-hsiang, who had been born in 
Fu-chien, proposed that the mercenary posts which guarded the Fu-chiense 
coastal waters should be re-opened in response to the growing threats from 
the sea.65 A proposal written by the Grand Co-ordinator, Nan Chü-i, on 17 
May 1625, mentions that, after Regional Deputy-Commander Yü Tzu-kao 
had returned to Amoy, only two Squadron Leaders, Wang Mêng-hsiung and 
Yeh Ta-ching, should maintain a continuous presence in the army camp on 
the P’eng-hu. If they were to achieve the goal of securing the Pescadores, 
they should contemplate remaining there for another three years. Since they 
had all originally been either mercenaries or Provincial Squadron Leaders 
(Ming-sê Pa-tsung), the condition that National Squadron Leaders (Ch’in-i 
Pa-tsung ) be posted there should be lifted.66 Meanwhile, the Hsü Hsin-su 
who was mentioned above had been recruited by Regional 
Deputy-Commander Yü Tzu-kao as a (Provincial) Squadron Leader,67 whose 
task was to act as the contact person for the silk-smuggling trade with 
                                                          
64 Iwao, ‘Li Tan: Chief of the Chinese Residents’, 63. Note. 142. (Iwao’s translation 
slightly revised).. 
65 TWYH, Ming shih-lu min-hai kuan-hsi shih-liao, 127. 
66 The Ministry of War, ‘T’iao-ch’ên P’êng-hu shan-hou shih-i ts’an-kao (2) [A 
Proposal for Dealing with the Later Stationing of Troops in the Pescadores (2), 
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67 Ts’ao Lu-tai, Ching-hai Chi-lüeh [An Account of the Pacification of Coastal 
Waters], TW, no. 33, (1959), 5. 
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Taiwan.68 Hence, at more or less about the same time, the smuggling route 
which linked Amoy-P’eng-hu-Taiwan and Japan was revived in the same way 
as it had been to counter the challenge mounted by the Japanese merchants in 
1616. Now there was one essential difference. In 1616, the Japanese 
merchants were willing to bypass Formosa (Taiwan) if the commodities for 
the transit trade could be obtained in Cochin-China and Manila, but now the 
VOC was determined to cut off all Chinese traffic with Manila and the 
Macao trade with Japan. If it achieved this goal, it could monopolize all the 
Sino-Japanese trade in Taiwan. This tricky situation meant that the new 
maritime mercenaries had to deal not only with the Chinese tributary system 
and the new tributary system which Japan was in the process of creating, they 
were also required to bridge the gap between the Chinese tributary system 
and the European newcomers. 
 
Captain and reluctant mercenaries 
In April 1623, the States-General and Princes Maurice of Nassau dispatched a 
fleet of eleven ships with orders to sail to Manila Bay via South America. The 
strategy was to intercept Spanish galleons en route from Acapulco to the 
Philippines.69 In the same period, the governor of Formosa, Martinus Sonck, 
was ordered to send an auxiliary fleet from Taiwan to join forces with it in 
Manila Bay. On 12 December 1624, the Council of Taiwan decided to equip a 
squadron to patrol the Bashi Strait in between Luzon and Formosa.70 On the 
                                                          
68 VOC 1093, Resolutie genomen bij den E heer gouv. Martinus Sonck za:[ende sijn 
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same day, Governor Sonck wrote a letter to Governor-General Pieter de 
Carpentier in which he made an interesting suggestion: 
‘Here are some junks belonging to the Captain China (Li Tan) and the Pedro 
China (Yen Ssu-ch’i), whom we would gladly recruit for the Company and 
have them accompany our fleet. The above-mentioned Captain China and 
Pedro China seem to be well disposed to this idea, so we shall keep working 
on it, expecting good results.’71 
Obviously Sonck was hoping for assistance from those junks which 
were anchored in the bay of Taiwan, but not all the members of the Taiwan 
Council agreed with his suggestion. Probably not even Li Tan and Yen 
Ssu-ch’i were sincere in their support. When the scheduled day of departure, 
20 January, arrived the Council had not yet approved his proposal, but Sonck 
must have finally been able to persuade his Council, because on the 25th, it 
agreed to employ the Chinese smugglers:  
‘ Previously in various meetings we have decided that it would be 
both advisable and useful to send some junks crewed by Chinese to Manila 
with our fleet, on the condition that they agree to serve the East India 
Company. Many Chinese are desirous of joining us now. Two junks have been 
fitted out by the Captain China (Li Tan )and one junk by the Pedro China 
(Yen Ssu-ch’i ). It has been decided to dispatch these three junks from here in 
the service of the Company. The sailors will enjoy the same treatment as 
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Companyemployees according to their rank.’72 
Nothing was mentioned about what reward would be given to Li Tan 
and Yen Ssu-ch’i after their junks had accomplished this mission. All that was 
required of them was to agree to hire out their junks and give the crews 
permission to serve the Company. Frankly speaking, it was a brilliant piece of 
calculation to keep the heads of the Chinese smugglers in the bay of Taiwan, 
while most of their manpower was being sent away. With these precious 
junks in their fleet without their owners, the Dutch did not have to be worried 
that Li Tan and Yen Ssu-ch’i might betray them. However, without their 
supervision, who would be suitable to be appointed the temporary leader of 
this mercenary squadron? One qualified person just happened to be at their 
disposal: Cheng Chih-lung alias Nicolas Iquan. 
Cheng Chih-lung was one of the agents who had been employed by Li 
Tan to assist him in distributing capital from Japan to the Chinese coast. 
When Li Tan was liaising between the Chinese army and the VOC, he felt 
obliged to call upon an interpreter because he could not speak Portuguese 
fluently.73 As it so happened, Cheng Chih-lung had been recommended by Li 
Tan to serve the VOC under Cornelis Reyersen as interpreter since the spring 
of 1624.74 Not a great deal is known about Cheng Chih-lung’s early career. 
What is sure is that he had been engaged as a commercial agent in the 
shipping corridor between Macao and Japan and that he had been baptized 
‘Nicolas Iquan’ and had learned Portuguese well.75 Not long before 1621, he 
                                                          
72 VOC 1093, Resolutie genomen bij Martinus Sonck, Taiwan/Pescadores, 25 Jan. 
1625, fos. 347v-348r. 
73 Leonard Blussé, ‘Minnan-jen or Cosmopolitan? The rise of Cheng Chih-lung alias 
Nicolas Iquan’, in EduardB. Vermeer (ed.), Development and decline of Fukien 
province in the 17th and 18th centuries, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990), 245-64 at 254. 
74 Iwao, ‘Li Tan: Chief of the Chinese Residents’, 78. 
75 Charles Ralph Boxer, ‘The Rise and Fall of Nicholas Iquan (Cheng Chilung)’, 
T’ien Hsia Monthly, Apr.-May (1941), 1-39 at 11-5. 
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was living in Hirado in Japan, where he befriended the chief of the Dutch 
factory, Jaques Specx. It is about this time that he might have been recruited 
as an agent by Li Tan.76 When he was dispatched to Taiwan, according to 
some Chinese sources he was also serving Yen Ssu-ch’i. There is good reason 
to believe that Yen Ssu-ch’i is identical to the Pedro China in the Dutch 
sources.77  
There must have been a tacit bargain between the parties. Li Tan and 
the Pedro China made Iquan feign that he was loyal the Dutch governor, but 
the governor neatly turned the tables and used Iquan to erode their influence. 
This drama reached its climax just two days after the fleet had departed, 27 
January 1625. According to the journal kept by the captain of the yacht the 
Victorie, Iquan only managed to man his junks by the skin of his teeth.  
‘Acting on the orders of the Honourable Commander Pieter Muijser, 
we hoisted the sails on the yacht in the roadstead of Taijouan, in order to sail 
out of the harbour towards the [South]Tamsuy River to join the four junks to 
our fleet. Just as we turned towards the south, the Chinese interpreter, Iquan, 
came aboard. He told us the junks would not be able to sail out of the river 
until the highest point of the flood tide at one o’clock in  the morning. We 
had intended to inform the Honourable Commander but, because there was 
no wind, we could do nothing in the river. We anchored there and 
immediately sent a small junk with a short note, to help them come out, … 
…The above-mentioned Iquan came on board again, and said that the 
junks had been found, but he had seen nobody. I asked them why the junks 
had not come out at night. He answered that the tide had not risen high 
enough. Then he asked us if we could wait 2 or 3 hours. Iquan was planning 
to depart with us in the direction of Manila on the smallest junk of the four, 
which had already sailed out. The other three junks would follow as soon as 
                                                          
76 Iwao, ‘Li Tan: Chief of the Chinese Resident’, 72-5. 




…When the appointed moment arrived, we saw no junk, so we abided by our 
decision to move on.’78 
Because the Council had been so late in giving its approval to this 
proposal, it had not been possible to shift the junks from the sandbank at the 
mouth of of the river at the high tide. A check of the calendar shows that the 
best opportunities would have been at full moon on the 23rd. The junks finally 
managed to sail out of the river on 8 February, precisely the highest tide of 
the month.79 The delays seem to be a sure sign that these Chinese volunteer 
mercenaries were not overenthusiastic about the task before them. Neither Li 
Tan nor the Pedro China supported the mission wholeheartedly. This 
assumption seems to be thoroughly confirmed by the fact Iquan reported that 
not a single member of the crew had actually reported for duty on these junks. 
Their absence seems to imply that he did not even have the support of his 
own mercenary soldiers. The fact that Iquan first failed to report personally 
with his small junk is just as mysterious.     
About one month later, the yacht the Victorie, which was originally 
assigned to lead the junks to the fleet caught up with the other ships on 26 
February near Cape Bolinao.80 The next day, two junks led by Iquan also 
                                                          
78 VOC 1087, Cort verhael van de voijagie gedaen met 't jacht Victoria naer de cust 
van Manilha int affweesen van de vloot van 27 Januarij tot 26 Februarij 1625 [The 
Short Log of the Voyage of the Yacht the Victoria’ to the coast near Manila after she 
was separated from the Main Fleet, 27 Jan.-26 Feb. 1625 ], fo. 354r-v. (hereafter cited 
as ‘The Report of the yacht the Victoria’)  
79 VOC 1085, Missive van Martinus Sonck aan de gouverneur-generaal Pieter de 
Carpentier, Taiwan, 19 Feb. 1625, fo. 232r; cf. Chiang (ed.), De Missiven, 174. 
80 VOC 1087, Journael van den tocht gedaen van Taijouan naer de baeij van Manilha 
ende custe van Luconia mette scheepen 't Wapen van Zeelandt, Noorthollant ende 
Orange, mitsgaders de jachten den Haen, Fortuijn en Victoria onder 't 
commandement van Pieter Jansen Muijser van 27 Januarij tot 22 Meij 1625, [Journal 
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joined the fleet. The commander of the fleet, Pieter Muijser, who was then on 
the warship the Wapen van Zeeeland, reported this reunion with 
double-edged, wry humor: 
‘On the 27th of the same month, we spied two sails. Two of the junks 
destined to support us had appeared. The commander, Iquan, came on board 
straightaway accompanied by six or eight warriors, carrying long and short 
swords and halberds, and reported that he had sailed with his three junks 
only six days after the yacht the Victorie had departed. But the crew of the 
third junk had not been willing to sail…81      
…I promised them that, if they need such ammunition as bullets, fuses and 
gunpowder, I would supply them. He had no shortage of food or anything 
else… I ordered him to sail close to our ships, and to remain in the vicinity of 
the fleet, so that we would not become separated. He had no objection to this 
request, but asked whether we could come to anchor close to the shore at the 
night. The reason being that in their judgement, the sea would become too 
rough to hold a position.’ 82  
After the 27th, the two Chinese junks under Iquan’s command did their 
very to deep up with the fleet,83but at night they still anchored their junks 
separately, somewhere close to the shore. Iquan complained to the Dutch 
                                                                                                                             
of the Ships the Wapen van Zeeland, the Noortholland and the Orange and the yachts 
the Haen, the Fortuijn, and the Victoria on their voyage from Taiwan to Manila Bay 
and the coast of Luzon under the command of Pieter Jansen Muijser, 27 Jan.-22 May. 
1635], 22 May.1625, fo. 377r. (Hereafter, ‘Journal of Ship Wapen van Zeeland...’); cf. 
‘ Bijlage III: Journael van den tocht gedaen van Taijouan naer Manila anno 1625 ‘, in 
Dirk Abraham Sloos, De Nederlanders in de Philippijnsche wateren voor 1626[The 
Dutch in Philippine Waters before 1626], (Amsterdam, J.H. de Wit: 1898), 130. 
81 VOC 1087, ‘Journal of the Ship the Wapen van Zeeland’, 22 May. 1625, fo. 377r; 
Sloos, De Nederlanders in de Philippijnsche wateren, 130.  
82 Ibidem, fo. 377r-v. 
83 Sloos, De Nederlanders in de Philippijnsche wateren, 130. 
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commander on the evening of the 27th, but the Dutchman only laughed, 
saying ‘Iquan earlier suggested dropping anchor close to the shore tonight, 
the judgement of a naive sailor’.84   
On the night of the 28th, the Chinese junks still insisted on anchoring 
within sight of the coast. The following day, they were again loath to sail 
away from the shore with the Dutch fleet. On the 2 March, the two junks 
were still keeping their own course along the coastline separate from the 
Dutch fleet. Commander Pieter Muijser decided to take measures to 
discipline this disobedience. He sent Junior Merchant Abraham le Poivre to 
the two Chinese junks, with 50 pounds of gunpowder, 20 pounds of bullets, 
seven muskets and three bundles fuses, so that he could explain to them once 
again what their obligations were.85 
‘I also told him that to steer clear of danger he should bring his junks nearer 
our fleet (they would be the Company employees approaching the enemy 
coast) and that we would not constantly hug the coast, therefore they should 
try to join us on the high seas. On the other hand, if were some accident to 
befall them, they should not blame us but acknowledge it was because of their 
own negligence.’ 86  
The co-operation did not run smoothly. Iquan and his men still refused to sail 
too far from the shore, repeating once and again ‘Haz mucho grande mar’.87  
For five days, notwithstanding their contradictory navigational 
preferences, both parties had been making compromises. The Dutch 
Commander, Pieter Muijser, was never really aware of what Iquan was trying 
                                                          
84 Ibid., 130. 
85 VOC 1087, ‘Journal of Ship Wapen van Seeland’, 22 May. 1625, fo. 377v; Sloos, 
De Nederlanders in de Philippijnsche wateren, 131. 
86 VOC 1087, ‘Journal of Ship Wapen van Seeland’, 22 May. 1625, fo. 377v; Sloos, 
De Nederlanders in de Philippijnshe wateren, 131. 
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NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627 
 52 
to say: ‘Haz mucho grande mar’ could mean ‘ the sea is very rough’ but also 
‘ the sea is very wide’. Iquan knew very well that the Chinese junks 
customarily sailed close to the shore rather than tempting fate on the 
off-shore routes. Hence, if he followed the Dutch fleet on the off-shore routes, 
this might reduce the chances of catching the Chinese junks. However, the 
reefs in the shallow waters near the shore posed a fatal threat to the larger 
Dutch ships. The goal of this fleet was to harass the Spanish naval force 
assembled in the vicinity of the bay of Manila and to welcome the fleet 
dispatched by the States-General which had sailed in from the Pacific Ocean. 
Neither of these two aims were of much use to Iquan’s team. Li Tan and the 
Pedro China would certainly expect rewards from Iquan for furnishing the 
junks, fitting them out and provisioning them. This sense of obligation was 
almost certainly the reason Iquan was so eager to lay his hands on booty, with 
or without the assistance of the Dutch fleet.     
To remedy this situation, a semi-independent maritime mercenary team 
under Iquan’s command supplied with Dutch military apparatus and flags 
was established. It was a temporary arrangement devised to acquire enough 
booty to satisfy every participant in this business. And this is exactly what 
happened. Two Chinese junks carried an ample horde of booty when they 
returned on 19 March 1625.    
‘The two Chinese junks brought 2,400 rials in silver and 3 piculs 40 
catties of raw silk, which were plundered from various Chinese and 
Portuguese vessels in waters near Pangasilan, according to the commanders 
of above-mentioned junks. These junks and their crews were hired to serve 
the Company and should have been supplied with the same victuals and 
beverages as the Company’ employees were. These junks have now 
(according to them) left the fleet with the consent of the Commander Muijser, 
because they were afraid that, once the Spanish galleons sailed out, their 
mission would be over… As for their voyage home, they had received no 
provisions at all, including their wages and other expenses incurred by the 
junks, weaponry and ammunition, in view of their performance we decided to 
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grant them 1,500 rials instantly, without waiting for ratification by 
Commander Muijser and to permit them to distribute it among their officers 
and seamen. If we pay the salaries and the fitting out and some other costs 
incurred by the commanders of above-mentioned junks, they will not be able 
to make any further claim (on booty).88             
This privateering construction, although initially it was only a 
temporary arrangement between the Chinese smugglers and the Dutch 
governor in Taiwan Bay, gradually evolved into a steady co-operation, since 
the elimination of the Sino-Manila trade benefited both parties. Under this 
construction, Iquan did not serve the Company on an individual basis, but as 
a leader of a team. His role as contact person on both sides was a precious 
opportunity for him to gain status without offending his bosses.89 At the end 
of this year, coincidentally Li Tan and the Pedro China died at almost the 
same time, which left Iquan in the role of the potential leader of all their 
followers residing in the area of the bay of Taiwan. From that moment, the 
Taiwan governor began to single him out quite markedly, which might be 
construed as a mark of respect. 
 ‘Iquan, who once served as interpreter for Commander Reyersen is 
                                                          
88 VOC 1093, Resolutie genomen bij Martinus Sonck, Taiwan/Pescadores, 20 Mar, 
1625, fo. 349r-v.  
89 This ties in neatly with the hypothesis put forward by Leonard Blussé that Iquan is 
the ‘third person’ who’ achieved a position of his own, beyond the control of both of 
the parties who had originally intended to manipulate him.’ Cf. Blussé, Leonard, ‘ The 
VOC as Sorcerer’s Apprentice: Stereotypes and Social Engineering on the China 
Coast’, in Wilt Lukas Idema (ed.), Leyden Studies in Sinology: Papers Presented at 
the Conference held in Celebration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Sinological 
Institute of Leyden University, December 8-12, 1980, (Lieden: E.J. Brill, 1981), 
87-105 at 104-5. However, I believe that Chinese smugglers would not have been 
called upon to support Cheng Chih-lung at the beginning of his operations. If this is so, 
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rid of him.  
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expected to arrive here soon with some twenty to thirty junks. These junks 
have raided those Chinese in the north who refused to pay a contribution and 
those Chinese who are the enemies of the people from Satsuma (Satzuma 
[J.]). As soon as they arrive, we should call a halt to their robbery, because 
they sailed in the name of the Company under the Prince’s flag and 
pennants.’90 
Although this letter reveals that the next governor of Formosa, Gerrit 
Frederikzoon de Wit, intended to cease this co-operation before it spun out of 
control, he went ahead and asked Iquan to suppress the Chinese pirates, but 
Iquan was not given enough power to be able to accomplish this mission. He 
arrived somewhat later on a big junk which had sprung a leak and divided his 
booty under the terms of the contract concluded with the Company.91 
Whatever the real truth of the matter, Iquan was the only person among the 
pirates and mercenaries on whom the Company could rely. 
Crossing the Rubicon 
In June of 1626, Iquan appeared before the Taiwan Council from which he 
requested letters which would allow him attempts to coax his ‘associate 
pirates’ or ‘piratical associates’ to live under Dutch rule in the bay of 
Taiwan,92because the reason behind this move was that the authorities in 
Zeelandia Castle wrongly believed that the agreement with the Fu-chien 
authorities had been sealed and expected that it would not be long before the 
Chinese junks would arrive to sell their promised commodities. In 
preparation for this consummation, the roadstead should be kept safe at all 
                                                          
90 VOC 1087, Missive van Gerrit Fredericksen de Witt aan de gouverneur-generaal 
Pieter de Carpentier, Taiwan, 29 Oct.1625, fo. 394v; cf. Chiang (ed.), De Missiven, 
216.  
91 VOC 1090, Missive from Gerard Frederiksz de With to Batavia, 4 Mar. 1626, fo. 
179r; Chiang (ed.), De Missiven, 234. 
92 VOC1093, Resolutie genomen bij de gouverneur Martinus Sonck, Taiwan/ 
Pescadores, 9 Jun.1626, fo. 370r. 
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costs. To be able to distinguish friendly from hostile Chinese junks, they 
needed the services of Iquan to inveigle any outlaws residing in the vicinity 
to reveal their true colours. The late governor of Taiwan, Martinus Sonck, 
had conceived a utopian dream: he wanted to create a free harbour, where 
Dutch, Chinese, Japanese, and Aborigines could live and trade together 
peacefully. He invited all Chinese residents to move to a new settlement in 
the island of Formosa, but his plans were thrown into disarray when the new 
town was devastated by a plague epidemic which spared no one.93 After its 
depredations, this whole settlement had to be abandoned.94  
In the following spring, the Dutch Council in Taiwan again dispatched 
its Chinese maritime mercenaries to intercept Chinese junks sailing to and 
from Manila.95 This time, the leader was not Iquan but one of his followers 
named Suntien. On 24 June, Suntien returned to Taiwan with captured 
cargoes of porcelain and a letter from Iquan, who was then residing on 
Nan-ao Island with a ‘large group of followers’. Iquan asked the Dutch 
governor to grant him a pass so that he might bring his force to the Bay of 
Taiwan. He also asked Suntien be sent back to join him and his force, 
because the best moment to intercept Chinese junks returning from Manila 
was approaching.96  
During the monsoon season of 1627, forty-three junks made legitimate 
voyages to the Philippines, the Cochin-China Peninsula, the Malay Peninsula 
and other destinations in the South China Sea. By the end of the season, only 
                                                          
93 VOC 1093, Resolutie genomen bij de commandeur Gerit Fredericksz de Wit ende 
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NICOLAES IQUAN BEFORE 1627 
 56 
twenty-three junks returned. The losses, including cash and commodities, 
were estimated at several million taels.97 The junks which did not return had 
definitely fallen victim to Dutch-sponsored privateers. Although it is not 
clearly expounded in the Dutch archival papers, Iquan’s plan was strikingly 
similar to the Dutch project put forward in 1625. On 22 May 1625, after the 
operations around Luzon had been completed, the Dutch fleet dispatched part 
of its force to the waters around Nan-ao Island off the southeastern coast of 
China. Their mission was to intercept any vessel trading with Iberian 
settlements: 
‘If you encounter any Chinese junk from Manila or Macao in the vicinity of 
Nan-ao Island, you should arrest it and confiscate its goods.98    
If any Chinese junk is intending to sail to Siam, Cambodia, Patani or other 
friendly places, you should allow it to pass without harassment.  
On the other hand, you should confiscate those coming from Macao or 
intending to sail to Malacca or any other hostile place.’99 
Furthermore, a rumour was spreading about a Chinese privateer who 
                                                          
97 Chu Ch’in-hsiang, ‘Ping-pu t’i-hsing ping-k’ê ch’ao-ch’u fu-chien hsün-fu chu 
t’i-kao[The Report by the Grand Co-ordinator Chu Ch’ing-hsiang Extracted from the 
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was conspiring to attack Macao: 
‘Lately we have received some news from Chinese junks, reporting that the 
Portuguese in Macao had been told that the Chinese freebooters (vrijbuijters) 
on the coast of China have made a contract with Chinese who live in or 
around Macao to take it over with their and Dutch assistance. Therefore, the 
Portuguese have expelled all Chinese from there, which has offended the 
Chinese officials in Kungtung province, so they no longer allow any food to 
be brought to Macao. This has resulted in a serious shortage of all things.’ 
100     
Quite probably one of these ‘Chinese freebooters’ was Iquan, because 
at that moment he was the only person who really maintained very friendly 
ties with the Dutch authorities in Taiwan while he waited off Nan-ao Island 
where he was gathering vessels. Among the twenty-three junks which 
returned safely were ten vessels which did not sail on Fu-chien’s harbours but 
frequented ports on the Kuang-tung coast. Fu-chienese trading junks which 
sailed into Kuang-tung harbours committed a serious violation of the 
regulations of the Chinese Empire. As it was possible that these junks had 
returned from pro-Dutch destinations (Siam, Patani, Cambodia), Iquan left 
them unharmed according to his instructions, but he did everything in his 
power to keep them away from the Fu-chien coast.  
    When Iquan sent a delegation of his followers on Nan-ao Island to the 
governor of Taiwan, Gerrit Frederikz de Wit, mentioned above, he was 
looking for a new home where his people would be welcome. He needed a 
home-base so that he could set about accumulating his capital, in other words, 
a place to store his money and his booty. His people needed a place to live 
through the winter, and this matter had to be settled before the north monsoon 
began in autumn. He was probably pondering his next step. At this juncture, 
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Pieter de Carpentier, Firando,1 Oct. 1627, fo. 358v. 
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he was involved in a new situation. According to a letter sent by the T’ung-an 
District Magistrate, Ts’ao Lu-tai, a famine was about to engulf Fu-chien 
Province: 
 ‘On account of the droughts, the harvest reaped in the spring of 1626 
consisted of only half the normal amount of grain (in the fields of T’ung-an 
District). The following summer and autumn, the drought intensified in 
severity and the paddy fields were totally empty. Not until the spring of this 
year, 1627, did a drop of rain fall. In the countryside, people have consumed 
all the roots and skins of any plants.’101         
The failure of a rice harvest was never an unusual event for the 
Fu-chienese people who lived around Chang-chou and Ch’üan-chou 
prefectures (the Min-nan area). Whenever this disaster struck, they had used 
to purchase rice from neighbouring Ch’ao-chou prefecture in Kuang-tung 
province.102 Therefore, when the first symptoms of a famine appeared in the 
spring of 1626, the Amoy Regional Commander, Yü Tze-kao, dispatched 
some junks to Kuang-tung province to purchase rice.103 Apparently, this 
                                                          
101 Ts’ao Lu-tai, Ching-hai Chi-lüeh, TW no. 33, 3.  
102 Wang Shih-mao,’ Min pu shu’[A Description of the Min Area], in: Ch’ê Chi-hsin 
(ed.), Chung-hua yeh-shih[Unofficial Histories of China], 16 vols, (Chi-nan: 
T’ai-shan publisher, 2000), II, 1911. ’There are no wells on the hills around 
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Chang, ‘Chinese Maritime Trade’, 155-60. 
103 VOC 1090, Missive van Gerrit Fredericksen de Wit uijt het jacht Erasmus aen den 
gouverneur generael , Chiu-lung River , 4 Mar. 1626, fo. 176 v; also in: Chiang (ed.), 
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from Kuang-tung to Chang-chou after purchasing rice.’ Cf. The Minister of War, Yen 
CHAPTER TWO 
 59 
imported rice was not sufficient to relieve the needs of the Ch’üan-chou 
people, especially those living in the non-urban areas: the T’ung-an District. 
In fact, when the famine devastated the countryside as the summer of 1626 
drew to its end, a retired high-ranking official, Ts’ai Hsien-ch’ên, who had 
served at the Nanking court for about thirteen years, sent a petition to the 
District Magistrate of Chieh-yang in Ch’ao-chou prefecture, asking him to 
supply the T’ung-an people with rice. In this letter he implied that the new 
Superme Commander of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi, Shang Chou-tso, had 
given the T’ung-an people a special dispensation to purchase rice, despite the 
current prohibition put on its sale by the Kuang-tung authorities.104 Since 
Shang Chou-tso left his post in Kuang-tung soon afterwards, this petition 
must not have had any effect. Another high-ranking official who had served 
at the Peking court and was taking a rest in Fu-chou accused the Fu-chien 
Grand Co-ordinator, Chu Ch’in-hsiang, of having issued a rice-ban in the 
summer of 1627, a policy which punished not the pirates but the people in 
T’ung-an.105 When the Chu’s successor, Chu I-fêng, consulted him on the 
                                                                                                                             
Ming T’ai,’Wei min-chiang pu-k’ê pu-ch’ü, min-fu pu-k’ê pu-liu têng shih on13 Mar. 
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104  Ts’ai Hsien-ch’ên, Ch’ing-pai t’ang gao[The Compilation of Works in the 
Ch’ing-pai Mansion], (Chin-mên: county government of Chin-mên, 1999), 859-860; 
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105  Tung Ying-chu, Ch’ung-hsiang-chi hsüan-lu[Selections of Tung Ying-chu’s 
Works], TW, no. 237, (1959), 69 ‘The previous Grand Co-ordinator did not 
understand the way the pirates behaved. He ordered all junks be prohibited from 
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best way to eradicate the pirates, he replied, ‘Hearing that in Chang-chou and 
Ch’üan-chou, people can now sell their daughter for only several tou of rice, I 
realize that people will be forced to commit robbery. The only solution is to 
lift the rice ban. If you do not do it now, later there will be a heavy price to 
pay for this damaging policy.’106     
     In these two years, it was very strange that only Ch’üan-chou 
prefecture, in T’ung-an District in particular, was afflicted by this famine. 
Why was there was no help forthcoming from Chang-chou or any special 
expedition to provide the starving people with rice? What is the explanation 
of the fact that that even when the local gentry of Ch’üan-chou tried to use 
their influence with their relatives and old friends at the emperor’s court, the 
Fu-chien authorities still adhered so stubbornly to this ill-informed policy? 
The explanation is very simple: Regional Commander Yü Tze-kao was 
exploiting this situation to make money from the rice trade, because he and 
he alone possessed the right to dispatch his junks to purchase rice under the 
pretext of collecting food supplies for his soldiers. In a letter of censure 
written by one high-ranking minister of the emperor enumerating the 
mistakes that Yü Tze-kao had made, the former raised accusations about this 
trade. 
‘How desperate the people in Min-nan were! The junk trade with Kuang-tung 
                                                                                                                             
only about 100 vessels had been under Chêng Chih-lung (Iquan)’s command. After 
the rice ban was issued, the vessels under his authority increased to 1000.’ In the other 
essay he mentions: ’When Cheng Chilung began his career, he had only a few dozen 
vessels. In 1626, the number had increased to 120 vessels. In 1627, it reached to 700 
vessels.’ Tung, Ch'ung-hsiang-chi hsüan-lu, 43. This record also proves that the rice 
ban must have been proclaimed by Grand Co-ordinator Chu Ch’in-hsiang in the 
summer of 1627. 
106 Tung, Ch’ung-hsiang-chi hsüan-lu, 38. A tou is a unit of dry measure. Each tou is 
equal to one-tenth of a tan. One tan equals about 107.4 litre, hence one tou equals 
10.74 litres. Cf. Ray Huang, Taxation in sixteenth-century Ming China, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University press, 1974),p. xiv. 
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had been disrupted. Moreover, when the harvest is poor the rice price jumps. 
The common people were starving, the situation was life-threatening. Yü 
Tze-kao dispatched some official junks to purchase grain, officially to collect 
supplies for the soldiers, but the actual upshot was that the grain was lost 
into the pirates’ hands.’107   
In short, while Iquan was intercepting the Chinese junks around Nan-ao 
Island in fulfillment of his contract with the Dutch, growing numbers of 
people were being forced to flee from their home town (which was also 
Iquan’s native place) in order to survive. However, the famine did not hold 
sway in T’ung-an District because Iquan was intercepting the rice junks at the 
behest of the Dutch, it was the rice-ban itself which lay at the root of the 
famine. Iquan could offer the refugees temporary shelter on Nan-ao Island, 
just as Dutch had housed him and his men in Taiwan, but the real solution 
was to lift this ‘rice ban’ before it was too late. This was the decision Iquan 
finally made after July of 1627.  
                                                          
107 Chiang Jih-shêng, T'ai-wan wai-chi [An Unofficial History of Taiwan], (Taipei: 
Shih-chieh shu-chü, 1704/1985), 32. ‘Kung-k’ê kei shih chung Yen Chi-tsu ts’an 
yü-tzu-kao shu [Charge Laid by the Palace Steward at the Office of the Scrutiny of 
Work, Yen Chi-tsu, against Commander Yü Tzu-kao].’ Although the document quoted 
is missing, it is mentioned in other official document and hence is reliable. Cf. Li 
Lu-shêng,‘ Wei min-k’ou ch’ang-chüeh min-shêng tung-yao têng-shih 29 Mar. 
1628[ Suggestions in Response to the Rampant Piracy in Fu-chien and the Unstable 
Local Government]’, in T'ai-wan shih-liao pien-chi wei-yüen-hui [Editorial 
Committee of Taiwan Historical Material] (here after cited as TWSL)(ed.), 
Ming-ch’ing t’ai-wan tang-an hui-pien[Compliation of Historical Documents of the 
Ming and Ch’ing Dynasties], 110 vols, (Taipei, Yüen-liu Publisher: 2004), I 
1621-1644, 304. The same quoted paragraph is also identical to another letter written 
by the Ministry of War. Cf. Yen Ming-t’ai, ‘Wei pei-ch’ên min-shêng kuan-yüen 
ch’ü-liu ping hai-shang ch’ing-hsing shih, 17 Mar. 1628 [Opinions about Whether or 
Not the Present Authorities in Fu-chien Should Step Down]’, in TWSL (ed.), 
Ming-ch’ing t’ai-wan tang-an hui-pien, I 1621-1644, 295.      
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On the first day of July 1627, Iquan defeated the Fu-chien naval force 
by surprising some ninety war-junks in the port of T’ung-shan (an Island 
nearby Nan-ao). It was the first time he used aggression on purpose against 
the naval force of Chinese empire.108 Flushed with his success, he attacked 
Amoy and destroyed the remaining thirty war-junks, spreading proclamations 
everywhere to announce that his only quarrel was with Commander Yü 
Tzu-kao and his followers. Since he did not kill any civilians during this raid, 
it would seem that his goal was indeed to eliminate the naval force so that 
‘the rice ban’ could be lifted. In the aftermath of this raid, it was easier for his 
adherents in his home town to sail to Kuang-tung to purchase rice.109 
However, since he had not brought all his followers to seek shelter in Taiwan 
Bay and had had the temerity to attack the imperial navy, he had crossed the 
Rubicon: he had passed the point of no return. What had forced him into this 
predicament? The long and short of it is that the Dutch turned out not to be 
such reliable friends the moment the Chinese officials offered them free 
trading rights to lure them into a conspiracy against Iquan.     
Farewell, Dutch Brother 
After Iquan had eliminated the war-junks, it was only natural that the starving 
                                                          
108 The Minister of War, Wang, ‘T'i wei-hai-k’ou P’i-Ch’ang Kuan-ping Nao-pai 
Chin-chü-shih ch’ih-pao ch’a-ts’an shih-shih kuan-yüen-shih [Because the pirates are 
still rampant and the official troops are defeated, we should certainly report the 
officials who failed to keep their duty and punish them, 13 Aug. 1627], Ming-ch’ing 
Kung-ts’ang t’ai-wan tang-an hui-pien, Vol. 3, 10-41 at11-5. Iquan had once attacked 
the T’ung-shan fort and skirmished with Coastal defense fleet around Amoy bay from 
7 April to 2 May 1627. With these actions Iquan claimed that he desired only to seek 
revenge on some of his rival pirates and that he was not seeking to pick up a fight 
with the official troops.   
109 Ts’ao, Ching-hai Chi-lüeh, 3; Chou Ch’ang-chin , ‘Ping-pu t’i-hsing ping-k’ê 
ch’ao- ch’u chiang-his-tao Chien-Ch’a yü-shih chou-ch’ang-chin t’i-kao 10 May 1628 
[Report of Province Chiang-his’ Investigating Censor Extracted from Scrutiny of 
Work]’, in TWYH (ed.), Chêng-shih shih-liao ch’u-pien, 8-9.   
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people who had sailed their junks to Kuang-tung thronged to him. As more 
people from his home town came to join him, he eventually managed to 
gather a fleet of 400 vessels and several tens of thousands of refugees. Late in 
the autumn, this force plundered some coastal settlements in Kuang-tung in a 
quest for rice, after which they returned to southern Fu-chien province to seek 
a shelter from the worst of the winter weather. In the middle of October, the 
Commander of the Fu-chien Naval Force, Yü Tzu-kao informed Governor 
Gerrit Fredericksz de Wit of Formosa that, if he were prepared to help him to 
root out Iquan and his followers, such an action would greatly benefit the 
chance of the Dutch to be granted ‘the legal trade’.110 Considering that the 
ultimate goal was to obtain the legal rights to trade with China, Governor De 
Wit agreed to join forces with the re-organized Fu-chien naval fleet in 
November but, buttering his bread on both sides, he also devised another 
proposal to put before Iquan. He offered the latter the opportunity to emigrate 
to Batavia with his followers. 
‘For this purpose this very day we shall dispatch a junk with a pass and 
letters, (in accordance with his latest letter and his request we received 
yesterday) telling Iquan that he can sail to Batavia with all his people. If he, 
Iquan, and his people are not willing to go, we shall try to afflict as much 
damage as much as possible on them with our present force namely: the 
yachts De Vrede, the Erasmus, De Haen, the Slooten and the Cleen Heusden 
and another five junks which are under our direction.’111 
Apparently Iquan did not accept this offer. It was likely that for him the 
                                                          
110 VOC 1093, Resolutie genomen bij de commandeur Gerit Fredericksz de Wit ende 
raed, Taiwan, 12 Oct. 1627, fos. 387 v-8 r.  
111 VOC 1093, Resolutie genomen bij de commandeur Gerit Fredericksz de Wit ende 
raed in’t jacht Erasmus leggende ter rede voor Aijmoij inder revier in Chincheu 
[Resolution issued by Commander Gerit Fredericksz de Wit and Council on the yacht 
the Erasmus in the roadstead of Amoy in the Chiu-lung River ], Chiu-lung River , 6 
Nov. 1627, fos. 389 v-90 r.  
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time had come to consider if now was the right moment to seek shelter in his 
home town, since most of his own people supported him. If he could make a 
contract with the Dutch for a lasting co-operation, why could he not request 
the Ch’üan-chou gentry to find an easy solution for him? After all, were they 
not united in their hatred of Regional Commander Yü Tze-kao?  
As a matter of fact, the Dutch sent only three yachts and three junks to 
attack Iquan in Beeren Bay on the night of 16 November.112 The Dutch were 
actually rather loath to fight Iquan and his followers and still tried to use 
persuasion: 
‘Regarding our negotiations with Iquan last night, that same night we 
terminated our brotherhood and friendship and made preparations for war, 
as we lay at anchor outside Beeren Bay where Iquan and his followers were 
anchored. He sent some fire- junks towards our yachts and junks, so we had 
to abandon our blockade and give them free passage. Thereupon the pirate 
sailed to the north with all his people (we thought they were heading for 
Chang-chou). They will cause huge damage there’.113  
It seems that neither De Wit nor Iquan was anxious to fight each other, 
but the local gentry were convinced that Iquan had defeated the Dutch in a 
sea battle.114 Certainly, Commander Yü Tze-kao’s alliance with the erstwhile 
pirates had originally not been welcomed by the gentry and his dependence 
on the Dutch force made his reputation even worse. As a result, by the end of 
                                                          
112 General missive, 6 Jan. 1628, in Cheng Shao-gang,’ De VOC en Formosa 
1624-1662’, II, ( Diss., Leiden University, 1995), 69. Beeren Bay is Ta-hsing, see 
picture 1. 
113 VOC 1093, Resolutie genomen bij de commandeur Gerit Fredericksz de Wit ende 
raed int jacht Erasmus leggende ter reede in Haerlemsbaij op de custe van China 
[Resolution Issued by Commander Gerit Fredericksz de Wit and Council on the yacht 
the Erasmus in the roadstead of P’ing-hai Bay on the Coast of China], P’ing-hai bay 
18 Nov. 1627, fo. 390 r.  
114 Ts’ao, Ching-hai Chi-lüeh, 22. 
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the year he had dug his own grave. In stark comparison with Commander Yü 
Tze-kao’s cowardly behaviour, Iquan’s conduct won him the affection of the 
people in his home town. He was now seen as the real protector of his people, 
far superior to the local officials who had not dared to remonstrate with Yü 
Tze-kao and criticize his ill-informed ‘rice-ban’ policy.   
When the Dutch left Chang-chou Bay, Iquan slowly moved his fleet in 
a northerly direction with the plan to approach Yü Tze-kao’s residence. In the 
first week of January, he finally sailed on Amoy, forcing Commander Yü 
Tze-kao to flee the city. Paradoxically, the mercenary Iquan returned home as 
the pirate who had protected his people from the machinations of corrupt 
officials. The gentry in Ch’üan-chou decided to send a petition to the emperor 
to ask that Iquan be pardoned and recruited into the naval force to defend 
their rice-junks. At the close of the summer of 1628, Iquan had basically 
obtained what he wanted and Commander Yü Tze-kao and his followers were 
given a prison sentence by the emperor.    
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Picture 1. Map of partial China, Vietnamese coast and southern Taiwan 
 
Source: Nationaal Archief, VEL 291, Kaart van een gedeelte van de Chinese en Vietnamese kust 
en zuidelijk Formosa  
No. Place names in Dutch Place names in English 
1 D. Stadt Macao The Macao City 
2 Tiatz / Beerens baij Ta-hsing or Bay of Bears*
3 I. Lamo ofte Lamon Nan-ao Island 
4 Pehoe ofte Piscadores P’eng-hu or Piscadores  
5 Wankan Wan-kang  
6 Taijvan Taiwan  




8 Pangsoij Fang-so  
9 Cabo Balie Cape Bolinao 
10 De Bocht van Pangasinaõ The Bay of Pangasinan 
11 Manilhas Manila 
The Chinese place names are mostly taken from ‘Yen-hai Ch’üan-t’u (The Compelete 
Coastal Map of China )’in: Ch'ên Lun-chiung, Hai-kuo Wên-chien-lu[My Knowledge 
about the Regions Abroad]，T’aiwan Wênh-sien Shih-liao Ts’ung-k’an, No. 7, 36-69. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SURVIVAL GAME 
OF THE MERCENARIES 
1628-1631 
 
Marched to Amoy for empty fame 
After Iquan’s negotiation with the Dutch commander, Gerrit Fredrikszoon de 
Wit, had broken down, he led his whole fleet consisting of about 1,000 
vessels with 20,000 people on board northwards in a gradual approach on 
Amoy.1 His purpose was to seek revenge for the abuses inflicted by the rice 
ban, his special targets were those he held personally responsible and 
therefore his sights were set in particular on the men he saw as the major 
culprits: Naval Commander Yü Tze-kao and his subordinate Hsü Hsin-su 
( Simsou [Dutch, hereafter D.]). 
In January 1628, Iquan appeared off Amoy. The local troops, both land 
and sea forces, all took to their heels, leaving their war-junks, weapons and 
provisions behind them.2 A report submitted to the Ch’ung-chên emperor 
says that the citizens of Amoy sent a messenger to beg for his mercy. Iquan 
                                                          
1 VOC 1094, Missive van Pieter Nuijts uijt het Fort Zeelandia aen den gouverneur 
generael, Taiwan, 15 Mar.1628, fo. 134r; 20,000 people is according to the Chinese 
source; Su Yen, ‘Wei ch’ên-hsiang fu-k’ou ch’ing-hsing ping-ch’ên shan-hou 
kuan-chien-shih [ Humble Opinion about how to Deal with Pirates in My Home Town 
and Other Complementary Measures] 15 July 1628’, in TWSL (ed.), Ming-ch’ing 
t’ai-wan tang-an hui-pien, I:1522-1644, 318-9. 
2 Ts’ao, Ching-hai Chi-lüeh, 15. ‘At the beginning of December, Cheng pirates 
visited Amoy again. Because the whole garrison had fled away, they seized all the 
war-junks and ammunition. Amoy city was in danger and the inhabitants of T’ung-an 
county succumbed to panic.’ 
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not only acquiesced in their request but also prudently kept his men stationed 
outside the city walls.3 Commander Yü Tze-kao fled to Chang-chou city 
disguised in the clothes of a workman, but the local Amoy inhabitants laid the 
blame for their plight on his incompetence and fear of their retribution forced 
him to hide in a mansion at T’ung-an district, where far away from both 
Amoy and Chang-chou. He had his door sealed and pretended to be ill.4 Hsü 
Hsin-su’s house was burned down and Iquan confiscated his goods. The 
entire Chang-chou area including Amoy Harbour (with the exception of the 
city itself) and the city on the opposite shore of the bay, Hai-ch’êng, were 
plundered. 5 Once they had completed this mission the pirates settled down 
as a permanent ‘force’ resident in Amoy.  
During the retribution, the hometowns of these pirates remained 
untouched and secure. Upon hearing what had happened during the past few 
days, 6  the gentry in Ch’üan-chou prefecture summoned a consultative 
committee to a meeting in a temple with the city elders on 15 January. They 
all agreed that Iquan’s case was a very particular one. They declared that they 
were willing to send a petition to the Ch’ung-chên Emperor and beseech him 
to forgive Iquan and those under his command, ‘since they were only 
refugees driven to extremes by the famine’. After contacting Iquan, both 
sides reached a consensus: the prefectural magistrate would send a petition to 
the Imperial court and Iquan submitted himself to the Coastal Defence Force 
on 22 February.7       
                                                          
3 Su, ‘Wei ch’ên-hsiang fu-k’ou ch’ing-hsing ping-ch’ên shan-hou kuan-chien-shih’, 
318-9. 
4 Ts’ao, Ching-hai Chi-lüeh, 14. 
5 VOC 1094, Missive van Pieter Nuijts uijt het Fort Zeelandia aen den gouverneur 
generael, Taiwan, 15 Mar.1628, fo. 134r. 
6 About the general role of local gentry in Fu-chien during this period and their 
influential position in maritime affairs, cf. Chang, ‘Chinese Maritime Trade’, 217-21. 
7 Su, ‘Wei ch’ên-hsiang fu-k’ou ch’ing-hsing ping-ch’ên shan-hou kuan-chien-shih’, 
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Peace was restored under this temporary arrangement. Although Iquan 
had broken the law, he was considered a man of high moral principles. On 30 
March, the emperor gave the order for the arrest of Commander Yü Tze-kao 
and his second-in-command, Hsü Hsin-su, after one of Investigating Censors 
had accused Yü Tze-kao of being a ‘stupid and corrupt’ person and had 
reproached Hsü Hsin-su with having ‘revealed classified information, 
participated in smuggling, and of having allowed the red-haired barbarians 
ashore.’ 8 The emperor awarded the death penalty but, perhaps even before 
the order arrived, Iquan had already been executed this verdict. This news 
was confirmed by two Japanese junks which arrived in Taiwan in June: 
‘… He has not only arrested the great mandarin Hsü Hsin-su, but also seized 
his goods and those of some other people, burned his house down and killed 
him.’9          
The same source indicates that de facto Iquan controlled the Amoy area and 
several nearby small towns, and that the Grand Co-ordinator 
(Chün-mên[Chinese hereafter C.], Combon[D.]10) Chu I-Fêng had made 
peace with him. 
‘Although… this Iquan had cause such devestation in the country of China, 
the Grand Co-ordinator was obliged to sign agreement treaty with him, even 
to grant him a very high military rank, on condition he should desist from 
                                                                                                                             
318-9. 
8  Chou, ‘Ping-pu t’i-hsing ping-k’ê ch’ao- ch’u chiang-his-tao yü-shih 
chou-ch’ang-chin t’i-kao’, 10.  
9 VOC 1098, Resolutie genomen [bij gouverneur Pieter Nuijts c.s.][Resolution of 
Governor Pieter Nuijts], Taiwan, 5 Jun. 1628, fo. 404r.  
10 Chün-mên means ’Provincial Military Commander’. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, during this period the Grand Co-ordinator was given the authority to take 
charge of a provincial military action, ‘Chün-mên’ became an additional title of the 
Grand Co-ordinator. Cf: Charles O Hucker., A Dictionary of Official Titles, 202. 
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leading the pirates and wreaking havoc on this country.’11      
Iquan had even shown the official letter pertaining to this temporary 
settlement to some Dutch sailors he had captured. They described the letter as, 
‘embellished with golden characters in an elegant style, and sealed with the 
emperor’s chop.’12 They were wrong. The letter had not been issued by the 
emperor; it was probably only a written memorandum issued by Grand 
Co-ordinator Chu I-Fêng without any legally binding force.13 The emperor’s 
sanction was issued in Peking only on 21 July, and was probably taken with 
him by the new Grand Co-ordinator, Hsiung Wên-ts’an, when he commenced 
his journey south.14 Iquan received the sanction from the hands of the 
General Surveillance and Military Defence Circuit of Hsing-hua and 
Ch’üan-chou, T’sai Shan-chi, on 23 August.15 In accordance with the petition 
                                                          
11 VOC 1098, Resolutie genomen [bij gouverneur Pieter Nuijts c.s.], Taiwan, 5 Jun. 
1628, fo. 404r It tallies with Chu I-fêng’s report to the Emperor. Cf. Grand coordinator 
of Fu-chien Chu I-fêng , ‘Ti Wei-ts’ai T’ung-kuo Chih-lun na Chü-k’ou Chih-chiang 
Têng-shih, 4 July 1628 [On Allowing the Big Pirate to Submit According to General 
Public Opinions]’, in: Ch’ên Yün-lin, Ming-ch’ing Kung-ts’ang t’ai-wan tang-an 
hui-pien, Vol. 3, 123-29 at 127-8. 
12 VOC 1098, Resolutie genomen [bij gouverneur Pieter Nuijts c.s.], Taiwan, 5 Jun. 
1628, fo. 404r  
13  Chao Yin-ch’ang, ‘Wei cho-ts’ai yü-ch’ing chao-chiang chü-k’ou têng-shih 
[Suggestions Following Public Opinion about the Granting of a Royal Pardon] 12 July 
1628’, in TWSL (ed.), Ming-ch’ing t’ai-wan tang-an hui-pien, I 1522-1644, 310. 
Grand Co-ordinator Chu I-Fêng mentioned he presented Iquan with a memorandum 
only after Iquan had kept the peace for about two months,. Therefore Iquan only 
obtained this memorandum in April or May 1628.  
14  Ku Ying-t’ai, ‘Appendix I: Cheng Chih-lung shou-fu[How Cheng Chih-lung 
Obtained a Royal Pardon]’, in P'êng Sun-i, Ching-hai chih[Gazette of the Pacification 
Overseas], TW no.35, 100. ‘1628, in the ninth month (lunar calendar, that is the end of 
October or November), Cheng Chih-lung was made a subordinate of Grand 
Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an.’ 
15 Wang Chi, ‘Appendix I: Ch’ung-chên ch’ang-pien hsüan-lu [ Selections from the 
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approved by the emperor, the court exonerated Iquan of his alleged crime, on 
condition he pacify the waters off the coast of China in the following three 
years. If he succeeded, he would be granted a certain rank and be formally 
appointed a naval officer.16 In other words, he was on probation. As the local 
official commented:  
‘ Iquan was neither a subject nor a soldier. He has submitted to no superior 
and stationed anywhere…  I can neither give him an order, nor summon him 
to present himself before me.’17 
Although Iquan did in fact have these areas under control, the title granted by 
the emperor offered him no substantial support as a genuine commander, 
because the court never paid his men any salaries nor granted them rations of 
rice throughout the following three years. Until they had successfully 
pacified the other pirates, the Grand Co-ordinator would not pay them the 
salaries and rice rations to which they were entitled. After having left the 
service of his former boss, the Dutch East India Company, Iquan now entered 
into a new contract with the Ming court and maintained his status as a 
semi-mercenary who would serve the court for the next three years. In reality 
he was essentially a mercenary captain employed by the gentry of 
Ch’üan-chou prefecture.   
 
Hungry mercenaries need to be fed 
Iquan and the other pirates knew that they were sitting on a time bomb. 
                                                                                                                             
Court Gazette during the Reign of Emperor Ch’ung-chên]’, in TWYH (ed.), Ming 
shih-lu min-hai kuan-hsi shih-liao [Historical Materials about Fu-chienese Waters 
Selected from the Veritable Records of the Ming], TW no. 296, 147; Cf: Charles O 
Hucker., A Dictionary of Official Titles, 211.  
16 Su, ‘Wei ch’ên-hsiang fu-k’ou ch’ing-hsing ping-ch’ên shan-hou kuan-chien-shih’, 
320-1.  
17 Ts’ao, Ching-hai Chi-lüeh, 27. 
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Twenty-thousand people had deserted their hometowns, pushed to this 
extreme by the starvation which was the inexorable corollary of the rice ban. 
Unless they did manage to survive, they would not be prepared to lay down 
their weapons for what seemed an empty promise. Therefore the first priority 
to ensure that the whole operation ran smoothly was to secure the regularity 
of the rice supply and, once this had been guaranteed, to create jobs which 
would allow the crews to earn their daily meals. The local gentry and the 
officials in the cities were perfectly aware that this was the only solution. 
Although foreign trade was prohibited by the imperial court, the coastal trade 
and local fishing conducted by small-sized junks was still permitted and was 
run under the supervision of the local officials. The first mission assigned to 
Iquan was to escort the rice-transport junks which were on their way to 
Ch’ao-chou, close to the border between Kuang-tung and Fu-chien provinces, 
and after he arrived there to purchase rice for the people of Amoy.18 Because 
it was harvested twice a year, in spring and autumn, Ch’ao-chou rice had to 
be transported to Amoy before the end of summer. The transportation of rice 
by sea had become a matter of routine in ensuring the supply to the Amoy 
market, as the Dutch witnessed in the following years: 
‘In China every year, sometimes more and sometimes less, as the people are 
suffering from the piracy in the south and are ground down by starvation, 
they have to be fed by vessels of 25-50 last, laden with rice, from Amoy and 
areas nearby, bound for the food coast…… our cruising vessels have already 
witnessed that in one day alone in the months of June and July, some 40 to 50 
junks sail by hugging the Chinese coast north of Nan-ao Island, each and 
every one loaded with rice and coarse wares.’19       
                                                          
18 Ibid. 22. ‘Nowadays Cheng Chih-lung escorts the rice-transport flotilla.’   
19 VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht Der Goes aen de camer 
Amsterdam [Letter from Governor Hans Putmans on the yacht Der Goes to the 
Amsterdam Chamber], Chiu-lung River, 14 Oct.1632, fo. 198v. Each last equalled 
1,250 kilograms, therefore 20-25 last would equal 25-31 tons. Cf. Judith 
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Chinese sources mention that the rice-transportation fleet consisted of 
slightly over thirty junks in 1631, a figure which reveals the scale of this 
trans-provincial rice trade.20    
Once the rice supply had been put back on a sound footing, most of the 
people were happy to return to their villages where they could be reunited 
with their families. By the end of the summer of 1628, only 4,000 to 5,000 
jobless people still remained in Amoy.21 Iquan ignored these people. He 
might have hoped that the new Grand Co-ordinator, Hsiung Wên-ts’an, 
would be willing to pay salaries and sign these people up as citizen militia 
members. His ideas struck a chord with the majority of the gentry in 
Chang-chou and Chüan-chou prefectures. However, as mentioned earlier, 
since Iquan’s official title had been granted in name only, there was no way 
that these men could be paid from the public budget. The new Grand 
Co-ordinator, Hsiung Wên-ts’an, refused to acquiesce in Iquan’s demands 
and one of his contemporaries commented on this stalemate: 
‘The gentry and the citizens in Chang-chou and Ch’üan-chou prefectures 
petitioned that salaries be paid to Iquan and his followers, but the Grand 
Co-ordinator[Hsiung Wên-ts’an] insisted that he would not pay these. I am 
afraid the Grand Co-ordinator might have already displeased quite a large 
number of people.’ 22          
                                                                                                                             
Schooneveld-Oosterling, Marc Kooijmans, VOC-glossarium: Verklaring van termen, 
verzameld uit de RGP-publicaties die betrekking hebben op de Verenigde 
Oost-Indische Compagnie, (Den Haag: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geshiedenis, 2000), 
67.  
20 Ts’ao, Ching-hai Chi-lüeh, 41.’ Recently the thirty junks of rice merchants sailed in 
the pirate flotilla and the latter did not harass the former. This was proof that these 
pirates had been subjugated.’   
21 Ibid. 29. ‘His gang still consisted of 4 to 5,000 people. He would have like to 
disband them but it seemed impossible.’ 
22 Tung, Ch’ung-hsiang-chi hsüan-lu, 71. 
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The report written by Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an mentions 
how urgently Iquan requested salaries as he cooled his heels waiting to 
receive the formal sanction by the emperor: 
‘After Iquan had submitted himself to the imperial court, on the one hand on 
every single occasion he ignored the assignment of his superiors. Meanwhile, 
on the other hand whether day or night, he demanded salaries be paid to his 
people… fortunately I did not hand him a single penny.’23       
If the truth be told, Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an did not have 
enough money in the treasury to pay any salaries because his coffers had 
been drained by the cost of the military campaign mounted to expel the 
Dutch from the Pescadores in 1624. His hands were further tied because the 
new tax-revenue was earmarked to be spent on building new war-junks and 
on casting new cannons. There was no help for it, Iquan was going to have to 
solve his financial crisis by himself, because he was the one responsible for 
leading these people into this impasse. As the party accountable, it was up to 
him to find a way to keep a balance between rice consumption and silver 
supply among these vagrants, while simultaneously he had to try to persuade 
them to settle down and pick up the threads of their normal lives again. He 
almost failed to meet this challenge because everyone’s life was dispensable 
in such a harsh environment, but somehow, undeterred, Iquan managed to 
pull himself out of this hell with a little help from the local gentry. About two 
months after Iquan received the emperor’s sanction, his close comrade Li 
K’uei-ch’i ( Quichi[D.]), chose to desert him and resume his piratical 
career.24 In view of the seemingly insurmountable problems facing him at 
                                                          
23 Hsiung Wên-ts’an, ‘Fu-chien hsün-fu hsiung ts’an-chieh-t’ieh [Remaining Report 
from the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien Hsiung Wên-ts'an ] 8 Jan 1631’, in TWYH 
(ed.), Chêng-shih shih-liao ch’u-pien, 22. 
24  Ts’ao, Ching-hai Chi-lüeh, 29. ‘ They cannot be disbanded because their 
neighbours insist on killing pirates. These neighbours had not been able to defeat the 
pirates when they were confronted with them earlier, but they would be able to kill 
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that time, most of Iquan’s followers chose to throw in their lot with this 
renegade. With envious and disapproving eyes they had seen how Iquan 
fawned on the officials and the gentry while he was less than generous to 
them who had been his faithful followers.25 In their eyes his behavior almost 
verged on the betrayal of his pirate brethren. While he was doing his best to 
set up a commercial network, he had no other choice as all other avenues 
were blocked. This task would have proved impossible without the help of 
the gentry, or more precisely, the investors and potential clients who were 
willing to back the trade for feeding those pirates who had surrendered. 
Therefore, as they were totally ignorant of the diplomatic niceties of this 
game, most of the members of his band chose to join Li K’uei-ch’i and 
deserted him in droves, taking all their vessels, goods, weapons and capital 
with them. Overcome by exhaustion, Iquan wept and railed to one of his 
close comrades but he did not betray his raw emotions to his newly won rich 
gentry-patrons.26 Li Kuei-ch’i had followed Iquan’s lead and remained in 
Taiwan , after all they shared some common past.27 In the end, even this old 
comrade lost his trust in him. Iquan was now playing for very high stakes.   
                                                                                                                             
disarmed pirates who had surrendered. No wonder they were still crowding into Amoy 
for they could not return to their hometowns.’  
25 Hsiung, ‘Fu-chien hsün-fu hsiung ts’an-chieh-t’ieh’, 22. ‘ Iquan stored several 
hundreds of  thousands taels of cash without even sharing them with his followers’ ; 
Ts’ao, Ching-hai Chi-lüeh, 31. ‘ Iquan is disposed to make friends with rich families, 
nobles, officials. He is very proud of his noble guests, and has spent large sums of 
money on entertaining them.’ 
26 Ibid. 32. ‘It is said that Brigade Commander Chang was Iquan’s best friend. After 
Li K’uei-ch’i had betrayed him and sailed off, Iquan did his best to appear normal and 
talked calmly with Provision-Master Wang. Only after he saw Brigade Commander 
Chang did he cry out and collapsed.’  
27 VOC 1093, Resolutie genomens bij den commandeur [Gerard. Frederiksz] de Wit 
ende den raet, Taiwan, 16 Oct. 1626, fos. 378r-v. The Dutch in Taiwan decided to send 
soldiers to the village of Soulang slightly north of their settlement, in an attempt to 




Iquan and the VOC engage in smuggling 
Li K’uei-ch’i turned his back on Iquan when it gradually began to dawn on 
him that he no longer counted as his equal. After Iquan had been granted his 
imperial sanction, he thrice summoned Li K’uei-ch’i to have a meeting with 
the coastal defence official in Fu-chou but Li K’uei-ch’i refused and sailed 
away with all his fleet. Not long afterwards Iquan’s suspicions were aroused 
and, in a state of alarm, he rushed home to Amoy where he promptly 
stationed 600 of his soldiers as a guard. His action was justified when Li 
K’uei-ch’i’s people sailed into Amoy Harbour on 30 October and took the 
market place outside the city wall by storm, plundering all the goods they 
could lay their hands on in the process.28 Five days later, Iquan received help 
from the militia stationed in the environs of Ch’üan-chou prefecture, among 
them the naval militia men recruited from among the fishermen. On the sixth 
day, Li K’uei-ch’i withdrew with his fleet of 3,000 people.29 Now Iquan had 
to assume the sole responsibility of paying his troops because, if he did not 
have a permanent force at his disposal, he could not even guard himself 
against his former followers.30     
If a person happened to be in possession of junks and sailors, the 
traditional way to increase his income was to participate in foreign trade. But 
in 1628, with everything awry as a consequence of the disturbances along the 
coast, the emperor had issued an edict forbidding any overseas trade.31 This 
edict extinguished the hope of these sailors at a loose end who were hoping to 
engage in regular foreign trade to make a living. Li K’uei-ch’i’s betrayal of 
                                                          
28 Ts’ao, Ching-hai Chi-lüeh, 31. 
29 Ibid. 28. 
30 Ibid. 32. 
31 Chu, ‘Ping-pu t’i-hsing ping-k’ê ch’ao-ch’u fu-chien hsün-fu chu t’i-kao, not 
dated’, 5. This suggestion was approved by the emperor on 26 March 1628. 
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Iquan might have been a consequence of this calamitous edict. The order had 
originally been issued by the previous Grand Co-ordinator, Chu I-fêng , who 
proclaimed that ‘ no merchants will be allowed to sail in this year (1628). 
Any merchant or official who violates this order will be treated as a 
criminal.’ 32 The order arrived in Fu-chien province around April33 and, 
once it had been made public, merchants in Chang-chou and Ch’üan-chou 
had no alternative but to engage in smuggling. Generally speaking, only 
pirates traded in contraband and officials were expected to live on the salaries 
they were paid by the emperor. The fly in the ointment was that Iquan’s title 
was that of an official in spe,he had to prove himself before it was officially 
sanctioned. How could he possibly pay his soldiers if he was unable to 
conduct any trade (legal or otherwise)? 
This catalogue of disasters made life difficult for Iquan. Between 
February and August, he had to come to terms with the way his life had 
changed in such a dramatic way. These sudden changes embarrassed his old 
comrades, the VOC merchants in Taiwan, Japan and Batavia even more than 
they did him.  
As far as the Dutch were concerned, before the end of the year 1627 
when Commander De Wit had answered the appeal of the previous Grand 
Co-ordinator, Chu I-fêng, to sweep the seas clean of all pirates as proclaimed 
in the edict of the Chinese emperor, Iquan was a dispensable pawn. Grand 
Co-ordinator Chu I-fêng and Commander Yü Tzu-kao had both promised the 
Dutch free trade as their reward if they made short shrift of Iquan. 
Entertaining these high hopes, Commander Cornelis de Wit advanced a sum 
                                                          
32 Ibid. ‘Now it has been decided that the1628 oceanic trade will be forbidden at the 
suggestion of the Grand Co-ordinator. All vessels have been prevented from sailing.’  
33 Kawaguchi Choju, T’ai-wan kê-chü chih[A History of Taiwan during Separation], 
TW no.1, 8. ‘In the third month (in lunar calendar, thus April of 1628), the imperial 




of money to Commander Yü Tzu-kao’s merchants and to Squadron Leader 
Hsü Hsin-su, expecting a huge amount of raw silk in return. On 29 October 
1627, after the Dutch had handed over no less than 66,550 rials to Hsü 
Hsin-su, they received only 8,150 catties raw silk in return, because, they got 
cold feet because of Iquan’s threats and had been forced to beat a hasty 
retreat.34 On the 19 November, before he left for Batavia Commander 
Cornelis de Wit ordered three junks to sail to Amoy to pick up the remainder 
of the raw silk. Unfortunately they ran into pirates close to shore and were 
plundered. 35  By January 1628, when Iquan’s fleet showed op in the 
roadstead of Amoy, Hsü Hsin-su was still trying to load the raw silk for 
which the Dutch had paid, because he was still expecting the three Dutch 
junks which were plundered by the pirates and would never arrive.36 Around 
about February, the Dutch in Taiwan sent another three junks.37 The first of 
these junks was accompanied by the junk of the Chinese official appointed to 
govern the Pescadores and she was loaded with a cargo of rice (perhaps for 
Hsü Hsin-su).38All three were taken by Iquan’s people, and it seems the 
                                                          
34 VOC 1098, Missive van Pieter Nuijts naer Batavia aan gouverneur generael [Jan 
Pietersz.] Coen, Taiwan, 14 Aug. 1629, fos. 408r-v; Generale Missive, 6 Jan. 1628, in 
Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 69-71. Because all Hsü Hsin-su’s raw silk was for sale 
at a fixed price of 142 taels per picul, equals to 194.5 rials (1 tael=3.5 F= 70 stuivers; 
1 rial=51 stuivers), which should have been enough to pay for 34,200 catties raw silk. 
Here ‘rial’ refers to the Spanish silver coin piastra fuerte which is written  ‘reaal van 
achten’ or ‘reaal’ in Dutch but is called piece-of-eight by the English. Cf. Kristof 
Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade 1620-1740, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958), 50. 
35 VOC 1094, Missive van Michiel Sael naer Taijouan aen gouverneur Pieter Nuijts, 
Haerlemsbay [P’ing-hai Bay], 7 Dec. 1627, fos. 197r; Generale missive, 6 Jan. 1628, 
in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 69-71. Haerlems Bay is P’ing-hai Bay. See Picture 3. 
36 VOC 1094, Missive van gouverneur Pieter Nuijts naer Batavia aen gouverneur 
generael [Pieter de Carpentier], Taiwan, 28 Feb. 1628, fo. 130v. 
37 Ibid. 
38 VOC 1094, Missive van gouverneur Pieter Nuijts naer Batavia aen gouverneur 
generael [Pieter de Carpentier], Taiwan, 15 Mar. 1628, fo. 134r. 
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Dutch then despaired of collecting their goods. At the same time, Iquan also 
captured a Dutch yacht which was returning from Japan laden with silver. 
Hence the original plan so carefully devised by the Dutch was smashed to 
smithereens by Iquan and later the insult was heaped on injury when it was 
reported that the new Grand Co-ordinator, Hsiung Wên-ts’an, had been 
reconciled with Iquan. Still fairly uncertain about whether free trade would 
be granted under these new condtions, the Dutch prevented the Japanese 
merchants newly arrived in Taiwan from engaging in the silk trade in Amoy. 
This high-handed treatment flared up into a violent conflict. The furious 
Japanese took the governor of Taiwan, Pieter Nuijts, hostage and seized 
120.5 piculs of silk goods from the VOC warehouse by force. This action has 
been called the ’Hamada Yahei Incident’ by later historians.39 From March to 
August, both Iquan and the Dutch were keen to make some more money by 
conducting an informal trade, which meant in fact that they had to engage in 
smuggling without any word of this reaching the ears of the Grand 
Co-ordinator.  
 
Initiation of family business 
The news of the reconciliation was confirmed when some letters written by 
Dutch captives were delivered to Taiwan at the beginning of June 1628.40 
Governor Pieter Nuijts decided to try his luck and dispatch four yachts to 
Amoy.41 Somewhat earlier he had sent a letter from Taiwan to Iquan, telling 
                                                          
39 Generale missive, 10 Feb. 1629, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 77-8. A more 
detailed study of the Dutch-Japanese conflict in Taiwan in 1628, cf. Tonio Andrade, 
How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch , Spanish, and Han Colonization in the 
Seventeenth Century[online], (Gutenberg Project, Columbia University Press, 2006), 
27-43. 
40 VOC 1098, Resolutie [bij gouverneur Pieter Nuijts c.s] genomen in Taijouan, 
Taiwan, 5 Jun. 1628, fo. 404r.  
41 VOC 1103, Missive van Pieter Nuijts naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, 
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him that Commander Cornelis de Witt’s hostility had been a grievous error 
and apologized as follows: 
 ‘We are ignorant of what caused the dispute, and therefore [unable] to 
judge who is right or wrong. We cannot afford to allow complaints to be 
made and take root on either side. Therefore pray do not leave us in the dark 
about the actual conditions, so that we can ascertain a just punishment for 
those who have brought this about, and be reconciled with Your Honour.’ 42         
The letter seems to have been effective, because Iquan released all the 
Dutch captives, including the yacht complete with all the cash and goods she 
was carrying.43 As a consequence of this gesture, the tacit trade between 
Chinese merchants and the Dutch carried on for about two months, but it was 
not long before the balance was upset again. Iquan might have been given 
some prior warning that the emperor’s sanction would be arriving at the 
beginning of August. Apprehensive that the new Grand Co-ordinator, Hsiung 
Wên-ts’an, might find out about his illegal dealings, Iquan asked Pieter 
Nuijts to leave at once, threatening that if he did not do so he would take up 
arms against the Dutch after 4 August.44 Soon after Nuijts had returned to 
                                                                                                                             
Batavia, 30 Sept.1631. fos. 389v-390r. 
42 VOC 1094, Missive [van Pieter Nuijts] aan Icquan te seinden, Zeelandia, not dated 
Mar. 1628, fo. 127v. It is an enclosure to a letter written by Senior Merchant Cornelis 
van Neijenroode in Japan to the Governor-General in Batavia. There is no trace of the 
main letter but it should have been written by Pieter Nuijts who in charge of the 
Taiwan factory at that moment. 
43 Generale Missive, 10 Feb.1629, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 79; VOC 1096, 
Missive van gouverneur Pieter Nuijtz naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael [Jan 
Pietersz. Coen], Taiwan, 26 Oct. 1628, fo. 203r. 
44 Generale Missive, 10 Feb.1629, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 79; VOC 1096, 
Missive van gouverneur Pieter Nuijtz naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael [Jan 
Pietersz. Coen], Taiwan, 26 Oct. 1628, fo. 203v. According to Governor Pieter Nuijts’ 
report, this hostile gesture was elicited by Iquan’s reluctance to allow some merchants 
sell their raw silks at a lower price. But since it is known that Iquan offered the silk at 
THE SURVIVAL GAME 1628-1631 
 82 
Taiwan, a special delegate dispatched by Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung 
Wên-ts'an came to visit Zeelandia Castle. The delegate demanded Nuijts 
confirm that the Dutch had signed a private contract with Iquan and admit 
whether they had concluded peace with him? Governor Pieter Nuijts and the 
Council of Taiwan answered as follows: 
‘… Although in response to the two letters received from the Governor, 
he[Iquan] has released the captured yacht the Westcappel, its crew and 863 
taels of silver and some ammunition, clearly no verbal, or written treaty has 
been concluded. Indeed, His Honour (the Governor of Taiwan) is and will 
remain a friend of Your Excellency (the Grand Co-ordinator) and the 
Emperor of China.…’45             
The Dutch governor Pieter Nuijts must have begin to be aware of the 
risk he was running of losing the trust of Chinese authorities and he also 
believed that the free trade treaty might be nullified because of the smuggling 
trade which had been thriving during June and July.     
On the horns of a dilemma, Governor Nuijts decided to direct all his 
ships to the Chinese coast and transport the Grand Co-ordinator’s delegate 
back to the Chiu-lung River estuary on 12 August.46 Several days later, the 
five Dutch yachts under Nuijts’ command ran into Iquan’s fleet, which was 
returning from the south, probably from another mission to escort the 
rice-transportation junks. Eight to ten days later Iquan returned and four more 
                                                                                                                             
a price of 130 taels per picul, which was not only a price lower than that Hsü Hsin-su 
offered (142 taels) but also lower than the price he had agreed with Pieter Nuijts on 1 
October (140 taels), Nuijts’ explanation was shaky.  
45 VOC 1096, Resolutie [bij gouverneur Pieter Nuijts c.s]getrokken in de rivier 
Chincheo, Chiu-lung River, 12 Aug. 1628, fo. 216r; cf. VOC 1103, Missive van Pieter 
Nuijts naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, met bijlage, Batavia, 28 Dec. 1631, 
fos. 413 v-414 r. 
46 Ibid. Five yachts and four ships. It is also mentioned that Governor-General’s order, 
which required Governor Nuijts to conclude the free trade treaty, had just arrived. 
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powerful Dutch ships arrived in Amoy. 47  Iquan received his imperial 
sanction on 23 August. Perhaps the same day Nuijts invited him aboard on 
the yacht the Texel, and took him hostage. Nuijts has left the following 
description of the incident: 
‘… (Iquan) was told that he must remain with us until our captains no longer 
had to face any opposition, or that news had been received from the Grand 
Co-ordinator in Fu-chou saying that the free trade conducted by the 
Hollanders was permitted conditional on the various promises. Otherwise, … 
he would be transported to yacht the Arnmuijden.’48 
Iquan was kept confined in the yacht the Texel for almost one month. 
Obviously no response had arrived from Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung 
Wên-ts’an, since Iquan’s official title did not necessarily mean that he could 
count on the support of the court. The real purpose of his appointment had 
been to eliminate the menace threatening the sea trade, from either Chinese 
pirates or the Dutch ‘Barbarians.’ Under intense Dutch pressure, Iquan had 
pretended that he had the authority to allow all Chinese merchants to trade 
freely with the Dutch49 and the smuggling trade picked up again smoothly 
during Iquan’s detention. Iquan’s mother was the only person to take steps to 
rescue her son.50 She insisted that Nuijts should adapt/foster her youngest 
                                                          
47 VOC 1096, Missive van Pieter Nuijts naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael [Jan 
Pietersz. Coen], Taiwan, 26 Oct. 1628, fos. 203 v-204 r. 
48 VOC 1103, Missive van Pieter Nuijts naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, 
met bijlage, Batavia, 30 Sept.1631, fo. 390r. 
49 VOC 1096, Missive van Pieter Nuijts uijt Zeelandia aen den gouverneur generaal 
[Jan Pietersz. Coen], Taiwan, 26 Oct. 1628, fo. 204r. The silence in Chinese sources 
about this incident implies that either the authorities were impotent to rescue Iquan or 
they were glad of the opportunity to get rid of him. 
50 Iquan’s father married two wives. The first four sons were born to his first wife, 
Shu, and the fifth son was that of his second wife, Huang. It is not certain to whom 
Pieter Nuijts was referring. Iquan’s family members are recorded in ‘The 
Genealogical Chart of the Cheng Family’, cf : Cheng Chih-lung(comp.), Chêng-shih 
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son as a guarantee of the commercial partnership between the Cheng family 
and the VOC. This hostage would be a pledge that Iquan would co-operate 
with the Dutch. It would be a commercial contract without formal written 
articles.      
The truth about Iquan’s detention by the Dutch had to be concealed. 
His family must have spread the false rumour that he was being entertained 
by the Dutch. They would have feared that a treacherous follower might seize 
this opportunity to snatch his command. The ‘adoption show’ was played out 
with appropriate celebrations but the Dutch discovered that so-called 
‘ delegate of the Grand Co-ordinator’ whom they had dispatched to deliver 
their ultimate letter turned out to be a ‘ recognized’ friend of Hsü Hsin-su.51 
Therefore it was dubious whether the latter would have tried to help Iquan or 
was just attempting to string him along. In the meantime, Grand Co-ordinator 
Hsiung Wên-ts'an forwarded the formal documents confirming the emperor’s 
imperial sanction to Iquan’s house in Amoy.52    
Realizing that he was not achieving anything in terms of a ‘free trade 
treaty’ from the Chinese court, Governor Pieter Nuijts did a volte-face and 
took Iquan’s mother’s suggestion. He accepted Iquan’s younger brother as a 
security, and signed a tentative contract with Iquan on 1 October. 53 
Thereafter Iquan’s family was dragged ever more intensively into the 
                                                                                                                             
tsu-p’u [Genealogical Chart of Chang family], T’ai-wan wên-hsien 
hui-k’an[Collectanea of Taiwan Historical Documents here after TWH], 7 vols. 
(Peking: Chiu-chou Pulisher, 2004), I, No. 5, 597. 
51 VOC 1103, Resolutie over het accoord met Iquan [Resolution pertaining to the 
Contract Concluded with Iquan], Chiu-lung River, 1 Oct. 1628, fo. 415r.  
52 Ibid. 
53 VOC 1096, Het accoordt getrocken tusschen Pieter Nuijts ende Iquan, overste 
Mandorijn van Aijmoij op Taijouan [Contract Concluded in Taiwan between Pieter 
Nuijts and Iquan, Chief Mandarin of Amoy ], Chiu-lung River, 1 Oct. 1628, fos. 
124-125; VOC 1103, Missive van Pieter Nuijts naer Amsterdam aen de Camer 
Amsterdam, met bijlage, Batavia, 30 Sept.1631. fos. 390r-391r.  
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commercial whirlpool. Within a fortnight of the Dutch departure from Amoy, 
Iquan’s old comrade Li K’uei-ch’i abandoned Iquan, taking with him all 
valuable resources which remained.    
 
An-hai Harbour and the fishermen militia 
From an emotional point of view it must have been acutely depressing for 
Iquan to be deserted by his old comrades but, from an economic point of 
view this incident served the purpose of reducing the expense of having to 
feed followers. Iquan now maintained his troops at the basic level of 600 
soldiers. On land, whenever the situation necessitated it, he added some 
militia from the countryside of Ch’üan-chou, up to a total of 1,000 men. At 
sea he depended on a militia force composed of fishermen. He was not 
obliged to pay any expenses from his private purse for either of these forces. 
Li K’uei-ch’i and his fleet invaded Amoy on 2 January 1629 but he was 
defeated by Iquan’s troops including his hometown militia after a nine-days 
struggle.54 On 7 February, Iquan’s force pursued them to the coast of the 
province of Kuang-tung and in the course of this pursuit managed to persuade 
some of the vagrants to go home.55 A little later peace was restored and the 
rice trade between Amoy and Ch’ao-chou could be resumed without any 
more danger of assaults by Li K’uei-ch’i.56 It was rumoured that this pirate 
chief had decided to remain in Macao 57 but, all of a sudden in July, Li 
                                                          
54 Ts’ao, Ching-hai Chi-lüeh, 36; 39. 
55 Ibid, 39; Chang Yen-têng, ‘Ping-k’ê ch’ao-ch’u chê-chiang hsün-fu chang yen-têng 
t’i-pên[ Report from the Grand Co-ordinator of Chê-chiang, Chang Yen-têng, Copy 
preserved in the Ministry of War], 16 May. 1629’, in TWYH (ed.), Chêng-shih 
shih-liao ch’u-pien, 14. ‘ After Li K’uei-chi betrayed and deserted Iquan, his gangs 
sailed to the border area between Fu-chien and Kuang-tung, including Ch’ên 
Ch’êng-yü (which was written Zansingouw in Dutch) in approximately 600 junks …’  
56 Ts’ao, Ching-hai Chi-lüeh, 41. 
57 VOC 1098, Missive van gouverneur Hans Putmans uijt ’t Casteel Zeelandia aen de 
THE SURVIVAL GAME 1628-1631 
 86 
K’uei-ch’i sailed back to Amoy with several big junks of the Kuang-tung 
type and ambushed Iquan.58 
‘(We) have heard that the pirate Li K’uei-c’hi (Quechi[D.]) has destroyed all 
Iquan’s junks and has made himself master of the Chiu-lung River area.’59 
After Amoy had been under siege for about forty days, the 
Ch’üan-chou gentry sent the Grand Co-ordinator petitions begging him to 
dispatch some junks from Fu-chou, because the size of these vessels was 
comparable to that of the big Kuang-tung junks.60 When Li K’uei-ch’i heard 
the news that the Grand Co-ordinator was planning to dispatch 100 Fu-chou 
junks southwards to assist Iquan, he decided to steal a march on 12 August . 
He attacked the Grand Co-ordinator’s fleet in Fu-chou before Iquan had had 
the chance join it. According to the news received in Taiwan on 25 September 
1629: 
 ‘… a wancan has arrived which brought us the news that the Grand 
Co-ordinator (who had fitted out an armada about 300 junks in Fu-chou) had 
summoned Iquan from Amoy to put him in command of these junks as an 
‘Admiral of the Sea’ and expel Li K’uei-ch’i. When Li K’uei-ch’i was 
informed of this, he suddenly moved his fleet there (before Iquan and his 
                                                                                                                             
Ed. heren bewinthebberen [in Amsterdam], Taiwan, 15 Sept. 1629, fo 32v. 
58  Ts’ai, Ch’ing-pai t’ang gao, II, 861. ‘These rebellious pirates including Li 
K’uei-ch’i and others like him, invaded again. Their junks were constructed in 
Kuang-tung and therefore larger than the Fu-chienese junks of Cheng Chih-lung and 
Cheng Chih-hu. Because of their smaller size, the latter were not able to compete with 
the former.’ Ts’ao, Ching-hai Chi-lüeh, 48. These Kuang-tung-made large junks were 
called ‘Wu-wei ta-ch’uan [big junk with a black stern]’. 
59 VOC 1098, Missive van gouverneur Hans Putmans uijt 't Casteel Zeelandia aen de 
Ed. heren bewinthebberen [in Amsterdam], Taiwan, 15 Sept. 1629, fo. 32v. 
60 Ts’ai, Ch’ing-pa- t’ang gao, II, 861. ‘ The junks constructed in Fu-chou and fishing 
boats built in Chi-liao (coast of Hsin-hua county) are as large and as steady as the 
Kuang-tung junks…’  
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people approached) and attacked the above-mentioned armada. He took the 
biggest and strongest junks with him, and set the others on fire…’61 
It was just the same old story, Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an 
had to appease Li K’uei-ch’i in the same way as Grand Co-ordinator Chu had 
done previously in the case of Iquan. Accordingly the Grand Co-ordinator 
sent a petition to the emperor asking that Li K’uei-ch’i be treated in the same 
manner as Iquan had been and signed a cease fire with this pirate during the 
autumn.62 During the truce, Iquan and his troops remained inside the city 
walls of Amoy with Li K’uei-ch’i’s followers stationed outside.     
Since the Li K’uei-ch’i had now stepped into Iquan’s shoes as it were, 
another pirate by the name of Ch’u Ts’ai-lao secretly contacted the Grand 
Co-ordinator to solicit better conditions than those granted Li K’uei-c’hi.63 
This request instigated a conspiracy against Li K’uei-ch’i. Local officials 
secretly set about fitting out a fleet of junks in the Ch’üan-chou region and 
offered them to Iquan. On 9 February 1630, Iquan and Ch’u Ts’ai-lao 
launched a surprise attack on Li K’uei-ch’i and were able to capture him that 
same day.64  
                                                          
61 VOC 1098, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt ’t Casteel Zeelandia aan d’Ed. heer 
gouverneur generael Jan Pietersz. Coen, Taiwan, 28 Sept. 1629, fo. 41v.  
62 Ku, ‘Appendix I: Cheng Chih-lung shou-fu’, 150. ‘ The Fu-chienese pirate Li 
K’uei-ch’i surrendered to the officials with Cheng Chih-lung. Later he fell out with 
Cheng Chih-lung and reverted to piracy. Thereafter Li K’uei-ch’i announced he would 
surrender to Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an. Hsiung Wên-ts’an reported this 
case to the emperor and the emperor allowed Hsiung Wên-ts'an to handle it at his own 
discretion.’ 
63 ‘Ch’u Ts’ai-lao’ is noted in formal Chinese sources most likely as ’ Chung Pin’. 
However, since he is mostly referred to in Dutch archives as Ch’u Ts’ai-lao, I shall 
use this name. Cf. Shên Yün, T’ai-wan Chêng-shih shih-mo[The begin and end of the 
Cheng regime in Taiwan], TW no. 15, 5. 
64 Ts’ao, Ching-hai Chi-lüeh, 56. 
THE SURVIVAL GAME 1628-1631 
 88 
As Iquan had been absent from Amoy since the end of September, a 
new Regional Commander, Chao T’ing, was put in charge of the coastal 
defence. 65  Regional Commander Chao had sedulously flattered Ch’u 
Ts’ai-lao and urged him on to betray Li K’uei-ch’i.66 The upshot was that 
Ch’u Ts’ai-lao did succeed in usurping Li K’uei-ch’i’s position. On 9 March, 
the emperor assented to Li K’uei-ch’i being accorded the same treatment as 
Iquan had received. Once this matter had been settled, it was decided that 
Iquan would be based along the coast north of Ch’üan-chou, while Li 
K’uei-ch’i would be stationed along south of Ch’üan-chou.67 Since Ch’u 
Ts’ai-lao had already taken Li K’uei-ch’i’s place, he sent a letter informing 
the Dutch in Taiwan of his new position: 
‘The Grand Co-ordinator has ordered me to accompany Iquan to Amoy, so 
that I might join Iquan there to serve the emperor properly.’68       
After Li K’uei-ch’i had been arrested, Iquan returned to Amoy. In 
March, Governor Hans Putmans of Taiwan dispatched some Chinese 
                                                          
65 He was appointed the successor of Regional Commander Yü Tzu-kao not long 
after Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an arrived. Although his was a formal court 
appointment, the garrison in Amoy had long been unmanned. The new garrison under 
his command should have been equal in size to the number of Iquan’s newly recruited 
soldiers. Hsiung, ‘Fu-chien hsün-fu hsiung ts’an-chieh-t’ieh’, 23. cf. The Minister of 
War, Yen Ming-t’ai,’Wei min-chiang pu-k’ê pu-ch’ü, min-fu pu-k’ê pu-liu têng shih 
on 13 Mar. 1628 [Suggest to Remove the Military Commanders of Fu-chien while 
Keep the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien at Station ]’, in: Ch’ên Yün-lin, 
Ming-ch’ing Kung-ts’ang t’ai-wan tang-an hui-pien, Vol. 3, 81-115 at 113-5. Chao 
T’ing was ordered to take this position by Emperor’s order on 13 March 1628.   
66 Ts’ao, Ching-hai Chi-lüeh, 47. ‘Chao Ting got on well with pirates.’ 
67 Ku, ‘Appendix I: Cheng Chih-lung shou-fu’, 150. ‘The Fu-chien waters in the south 
of Chang-chou have been put under Li K’uei-ch’i’s control and the Fu-chien waters to 
the north of Chang-chou are under Cheng Chih-lung’s control.’  
68 VOC 1101, Missive van Tousailack [Ch’u Ts’ai-lao] naer Taijouan aen Hans 
Putmans, [received in]Taiwan, 8 April 1630, fo. 474r.  
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merchants who were living in Batavia with instructions to sail to Amoy and 
Hai-ch’êng city to sell the Company pepper.69 Iquan lost no time in sending a 
message to the Dutch factory in Taiwan ordering 200 piculs of pepper at 
approximately the same price as the Batavian Chinese merchants had asked.70 
When the Dutch junk arrived in Amoy, its crew were witness to the fact that 
Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an sent a mandarin to pay the salaries of 
Iquan and Ch’u Ts’ai-lao, as their reward for defeating Li K’uei-ch’i. As 
neutral parties, the Dutch had also taken part in this brave action and hence 
Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an was also acknowledging the 
friendship and amenability of the Dutch, an intimation that to some degree at 
least free trade would granted: 
‘This mandarin praised us extravagantly on behalf of the Grand 
Co-ordinator and because our endeavours [implied] that there is no doubt 
that we shall be granted free trade. All kinds of goods will be able to be 
brought in abundance to us in Taiwan. Some merchants have asked us to 
procure six or seven licences from the Grand Co-ordinator, intimating that if 
the licences were granted to them, they would be able to trade with us 
freely.’71     
Iquan began to distribute the pepper he had bought from the Dutch, as Ch’u 
Ts’ai-lao mentions in above-mentioned letter: 
‘The merchants have concluded a contract with Iquan, for which he went to 
                                                          
69 VOC 1101, Resolutie des Comptoirs Taiwan [genomen bij Hans Putmans], Taiwan, 
27 Feb. 1630. fo. 424r. 
70 VOC 1101, Resolutie des Comptoirs Taiwan [genomen bij Hans Putmans], Taiwan, 
6 Mar. 1630. fo. 425r. 
71 VOC 1101, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael 
Jacques Specx, Taiwan, 5 Oct. 1630, fo. 422v; Leonard Blussé, Margot E. van Opstall, 
Ts’ao Yung-ho, Wouter E. Milde (eds), De dagregisters van het kasteel Zeelandia: 
Taiwan 1629-1662[The Diary of Castle Zeelandia], 4 vols, ('s-Gravenhage : Nĳhoff, 
1986), I:1629-1641, 21. 6 Mar.1630.(henceforward cited as ‘Dagregister Zeelandia’.) 
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see the Grand Co-ordinator so that the trade would be conducted in the 
proper fashion’.72       
Since Ch’u Ts’ai-lao was absent from Amoy Harbour, he was excluded from 
the luxury trade and therefore unable to build a proper source of income for 
his troops. Therefore, he had no other recourse than to squeeze this out of 
trade by violence. 
‘On the 10th of this month (April), about 20 small junks of his (Ch’u 
Ts’a-lao)returned  to the harbour (of Amoy). The crews of these vessels 
came ashore and behaved brutally, smashing some houses to pieces… hardly 
a person was to be seen in the suburbs, and no resistance was offered.’73 
The same scene was witnessed by a Chinese official in the 
vicinity.74Ch’u Ts’ai-lao intended to redirect the proceeds he stole from 
Iquan’s trade into his own pocket. He therefore positioned his main force at 
the entrance of Amoy Bay and sent some of his small junks into Amoy 
Harbour to harass those merchants who did business with either the Dutch or 
Iquan. Their special targets were those merchants who associated with Iquan. 
Because his base had been weakened and he was deprived of his own vessels, 
Iquan’s only option was to retreat from Amoy to An-hai.75 Later, Iquan’s 
merchants from An-hai came directly to the Dutch ships anchored at Wu-yü  
                                                          
72 VOC 1101, Missive van Tousailack [Ch’u Ts’ai-lao] naer Taijouan aen Hans 
Putmans, [received in]Taiwan, 8 Apr.1630, fos. 473v-474r.  
73 VOC 1101, Missive van Paulus Traudenius naer Taijouan aan Hans Putmans, 
Chiulung River, 11 Apr. 1630, fo. 475r. 
74 Ts’ao, Ching-hai Chi-lüeh, 50. ‘The pirates have become extremely reckless. They 
sail around capturing people from all around Amoy. …The residential command 
positioned on the city wall, [although] seeing such mayhem,.. ordered his soldiers to 
fire not a single bullet and kept his soldiers within the city, resisting any action which 
would attack the pirates.’  
75 VOC 1101, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael 
Jacques Specx, Taiwan, 5 Oct. 1630. fo. 412r.  
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Island.76 Unlike the town of Amoy which is built on a deep water bay, An-hai 
is located well within a shallow estuary. Big ships and junks had to anchor 
near the island of Quemoy in Wei-t’ou Bay (in Dutch records ‘Erasmus’ Bay) 
outside the river mouth. It was said: 
‘This is a very narrow, shallow river, which almost always runs dry at low 
water level,… with the exception of the mouth.’77 
As a consequence of its location, An-hai city was perfectly sheltered from the 
threat of a barrage of heavy cannon because of its shallow water. Its 
geographical position also made it the perfect headquarters for the fishermen 
militia and the rice-transportation junks. Hence, supported by a relatively 
small number of very well-disciplined soldiers, Iquan’s mercenary company 
had no great difficulty holding out at An-hai. Because the foreign trade in 
luxury items was the most important pillar of his enterprise, Iquan was 
zealous in his efforts to have it legalized, but before Iquan had been able to 
arrange the legal licences for the Dutch, Ch’u Ts’ai-lao captured a Dutch 
yacht on 23 June and later took another three Dutch junks after he returned 
from his mission to Nan-ao Island.78 Later he realized Iquan was residing in 
An-hai, so he decided to blockade Wei-t’ou Bay, using as his excuse that 
Iquan was a traitor. Iquan sent a letter to the Dutch authorities in Taiwan 
asking for help and declaring that the chance of setting up a legal trade was at 
stake: 
‘I shall do my best here. I have proposed free trade to the Grand 
                                                          
76 VOC 1101, Missive van Nicolaas Kouckebacker naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, 
Chiu-lung River, 2 Jun. 1630, fo. 484r.  
77 VOC 1101, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael 
Jacques Specx, Taiwan, 5 Oct. 1630, fo. 412r. 
78 VOC 1101, Missive van Tousailack naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, [received 
in]Taiwan, 18 May 1630, fo. 480v. His new mission was to eliminate the pirate Yeh 
Wo-chên written as ‘Nooting’ (in Dutch) who had occupied places in the vicinity of 
Nan-ao Island. 
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Co-ordinator through the Regional Commander, Chao T’ing ( Tingia[D.]) 
and he has consented to it. Several merchants have contacted the Grand 
Co-ordinator personally about this matter, saying that he will grant a licence 
to them.’ 79       
Meanwhile, Ch’u Ts’ai-lao had not remained inactive and had made further 
moves. He prepared to intercept the Amoy junks homeward bound from 
Manila in the hope of accumulating enough capital to build up his own 
foreign trade. On the 22nd, somewhere in the vicinity of Wei-t’ou Bay he 
captured around a Ch’üan-chou junk returning from Manila with a cargo 
valued at about 28,000 rials. 80  He also plundered fishing-boats and 
rice-transporters.81 Ch’u Ts’ai-lao even dared to send several small-sized war 
junks into the An-hai River, where they set fire to Iquan’s junks.82 While he 
was carrying out these depredations, the fishermen militia, on whom Iquan 
depended, had all sailed to the Kuang-tung coast to fish, depriving Iquan of 
any means to fight back, so he prudently stayed put in An-hai,83 where he 
busied himself purchasing goods there to meet the Dutch orders. Now the 
only possible threat to Ch’u Ts’ai-lao were the new war-junks which were 
under construction in some shipyards around Fuchou.84 In a letter to the 
Governor of Taiwan dated 26 August, Iquan informed the former that he was 
leaving to sail to Fu-ch’ing ( a district near Fu-chou).85 Obviously this move 
was a reaction to Ch’u Ts’ai-lao’s movements. Ch’u actually sailed out with a 
                                                          
79 VOC 1101, Missive van Iquan naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, [received in] 
Taiwan, 22 Jun. 1630, fo. 486v.  
80 VOC 1101, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael 
Jacques Specx, Taiwan, 5 Oct. 1630, fos. 413r-v; fo. 421v. 
81 Ts’ao, Ching-hai Chi-lüeh, 58-59. 
82 Ibid, 46. 
83 Ibid, 58. 
84 Ibid. 
85  VOC 1101, Missive van Iquan naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, [received 
in]Taiwan, 26 Aug. 1630. fos. 497r-v.  
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fleet of fifty junks bound for Hsiao-ch’êng ( Tsiotia[D.]), a place near 
Fu-chou. 86  His absence gave Iquan’s business partners the opportunity 
remove their stores from Amoy to An-hai: 
 ‘…. upon seeing that Ch’u Ts’ai-lao leaving, Iquan’s people and the 
inhabitants of Amoy city grabbed everything which was his and on which he 
relied. They also killed (according to what we have heard) some of his 
followers. Thereupon, fearing that Ch’u Ts’ai-lao might come back, they 
returned to An-hai.’87  
In September, Ch’u Ts’ai-lao’s fleet ran into a severe typhoon and fifty 
to sixty of his junks foundered.88 It was only then that Iquan’s lucky star rose 
again because his losses meant that Ch’u Ts’ai-lao was no longer able to 
blockade Wei-t’ou Bay. On 15 October, before Ch’u Ts’ai-lao had returned to 
Amoy, the Mobile Crops Commander of Ch’üan-nan (Ch’üan-nan 
You-chi[C.], Jouckicq [D.]) and the Mobile Crops Commander of Wu-t’ung 
(Wu-t’ung You-Chi[C.], Gotoncquiou[D.]) of the Amoy residential troops 
promulgated a placard forbidding anyone to trade with Dutch vessels which 
happened to be in the vicinity of Amoy,89 but by this time Iquan had already 
assembled all the merchandise Dutch needed in An-hai: 
‘…The Chinese merchant Jancon has informed His Honour Governor 
Putmans, that various commodities such as gold, silk, candied sugar and 
other sorts of sugar etc. can be obtained free from interference by anyone in 
                                                          
86 VOC 1101, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael 
Jacques Specx, Taiwan, 5 Oct. 1630. fo. 413v.  
87 Ibid., fo. 414r.  
88 Ibid.. fo. 423r. 
89 VOC 1102, Resolutie in de rivier Chincheo gearresteert [door Hans Putmans ende 
raedt int Jacht Bommel ter reede voor Aijmoij inde rivier Chincheo], Chiulung River, 
15 Oct. 1630, fo. 511v. Ch’üan-nan refers to southern side of Ch’üan-chou prefecture. 
Wu-t'ung refers to Wu-yü and T’ung-shan. 
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An-hai….’90     
But Ch’u Ts’an-lao was not finished yet. Within a very brief space of 
time, he reappeared in Amoy in the name of the new Regional Commander, 
Chao T’ing, and dispatched some messengers to Governor Hans Putmans 
whose ship was anchored in the Chiu-lung River estuary. He demanded that 
every commodity the Dutch shipped to Amoy be traded through his agency 
only. 91  Such a condition was unacceptable to Putmans because it 
contravened the Governor-General’s instructions to him.92 Both sides never 
fully reached an agreement on trade. While they were haggling about 
conditions, Iquan was gradually building up his naval force in An-hai. At the 
beginning of December, Ch’u Ts’ai-lao again led his full force away from 
Amoy with the plan to secure some advantageous anchorages which, he 
thought, would obviate his being encircled by Iquan.93 Notwithstanding 
Iquan attacked Ch’u Ts’ai-lao on 16 December: 
 ‘…Iquan attacked Ch’u Ts’ai-lao, burned his brother’s junk and drove him 
off while he was scuttling away in a northerly direction with a few junks. 
Several days later, Ch’u Ts’ai-lao’s vice-admiral deserted him and 
surrendered to Iquan with four large and six small junks. …The pirate chief 
himself escaped.’94  
                                                          
90 Ibidem. 
91 VOC 1102, Resolutie in de rivier Chincheo gearresteert [door Hans Putmans ende 
raedt int Jacht Bommel ter reede voor Aijmoij inde rivier Chincheo], Chiu-lung River, 
28 Nov. 1630, fo. 515v. 
92 Ibid., fo. 517r. 
93 VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], 
Taiwan, 21 Dec. 1630, fo. 521r. 
94 Ibid., fo. 522v-523r; Wang, ‘Appendix I: Ch'ung-chên ch'ang-pien hsüan-lu’, 157. 
‘Chung Liu (alias Chung Pin or Ch’u Ts’ai-lao) was defeated in the sea battle of 
P’ing-lin Bay on 16 December 1630. He was killed and his followers fled…. On 28th 
the remainder of pirates arrived in P’ing-hai. They were approached by Cheng’s 
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When he was apprised of the news, the Dutch governor was excited 
about the potential trading opportunities this opened up and decided to 
transport 80,000 silver rials and 2,100 piculs of pepper and some other 
tropical commodities to the Chiu-lung River estuary.95 The Dutch were able 
to enjoy selling their merchandise without interference until 27 January, when 
the official Chinese New Year began and all shops closed as everyone went 
home to celebrate the spring festival. The Dutch merchants decided to send 
Senior Merchant Paulus Traudenius to An-hai: 
 ‘His honour Governor Putmans and the Council decided to dispatch Senior 
Merchant Traudenius to An-hai on the junk the Tancoya with 4,000 rials, in 
order to purchase rice and to use this as a pretext to see whether he would be 
able to get hold of some gold and silk, and also[to spy out] what kinds of 
commodities the merchants there have, so as to spur them on to bring these 
goods [for trade], because the sale of pepper has been disappointing and 
hence it has to be stored with the Company. Therefore we should get rid of it. 
The junk should be loaded with 50 piculs of pepper and 15 piculs of Elephant 
tusks to be exchanged by the said Traudenius for some gold, silk, or porcelain. 
In order to facilitate Traudenius’ access to the house of Theyma[ the mother 
of Iquan] and her son Cheng Hung-K’uei (Zija[D], Iquan’s younger brother), 
each one of them should be offered six bags of pepper and six yards of tusk.’ 
96       
Because almost no one came to the Dutch yachts for pepper during 
Chinese New Year, the Governor and Council decided to offer Iquan more 
                                                                                                                             
soldiers. Faced with such a menacing threat, they abandoned their war-junks and 
ammunition, and fled to Kuang-tung in small boats.’ 
95 VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], 
Taiwan, 4 Jan. 1631, fo. 523v.  
96 VOC 1102, Resolutie in de rivier Chincheo gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende 
raedt int Jacht Wieringen ter reede Aijmoij inde riviere Chincheo], Chiu-lung River, 
27 Jan. 1631, fo. 524r. 
THE SURVIVAL GAME 1628-1631 
 96 
pepper if he paid the last consignment of commodities off.97 Therefore, 
although the Dutch yachts moored by preference in the Chiu-lung River 
estuary or in the Amoy roadstead, they sent one or two junks to An-hai. On 
March 17, Iquan, who had been busily fitting out more his armada in An-hai, 
eventually managed to destroy the whole of Ch’u Ts’ai-lao’s force.98 This 
victory marked the last act of the game of survival played out by the pirates. 
Although the Dutch did not take part in it, they did begin to play a 
co-operative role soon after they stepped on the stage. They stopped cruising 
and let the junks from Manila return to their home ports in exchange for 
being allowed to enter the Chiu-lung River area by the Chinese Coastal 
Defence Force.99 On 12 June 1631, the triumph over the pirates was reported 
to the emperor’s court in Peking.100 Iquan might have felt encouraged by 
some promises from the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Hsiung Wên-ts’an, 
according to a message received by the Dutch in Taiwan: 
 ‘…Because Iquan will shortly be stationed in Amoy as Mobile Crops 
Commander [of Ch’üan-nan[C]]and his brother, Cheng Hung-k’uei 
[Sicia[D]], as Mobile Crops Commander of Wu-t’ung, our trade will depend 
greatly on him. Iquan requires 2,000 taels (he does not specify what for in his 
letter)….’101      
                                                          
97 VOC 1102, Resolutie in de rivier Chincheo gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende 
raedt int Jacht Wieringen ter reede voor Aijmoij inde riviere Chincheo ], Chiu-lung 
River, 8 Feb. 1631, fos. 524 v-525 r. 
98 VOC 1102, Resolutie in de rivier Chincheo gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende 
raedt in t jacht Wieringhen liggende ter reede voor Aimoij], Chiulung River, 1 Mar. 
1631, fos. 525 r ; Dagregister Zeelandia, I:1629-1641, 45. 5 Apr. 1631.  
99 VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], 
Taiwan, 29 May. 1631. fos. 532r-v;fo.533 r .  
100 Wang, ‘Appendix I: Ch’ung-chên ch’ang-pien hsüan-lu[Selections]’, 158.  
101 VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], 
Taiwan, 4 Jul. 1631, fo. 533v. According to a letter written by Grand Co-ordinator 
Tsou Wei-lien to Iquan, he tried to encourage him by recommending him for the 
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Later it was revealed that the 2,000 taels might have been restitution 
claimed for a certain Chinese junk returning from Manila which had been 
intercepted by a Dutch yacht.102 Governor Hans Putmans investigated this 
case immediately, and found it was possible that some of his subordinates had 
indeed committed the crime.103 Very probably the owner of that junk was 
paid compensation through the mediation of Iquan.104 After Ch’u Ts’ai-lao 
had been defeated, fifty-three junks departed from China bound for Manila. 
They were all involved in the smuggling trade. Were they sailing out under 
the cover of Iquan’s armada? Reviewing their overall tonnage it would seem 
that only one-quarter of the usual merchant junks visited Manilla and thus 
they might have been mixed among Iquan’s ships.105 This smuggling trade 
                                                                                                                             
position of Assistant Regional Commander (Ts’an-chiang) of the Ch’ao-chang in 
Nan-ao and his brother, Cheng Chih-hu, for Mobile Crops Commander of Wu-hu. 
Therefore in this letter ‘Sicia’ might actually refer to Cheng Chih-hu. Cf. Tsou 
Wei-lien, ‘Yü Chêng-ts’an-jung[Letter to Assistant Regional Commander Cheng]’, in 
id, Ta-kuan lou-chi [Works in the Ta-kuan House], pien-chi wei-yüen-hui [Editorial 
Committee of Ssu-k’u ts’ung-shu ts’un-mu ts’ung-shu](ed.), Ssu-k’u ts’ung-shu 
ts’un-mu ts’ung-shu, 426vols, (Tainan county: Chuang-yen Wên-hua, 1997), part Chi, 
no. 183, 269. 
102 VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], 
Taiwan, 30 Jul. 1631, fo. 534r. The claimed price was 1,900 rials. 
103 VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], 
Taiwan, 6 Aug. 1631, fos. 534 v -535 r.  
104 Daghregister gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse als 
over geheel Nederlands India[ Diary Kept in Batavia Castle about What Has 
Happened All Over the East Indian Area], 31 vols, eds Jacobus Anne van der Chijs, H. 
T.Colenbrander, J. de Hullu, F. de Haan and W. Fruin-Mees (Batavia and The Hague: 
Ministerie van Koloniën, 1888-1931), 1631-1634, 51. 20 Nov. 1631. (here after cited 
as ‘Daghregister Batavia’) 
105 VOC 1102, In het Comptoir Tijouan den 10en Augusteo 1631 Joctee Chinesen 
weever met eenige Coopmanschap jongst uijt China alhier g’arriveert zijnde ende van 
dit tegenwoordige zuijder musson in Manilha geweest hebbende, is door last van D Hr 
Gouverneur Putmans onder vraecht vande gelegentheijt derselver plaatse ende heeft 
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will have provided enough income to pay the salaries of Iquan’s troops and of 
the fishermen militia as well. After everything had been settled, Iquan was 
dispatched by Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an to eliminate a group of 
bandits hiding in the hills. This assignment was a confirmation that he had 
been accepted by the Chinese government after the pirate’s game of survival 
had been played out. The comment of one of his contemporaries reveals what 
the gentry thought: 
 ‘Although Ch’u Ts’ai-lao drowned, the rest of his people have fled away. 
Now that Iquan has removed his rival, we shall have to handle him with kid 
gloves. We cannot disband his followers too rapidly. We also cannot reduce 
their salaries too soon. Furthermore, as his revenue comes from the Dutch 
trade, so we cannot take that away and hand it over to public tender. ….In the 
Grand Co-ordinator’s report of victory to the emperor, he has implied that 
Iquan and his brother should be appointed Frontier Defence Officers. I think 
this is very wise.’106   
Although foreign trade was still officially forbidden, Iquan’s people 
had to be fed. Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an might therefore have 
tolerated Iquan’s smuggling trade in An-hai. As guardians and supervisors of 
the official foreign trade, under the emperor’s edict the Amoy authorities 
should not have allowed any foreign trade. Mindful of their official duties, 
after all the junks had returned from Manila, and only after that, the Amoy 
                                                                                                                             
geantwoordt [Answers given after his arrival in Taiwan by the Chinese weaver Joctee 
who has been in Manila during current south monsoon to the questions raised by 
Governor Putmans about the situations in that place] (henceforward cited as 
‘Information about Manila’), Taiwan, 10 Aug. 1631, fo. 555r. According to this report, 
53 junks were needed to carry the cargo 12 junks had done earlier. They might have 
been the vessels belonging to Iquan’s fishermen militia, because the tonnage of each 
vessel had been reduced to half and the profits would also have been cut.    
106 Tung, Ch’ung-hsiang-chi hsüan-lu, 84.  
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officials again issued a placard re-iterating the maritime prohibition.107 The 
order decreed that no Dutch vessel would be allowed to sail into Chiu-lung 
River estuary or its vicinity or the Amoy roadstead. Consequently, the An-hai 
trade was the only avenue open to the Dutch even though they were very 
reluctant to share the Chinese trade with their foe: the Spaniards in Manila.    
Picture 2. Embouchure de la Riviere de Chincheo à La Chine [The Estuary of 













Source: René Auguste Constantin de Renneville (ed.), Recueil des voyages qui ont servi a 
                                                          
107 VOC 1102, Missive van de Chinese mandarijn Soutongiou naer Aijmoeij aen 
Hollanders [Letter to the Dutch in Amoy from the Chinese Mandarin Mobile Corps 
Commander of Wu-t’ung (Wu-yü and T’ung-shan) ], Chiu-lung River, 8 Sept.1631, fo. 
556r. 
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l'etablissement et aux progrez de la Compagnie des Indes Orientales, formée dans les 
Provinces-Unies de Païs Bas [The Collections of Voyages about the Establishment and 
Expansion of the United Netherland Provinces’ East India Company], (Rouen: Chez P. Caillous, 
1725), Tome IX, 176. National Museum of Taiwan History, 2003.015.0036.  
Oringinal explainations following the letters: 
A is the City Amoy, where the Coastal Defense Circuit is holding residence. 
It is harbouring lots of ships fully laden with merchants. 
B is the great city An-hai, away from Amoy for 6 to 7 dutch miles. It is also 
very active in business and trade. 
C is a stone brige stands over the river, which is 350 pace long and is made 
on the arches of steady hard lime stones. 
D Erasmus Bay 
E The eiland Quemoy is also very populated, and fisery is prosperous. 
F The island Lieh-yü, where our [VOC] ships frequently anchored and traded 
with the coming merchants. 
G The island Ta-tan, which usually laid at starboard side when we went up 
stream. 
H The eiland Wu-yü or the temple, where our ships frequently moored behind 
and traded. 
I the Island Kulang-yü, laid opposite Amoy at the distance of one shoot of an 
iron canon. It is inhabited by lots of fishermans. 
K the island of tower (Kuei-yü), laid in the first narrowness of the Chiu-lung 
River. 
L The Mount T’ai-wu, a very useful sign of the Chiu-lung River, where 






OF THE AN-HAI TRADING EMPORIUM 
1630-1633 
 
1630: the exceptional year in which the Eastern Ocean monopoly of 
An-hai was established 
Over such a span of time it is difficult to tell whether Iquan knew that the 
Dutch in Taiwan had decided to put a brake on their cruising expeditions 
against the Chinese junks sailing to and from Manila. Historical fact states 
that in summer of 1631 the governor of Taiwan, Hans Putmans, visited Amoy 
to pay compensation for the loss of a Chinese junk which had been plundered 
on her way back to China from Manila. The local Hai-ch’êng gazette reports 
the sea ban was lifted in that year. Interestingly, the tax revenues which 
Hai-ch’êng had hoped for from the expected rise in shipping fell short of the 
high expectations.1 This local record runs counter to both the Dutch and 
Spanish accounts, which mention large numbers of junks sailing to the 
Philippines. The Dutch records state that fifty-three Chinese junks arrived in 
Manila that year, a number which tallies fairly closely with the Spanish 
records which mention fifty. 2  Perhaps this shortfall (many junks, but 
                                                          
1 Liang Chao-yang, ‘Hai-ch’êng hsien-chih’, 382. ‘In the year 1631, the oceanic trade 
was again permitted. But the customs revenues were still meagre’ The court records 
tally with this information, showing that the emperor ordered to open up the trade on 
4 August 1631. cf. The Minister of War, Hsiung Mingyü, Ch’ou-i Fu-chien k’ai-hai 
li-hai [Considerations on pros en cons concerning the opening of the Overseas Trade 
in Fu-chien] Setp. 1631’, in: Ch’ên Yün-lin, Ming-ch’ing Kung-ts’ang t’ai-wan 
tang-an hui-pien, vol. 3, 150-97at 192-3. 
2 VOC 1102, The Information about Manila, Taiwan, 10 Aug. 1631, fo. 555r; William 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN-HAI 1630-1633 
 102 
disappointing tax revenues) can be explained by the prevalence of smuggling 
which continued to paralyse the legal trade. As mentioned before3, fifty-three 
small junks carried about as much as twelve big ones. Since the officials were 
approached for permission by only a small number of applicants who wished 
to pursue licit trade, it would appear that most of the junks sailing on Manila 
were small-sized junks belonging to smugglers. Other evidence reveals that 
the size of a fishing junk was very similar to that of these samll trading junks: 
‘Whether, according to the instructions of the Honourable Governor-General, 
[our] junks should cruise between Fu-chou and Chi-lung (where the enemy’s 
stronghold is located) in the course of this voyage in order to intercept, 
confront, and attack Chinese trading junks sailing to or back from there, or 
whether according to the instructions from Japan, from their assessment of 
the situation in the Chinese trade, that we should save our expenses in this 
matter as [it seems the outcome of] a sustained cruising action against the 
Manila junks would be uncertain. [This is] because the many fishing junks 
which sail these waters every day are so big, they can scarcely if all to be 
distinguished from the trading junks. If some of them are hit or attacked by 
accident, this always arouses ire against us in China….’4       
It is true that two very important fishing grounds were located on the 
sea route between Ch’üan-chou and Japan, and that between Japan and 
Manila. The first lay very close to the sea route from Ch’üan-chou to 
                                                                                                                             
L. Schurz, Manila Galleon, (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1959), 71. On the other hand, 
according to Pierre Chaunu, the number was 39. Cf. Pierre Chaunu, Les Philippines et 
le Pacifique des Ibériques: XVIe, XVIIe, XVIIIes[The Iberian Philippines and Pacific: 
16th-18th century], (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N, 1968), 156.  
3 Cf. Chapter 2, footnote 105. 
4 VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert [door Hans Putmans ende raedt], 
Taiwan, 4 Oct.1631, fos. 543v-544r. Although it describes the size of fishing junks as 
‘big’, this is a comparison with the off-shore fishing junks. It does not imply that these 
fishing junks were as big as the overseas trading junks sailing to Siam and Java. The 
enemy in Chi-lung refers to the Spaniards. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 103 
Okinawa[J.] （ Ryūkyū[J.], Liu-ch’io[C.] ） and Japan, not far from the 
northeastern Taiwanese waters where an upwelling current forms a natural 
fishing ground. The junks sailing to Japan usually set a course towards these 
waters first before following the string of islands of the Ryūkyū Archipelago 
until they reached Kyushu. The second fishing ground was situated close to 
the southwestern coast of Taiwan, where a cold current (the Oyashio) meets a 
warm current (the Kuroshio). The junks sailing to Manila usually set course 
for the Pescadores, from where they headed south, sailing along the coast of 
Taiwan towards Luzon. This route crosses the fishing grounds where the 
warm and cold currents meet.  
It is amazing that the Chinese officials believed that by restricting the 
size of ships and the quantity of provisions they could carry they could 
confine the activities of sailors close to shore. This line of thought was 
decidedly impractical in the silk-for-silver trade, because both commodities 
occupied far less space than bulky goods like elephant tusks and deer skins. 
The coastal defence force was rarely in a position to offer these trading junks 
any protection. Its principal job was to prevent smuggling, and guard the 
shores. Fishermen, who always needed money, were far more 
accommodating and often offered merchants their services in delivering 
messages or supplying them with essential food and fresh water. Usually the 
sailing rhythm of the Fu-chien fishing junks to the different fishing grounds 
was governed by the fishing season. When they arrived during the season, 
they poured in in such huge numbers, the soldiers of the coastal defence force 
felt overwhelmed. Since the fishing fleets on the high seas were not regulated 
by any official authority , the pirates tended to fill the vacuum. The report of 
the Chê-chiang Grand Co-ordinator, Chang Yen-teng, clearly reveals his 
worry that these Fu-chienese fishermen were actually under the protection, if 
not the control of the pirates, who collected private protection money from 
them.  
‘The massive number of fishing boats causes problems. The fishing grounds 
situated off Chê-chiang province, off Tai-chou and Chang-kuo and Ning-po 
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prefecture yield ribbonfish. Only the Fu-chienese fishermen in Pu-t’ien 
district and Fu-ching district are skilled [at catching this species]. Several 
hundreds of their fishing boats arrive every July and August. This really huge 
gathering only disbands in December. The coastal defence force is 
embarrassed by the situation.   
…The pirates live in islands nearby. They choose their leader themselves and 
issue passes, which they sell according to the size of the junks, at a price 
ranging from 20 to 50 taels. Before anyone can begin to collect their catch, 
they must show them the pass which they have purchased. To issue a licence 
before the merchandise is sold is called’ Pao-shui ’, to levy silver after the 
merchandise has been sold is called ’Chiao-p’iao’ . This payment has always 
been collected efficiently in certain periods and has become a kind of custom. 
No one has ever even suggested that such a practice is illegal’.5        
The size of the junks used in the rice trade was probably not very 
different from that of the fishing junks. They were certainly not as large as 
the big junks which sailed to Siam or Java. In other words, they fell also 
under the protection of the groups which controlled the fishing-boat. At the 
times the fishing-boats were under the control of pirates, they could be used 
against the official authorities because the coastal defence force was too weak 
to prevent the harassment by the pirates. When Iquan was recruited to serve 
in the coastal defence system of the Chinese empire, he tried to satisfy the 
requirements of both the officials and the fishermen. He did not stop 
collecting the protection money since he needed the revenue to feed his own 
men, but he opened the door for the fishermen to take part in the Manila 
smuggling trade.         
When the Dutch decided to pay compensation for one plundered 
Manila-bound junk after Iquan had acted as mediator, the latter claimed that 
                                                          




he was more efficacious than the former officials in safe-guarding the welfare 
of the merchants. The Dutch did not yet realize that Iquan was not a proper 
official and that the Chinese administration had never asked for the 
compensation. The only solution the officials could think of was to forbid 
anyone ever to trade with the Dutch again. Emerging from this incident with 
a glowing reputation, Iquan might have seemed to have gained even more 
legitimacy to collect his protection money from all shipping, irrespective of 
whether it was legal or not.   
So far, no solid evidence has been found to prove that Iquan also 
intervened/participated in the Chinese smuggling trade with Japan at the time. 
This was precisely the period in which the Dutch were forced to suspend 
their trading activities in Japan temporarily because of the Japanese-Dutch 
conflict of 1628 in Taijoun. Their trade activities in Hirado were not resumed 
until four years later in the autumn of 1632.6 Coincidentally, the Portuguese 
trade with Japan was also suspended at more or less the same moment 
because the Bakufu had received the news that a Japanese junk had been 
attacked by a Spanish ship in Siam.7 The interruption of the raw silk trade 
which passed through these two important channels naturally drove the price 
up to a new height. The raw silk price reached 345 taels per picul in Japan in 
October 16318 and in Manila it was selling for 311 taels.9 Despite these 
inflated prices, the Dutch could purchase silk from the Chinese for only 135 
                                                          
6 Innes, Robert LeRoy., The Door Ajar: Japan’s foreign trade in the seventeenth 
century, (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1980), 185. Blussé, ‘Bull in a China 
Shop: Pieter Nuyts in China and Japan (1627–1636)’, in Blussé (ed.), Around and 
About Dutch Formosa, ( Taipei: NanTien Publisher, 2003 ), pp. 95-110 at 103,106. 
7 Innes, The door ajar, 266. 
8 Ibid, 280. Table 10. 
9 VOC 1102, Information about Manila, 10 Aug. 1631, fo. 555r. The raw silk price 
was 350 rials per picul. As one Japanese tael equalled 58 stuivers and 1 rial equalled 
51 stuivers, 1 rial equalled 0.89 tael. In this conversion, the raw silk price in Manila 
was 311 taels per picul.  
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taels.10 A simple calculation shows that the profits earned by the Chinese 
smugglers would have been at least 155 per cent in Japan and 130 per cent in 
Manila. Unsurprisingly they were loath to share this opportunity to make a 
large fortune. Besides the fifty-three Chinese junks which made port in 
Manila, approximately sixty arrived in Japan.11 Two junks belonging to 
Iquan also returned to An-hai from Japan in the winter of 1631.12  
How much profit Iquan actually earned from his fisherman smugglers 
is shrouded in mystery. However, in the above description the strong position 
occupied by the Ch’üan-chou or An-hai merchants in the silk-for-silver 
smuggling trade emerges quite clearly for the first time. For different reasons, 
the Chinese merchants in Chang-chou, the Portuguese merchants in Macao 
and the Dutch merchants in Taijouan were all temporarily excluded from the 
Japan trade in this exceptional year. The explosive growth of this trading link 
must have astonished every member of the newly constructed trading system 
which was based in An-hai.    
 
Towards the An-hai Monopoly in the Western Ocean: the Taijouan trade 
from 1630-1632 
The Dutch insisted on selling their goods from their yachts or junks at an 
anchorage in the bay of Amoy, in the vicinity of Amoy or Hai-ch’êng. As 
there was a ready market in Chang-chou for most of the commodities they 
had to sell, slowly and surely they had succeeded in building up a 
smooth-running channel of exchange through the good offices of Squadron 
Leader Hsü Hsin-su and Regional Commander Yü Tzu-kao when Iquan 
shattered their carefully laid plans in 1628. After his intervention threw all 
                                                          
10 The price in 1631 was 135 tael. Cf. Generale Missive, 1 Dec. 1632, in Cheng, De 
VOC en Formosa, 103. 
11 Innes, The door ajar, 635. Table A. 
12 Daghregister Batavia, 1631-1634, 61. 21 Jan.1632.  
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their projects into disarray, the newly appointed governor of Taiwan, Hans 
Putmans, decided to follow the Governor-General’ s instruction to trade 
directly with Chinese peddlers and carry this commerce out on a cargo by 
cargo basis. This cautious approach would avoid being saddled with the huge 
debt which was frequently the unpleasant outcome of paying advances to rich 
agents too hastily.13 
While they were busily engaged in selling their commodities to some 
adventurous peddlers, their old partners, under the protection of Squadron 
Leader Hsü Hsin-su and Regional Commander Yü Tzu-kao, were eliminated 
on the orders of the new Grand Co-ordinator, Hsiung Wên-ts’an. When Iquan 
showed signs of gradually shifting his base to An-hai in 1630, the Dutch saw 
his move as a second option to fall back on if they ran into more difficulties 
in and around Amoy. As some of their fears had been allayed after Ch’u 
Ts’ai-lao’s pirate force had been rapidly reduced in October 1630, the Dutch 
decided that it was safe to return to the bay of Amoy again to purchase the 
Chinese commodities ordered by Batavia. By February 1631 the trade had 
been more or less resumed on a normal footing and was busily conducted 
throughout the whole of the following spring and summer. Then, sometime 
around August 1631, Iquan was formally assigned to root out the bandits who 
occupied the hilly areas on the southwestern border of Fu-chien province.14 
After he left on this mission on 8 September on the orders of Grand 
Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an, the Amoy Regional Commander Chang 
(further name unknown) put up a placard forbidding any trade with the Dutch 
                                                          
13 Ts’ao, Ching-hai Chi-lüeh, 16. ‘These pirates who betrayed Cheng Chih-lung 
would lure the red-haired barbarians into Amoy waters and cause trouble.’ 
14 Liang T’ien-chi, ‘Hui-ch’ao Kuang-tung shan-k’ou chung-ling-hsiu têng kung-tz’u 
ts’an-kao[The Suggested Rewards for the Joint Forces to Attack the Bandits in 
Kuang-tung Chung-ling-hsiu]’, in TWYH (ed.), Chêng-shih shih-liao ch’u-pien, 24. 
‘Around August or September, Grand Co-ordinator, Hsiung Wên-t’san dispatched 
Acting Regional commander Cheng Chih-lung with Cheng Chih-hu to lead 2,000 
soldiers to Shang-hang District.’ 
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and requiring all Dutch vessels to leave Amoy and return to Taiwan.15 The 
Dutch drew up an account which has survived of what the Chinese merchants 
had purchased from them between 30 November 1630 and 30 September 
1631. 
Table 4-1.The various commodities sold by the Dutch between 30 
Nov.1630 and 30 Sept. 1631 
Commodity  Stored amount  
on 30 Nov.1630   
Sold amount 
on 30 Sept. 1631 
Percentage 
Sold  
Pepper  231,074 catties 198,024 catties  85% 
Elephant Tusks 6,412 pounds 5,312 pounds 82.8% 
Sandalwood   9,679 catties  800 catties  8% 
Cloves 1,659 pounds     48 pounds  2% 
Nutmeg 10,270 pounds   2,624 pounds 25% 
Source: VOC 1102, Notitie van de waere bevindinge wat aftreck ende consumptie volgens de 
lopende boecken vant Comptoir Taijouan in de onderheven coopmanschappen ‘tsedert primo 
November 1630 tot ultimo September 1631, Taiwan, fos. 565v-566r.  
This account provides unequivocal evidence that, although various sorts of 
tropical commodities were offered for sale by the Company, the most popular 
commodities were pepper and elephant tusks. These goods were sold in 





                                                          
15 VOC 1102, Missive van de Chinese mandarijn Soutongiou naer Aijmoeij aen 
Hollanders[Letter Written by Chinese Mandarin Soutongiou to the Dutch in the 
Vicinity of Amoy], Chiu-lung River, 8 Sept. 1631, fo. 556r.  
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Cash purchases 35,550(18%) 2,297(35.8%) 552 (21%) 
Bartered in the bay 
of Amoy 140,574 (71%) 3,075(47.9%) 872 (33.2%) 
Chinese merchant 
Gampea  13,600 (6%) 1,200(45.8%) 
Other Chinese 
merchants   8,100 (4%)  
Total amount sold 197,824 6,412 2,624 
Source: VOC 1102, Notitie van de waere bevindinge wat aftreck ende consumptie volgens de 
lopende boecken vant Comptoir Taijouan in de onderheven coopmanschappen ‘tsedert primo 
November 1630 tot ultimo September 1631, Taiwan, fos. 565v-566r. 
The table reveals that, even though some Chinese merchants (Gampea, 
Hambuan, Injeij Watting) obviously had larger amounts of capital to dispense, 
most of tropical commodities sold by the Dutch passed through the hands of 
the peddlers who carried small portions of goods or cash to the Dutch vessels 
anchored in the bay of Amoy. As Governor Hans Putmans reported: 
‘…So it is that the Chinese who come to the Chiu-lung River estuary with 
some commodities do so stealthily, running a grave risk not least because 
they are poor, obscure peddlers not men of property, and unless the Company 
allows them some credit, as indeed we have done so far, the Company must 
distribute its capital and receive some goods here.’16     
 
 
                                                          
16  VOC 1102, Missive van den oppercoopman Jan Carstens Naer Batavia aen 
gouverneur generael Jacques Specx, Taiwan, 30 Oct. 1631, fo. 560r-v.  
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Table 4- 3:  
















Paid in cash 
3,555 1,035.5 226.2 4,816.7 
(20.7%) 
Bartered in the bay of 
Amoy 








  810 810  
(4.7%) 









Source: VOC 1102, Notitie van de waere bevindinge wat aftreck ende consumptie volgens de 
lopende boecken vant Comptoir Taijouan in de onderheven coopmanschappen ‘tsedert primo 
November 1630 tot ultimo September 1631, Taiwan, fos. 565v-566r.The price of each commodity. 
Cf. Daghregister Batavia, 1631-1634, 52. 20 Nov. 1631. Picul = 122 pounds. 
The figures in this table leave no doubt that the bulk of the income came 
from the pepper trade, especially that conducted with peddlers in the bay of 
Amoy the total sum (23,279 taels) of the goods traded amounted to 32,591 
rials.17 Putmans’ report states that some 80,000 rials in silver coins had been 
made available before 2 February.18 Bearing this in mind, the proportion of 
                                                          
17 In 1632 one rial equalled 50 stuivers while one Chinese tael equalled about 70 
stuivers. Therefore one tael equalled 1.4 rials. See Appendix I, table E: the value of 
rial and tael around Taiwan, 1624-1661. 
18 VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende rade], 
Taiwan, 4 Jan. 1631, fo. 523v; VOC 1103, Missive van Hans Putmans naer 
Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, Taiwan, 10 Oct. 1631, fo. 339r. The former 
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capital which the Dutch invested on the Coast of China in cash and tropical 
commodities was about 10:4. Silver coins imported from Batavia 
predominated in this trade. 
Although it would be hard to say how much of this was invested with 
Iquan or with his merchants, it does give some idea of the scale of the 
An-hai-Taijouan trade during this initial period. The bulk was sold to the 
peddlers but certain established merchants were certainly involved. Gampea 
(Hung Hsü) and Bendiok (Ming Yüeh, alias Cheng T’ai) were the two most 
important merchants who represented Iquan in the An-hai-Taiwan trade. 
Bendiok took over the supplying of high quality silk goods after Iquan moved 
from Amoy to An-hai in the summer of 1630.19       
In his guise of Iquan’s servant, Gampea seems to have begun to deal 
with the Dutch in the area around Amoy after the defeat of Ch’u Ts’ai-lao.20 
As the tables show, his main duty was to take charge of the tropical 
commodities imported by the Dutch. Both of Gampea and Bendiok were also 
mentioned as food suppliers when the Dutch in Taiwan accidentally ran into a 
shortage of rice: 
‘… since last month we have been informed of the need for such a quantity of 
rice, owing to the enemy’s siege[of Batavia], otherwise they would have been 
able to deliver more than enough to cover our requirements. 
                                                                                                                             
source mentions that Putmans decided to take cash to the Coast of China and the latter 
reported that most of the cash had been paid out before 2 Feb. 1631. 
19 VOC 1101, Missive van Paulus Traudenius naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, 
Chiu-lung River, 7 May. 1630, fo. 478v; VOC 1101, Missive van Nicolaas 
Kouckebacker naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, Chiu-lung River, 2 Jun. 1630, Fo. 
484r. Hung Hsü and Cheng T’ai are two most prominent merchants who serve the 
Cheng family. Their active period and role correspond to those of Gampea and 
Bindiok in the Dutch archives. However no direct evidence of their identities can be 
traced. 
20 Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 46. 5 Apr. 1631. 
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….upon which we and His Honour [Putmans]unanimously decided to draw 
up a contract with the merchants Bendiock and Gampea for 1,200 sacks of 
wheat and about as much again of rice, to be delivered in Taiwan.’21 
Later the Dutch heard that a placard had been posted in Amoy on 8 
September, ordering them to depart to Taiwan. Nearly a fortnight later, on 20 
September they decided to send a letter to An-hai, requesting Iquan’s 
assistance. The response from An-hai was that Iquan’s mother told the 
messenger that because the mandarin ‘ who was in charge of the annual 
inspection of the junks’ had arrived, she could not help and asked them to 
leave.22 Both Bendiock and Gampea were depicted as maintaining close 
links with Iquan, in fact they were his employees.23 They sailed to Taiwan 
with licences granted through his intervention.24 On 27 September 1631, the 
governor of Taiwan, Hans Putmans, decided to pay each of them 100 picul 
pepper and 400 rials in cash as an advance which would enable them to barter 
for the goods they desired from the Company yachts moored in the bay of 
Amoy, irrespective of the hostile proclamation on the placard.25 Hampered 
by the absence of Iquan and put under pressure by the Grand Co-ordinator, 
Hsiung Wên-ts’an, the Dutch gradually acquiesced in trading with Iquan’s 
merchants rather than, as had been their wont in recent years, of with some 
                                                          
21 VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], 
Taiwan, 5 Sept. 1631, fo. 537v. 
22 VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], 
Taiwan, 20 Sept. 1631, fo. 539r.  
23  VOC 1102, Missive van den oppercoopman Jan Carstens naer Batavia aen 
gouverneur generael Jacques Specx, Taiwan, 2. Sep. 1632, fo. 227r. Both of them are 
referred as Iquan’s ‘creatures’; VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer 
Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, T’ung-shan, 30 Sept. 1633, fo. 227v.  
24 VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], 
Taiwan, 20 Sept.1631, fo. 539r. 
25 VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], 
Taiwan, 27 Sept.1631, fo. 543v.  
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obscure peddlers. Later, the Dutch left the Amoy roadstead and shifted their 
anchorage to an island in the mouth of the bay called Lieh-yü , where they 
waited to see what would happen next. When the stream of peddlers dried up 
completely, they decided to try to make official contact with An-hai in 
November: 
‘The Council…decided unanimously in agreement with His Honour [Hans 
Putmans] that because of the placard placed by the Grand Co-ordinator in 
Amoy (which forbids all our trade), now no one else other than Gampea and 
Bindiock will dare to come… and the trade will obviously slow down, to 
dispatch Traudenius to An-hai from Lieh- yü with 6,000 rials in an attempt to 
stabilize the trade to its former level. And in order to entice Mrs Cheng (who 
is a greedy woman), we shall bestow on her goods worth about 100 rials.’26      
The meesage seemed to be that only if the Dutch were to leave the 
place where the Amoy troops were garrisoned would their trade  be 
tolerated. 27  When he returned from his mission on a junk Merchant 
Traudenius reported that the 6,000 rials had been successfully spent mostly 
on raw silk and gold. Also In his opinion, An-hai could supply more than had 
been included in this order.28 When they heard this news, the Dutch in 
                                                          
26 VOC 1105, Resolutie gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende sijn presente raaden]int 
Jacht Wieringen ter reede voor ’t Eijlandt Lissua in de rivier Chincheou], Chiu-lung 
River, 8 Nov. 1631, fo. 214r.  
27 The next Grand Co-ordinator, Tsou Wei-lien, confirmed this smuggling trade 
between Iquan and the VOC had been tolerated by the previous Grand Co-ordinators, 
Hsiung Wên-t’san. Tsou Wei-lien, ‘Fêng-ch’ao hung-i pao-chieh shu [A Report on a 
Victory in the Battle to Eliminate Red-haired Barbarians]’, in id., Ta-kuan lou-chi 
[Works in Ta-kuan house], Ssu-k’u ts’ung-shu ts’un-mu ts’ung-shu pien-chi 
wei-yüan-hui[editorial committee of Ssu-k'u ts'ung-shu ts'un-mu ts'ung-shu](ed.), 
Ssu-k'u ts’ung-shu ts’un-mu ts’ung-shu, 426 vols, (Tainan county: Chuang-yen 
Wên-hua, 1997), part Chi, no. 183, 240. 
28 VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int 
jacht Catwijck ter reede onder t eijlandt Lissuo inde revier Chincheo, Chiu-lung River, 
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Lieh-yü decided to send another 8,000 rials to An-hai immediately, and 
dispatched another junk carrying all their remaining pepper, elephant tusks 
and 20-30 piculs of sandalwood from Taijouan to Lieh-yü to see what would 
happen.29 On 28 January, the Dutch gave both Gampea and Bindiok 300 rials 
because they were the only merchants who still continued to supply what the 
Company ordered.30 The upshot of these machinations was that in the spring 
of 1632 the Sino-Dutch trade fell into the hands of the An-hai merchants. 
Because no systematic accounts are available detailing the silver imports 
from Taiwan to An-hai, it is impossible to form some idea of the exact figure 
of the capital flow. What is known is that Batavia had shipped 80,000 rials to 
Taiwan on 1 July 1631 and some 20,000 rials still remained in Taiwan six 
months later on 7 January 163231. There is also evidence that 36,000 rials 
were still in store in Taiwan in April 1631.32 After calculating these amounts, 
it seems fairly safe to say that at least 96,000 silver rials were invested in the 
An-hai trade between April 1631 and January 1632, bearing in mind that the 
Dutch capital in Japan was still frozen by the Shogun during this period. 
Comparing this amount with the cash investment of 80,000 rials in February 
1631, this estimate sounds acceptable. 
Although the Dutch spent 176,000 rials in cash during the time they 
spent around An-hai between February 1631 and January 1632, the 
commodities they purchased were not delivered straightaway. The most of 
the goods had to be collected later either in Taiwan or in An-hai. As they were 
                                                                                                                             
1 Dec. 1631, fo. 215v. 
29 Ibidem. 
30 VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int 
jacht Zeebrurch ter rede ondert Eijlant Lissuw inde riviere Chincheo, Chiu-lung River, 
28 Jan. 1632, fo. 219v.  
31 VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int 
jacht Catwijck ter reede ondert Eijlant Lissuw in de revier Chincheo, 7 Jan. 1632, fos. 
218r-v; Generale Missive, 6 Jan. 1632, in: Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 96. 
32 Daghregister Batavia, 1631-1634, 10. 2 Apr.1631. 
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not sure whether they would be able to collect most of the goods before the 
south monsoon season in the summer of 1632, the Dutch authorities in 
Taiwan dropped their plan to intercept the junks which would be returning 
from Manila as they were afraid of running the risk of missing out on the 
goods which had not yet been delivered.33 In that monsoon season seventeen 
Chinese junks from Amoy and An-hai visited Manila34 And the Spanish 
records show that they exported about 114,279 rials from Manila.35 Hence 
the volume of the Dutch trade in An-hai was comparable to the Amoy-Manila 
trade, but the price which the Spaniards paid for raw silk in Manila was much 
higher than that for which it could be had in Taiwan. At a time at which the 
Dutch were reluctant to pay 134 taels per picul on the China Coast, the 
Spaniards were having to pay 360 rials (257 taels), almost double that price, 
in Manila.36 The bulk of the capital invested in An-hai by the Dutch 
                                                          
33 VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int 
jacht Catwijck ter reede ondert Eijlant Lissuw in de revier Chincheo, 7 Jan. 1632, fo. 
217v. The Dutch heard of the report from Japan stating that seven or eight junks were 
going to be fitted out for the run to Manila. They decided not to intercept them, which 
meant deliberately ignoring Governor-General Jacques Specx’s order to do so. They 
even consulted with Iquan about this matter.  
34 VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht der Goes liggende ter reede 
onder het eijlandt Lissuw [naer Batavia aan gouverneur generael Jacques Specx] 
[Letter from Hans Putmans on the Yacht Der Goes at the Anchorage nearby Lieh-yü 
to Governor-General Jacques Specx ], 14 Oct. 1632, fo. 206r. It also mentions one of 
the junk was intercepted by a Chinese pirate, Liu-Hsiang ( Janglau[D.]), on its return 
voyage. The Spanish records state that only 16 junks from China arrived in Manila. 
Chaunu, Les Philippines, 156.  
35 Ibid, 200- 219. The total amount of the Chinese commodities imported in Manila 
from 1631-1635 was worth about 571,396. 67 rials, therefore the average value for 
each year was about 114,279 rials. Chaunu accounted with Spanish ‘Peso’, which 
equalled one rial when circulated. Id., Les Philippines,30. The peso was equal to 8 
reales. Cf. Oskar Hermann Khristian Spate, The Spanish lake, (Canberra: The 
Australia National University Press, 1979), xxi.  
36 VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht der Goes liggende ter reede 
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consisted of silver coins, supplemented by some tropical commodities, 
especially pepper. After they had purchased a sizeable amount of pepper from 
the Dutch in the bay of Amoy in the 1630-1631 season, the realization that 
they could also reduce their costs if they purchased pepper directly from 
Batavia dawned on the Chang-chou merchants. When they were fitting out 
the junks for the voyage to Manila, they solicited Iquan’s help in applying for 
the requisite licences to participate in the trade to Batavia from Grand 
Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an.37 It is a recorded fact that at least one 
Chinese junk sailing in Iquan’s name did depart from Chang-chou and arrive 
in Batavia.38 Hence, by giving them these sorts of opportunities, the Dutch 
indirectly helped Iquan to expand his influence among the merchants of 
Chang-chou.     
As they trading season opened in August 1632, the Dutch began to 
contract business deals with the Chinese merchants again. With 32,000 rials 
in hand for their ventures, their first step was to visit Iquan’s mother and his 
brother, Cheng Hung-k’uei, an excuse they used to carry 8,000 rials to 
An-hai.39 When they had ascertained the price of raw silk , on 2 September 
                                                                                                                             
onder het eijlandt Lissuw [naer Batavia aan gouverneur Specx], Chiu-lung River, 14 
Oct. 1632, fo. 206r; the rate of conversion between the tael and the rial, see: Appendix 
I, Table E: the value of rial and tael circulating in Taiwan 1624-1661. 
37 Ibid., fo. 197r. Iquan had returned from his mission in the hills and spent a short 
time in An-hai. He also had a meeting with Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an 
whom he consulted about the strategy to be employed against the rising new pirate 
Liu Hsiang.    
38 Daghregister Batavia, 1631-1634, 73. 3 May. 1632. The junk left Batavia on 6th 
July 1632.  
39 VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int 
jacht der Goes leggende ter reede buijten t Eijlant Quemoij voor de reviere Chincheo, 
24 Aug. 1632, fo. 227v; VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht der Goes 
liggende ter reede onder het eijlandt Lissuw naer Batavia, 14 Oct. 1632, fo. 201r. 
Although the Dutch authorities decided to carry 32,000 rials to the Chiu-lung River 
estuary, they later reported that only 16,000 rials had actually been taken.   
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1632 another 6,000 rials were sent to An-hai to be divided in half between 
Gampea and Bindiok.40 A fortnight later on 17 September they decided to 
send another 20,000 rials and 600 piculs of pepper from Taiwan.41 After 
these sums had been dispatched on 14 October their remaining capital 
amounted to 61,600 rials.42 Therefore at least 93,600 rials in silver coins 
were collected to be invested in China in that season.43 This amount was 
about the same as in the preceding two years.  
 
The export of Japanese silver which had suspended on account of the 
Hamada Yahei Incident in Taiwan in 1628 was gradually resumed in the year 
1632. On 27 January and 21 February 1633, new loads of Japanese silver 
were shipped to Taiwan.44 Governor Putmans decided to invest 175,730 rials 
in a more conservative speculation, because he was worried that the Chinese 
merchants would not be able to absorb any more. On 10 February he again 
sailed at the head of his ships to the bay of Amoy intent on trading. From 
there he set sail to Batavia at the beginning of March 1633.45 In the short 
time he spent in the bay of Amoy, he found that the limited free trade 
                                                          
40 VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int 
jacht der Goes leggende ter reede ondert eijlant Taota in de revier Chincheo 
[Resolution issued by Governor Hans Putmans and his current Council on board the 
yacht Der Goes in the roadstead of Ta-tan Island in the Chiu-lung River], 2 Sept. 1632, 
fo. 228r-v; Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641,75. 2 Sept. 1632. 
41 VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int 
jacht der Goes ter reede onder t eijlant Aijmoij in de revier Chincheo, Chiu-lung River, 
17 Sept. 1632, Fo. 228r; Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 77. 17 Sept. 1632. 
42 Generale Missive, 1 Dec. 1632, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 103.  
43 Daghregister Batavia, 1631-1634, 148. 7 Feb. 1633. At the end of 1632 only 
16,000 rials remained in Taiwan. Therefore at least 77,600 rials must have been 
released up to then.  
44 Ibid., 151. 22 Feb. 1633.  
45 Ibid., 160-161. 4 Apr. 1633.  
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permitted with the An-hai merchants had been encroached upon once again. 
The merchants only dared to visit the Dutch vessels under the cover of the 
darkness. Putmans tried to contact Iquan, who had finally returned to An-hai 
from his bandit-eradication mission, so that he could push him to 
acknowledge the right of the Dutch ships to trade at the bay of Amoy, but all 
his efforts were in vain. He left for Batavia convinced that Iquan could not be 
trusted and feeling he was on slippery ground decided to suspend any further 
negotiations with the Chinese authorities. Why did Iquan suddenly become so 
reluctant to help the Dutch after he returned from the hills?   
            
Regional commander without a fixed base 
On 12 June 1631, after Iquan defeated the pirate Ch’u Ts’ai-lao, he was 
finally granted the longed for official status he had been promised earlier. But 
it was almost a year before the rank was formally confirmed on him and his 
adherents on 22 May 1632.46 In other words, tantalizingly Iquan was forced 
to linger eleven months before his rank was officially conferred. This gap 
offers a possible explanation of why his greatest supporter, Grand 
Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an , had kept silent about his smuggling trade 
with the Dutch. He had been abashed that he had had to fund Iquan from the 
public budget. In the meantime, Iquan had to make do with the rather 
embarrassing rank of ‘Fu-i You-chi ‘, which literally means ‘Commander of 
the Barbarian-deterrent Mobile Corps’. 47  
This provisional title granted by the Grand Co-ordinator implied that he 
had still not been accorded a permanent title. This fraught situation might 
                                                          
46 Wan, ‘Appendix I: Ch’ung-chên ch’ang-pien hsüan-lu’, 161. ‘On 22 May 1632.... 
Cheng Chih-lung was awarded the official rank of Commander of Mobile Corps and 
Cheng Chih-Hu was awarded the official rank of Defender.’ 
47 Liang ,‘Hui-ch’ao kuang-tung shan-k’ou chung-ling-hsiu têng kung-tz’u ts’an-kao’, 
48; 54-5; 57; 63. 
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have been one of the reasons Iquan had been willing to obey the Grand 
Co-ordinator’s order to do battle against the mountain bandits. Undoubtedly 
this military action had been deemed an essential exercise because one of its 
effects would be to protect the interests of the merchants in Ch’üan-chou and 
Chang-chou. The mountain bandits threatened the vital paddy-fields and 
harassed the merchants trading along the land route between Kuang-tung and 
Fu-chien provinces. As Iquan had been personally affected by these raiders, 
he was probably very happy to have the chance to eradicate them.48  
The bandits, some 20,000 of them,49  had originally plundered at 
random in the hills on the eastern border of Kuang-tung province in April 
1631 and had then gathered near the Mei River Valley, some 95 kms distant 
from the town of Wu-p’ing  in the southwest of Fu-chien province, about 
200 km from Amoy. This was far away from the area in which Iquan could 
exert what power he had. The bandits barricaded themselves in on the slopes 
of a mountain called T’ung-ku-chang, east of the Han River Valley. 
Downstream from here, stretched out along the Han River were located the 
most important paddy fields which were vital to provisioning the cities of 
Chang-chou and Ch’üan-chou. With such a prize at stake, no wonder Iquan’s 
mission was sanctioned by three high-ranking Mandarins: the Grand 
Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, the Grand Co-ordinator of Southern Chiang-hsi 
and the General Surveillance and Military Defence Circuit of Southern 
Chang-chou.50 A Dutch source discloses that Iquan departed from Amoy on 
his mission in September 1631: 
‘The China trade has recently lain under a threatening cloud, because the 
Mandarin Iquan and all his soldiers have been summoned by the Grand 
                                                          
48 For example, the porcelain was imported from Chiang-hsi and the preserved ginger 
from Kuang-tung. Both items featured on the Dutch order-list. 
49 Liang, ‘Hui-ch’ao kuang-tung shan-k’ou chung-ling-hsiu têng kung-tz’u ts’an-kao’, 
37. 
50 Ibid., 39. 
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Co-ordinator to pacify some rebellious Chinese who have fortified themselves 
in the mountains…..It has been a month since they left Amoy. He has taken 
his brother along with him too.’51    
Iquan led 2,000 soldiers to Shang-hang almost on the southwestern 
border of Fu-chien,52 and set up camp at San-hê-pa near the northern end of 
the Han River Valley on 8 October 1631. This site was not far from the 
eastern side of T’ung-ku-chang Mountain.53 The bandit chief whose name 
was Chung Ling-hsiu had fortified himself at a place on the side of the 
mountain which was too high for the government force to launch an attack. 
The bandits had robbed their food supplies from the fields in the Han River 
Valley and frequently collected taxes in the local river port called Hsin-tu.54 
Iquan’s first plan was to cut off the food supply of the robbers and only when 
this had been accomplished to attack them at Hsin-tu, which he did on 17 
October 1631.55 He dispatched only 500 musketeers under the command of 
his brother Cheng Chih-hu to ransack the port in a night attack. Forty-five 
vessels which belonged to the bandits were set alight, so that they could no 
longer be used to exact private taxes.56 As they could not do without food, 
                                                          
51  VOC 1102, Missive van den oppercoopman Jan Carstens naer Batavia aen 
governeur general Jacques Specx, Taiwan, 30 Oct. 1631, fo. 557v. Although this letter 
does not mention that Iquan approached T’ung-ku-chang by water, the Dutch knew he 
had left Amoy. Later, on 31 December, they heard that Iquan might depart from Amoy 
and head for T’ung-ku-chang. Probably the Dutch only knew he had travelled farther 
than Wu-ping, which was at the southwestern corner of Fu-chien. They believed 
Iquan’s destination was Wu-ping (written as ‘Boupijningh’ in Dutch) by water. VOC 
1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden, Chiulung 
River, 31 Dec. 1631, fo. 216v.  
52 Liang, ‘Hui-ch’ao kuang-tung shan-k’ou chung-ling-hsiu têng kung-tz’u ts’an-kao’, 
39. 
53 Ibid, 39-40.  
54 Ibid, 37.  
55 Ibid, 40.  
56 Ibid, 40. 
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the bandits decided to descend from the western side of the mountain and 
proceed to a port on the Mei River called Ping-ts’un. As this tactic had been 
predictable, Iquan sent his brother ahead with 300 soldiers while he collected 
another 1,000 soldiers for the final battle with Chung Ling-hsiu. When he 
heard that there were only 300 musketeers in Ping-ts’un, Chung Ling-hsiu 
lost no time in attacking them immediately, because he believed his troops 
were superior to Iquan’s musketeers. The scene is vividly depicted: 
‘On the 30th… 1,000 bandits with Chung Ling-hsiu among them appeared. He 
was furious with Iquan’s musketeers so he selected his best people to confront 
them. Chêng Chih-hu pretended to be poorly armed, and kept his real force 
hidden. The bandits saw he had only a few soldiers with him, gathered into a 
pack and launched a headlong assault on horseback. Suddenly many muskets 
were fired simultaneously and the bandits could not hold their position. Some 
were decapitated, others were killed in other ways, and the rest fled, so they 
were totally wiped out.’57     
After this victory, Iquan wasted no time but led all his troops in an 
attack on the bandits’ lair on T’ung-ku-chang Mountain. From 6 to 8 
November, Iquan’s soldiers destroyed most of bandits’ houses and food stores. 
The remaining bandits gathered 4,000 people to do battle against Iquan on 
the final day but all in vain. One of the officers of the reinforcements was 7.5 
km away while the battle was raging. He testified that ‘the sky was filled 
with gunshots and the faint sound of yelling’.58     
Iquan’s victory won him a high reputation among the officers who 
took part in this military action. It seems they were all astonished by the 
performance of his musketeers, who had skillfully repulsed an enemy at least 
twice their number. This was the moment at which the value of Iquan’s 
musketeers was burst upon the world. Small firearms were widely used in 
                                                          
57 Ibid, 37-8. 
58 Ibid, 41.  
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN-HAI 1630-1633 
 122 
East Asia at this time and therefore could not be classified as any kind of 
secret weapon but in that period, unless well-disciplined, the musketeers 
usually could still not gain the upper hand over archers. The overwhelming 
victory of Iquan’s musketeers against the bandits was only made possible by 
their discipline. A Japanese author, Kawaguchi Choju, had this to say about 
the military tactics deployed by Iquan: 
‘Iquan led his troops in an attack on the bandits from Wu-p’ing. He ordered 
every soldier and officer to bear a musket and divided them into groups of 
five men. They opened fire in turn while the spearmen defended them. In this 
fashion they pushed forward step by step until they had destroyed the bandit 
lair.’ 59    
Iquan himself was a very good shot. In the autumn of 1629, Li K’uei-ch’i had 
occupied the harbour area of Amoy and destroyed Iquan’s vessels, while 
Iquan fortified himself and his people inside the walls of Amoy. Li K’uei-ch’i 
was forced to drop his siege plans because Iquan’s musketeers managed to 
hold his troops at some distance from the city walls, which made an attempt 
to storm them impossible. It was said that: 
‘Iquan’s house was in the city of Amoy. He poured all his efforts into 
defending his own property. When the pirates stormed the city walls with 100 
men, Iquan fired two shots and killed two people with two shots. Li K’uei-ch’i 
was shocked by this, and made no further attempts to storm the town.’’60        
It was no coincidence that 600 soldiers, possibly his musketeers, were 
stationed inside the walls to defend the city .61 When Iquan captured the 
Dutch yacht the Westcappel in 1628, he enlisted seventy-six Dutch soldiers 
who had been on her to guard his house in Amoy62 and he probably used 
                                                          
59 Kawaguchi, T’ai-wan kê-chü chih, 8.   
60 Ts’ao, Ching-hai Chi-lüeh, 45. 
61 Ibid, 31. 
62 Generale Missive, 10 Feb. 1629, in: Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 79. 
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these men to drill a basic training into his 600 musketeers. The first muskets 
Iquan owned might actually have been furnished by the Dutch East India 
Company when he was hired as a maritime mercenary to intercept Chinese 
junks sailing to Manila in 1625. A contemporary Chinese record gives an 
impression of how efficiently the Dutch used these muskets when they 
intercepted Chinese junks: 
‘After the Dutch sailed, they anchored their ships on the high seas and 
scanned [the sea] with their spy glasses. If a trade junk hove in sight, they 
would lower several of their ship’s boats. Each boat carried six to seven men. 
As the junk sailed past, they would close in on her. If we exposed our bodies 
above the side of the junk to defend ourselves, they would fire their muskets 
[at us]and each shot killed one person, and not a single shot was ever fired in 
vain.’63  
Iquan’s 500 to 600 musketeers, sometimes reinforced by 1,000 to 1,500 
infantry soldiers, seem to have been the backbone of his mercenary force. 
When he was forced to leave Amoy and move to An-hai in 1630, Iquan began 
to build a fort which he could use as an emporium for his trade in rice, 
tropical commodities and silver. As already said, the trading season of 1630 
was probably his most profitable ever. The Dutch sources state that his fort 
was completed at the beginning of 1633. Gampea and Bendiok both admitted 
that they were the officers who commanded the soldiers who defended this 
An-hai fort.64 Now Iquan’s star was rising and he had achieved more than his 
original aim of feeding his own people. He had also succeeded in integrating 
the fisherman militia into his smuggling network and he maintained a private 
semi-permanent defence force of 500 to 2,000 soldiers. The naval force 
assembled with the consent of the local interests of the Chang-chou and 
                                                          
63 Chiang, T’ai-wan wai-chi, (Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chü,1985), 43. 
64 VOC 1113, Missive van Gampea aan Nicolaes Couckebacker, Chiu-lung River, 12 
Apr. 1633, fo. 537v;VOC 1113, Missive van Bendiock aan Nicolaes Couckebacker, 
Chiu-lung River, 12 Apr. 1633, fo 537v. 
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Ch’üan-chou merchants was part of this army. As long as the illegal trade was 
tolerated by the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, this official was prepared to 
overlook the fact that Iquan fed his soldiers from the proceeds of the 
smuggling trade.  
After December 1631, after the provisions Iquan had brought with his 
soldiers had been consumed, he cut short the military action and returned to 
An-hai for a while.65 His respite was of short duration as it was not long 
before he received another order to pursue the bandits deeper into 
Kuang-tung province.66 On 30 March 1632, Iquan’s troops finally succeeded 
in capturing Chung Ling-hsiu at the northern end of the Mei River Valley.67 
Most of the troops were due to have returned to An-hai in April, but Iquan 
was given more orders to pursue the remainder of the bandits into Chiang-hsi 
province the region into which they had fled in May.68 This time the order 
came from by the General Surveillance and Military Defence Circuit of 
Southern Chang-chou who also sanctioned the issuing of two months’ worth 
                                                          
65 VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int 
jacht Catwijck ter reede ondert Eijlant lissuw inde Rivier Chincheo, Chiu-lung River, 
31 Dec. 1631, fo. 216v; VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne 
presente raeden, Chiulung River, 7 Jan.1632, fo. 217v. Since Iquan did not depart 
from Amoy but left directly from An-hai, the Dutch believed he had taken the 
overland route and returned to the battlefield again. Liang, ‘Hui-ch’ao kuang-tung 
shan-k’ou chung-ling-hsiu têng kung-tz’u ts’an-kao’, 52. ‘Cheng Chih-lung struck 
deep into the neighbouring province but the soldiers ran short of rations and some 
succumbed to illness. Therefore he returned to recruit new soldiers and purchase 
food.’ 
66 Ibid, 54. ‘During December 1631 to January 1632,…The Fu-chienese Mobile 
Corps Commander of Fu-i, Cheng Chih-lung, dispatched by the Grand Co-ordinator 
of Fu-chien in response to the invitation of the Chiang-hsi Grand Co-ordinator. He led 
2,000 soldiers who carried enough provisions to last for three months, as well as 
sailors and ammunition, heading in that direction.’  
67 Ibid, 52. 
68 Ibid, 64.  
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of provisions for 300 musketeers.69 On 5 June, Iquan’s troop defeated the 
bandits in the mountain area of Ch’ao-guan, approximately 300 kms from 
Amoy.70 Although the size of Iquan’s musketeer army was small compared 
to the number of official troops dispatched from Kuang-tung and Chiang-hsi 
provinces, their efficiency gave them the leading edge in this mission. Just 
when the execution of the mission was drawing to its final stage, Iquan was 
summoned to return to Amoy again by the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, 
Tsou Wei-lien. Amoy was under attack from yet another pirate who was 
cruising the coastal waters of Kuang-tung province; his name was Liu Hsiang. 
A Dutch source records that Liu Hsiang’s fleet attacked the coast of Fu-chien 
in the first half of July: 
‘…The pirate Liu Hsiang has plundered the whole area of the bay of Amoy 
with about 100 junks. He has destroyed all Iquan’s junks anchored in the 
harbour of Fu-chou and killed a group of people. Iquan has returned once 
again from Wu-p’ing and travelled there render assistance to the Grand 
Co-ordinator (in Fu-chou). Consequently all traffic has been blocked and the 
coastal areas around the bay of Amoy have become unsafe.’71    
In short, Iquan had returned from his mission 300 kms away and rushed 
straight to Fu-chou to assist the new Grand Co-ordinator, Tsou Wei-lien, who 
had only been assigned to this position on 25 April. The latter must have 
informed Iquan that his formal rank had been approved by the emperor on 22 
May. The former Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Hsiung Wên-ts’an, was 
promoted to the position of Supreme Commander of Kuang-tung and 
                                                          
69 Ibid, 64; 55.  
70 Wan, ‘Appendix I: Ch’ung-chên ch’ang-pien hsüan-lu’ , 164. 
71 VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int 
jach ten Catwijck leggende ter reede ondert Eijlant Lamao, Nan-ao, 22 Aug. 1632, fo. 
224r. When the Dutch ships arrived in Nan-ao on the last day of July, they heard the 
news from one of their junks. The junk had sailed from Nan-ao 12 days earlier and 
had picked up this news from Taiwan. 
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Kuang-hsi provinces on 14 April.72 In order to set about securing law and 
order in Fu-chou prefecture, Iquan took up temporary residence on Wu-hu, an 
island located outside the estuary of Min River. Thereafter he was called the 
‘Regional Commander of Wu-hu’ . Because of Liu Hsiang’s depredations in 
the Fu-chou area, even the illegal trading junks were not able to depart on 
their voyage to Japan. In fact only four junks made it to Japan that year.73 As 
they were able to take advantage of the disturbed situation around the bay of 
Amoy, the Dutch could continue to run their barter trade with Iquan’s 
servants in An-hai undisturbed during the autumn, but change was just on the 
horizon. After Iquan had again successfully defended Fu-chou from Liu 
Hsiang’s raids in October, the new Grand Co-ordinator instructed him to 
carry a new mission, one which embarrassed him. This official wanted Iquan 
to enforce the maritime prohibition as a means to reduce Liu Hsiang’s 
strength. Iquan was caught between the Devil and the deep blue sea, either he 
had to try to legalize the Dutch trade or he might run the risk of being 
instructed by the Grand Co-ordinator to destroy the Dutch base in Taiwan, if 
the latter happened to be tempted to cast their lot in with the pirates this time. 
Although this was a seemingly impossible situation, Iquan still spent a great 
deal of time and effort trying to stifle this development in the bud: 
‘The Red-haired barbarians had once occupied the Pescadores, in an attempt 
to force the Chinese government to open a market for them there. Later they 
shifted to Taiwan, but from time to time anchored their ships off Amoy. 
[Tsou]Wei-lien frequently advised Iquan to keep them away from Amoy, but 
he refused to comply.’74 
A debate had been raging between two different parties at the imperial 
court. The different parties were divided about whether the Red-haired 
                                                          
72 Wang, ‘Appendix I: Ch’ung-chên ch’ang-pien hsüan-lu’, 161. 
73 Innes, The door ajar, 635. Table A. 
74 Chang T’ing-yü (et eds), Hsin-chiao-pên ming-shih[Newly Complied History of 
the Ming Dynasty], 332 Vols, (Taipei: Ting-Wên Shu-Chü, 1987), Vol.235, 6138. 
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barbarians were good or evil and whether the Chinese merchants should be 
allowed to trade with them in Taiwan or not. Iquan had chosen the Dutch side 
since he had just succeeded in creating his An-hai base, but, treading a wary 
path, he affected an indifferent attitude as if to deny his friendly relationship 
with the Dutch. At least this is the impression  Governor Hans Putmans of 
Taiwan had when he sailed from the bay of Amoy on his way to Batavia on 1 
March, 1633.    
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CHAPTER FIVE 
STORMY WEATHER AT THE IMPERIAL COURT 
AND ON THE SOUTH CHINA COAST 
1632-1633 
 
The Dutch Petitions 
During the summer of 1632, Iquan was summoned back to the coast of 
Fu-chien to ward off the raids mounted by the Kuang-tung pirate Liu Hsiang. 
For the duration of this mission he was placed under the direct command of 
Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien. This new Grand Co-ordinator had been 
profoundly shocked by the surprise attack of Liu Hsiang and in a hurry to 
remedy the situation he availed himself of a disastrous policy: the 
re-introduction of the sea ban. In October 1632 the Grand Co-ordinator 
reported the strong measures he had taken to the capital Peking.1 In response 
to this policy, Iquan had hurried to put his trade with the Dutch in order. 
Governor Hans Putmans reported that Iquan suddenly changed his attitude 
and became the obedient servant of the Grand Co-ordinator and the military 
officers at Chang-chou, Hai-ch’êng and Amoy: 
‘Besides, Iquan not only refused to let us station a merchant in Amoy or 
An-hai as before, but also to anchor our junks at those places. Moreover, he 
did not allow us to accept a consignment of timber which we had purchased 
                                                          
1 Wan, ‘Appendix I: Ch’ung-chên ch’ang-pien hsüan-lu’, 165. ’On 15 October 1632, 
the Fu-chienese pirate Liu Hsiang led several thousand followers aboard 170 junks to 
raid Min-an-ch’en. They plundered and slaughtered, sweeping all the houses clean. 
All the inhabitants fled and the citizens in Fu-chou were terrified… Commander 
Cheng Chih-lung happened to be in Fu-chou preparing for a new assignment in 
Chiang-hsi, therefore the Grand Co-ordinator diverted his attention from this in order 
to defend Fu-chou. …The pirates knew they were well prepared and decided to leave.’  
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on an earlier occasion. [This volte-face]seems attributable to the strict 
supervision of the new Grand Co-ordinator (Tsou Wei-lien) and other 
grandees.’ 
When Iquan’s merchants suddenly withdrew their co-operation, Governor 
Putmans was thrown into confusion: 
‘Meanwhile, it seems also that his (Iquan’s) merchants show more 
commodities than ever happened before. Whether this is meant to hold our 
necks and lure us to leave the coast soon, or to foster his own benefits and 
profits, cannot yet be judged.’2        
In essence, Iquan was trying to create the impression that his merchants 
were acting to please themselves and that they contravened his wishes. He 
now assumed the role of the director of a drama in which the ‘Chinese-Dutch 
peddlers humbly sent petition to the emperor’. His new role as a royal official 
constrained him to remain neutral, acting as if he had nothing to do with the 
matter. The main actors on the stage were now his merchants, not be himself. 
He masterfully created a spectacle around the Chiu-lung River estuary 
through his merchants. He also tried to convince the Dutch to act as friendly 
guests. In the same letter the Dutch governor Hans Putmans reported: 
‘Rushing back to An-hai from Fu-chou, on October 7 Iquan dispatched his 
representatives Gamsia and Bindiok, to greet Your Honours’ letter with gifts 
and sandalwood. On the same day they offered us an appropriate reciprocal 
honour and saluted us with cannon shots. It seems that Iquan was very 
inclined to receive us with appropriate ceremony. However, this does not 
accord with the customs of China and, because trading with us violates their 
                                                          
2 VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht Der Goes liggende ter reede 
onder 't eijlant Lissuw in de riviere Chincheo aen gouverneur generaal Specx, 
Chiu-lung River, 14 Oct. 1632, fo. 204v.  
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laws, he did not dare to do so, fearing to create an enormous scandal.’3            
Iquan had tried to explain his new tack to Governor Putmans in a 
personal letter sent three week earlier. He had written to inform him that via 
his personal connections he had begun to persuade certain mandarins to open 
up a trade corridor between Chang-chou and Taiwan. He implied that the best 
option for the Dutch was to obtain the legal right to receive Chinese 
merchants in Taiwan. Iquan put it this way: 
‘Nowadays our Emperor rules by means of severe punishments. Your Honour 
can easily picture how different the customs in our land are from yours. For 
the reason, not everything can be fulfilled according to your wishes. I have 
done my utmost to persuade various great mandarins in Chang-chou to 
obtain freedom of trade for the Company.’4     
Iquan also set out his plan to help the Dutch (and himself) by legalizing 
Chinese shipping in Taiwan: 
‘The Coastal Defence Circuit of Hsing-hua and Ch’üan-chou prefectures 
(Hsing-Ch’üan-Tao)[ Ts’êng Ying] heard that the great mandarin in 
Chang-chou will help Your Honour out in this trade affair. He has written me 
a letter asking what was the best way for people to go about their trade? 
Therefore I have addressed a letter to the Grand Co-ordinator in order to 
enquire how our people can run their business as before. What answer we 
shall receive, only time will tell.’5 
Iquan’s intention was to imply that he had persuaded some of his 
acquaintances to create a ‘public opinion’ among the local gentry. The main 
supporter of this move was the Coastal Defence Circuit of Hsing-hua and 
                                                          
3 Ibidem. 
4 VOC 1105, Missiven door Iquan aen den heer Putmans[Letter written by Iquan to 




Ch’üan-chou prefectures Ts’êng Ying,6 who was the key person in the 
issuing of all the licences for the Ch’üan-chou fishing boats and rice 
transportation junks and hence directly regulated Iquan’s An-hai trade and the 
smuggling trade with the Dutch. Ts’êng Ying had been appointed to this 
position in 1631 on the recommendation of the former Grand Co-ordinator 
Hsiung Wên-ts’an. 7  No doubt Ts'êng was aware of how the Grand 
Co-ordinator Hsiung had tolerated Iquan’s trade because this allowed him to 
maintain his troops. However, his co-operation with Iquan was not based 
only on secular interests, there is good reason to think that there might have 
been other grounds as well. Iquan had been baptized a Roman Catholic and 
during his expeditions in Chiang-hsi province he had been summoned to 
Fu-chou for several times by the Grand Co-ordinator. It is possible that he 
attended a Roman Catholic mass said there by the Jesuit Giulio Aleni. At that 
time there was a very active local circle of believers in Fu-chou who gathered 
around this particular Italian priest. Iquan and Ts’êng Ying were both 
members of this special group.8 No wonder in his letter Iquan seemed to be 
expressing an appreciation of Western trade policies, assessing that they were 
better than the closed policy pursued by the Chinese empire. Whatever the 
                                                          
6 All those efforts also recorded briefly in: Daghregister Batavia, 1631-1634, 119. 24 
Nov. 1632. 
7 Huang Jên, Kuo Kêng-wu,TWYH (eds), Ch’üan-chou fu-chih hsüan-lu[Selections 
from the Local Gazette of Ch'üan-chou Prefecture], TW no. 233, 68. ‘ In the year 
1631, Ts'êng Ying was appointed the coastal defence official of Hsing-Ch’üan 
(Hsing-hua and Ch’üan-chou)… This was on the recommendation of Grand 
Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an…’ 
8 Yeh Nung, ‘His-lai k’ung-tzu: Ai Ju-lüeh chung-wên chu-shu yü ch'uan-chiao 
kung-tso k’ao-shu[The Confucius from the West, Aleni Jiulio’s Missionary Action and 
the Chinese Works]’, Journal of Jinan University(Philosophy and Social Sciences), 
No.142(2009), 118-54 at 121; Ku Wei-min, ‘Ming-chêng ssu-tai yü 
t'ien-chu-chiao-hui kuan-his[The Relationship between the Roman Catholic Church 
and the Chêng family for Four Generations]’, Wên-hua tsa-chih[Revista de Cultura], 
50(2004), 69-79 at72-3. 
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case might have been, the new Grand Co-ordinator, Tsou Wei-lien, ultimately 
remained the only person who could legally issue passes to any Chinese trade 
junks sailing to Taiwan. Ts’êng Ying’s opinion, expressing the point of view 
of a lower-ranking official, would not have held any water with the Grand 
Co-ordinator. Iquan’s letter reveals that another high-ranking official was also 
involved in his lobbying. This ‘great mandarin’ who showed sympathy and 
was inclined to help resided in Chang-chou. Only because of the support this 
great mandarin did Iquan dare to beseech Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien 
to continue his predecessor’s, Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an, policy 
of granting passes and allowing local people to trade with the Dutch in 
Taiwan. The highest-ranking mandarin in Chang-chou was the Regional 
Inspector (Hsün-an), Lu Chên-fei, who was actually ranked more highly than 
the Grand Co-ordinator himself.9  
Hence it seems that Iquan’s party had lobbied the Chinese court to 
allow the Dutch trade ever since Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts'an’s 
term of office. According to a letter Iquan sent to the Governor-General 
Jacques Specx dated 6 November, these attempts had led to a dead end:  
‘So far we have done all we can to achieve freedom of trade for Your Honour. 
We have always been and still are sincere in offering a helping hand. 
However, our emperor refused to countenance Chinese engaginge in business 
with the Dutch in whatever form.’10     
                                                          
9 Wan, ‘Appendix I: Ch’ung-chên ch’ang-pien hsüan-lu’, 165. 15 Oct. 1632, ‘[the 
emperor replied] Tsou Wei-lien had been just assigned as the new Grand Co-ordinator, 
therefore he should not resign because of the pirate raids. All the achievements and 
failures of the Fu-chien government will be reported by the Regional Inspector’; Chi 
Liu-chi, ‘Lu-wên-chên kung-ch’uan[Biography of Lu Chên-fei]’, in Lu Chên-fei, 
Lu-wên-chên-kung chi[Complete works of Lu Chên-fei], TWH, I, No. 4, 498. This 
confirms that this Regional Inspector was Lu Chên-fei; Hucker, A Dictionary of 
Official Titles, 253  
10 VOC 1109, Translaet missive van den mandorijn Iquan aen den gouverneur 
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This situation explains why the new Grand Co-ordinator, Tsou Wei-lien, 
refused to fly in the face of the emperor’s order, even though Iquan pressed 
him to hand out at least a few passes for junks sailing to Taiwan, 
notwithstanding the fact that the Dutch obviously preferred to trade freely 
from their own junks in the Chiu-lung River estuary. Iquan reported the 
disappointing results of their lobbying: 
‘We have approached His Honour ( [Tsou Wei-lien]) several times, and 
seriously set out and championed the business prospect of the Company. His 
Honour replied, that we should exhort Your Honour’s people to return to 
Taiwan, and then passes will be granted to (Chinese junks to sail to) all 
places.’11   
In the other words, Iquan had arranged with the new Grand 
Co-ordinator that he could at least allow his people to trade with the Dutch if 
they met in Taiwan. After Gamsia and Bindiok had welcomed the Dutch, 
these two merchants sent petitions to the court. According to Iquan: 
‘Immediately a letter (signed by Gamsia and Bindiok) was sent to His 
Majesty (in order to procure some passes so as to improve the trade). What 
answer we shall receive, only time will tell. Because I treat everyone fairly 
and reasonably, I fear no one (although there are some jealous people who 
slander me).’12     
In Iquan’s opinion, the merchants’ petition was the best way to bring 
about the legalization of the Sino-Dutch trade. The Dutch considered this 
questionable. Their first objection was that the price of silk sold by the 
                                                                                                                             
generael [Jacque] Specx [Translation of the Letter from the Mandarin Iquan to 
Governor-General Jacque Specx], Chiu-lung River, [received on] 6 Nov. 1632, fo. 
213r. 
11 Ibid., fo. 213v. 
12 VOC 1109, Translaet missive van den mandorijn Iquan aen den gouverneur 
generael [Jacque] Specx, Chiu-lung River , [received on] 6 Nov. 1632, fo. 213v. 
STROMY WEATHER 1632-1633 
 134 
Chinese merchants in Taiwan would be higher than the price offered by the 
Chinese vendors who sold their goods in small lots in Chiu-lung River 
estuary. The second reservation was that the Dutch had been running their 
business in the Chiu-lung River estuary since at least 1630 more or less 
satisfactorily. Finally, although Shogun Tokugawa Iemitsu had ceased to 
issue passes in the year 1629 to 1630, in 1631 five and in 1632 three junks 
had left from Japan to visit the Spanish settlement in north Taiwan. In 
January 1633, a Japanese junk which belonged to a Chinese Anachoda named 
Kijko had arrived in Taiwan with a pass issued by the Dutch president at 
Firando, Cornelis van Nieuwenoode. Its cargo was worth about 10,000 
taels.13 This arrival of this junk from Japan would no doubt drive up the silk 
price in Taiwan. After due consideration of all these reasons, Governor Hans 
Putmans of Taiwan decided to take his trading capital to the Chiu-lung River 
estuary once again in the middle of February in 1633.  
Putmans sent a letter to Iquan explaining that he had come because he 
was eager to know what the Emperor’s reply to the petition of October 1632 
had been.14 Iquan replied immediately. He explained that the execution of 
the plan had been delayed because of some trivial problems but was going 
ahead nonetheless: 
‘As regards the trade, I have remonstrated with the Grand Co-ordinator that 
when I was in Fu-chou I went to fill my junks with cargo. He therefore sent 
an express letter to the court. His Majesty’s reply was that it has never been 
the custom to dispatch junks to Taiwan in the past, therefore proposal was out 
                                                          
13 VOC 1109, Resolutie bij d hr gouverneur [Hans]Putmans en den Raedt in Taijouan 
opt vertreck vanden E Willem Jansen (baeckende de medegebrachte contont als 
anders) genomen,Taiwan, 28 Jan. 1633, Fo. 220v; Daghregister Batavia, 1631-1634, 
151. 22 Feb. 1633. 
14 VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer de rivier Chincheo aen Iquan[The 




of the question. In response to this, I have written to several notable men in 
Chang-chou explaining that those people in Taiwan [the Dutch] are one and 
the same nation as those in Batavia (or Kalapa, the original name recorded 
by Chinese for generations).’15  
Under the constitution of the Chinese empire, all trade with foreigners 
had to be within the framework of the tributary system. Foreign rulers 
delegated envoys to pay homage to the Chinese emperor who symbolized the 
centre of the universe and the trade was carried out under the aegis of this 
diplomatic ritual as an extension of the exchange of presents. All foreign 
countries participating were supposed to have been registered on a list since 
the fourteenth century. The Europeans who had been arriving in Asia since 
the sixteenth century were all total strangers in this traditional picture.16 
Iquan had to persuade the emperor that the Dutch had taken the place of the 
Kalapa kingdom, because Kalapa (which was occupied by the Dutch and 
renamed Batavia in 1619) was known to the Chinese of former times. The 
idea was that, after the emperor had recognized the Dutch were based at 
Kalapa, the traditional trade with Kalapa could be extended to Taiwan and be 
legalized. It is a pity that Iquan did not explain this in detail and that the 
Dutch did not have the patience to wait for the outcome. The only matter 
which concerned them was whether Chinese junks would be allowed to visit 
Taiwan, yes or no.17  
Iquan was not able to offer Putmans any assistance in the trade in 
                                                          
15 VOC 1109, Missive van Iquan naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, Taiwan, [received 
on] 16 Feb. 1633, Fo. 235v. Kalapa is the original name of Batavia which had been 
recorded by the Chinese for generations. 
16 Cf.  John K. Fairbank, ‘ Tributary Trade and China's Relations with the West.’, in 
The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol.1, no. 2 (1942),129-49. 
17 VOC 1109, Missive van Iquan naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, Taiwan, [received 
on] 16 Feb. 1633, Fo. 235v. Iquan mentioned five to six junks were ready to sail. 
Since the mandarin refused to issue passes, they dared not to leave for Taiwan. 
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Chiu-lung River estuary and An-hai, because he had been assigned to other 
places. He wrote:  
‘Because I am now a mandarin and subject to the emperor, I am not allowed 
to trade. Therefore I cannot help Your Honour in the trade. The matters of 
trade are the business of the merchants and Your Honour should lodge your 
request with them and persuade them [to help you].      
Your Honour falls under the jurisdiction of the Mobile Crops Commander of 
Southern Ch’üan-chou (You-chi of Ch’üan-nan[C.]; Joukick van 
Swanglang[D.]) . Your Honour can write a personal letter to him, explaining 
the purpose of your visit, and ask him to issue the licences which would allow 
the merchants to trade. Your Honuor said in your letter that if the trade is not 
allowed, other measures will have to be resorted to. Let the above-mentioned 
Commander consider this.’18 
The evidence seems to indicate that Iquan’s plan for issuing passes by 
referring to the relations formerly maintained with Kalapa was not only 
doomed, but he personally was being transferred away to another post. He 
even returned the gifts sent by Governor Putmans with the same letter. This 
gesture terrified Putmans, especially because Chinese merchants were still 
125,741 guilders in debt to him according to the accounts up to 18 
February.19 Four days later, Iquan sent another letter informing Putmans 
about the petition. He mentioned that a group of mandarins had voiced strong 
objections to the legalization of the trade. Their opposition meant that the 
case now passed into the hands of the ministry of Rites (Li Pu, in charge of 
                                                          
18 Ibidem. 
19 VOC 1113, Per het Comptoir Taijouan aen het Comptoir Generael op Batavia f 
503,817:17:2 voor sooveel de naervolgende contanten, coopmanschappen, scheeps 
behoeften, victualien, ammonitien van oorloge ende andere restanten als uijtstaende 
schulden comen te monteren [The factory of Taiwan had been lent f. 503,817:17:2 in 
cash, commodities, provisions, ammunitions by the general factory in Batavia], 
Taiwan, 18 Feb. 1633, fo. 527r. 
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the tributary missions). Before the matter was settled, Grand Co-ordinator 
Tsou Wei-lien refused to issue any pass. Iquan warned Putmans that if he 
ventured to engage in the smuggling trade right now, public opinion might 
turn against to him. The best solution was to halt the trade for a while.20 In 
despair, Putmans now wrote a very long letter protesting that the Dutch had 
been the dupe of the Chinese officials since 1622. He addressed this letter to 
all the principal mandarins, including the Grand Co-ordinator, the Coastal 
Defence Circuit of Chang-chou, the Coastal Defence Circuit of Ch’üan-chou, 
the Regional Commander in Amoy and the Mobile Crops Commander of 
Wu-t’ung.21 Then he sailed seething with resentment but with empty holds to 
Batavia on the first day of March.  
 
Cry wolf again? Imperial permission for Sino-Taiwan trade 
Ironically, the eventual success of Iquan’s strategy was just on the point of 
materializing. The Ministry of Rites agreed that the Grand Co-ordinator had 
the right to issue passes to trading junks bound for Taiwan. Iquan explained 
this as follows: 
‘The superme mandarin in Chang-chou has sent a message to the Coastal 
Defence Circuit of Ch’ao-chou (Chootsieu[D]) and Chang-chou 
(Sonchieu[D]). His Honour has sent this notice to the Grand Co-ordinator 
[Tsou Wei-lien] and he had also remonstrated with the Imperial Council for 
Foreign Affairs [Ministry of Rites]. In the message, his Honour [announces 
that he] has decided to grant passes to junks bound for Batavia or Taiwan. It 
                                                          
20 VOC 1109, Missive van Iquan naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, Chiu-lung River, 
[received on], 21 Feb. 1633, Fo. 236r-v. 
21 VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Hocchieuw aen Combon van de 
provincie van Hocchieuw [Letter from Governor Hans Putmans to the Grand 
Co-ordinator of Fu-chien in Fu-chou], Chiu-lung River, 25 Feb. 1633, fo. 238v. 
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is a sure and rightful way to [gain] freedom of trade for the Company.’22    
It looks as if the other important mandarin the Coastal Defence Circuit 
of Ch’ao-chou and Chang-chou (Ch'ao-chang hai-tao) had sided with Iquan. 
Probably because the opinions of these two officials carried crucial weight, 
public opinion finally swung in Iquan’s direction. The emperor left the matter 
in the hands of the Ministry of Rites to decide. The time had now come for 
the Regional Inspector, Lu Chên-fei, the most superior mandarin in 
Chang-chou, to intervene. This mandarin dutifully recorded the emperor’s 
opinion on this matter and also noted how the local peoples had reacted to the 
maritime ban imposed by Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien: 
‘Regarding to the opening of foreign trade, the emperor has commented: ” 
The red-haired barbarians threaten us [by their attempts] to obtain trading 
rights. However, if all local authorities execute their administration as 
stringently as possible to prevent smuggling, their threats should not amount 
to anything much. Only because the Coastal Defence Systems have been 
corrupted and mischievous merchants trade covertly [with the Dutch] do 
such problems arise. At this court, we have still not made a decision about 
granting permission for this foreign trade. Someone has said it would be 
better to allow these people to trade in Manila rather than in Taiwan. My 
question is: since both of these are foreign countries, if we were to issue our 
junks permits to trade there, how can we force them to leave us alone? All 
mandarins should deliberate on this point and give your opinions.” The 
mandarins from Chüan-chou have argued that the opening of foreign trade 
would generate four kinds of interests. The mandarins from Chang-chou have 
asserted that piracy is not the result of trade with the foreigners. I [Lu 
Chên-fei]and Grand Co-ordinator Tsou [Wei-lien] have listened to these 
opinions and, knowing that everyone had a firm perspective in mind and was 
eager to speak out, we have judged most of opinions were in favour of 
                                                          
22 VOC1113, Missive van Iquan aen Hans Putmans, Chiu-lung River, [received on] 
23 Mar. 1633, Fo. 536r. 
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opening up.’23    
Yielding to the pressure exerted by Iquan’s party, Grand Co-ordinator 
Tsou Wei-lien declared himself willing to make a concession , but only if 
certain conditions were met. The Dutch should promise never again to visit in 
the Chiu-lung River estuary with their vessels. On 12 March, an official letter 
was issued by the Defender (Shou-pei[C.], Sijpeij[D.]) of Amoy, to confirm 
that the Dutch would be satisfied with such an arrangement: 
‘Now Their Highnesses do not know how Your Honour[the Dutch commander] 
will react. Therefore they cannot proceed with the matter. If the eight junks 
mentioned above are issued with licences, this will be with the precedent that 
they enjoy the same treatment as the junks sailing to Manila.’24  
Overjoyed by such a victory, on 23 March 1633 Iquan asked a 
merchant to send this official letter to Taiwan, accompanied by a private 
letter of his own. He was so excited that he even added some avuncular 
advice about how to address Chinese officialdom: 
‘If you have a notion to write a letter to the high officials of this kingdom, you 
should add the honorific word “gentlemen (Lao-yeh[C.], Lauja[D.])” after 
the titles of Coastal Defence Circuit (Hai-tao[C.],‘Haijtos’[D.]), the 
Provincial Military Commander (T’i-tu[C.], Titohous[D.]), the Assistant 
Regional Commander (Ts’an-chiang[C.], Samchangs[D.], the Mobile Corps 
Commander (You-chi[C.], Joukickx[D.]) and the honorific 
                                                          
23 Fan Hsien, Ch'ung-hsiu t'ai-wan fu-shih[Newly Complied Local Gazette of the 
Taiwan Prefecture], TW no. 105, 588. ‘The record was extracted from Regional 
Inspector Liu Chên-fei’s book ‘An-min chi-Lüeh [Regional Inspector ’s Memorandum 
in Fu-chien]’. The completed memorandum might have been lost and not preserved to 
present time. 
24  VOC 1113, Missive van Pongsipij aen Nicolaes Couckebacker [Letter from 
Lieutenant Peng to Nicolaas Couckebacker], Taiwan, [received on]12 Mar. 1633, Fo. 
537r. 
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“General-in-Chief” (Ta Chiang-chün [C.], Thaijtekoij[D.])” after the title of 
Deputy-Squadron Leader ( Shao-kuan[C.],Tiquans[D.]), Squadron Leader 
(Pa-tsung[C.],Betsonghs[D.]), Defender (Shou-pei[C.], Sioupijs[D.]). If you 
treat these people with courtesy, they will soon be championing the trade with 
the greatest assiduity and bestow their favour on the Company.’25     
His final sentence says it all: ‘This is a sure and irrefutable act [werk].’ 
In other words, his efforts to propagate the Dutch trade had prevailed. Grand 
Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien’s only condition was that the Dutch should 
promise never to dispatch any vessel to the coast of China again. On 30th, a 
‘letter of credence (Credentie brief)’ from the Defender of Amoy was 
received. In this he urged the Dutch to reconfirm this condition. This letter 
was mandated by the Grand Co-ordinator, the Regional Inspector 
(Hsün-an[C.], Sadnij[D.]), the Coastal Defence Circuit ( Hai-tao[C.], 
Haijtoo[D.] ) and the Assistant Regional Commander (Ts'an-chiang[C.], 
Samgangh[D.]). The letter is a genuine official document because it not only 
mentions all the highest ranking officials in Fu-chien province who were 
affected by this matter, but also carries an addendum, ‘ I have written to the 
Dutch governor, but have not received any reply. Therefore I am sending 
Your Honour this letter as verification.’26 
Iquan had pulled every string it was in his power to pull to have his 
trade with the Dutch legalized, but in his efforts he cut off all contacts 
between the VOC and the individual Chinese vendors. All trade would 
henceforth be controlled by the big Chinese merchants and if by some whim 
they were not willing to apply for passes to Taiwan, the Dutch would have no 
access to the Chinese market. Another worrying consideration was that, if the 
Japanese were to continue to visit Taiwan, they would soon outperform the 
                                                          
25 VOC 1113, Missive van Iquan aen Hans Putmans, 23 Mar. 1633, Fo. 536r-v.  
26 VOC 1113, Commissie ofte credentie brief door sioupij van Aijmoij bij den 
coopman Sidnia [Letter of Credence from the Lieutenant of Amoy delivered by the 
Chinese merchant Sidnia], 25 Mar. 1633, fo. 538r-v. 
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Dutch because they had the edge in price competition. The only option open 
to the Dutch was formally to establish official links and exclude the Japanese 
traders, under the pretext that their participation was deemed illegal by the 
Chinese authorities.  
Contrary to Iquan’s expectations, the Dutch in Taiwan did not seem 
overjoyed and replied ambiguously. The acting governor of Taiwan, Nicolaes 
Coeckbacker, replied on 6 April 1633: 
‘We shall remove our ships from the coast of China, after the commodities 
ordered have been supplied in sufficient quantities. Only after the said eight 
junks have arrived here with all the appointed commodities, do we promise 
that your strictures will be obeyed. If you allow Cheng Tai and Hung Hsü and 
the other merchants to bring the commodities in accordance with the order 
we dispatched, the Company will not only live with you in great friendship, 
but will also offer [you] some other special services [sonderlingen dienst].’27    
By the time this letter arrived on An-hai, Iquan had probably already left for 
Kuang-tung on his mission to pacify Liu Hsiang.28 Diplomatically speaking, 
the Dutch governor should have replied to the Defender or Regional 
Commander of Amoy rather than to Iquan who held no official position there. 
The former was the appropriate person with whom the Dutch should have 
had corresponded. The Mobile Corps Commander of Southern Ch’üan-chou, 
Chang Yung-ch’an, sent another private letter to urge the acting president of 
the Taiwan trading factory, Nicolaes Coeckerbaker, to confirm the message: 
‘I have sent Your Honour an earlier letter, but so far I have not received a 
reply. The three great mandarins dispatch their servants [hither] every day to 
                                                          
27 VOC 1113, Missive van Nicolaes Couckebacker naer de rivier van Chincheo aen 
Iquan, Taiwan, 6 Apr. 1633, fo. 532r.  
28 VOC 1113, Missive van Gampea aen Nicolaes Couckebacker, Chiu-lung River, 
[received on]12 Apr. 1633, fo. 537v; Missive van Bendiocq aen Nicolaes 
Couckebacker, [not located], [received on]12 Apr. 1633, fos.537v-538r.  
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hear your answer to our letter. Your Honour, please send us an answer 
quickly.’29  
These great mandarins must have been Grand Co-ordinator Tsou 
Wei-lien, Regional Inspector Lu Chên-fei and Coastal Defence Circuit. As 
the change of the monsoon season was imminent, the Dutch fleet could 
appear on the coast of China again at any time. To avoid the incipient 
catastrophe of the arrival of the Dutch fleet where it was no longer welcome, 
even before the Dutch had replied Grand Co-ordinator, Tsou Wei-lien decided 
to dispatch junks to meet it. Iquan sent a letter to Taiwan on 22 May 
informing the Dutch that four junks from Chang-chou and four junks from 
Ch’üan-chou were on the point of leaving carrying the imperial passes.30  
Acting-President Nicolaes Coekerbacker still doubted whether these 
eight junks would really show up in Taiwan, so he made cautious enquires 
among the Chinese merchants there, who confirmed this news, saying: 
‘Placards have been posted in the jurisdictions of Ch’üan-chou and 
Chang-chou, and also on all the gates of Hai-ch’êng city ( Haton(D.)) for this 
purpose, declaring that anyone who wants to take a junk to Taiwan after 
paying the imperial tax, as well as those people who intend to trade with 
Manila, can purchase their passes from the Assistant Coastal Defence Circuit, 
(Hai-fang t’ung-chih [C.],’ Haijon’[D.]) who is issuing the passes by order of 
the Grand Co-ordinator.’31   
                                                          
29 VOC 1113, Missive van Silouja aen Nicolaes Couckebacker, [received on]12 Apr. 
1633, fo. 537v. Chang Yung-ch’an was serving as Mobile Corps Commander of 
Southern Ch’üan-chou, vide: Tsou Wei-lien, ‘fêng-ch’ao hung-i pao-chieh shu’, 236. 
30  VOC 1113, Missive van Thee Silongh [Iquan] aen Nicolaes Couckebaker, 
[received on]22 May 1633, fol. 539r. 
31 VOC 1113, Missive van Nicolaes Couckebacker aen de gouverneur commandeur 
oft overhoofden comende met de schepen van Batavia naer Taijouan [Letter from 
Nicolaes Couckebacker to the Governor, Commander or Admiral outward bound to 
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Hence the first benefits of Iquan’s arrangement fell to the Chinese side; the 
Sino-Taiwan trade was legalized, using the example of Manila where the 
Spaniards had no official diplomatic ties with the Chinese empire as 
precedent. 
 
Red-haired Barbarians at the Gate 
Despite Iquan’s efforts, Governor Hans Putmans had long lost patience with 
the time-consuming procedure required to be granted access to legal trade on 
the basis of  unequal status. In a letter to the Gentlemen XVII dated 14 
October 1632, he had proposed to follow the belligerent example set by the 
Chinese pirates and make a strike, since when the latter had employed this 
tactic all of them had been able to force the Grand Co-ordinators to listen to 
what they had to say. He complained: 
 ‘This truly reveals the sort of treacherous and cowardly people the Chinese 
are. …  The more you deal with them with courtesy, civility, and 
punctiliousness, (as we have seen in a host of examples), the more they make 
us suffer and the more they push us around in circles and wear us out.’32 
Putmans had reached the conclusion that military means would be necessary 
to force any granting of permission to trade with Chinese vendors in the 
Chiu-lung River estuary. When he returned to Batavia in April 1633, he 
                                                                                                                             
Taiwan from Batavia], Taiwan, 31 May 1633, fo. 540r-v; According to the established 
pass-system, the pass was issued by an agent in Chang-chou prefecture, whose title 
was’ Hai-fang t'ung-chih’. Cf: Li Ch’ing-hsin, Ming-tai hai-wai mao-i chih-tu[The 
Overseas Trade System of Ming Dynasty], (Peking, Social Sciences Academic Press, 
2007), 320-25; This title is not included in Hucker’s dictionary and has been 
translated with the closest term. 
32 VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht der Goes liggende ter reede 
onder het eijlandt Lissuw [naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam], 14 Oct. 1632, 
Fo. 197r. 
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reported his experiences and revealed the plans he had made to 
Governor-General Hendrick Brouwer and the Council of the Indies in 
Batavia.33 After he had done so, they agreed to wage a war on China.34 On 2 
June, Hans Putmans departed from Batavia with a fleet of six ships and four 
yachts and set his course towards Chang-chou. 35  The fleet arrived at 
T’ung-shan Island, off the southern coast of Fu-chien province on 5 July. 
Here they met the yacht the Kamphaen sent from Taiwan on 3 June by 
President Nicolaes Coekerbacker to bring them up to date with all the 
negotiations which had taken place between March to June.36 On 7 July, after 
one day’s deliberation, Putmans made his decision: he assumed that this news 
was just another misleading lie and prepared for to launch an attack without 
further ado. He was confident that Iquan had no any knowledge of his secret 
plan. At that moment, five to six junks had just returned to Chang-chou from 
Manila. Iquan’s brother had put in charge of some of the war-junks en route 
from An-hai to the Kuang-tung coast where he was to take up a new 
assignment, but he bulk of his own fleet was still anchored in the Amoy 
roadstead after his second sea battle with the pirate Liu Hsiang.37 Is it 
possible that from the outset Putmans’ target had been Iquan’s force?  
Hans Putmans left only three yachts moored near Nan-ao Island, 
                                                          
33 Daghregister Batavia, 1631-1634, 161. 4 Apr. 1633; pp. 163-4, 22 Apr. 1633. 
34 VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, 
T’ung-shan, 30 Sept. 1633, fo. 228r.  
35 Daghregister Batavia, 1631-1634, 186-7. 2 June 1633; Generale Missive, 15 Aug. 
1633, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 110. The ship the Warmont was not in Batavia 
at that moment but was appointed to join this action.  
36 Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 93. 19 May 1633; VOC 1109, Missive van 
Hans Putmans naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, T’ung-shan, 30 Sept. 1633, 
Fo. 230r. The yacht the Kamphaen had been dispatched to meet the new fleet from 
Batavia.  
37 VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, 
T’ung-shan, 30 Sept. 1633, Fo. 230r. 
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with instructions to go after all Chinese junks returning from Manila, Quinam, 
Cambodia or any other destination to ports along the coast between Nan-ao 
and the Chiu-lung River estuary. He took the other seven vessels with him 
with the plan to destroy all Iquan’s war-junks anchored at Amoy at dawn on 
12 July. This surprise attack was a great victory for the Dutch fleet because as 
it had been caught on the hop, the Chinese armada did not have time to 
prepare for battle. Twenty-five to thirty great war-junks were lying at anchor 
when the Dutch fleet opened its bombardment. Realizing the hopelessness of 
the situation, many of the Chinese crews soon gave up the struggle and fled 
into the city of Amoy. The action continued the whole day and the Dutch 
ended up capturing three big war-junks and burned or sinking the others. 
When all this was happening, the commander of the garrison in Amoy, 
Mobile Corps Commander of Southern Ch’üan-chou (residing in Amoy) 
Chang Yung-ch’an was not present. He had been dispatched to Ch’üan-chou 
with his most experienced soldiers and had probably taken the majority of his 
war-junks with him. Iquan who had taken up residence in An-hai, had left his 
fleet in Amoy for an overhaul and cleaning. As Coastal Defence Circuit 
Ts’êng Ying’s report states that only five large war-junks of the Amoy 
garrison were destroyed by the Dutch, most of those sunk in the raid must 
have belonged to Iquan. Ts’êng Ying’s report specifies that ten to nineteen 
war-junks were sunk, so that more than half of them were Iquan’s.38 
As evening fell, the Chinese merchants Gamsia, Bindiok and the 
Defender Garrison Commander of Amoy (Wang shou-pei[C.], Angpij[D.]) 
                                                          
38 Lu Chên-fei, ’ Ping-pu t’i-hsing ping-k’ê ch’ao-ch’u fu-chien hsün-an Lu Chên-fei 
t’i kao[Report of Regional Inspector of Fu-chien Lu Chên-fei preserved in the 
Ministry of war]’, in TWYH (ed.), Chêng-shih shih-liao ch’u-pien, TW, no. 157, 88. 
‘Some ten more junks were burned by Cheng Chih-lung’s troops, while five junks 
were burned by Chang Yung-ch’an’s troops, under Mobile Corps Commander of 
Wu-t’ung.’  
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came to parley with Putmans.39 They were bursting with questions about 
why the Dutch had carried out a raid of this nature.40 It seems they had booty 
in mind since five to six Chinese junks had already returned from Manila, so 
Putmans probably fostered hopes of confiscating the remaining five to six 
richly laden junks which were due to arrive any time.41 Finally, ten days later 
on 22 July, the Dutch fleet did capture a Chinese junk from Manila with a 
cargo worth about 30,766 rials, including 27,994 rials in cash.42 By then the 
Mobile Corps Commander of Southern Ch’üan-chou, Chang Yung-ch’an, had 
returned to Amoy city. The letter addressed to Hans Putmans written by the 
Coastal Defence Circuit on 26 July was also signed by Chang Yung-ch’an 
and Iquan. They asked whether he desired peace or war.43 Three days later 
Putmans replied that what the Dutch wanted was to be able to trade freely in 
the Chiu-lung River estuary on an equal footing with all the other vendors 
rather than to be restricted to do business with specific merchants assigned to 
them in Taiwan.44  
The conditions the Dutch had demanded after their arrival in the 
Pescadores Islands in 1622 had never been officially approved. Iquan had 
expended much time and energy trying to persuade the Dutch that these 
                                                          
39 It is certain the ‘pei’ refers to ‘Shou-pei’, but what the ‘Ang’ represents s cannot be 
identified. 
40 Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 108. 12 July 1633. 
41 VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, 
T’ung-shan, 30 Sept. 1633, Fo. 230r.  
42 VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, 
T’ung-shan, 30 Sept. 1633, Fo. 230v; Inventaris vande Haer volgende contant ende 
coopmanschappen uijt een joncquen comende van Manila in dato 22en Julij anno 
1633 bij t jacht den Zalm voordesen Rievier Chincheo verovert, [Inventory of Cash 
and Commodities on a Junk Outward Bound from Manila on 22 July 1633 captured 
by the Yacht the Zalm in the Vicinity of the Chiu-lung River], [not located], 22 July 
1633, fo. 290v. 
43 Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 112. 26 July 1633. 
44 Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 114. 29 July 1633. 
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conditions were unacceptable to the Chinese Imperial court, but Hans 
Putmans remained obdurate. His motive might have been that he did not 
believe that the Dutch would be able to compete with the Japanese merchants 
in Taiwan. In other words, if they were to secure the Sino-Japan trade, the 
Dutch were limited to two options only: either somehow or other to exclude 
the Japanese merchants from Taiwan or to participate in direct trade with 
Chinese in the Chiu-lung River estuary. As it was, the Dutch seemed to have 
been convinced that if they harried the Chinese coast continually, they might 
be able to obtain opportunities to take part in the smuggling trade with 
Chinese vendors in the Chiu-lung River estuary. They also had an ulterior 
motive. Their reasoning also seems to have been that, if all Chinese naval 
vessels were destroyed, they personally could seize all the Chinese junks 
from Manila, which they had so far left to Iquan to deal with as he wished. 
The long and the short of it was that the Dutch appear to have believed that 
they could take Iquan’s place in the Sino-Japan trade.45 
In August, Iquan decided that his best option was to tackle the Dutch 
outright, but still no real battle took place. On the 24th the area was struck by 
a very severe typhoon, which forced both sides to cease their hostilities. On 
30 August, because of the hazardous conditions created by the strong winds 
                                                          
45 Leonard Blussé had correctly emphasized that Governor Putmans’s project was to 
follow in the footsteps of the Portuguese in Macao and win a free trade privileges 
from the Chinese court by means of eliminating any other force which happened to be 
cruising Chinese coastal waters. He also points out that the absence of Iquan was the 
factor which triggered Putmans’ aggressive action. However, in my opinion the trigger 
which fired Putmans’ aggressive attitude was the new Grand Co-ordinator’s, Tsou 
Wei-lien, plausiable decision to cut off the illegal trade between peddlers and the 
VOC in Chiu-lung River estuary. Cf: Leonard Blussé, ‘ The VOC as Socerer’s 
Appentice: Stereotypes and Social Engineering on the China Coast’, in Wilt Lukas 
Idema (ed.), Leyden Studies in Sinology: Papers Presented at the Conference held in 
Celebration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Sinological Institute of Leyden 
University, December 8-12, 1980, (Lieden: E.J. Brill, 1981), 87-105 at 101.      
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and driving rain, the Dutch fleet sailed from Amoy and returned to 
T’ung-shan Island in the south. The following day, they captured two big 
junks just returned from Quinam, loaded with cargo worth about 13,694 
rials.46 After this rich capture, they did not encounter any other fully laden 
junks as the south monsoon season was gradually coming to an end. Because 
the north wind was increasing in strength, they could not sail back to Amoy 
again before 16 October. 
Thwarted by the weather, the Dutch fleet was not able to put its 
strategy of blockading Amoy Harbour throughout of the whole southern 
monsoon season into action. Therefore the booty they had captured was far 
less than they had expected. On 22 October, the fleet of eight yachts 
succeeded in sailing against the wind to the outskirts of Chiu-lung River 
estuary. As he was well aware of the situation, it seems impossible to think 
that Iquan’s armada had not been feverishly recruiting new vessels to fight 
the Dutch flotilla during the past two months. After carefully weighing uphis 
chances, rather than opting for a pitched battle, he reverted to the old tactics 
that he had adopted earlier against Frederik de Witt in 1629. He let the Dutch 
fleet sail into the Amoy Bay and then sealed its mouth with suicidal 
fire-junks. As the Dutch confronted his 150 war-junks, they did not realize all 
these junks were all crewed by men who were potentially prepared to drop 
their vessels if it should be necessary for them to do so. In the battle which 
followed they lost two yachts. Governor Hans Putmans wrote: 
‘[We]had no chance to compete against their suicidal fire junks, [so we] 
                                                          
46 VOC 1109, Inventaris van de coopmanschappen bevonden in twee joncquen, onder 
de stadt Tangsoa op de wal sitende ende op 31 Augs- anno 1633 aengehaelt, ende voor 
een geode prijse verclaert, [Inventory of the Commodities Loaded in the Two Junks 
Captured in the Vicinity of T’ung-shan], location unknown, 31 Aug. 1633,fo. 291r. 
The total value of the goods was calculated from the inventory and the price list in the 




wighed anchor and sailed away. 
…, having blown towards their fleet by the wind, the Couckerken did her best 
to escape. But it was too late. Encircled by fifteen to sixteen big junks, the 
yacht was immediately stormed by them.’47     
Putmans led the other five yachts towards the Pescadores, where he 
summoned his council and declared that the projected war against China 
would be abandoned.48 
 
Lever effect of the Typhoons at the Imperial Court 
Superficially it seems that Iquan was the one who suffered from this Dutch 
raid, but closer examination shows that in fact it tended to reinforce and 
expand his already substantial influence. The two typhoons which arose at 
the end of August and in the middle of September prevented the Dutch fleet 
from blockading Amoy Bay. The upshot was that the combat between the 
Dutch and Chinese garrison troops did not happen around Amoy, but in the 
vicinity of T’ung-shan.  
When the Dutch arrived at T’ung-shan on 5 July, they acted very 
calmly. Five days later on the 10th they left and set course for Amoy, leaving 
only three yachts behind. They bided their time before launching any raid and 
allowed the five junks belonging to Iquan’s brother to pass through into 
Kuang-tung waters. This reticence was deemed advisable if they were to 
conceal their intention of surprising Iquan’s armada in Amoy. On 12th they 
began to attack the junks belonging to Chinese garrison of T’ung-shan. One 
of the crews, Thijs Hendrisen, reported: 
                                                          
47 VOC 1114, Missive van Hans Putmans aen de Camer Amsterdam, Taiwan, 28 Oct. 
1634, Fo. 2r.   
48 Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, p. 140. 31 Oct. 1633.  
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‘…we decided to follow your orders, and to destroy the vessels lying at 
Nan-ao. This was executed successfully. We attacked 28 junks and set fire to 
them. Most of these junks were equipped for war, and carried a full 
complement of soldiers. When they saw that we were in deadly earnest, they 
fled to land immediately.’ 49   
The report from the garrison troops states that there were thirteen 
garrison war-junks carrying 600 soldiers. Five junks were burned, even 
though they had returned fire ferociously. Their crews retreated to safety on 
land in T’ung-shan City.50 The leader of the garrison troops was the Regional 
Deputy-Commander of Nan-ao, Ch’êng Ying-lin. He was of higher rank than 
Iquan, and the Grand Co-ordinator, Tsou Wei-lien, apparently showed a 
marked preference for him as an reliable military man. After Iquan’s force 
had been destroyed in Amoy by Putmans, Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien, 
thought this might be a chance to get rid him or at least teach him a good 
lesson. He severely criticized Iquan, writing that his tolerant attitude towards 
the red-haired barbarians had caused this disaster.51 He also mentioned that 
the reason the Dutch fleet remained in Amoy rather at T’ung-shan was 
                                                          
49 VOC 1111, Missive van Thijs Hendricxden aen Hans Putmans, onder zeijl voor 
Wierings baeij[Letter from Thijs Hendrisen to Hans Putmans under sail to Ching-hai 
T’ou bay], not located, 23 July 1633, fo. 542v. Wierings Bay is ‘Ching-hai T'ou’ Bay, 
see picture 3. 
50 Lu, ‘ Ping-pu t’i-hsing ping-k’ê ch’ao-ch’u fu-chien hsün-an Lu Chên-fei t’i kao’, 
86. ‘ The thirteen junks and six hundred soldiers of the Chang-chou garrison opened 
fire with cannon… In the opening stages [of the battle] Hsieh Chi’s junk was burned 
by the Dutch, the other four junks were also burned… the sailors and soldiers landed 
from their junks and ensconced themselves in Fort Nan-ao while the Dutch ships 
ceased their action.’   
51 Ibidem, 83. Critical letter written by Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien to the 
emperor entitled ‘How my prediction came true when the Dutch launched a sudden 
assault. I accuse the Coastal Defence of negligence and urge them to expel the Dutch 
so as to redeem their laxity.’ The Regional Inspector Lu Chên-fei thought this letter 
apparently referred to Iquan and was blaming him. 
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because of the glorious victory won by Regional Deputy Commander Ch’êng 
Ying-lin.52 Perhaps for the same reason, this aversion to Iquan, the most 
important supporter of Iquan’s Dutch trade policy, the Coastal Defence 
Circuit, Ts’êng Ying, was demoted at the same time. 
Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien might have achieved his desire had 
not the two typhoons brought the Dutch fleet back to Nan-ao Island, the area 
under the command of Regional Deputy-Commander, Ch’êng Ying-lin. There 
the Dutch fleet not only captured two valuable Chinese junks from Quinam, 
but also seized 214 cattle from the coast as booty .53     
When the Dutch did eventually return to the Chiu-lung River estuary 
where it was defeated by Iquan on 22 October, public sympathy swung his 
way. The Regional Inspector, Lu Chên-fei, Iquan’s other fervent supporter, 
made no bones about this. Making a comparison between Iquan and Regional 
Deputy Commander Ch’êng Ying-lin, he said that the former had not only 
fought on water in other areas where out of his garrison zone and had 
suffered greatly, he had also helped the garrison troops in Amoy to win a 
glorious victory.（Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien had put him in charge of 
this military action because of Ts’êng Ying ’s recommendation). In contrast 
with his military proven prowess, Ch’êng Ying-lin had not been able to 
prevent the assaults launched on Amoy from T’ung-shan and had failed 
protect his charge properly when it was attacked by the Dutch. Consequently 
Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien was dismissed by the emperor after this 
incident.54 His fall from grace was also partly attributable to the disputes 
                                                          
52 Ibid., 84.  
53 Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641,127. 14 Sept. 1633. 
54 Tsou Wei-lien, ‘Appendix: ping-pu hsing ping-k’ê ch'ao-ch’u fu-chien hsün-fu tsou 
t'i-kao[Report of the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Tsou Wei-lien, preserved in the 
Ministry of War ]’, in TWYH (ed.), Ch’ing-tai kuan-shu chi ming-t’ai-wan chêng-shih 
wang-shih[The Annihilation of the Cheng Family from the Official Records during 
the Ch’ing Dynasty], TW, No. 174, 47-8. ‘On 23rd October 1633, the emperor issued 
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raging between factions at the imperial court as well as his un-co-operative 
attitude which had irritated the Fu-chienese mandarins. 55  
As a consequence of accusations lodged by Regional Inspector Lu 
Chên-fei, Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien’s impotence in military matters 
and in maintaining law and order in the local situation could no longer be 
overlooked by the court. The emperor ordered somebody else be appointed to 
his position. Ironically, the official order was issued on 21 October, just one 
day before Iquan’s victory in the Chiu-lung River estuary.56 Although the 
court still did not recognize Taiwan as an official trading destination, local 
opinion in Fu-chien was adamant about its commercial possibilities and 
Coastal Defence Circuit Ts’êng Ying issued the Ch’üan-chou merchants with 
provisional passes after February of 1634.57 Coincidentally, just at the same 
                                                                                                                             
commands in response to Tsou Wei-lien’s letter: how could the Grand Co-ordinator 
complain about the militants under him? He should have apportioned rewards or 
punishment according to their achievements and abilities. Tsou Wei-lien is guilty of 
dereliction of his duty.’. 
55  TWYH (ed.), Ming-shih hsüan-chi, TW no. 307, 153. ‘All the Fu-chienese 
mandarins who served in Peking accused him (Tsou Wei-lien) at the imperial court; 
consequently he was relieved of his post by the emperor.’ 
56 The Ministry of War, ‘Appendix: Ping-pu hsing li-pu tzu-kao[Letter Sent by the 
Ministry of War to the Ministry of Personnel]’, in TWYH (ed.), Ch’ing-tai kuan-shu 
chi ming-t’ai-wan chêng-shih wang-shih, TW no. 174, 46. The new Grand 
Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Shên You-lung, was appointed on 21 October 1633.   
57 Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 196-7. 21 Oct 1634.New Grand Co-ordinator 
Shên You-lung approved the provisional passes issued before October 1634 but some 
official had already issued these sometime earlier than that. In a letter written in 1639, 
Ts’ai Hsien-ch’ên had mentions that Coastal Defence Circuit Ts’êng Ying had issued 
the passes which allowed Amoy junks to trade in Kuang-tung with the 
acknowledgement of the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Shên You-lung, and the 
governor of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi, Hsiung Wên-t’san, This document confirms 
the official who was in the position to issue provisional passes was Ts’êng Ying. Ts’ai, 
Ch’ing-pai t’ang gao, II, 889-90.  
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time the Nagasaki regent was accused of issuing passes for junks sailing to 
Southeast Asia, including Taiwan, without the acknowledgment of the 
Shogun. His slap on the wrist meant that no more Japanese junks would be 
able to come to Taiwan with a shogunal pass.58 The sense of urgency which 
forced the Dutch to fight so hard to obtain free trade in Chiu-lung River 
estuary suddenly dissipated. The hostile feelings towards Iquan vanished as 
snow before the sun as the first junks sailed into the bay of Taijouan. In 
retrospect, during the summer and autumn of 1633 Iquan was facing storms 
which threatened his personal career at the imperial court and in Fu-chien 
waters, but after the tempests had been ridden out with luck and patience, 
both turned out to be very beneficial to him.  
                                                          
58 Daghregister Batavia, 1631-1634, 249-50. 19 Feb. 1634. 
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Source: VEL 272, Kaart van China en Formosa  
No. Place name along the coast 
 in Dutch 
Place name along the coast  
in Chinese 
1 Canton Kuang-chou 
2 I. Haitiumon Island Hu-t’ou-mên 
3 Macao Ao-mên 
4 P. Lantaon Cape of Nan-t’ou 
5 Pedra Branca Ta-hsing 
6 Haarlems Bai/ Pingaisou P’ing-hai-so 
7 Branders Bay/ Kamptsou Yen-chou 
8 Kramers bay Hou-mên  
9 Pesaau de schaar/ Groote imbocht Pai-sha-hu 
10 Oucham Wu-kan near by 
 (Groeningen Bay/ Tien-wei)  
11 Reiersens bai/ Cathei Chia-tzu 
12 Cape de Goed hoop/ Phcio Ch’ien-ao 
13 Tsinsing Shên-ch’üan  
14 Nassouen bai/ onbekende imbocht （Ch’ih-ao） 
15 Wieringens bai/Zinhaisou Ching-hai-so 
16 Orangebai/ Zoatoupou Ch’i-t’ou-p’u* 
17 I. Lama/ Lamon Island Nan-ao 
18 Klox bay Bay of Clock/ 
Bay of Hsüan-chungi 
19 Tongsoa T’ung-shan 
20 Tongsoa/ victorie bay Bay of T’ung-shan 
21 Walvis bai Bay of Whale / 
 Bay of Liu-aoii 
22 Tinhaij Chên-hai 
23 Berg van Chinchieu Mountain South Ta-wu 
24 Quemoy Quemoy 
                                                          
i ‘Hsüan-chung’ literally means ’a clock hanged’.  
ii ‘Liu-ao’ literally means ‘six gigantic fishs’. 
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25 Aimon Amoy 
26 Haiting Hai-ch’êng 
27 R. Cinchieu Chiu-lung River 
The Chinese place names are mostly taken from ‘Yen-hai Ch’üan-t’u [The Compelete 
Coastal Map of China] ’in: Ch’ên Lun-chiung, Hai-kuo Wên-chien-lü [My Knowledge 
about the Regions Abroad], T’ai-wan Wên-hsien Shih-liao Ts’ung-k’an 
[Compilation of historical documents relating to Taiwan] vol. 7, 36-69; * Hao 
Yü-lin, Fu-chien T’ung-chih [The General Gazette of Fuchien], Ching-yin 





THE WINDING WAYS 
TOWARDS THE WESTERN OCEAN 
1631-1636 
First dip into the Western Ocean 
The legalization of Iquan’s Sino-Taiwan trade appears to have been a natural 
consequence of his own growing official status. In view of his personal 
involvement with the VOC in Taiwan and the mercenary character of his 
troops, it was a simple and efficient way to maintain the regional peace and 
keep the balance between the multiple interests of the imperial court, the 
VOC and the Fu-chienese. The burden of Iquan’s song as he tried to convince 
imperial court was that the Dutch were the natural successors to the people of 
Kalapa since Batavia had been founded at the same place. Therefore the trade 
with Taiwan should be seen as the continuation of the former trade with 
Kalapa. The Taiwan trade should be categorized under the title of Batavia 
trade and as a matter of course be slotted into to the traditional ‘Western 
Ocean’ trading route of the Chang-chou or Hai-ch’êng merchants, rather than 
that of the Ch’üan-chou merchants represented by Iquan.  
As mentioned before, for the years, 1630-1632 the VOC trade with 
Japan was interrupted because of the violent incident involving the Japanese 
merchant Hamada Yahei in Taiwan but the burgeoning trade between Taiwan 
and An-hai was substantially swelling the existing trade between Amoy and 
Batavia. Since Iquan’s raids on the coast of Fu-chien in 1629, Chinese 
foreign trade had been either prohibited by the Chinese authorities or 
obstructed by pirates. Naturally, this upheaval also caused an interruption of 
the regular visits of the Chinese junks to Batavia. The Dutch records show 
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that by the end of 1629 no junks had visited Batavia for two years.1 The 
Chinese merchants who lived in Batavia had been doing their best to run the 
trade via the Batavia-Taiwan-Amoy axis. Limlacco had dispatched his junks 
with his son-in-law, Boyco, on board to Taiwan on private business.2 Boyco 
and another Chinese merchant from Batavia, named Jancon, joined forces to 
purchase the pepper from the Dutch in Taiwan and then tried to sell it in 
Hai-ch’êng.3 Bendiock was also deeply involved in doing business with 
them. Later, owing to the restrictions of the Amoy authorities and the 
harassment inflicted by Ch’u T’sai-lao, the trade gradually shifted to An-hai 
and Jancon was the person who was dispatched by Governor Hans Putmans 
to examine whether the An-hai could offer the Company any useful 
commodities. 4  As the partnership between Iquan and the Dutch was 
beginning to be constructed on a more solid foundation, these Chinese 
merchants from Batavia might have been seeking closer contact with Iquan’s 
merchants with a view to doing business.  
In the year 1631, because the pirate Ch’u T’sai-lao had been 
                                                          
1 VOC 1098, Missive van Pieter Nuijts naer Amsterdam aen de Kamer Amsterdam, 
Batavia, 15 Dec. 1626, fos. 319v-320r.  
2 VOC 1101, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael 
Jan Pietersz Coen, Chiu-lung River, 5 Oct. 1630, fo. 420r; Resolutie des Comptoirs 
Taijouan, Taiwan, 27 Feb. 1630, Fo. 424r.Because Governor Hans Putmans insisted, 
the Council decided to flout the instruction of Governor-General Jacques Specx, and 
lend Boyco and Jancon 400 piculs of pepper, accepting Limlacco’s property in 
Batavia as surety.  
3 VOC 1101, Missive van Paulus Traudenius naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, 
Chiulung River, 11 Apr. 1630, fo. 475r-v. 
4 VOC 1102, Resolutie in de rivier Chincheo gearresteert [Resolution Made on the 
Chi-lung River], 15 Oct. 15 Oct. 1630, fo. 511v. About the activities of Chinese 
merchants in Batavia running this axis, Cf. Leonard Blussé, ‘Chapter IV Testment to a 
Towkay: Jan con, Batavia and the Dutch China trade’, in id., Strange Company: 
Chinese settlers, mestizo women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia, (Dordrecht: Foris 
Publications, 1986), 49-96.   
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defeated by Iquan at the end of the previous year, the Chinese authorities 
decided to relax the maritime prohibitions and allow the Fu-chienese junks 
sailed to Southeast Asia again.5 According to the news passed on to the 
Dutch by Chinese merchants in Japan, five junks had been fitted out to sail to 
Batavia in the spring.6 Certainly, in July 1631 five junks returned to China 
from Batavia. One of them carried a cargo worth about 60,000 rials, double 
the value of the average cargo of junks visiting Manila.7 Perhaps the Chinese 
citizens in Batavia were lured by this sort of lucrative trade and this 
enticement to riches stimulated them to look for alterative channels to pursue 
the trade rather than merely sending junks under Dutch supervision. The 
solution was simple. All they had to do to run their business was to acquire 
Iquan’s help which would enable them to use the junks which departed from 
Amoy. At this time the Dutch did hear rumours that there were two merchants 
in Haich’êng who had tried to obtain official Chinese licences for Batavia, 
probably via Iquan.8 In the spring of 1632, news came that Iquan had 
decided to dispatch junks to Batavia and these would be accompanied by 
those of other merchants.9 He had sent one of his nephews, Huang Liu-kuan
（which is written in Dutch as ’ Lacqua’, ‘Lacknio’ or ’ Lacknia’), on one of 
the three big junks bound for Batavia.10 
                                                          
5 Liang,‘Hai-ch'êng hsien-chih’, 382. 
6 Daghregister Batavia, 1631-1634, 9. 28 Mar. 1631. 
7 Daghregister Batavia, 1631-1634, 30. 18 July 1631. 
8 VOC 1107, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael 
Jacques Specx, 9 Nov. 1631, Fo. 197r. Iquan was then summoned by the new Grand 
Co-ordinator , Tsou Wei-lien, to defend Fu-chou after intelligence had reached there 
that the pirate Liu Hsiang was approaching.  
9 VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Putmans ende sijne presente raeden, Chiu-lung 
River, 7 Jan. 1632, Fo. 218r. 
10 VOC 1105, Missive van Iquan naer Lissuw[Lieh-yü] aen Hans Putmans, 23 Sept. 
1632, Fo. 209r. He is called a nephew (neef) of Iquan and therefore was quite 
probably Huang Chêng-ming, a sixth cousin of Coxinga’s on his mother’s side. Cf. 
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The Huang family were probably among the Fu-chienese merchants 
residing in the vicinity of Macao, which was Iquan’s step-mother’s native 
place. It was said that Iquan began his overseas adventures when he ran away 
from his parents and went to see his step-mother’s brother, Huang Ch’eng, in 
Macao. Huang Liu-kuan must have been related to a branch of this Huang 
family in Kuang-tung. He was one of the merchants frequently seen trading 
with the Dutch in An-hai, where he was almost as prominent as Biendiok and 
Gamsia.11 The junk arrived in Batavia on 24 April and departed nearly two 
months later on 6 July carrying 300 picul of pepper with a large quantity of 
silver coins and some sandalwood.12 Unfortunately the junk did not enjoy a 
smooth passage home. She had departed too late and the monsoon changed 
direction as she neared the coast of Kuang-tung. Unable to sail farther north, 
she entered the mouth of the Pearl River on 2 September. Her choice of 
destination violated the imperial regulation which did not tolerate any junk 
sailing into this river without prior permission. Huang Liu-kuan had probably 
dared to break this law because he knew Iquan’s old friend, former Fu-chien 
Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an who had subsequently been appointed 
Supreme Commander of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi provinces. Although he 
had knowingly violated imperial regulations, he did possess a valid licence 
                                                                                                                             
VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael 
Jacque Specx, Taiwan, 6 Nov. 1632, fo. 218v; VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans 
uijt het jacht der Goes liggende ter reede onder het eijlandt Lissuw[Lieh-yü] in de 
rivier van Chincheo aen Paulus Traudenius, Chiu-lung River, 14 Oct. 1632, fo. 202v. 
This letter mentions that the previous Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Hsiung 
Wên-t’san, had issued three licences for Iquan’s people. Although Liu-kuan is the 
person whose name best fits the transliteration, Lacqua, there is no direct evidence to 
indicate they are identical.  
11 VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Putmans ende sijne presente raeden, Chiu-lung 
River, 9 Mar. 1632, fo. 220v. The Dutch paid Hung-hsu and Cheng-Tai together 1,000 
rials in advance for gold. 
12 Daghregister Batavia, 1631-1634, 73. 3 May 1632; p. 86. 6 July 1632; Dagregister 
Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 76. 11 Sept. 1632.   
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issued by the Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung personally in Fu-chien a year 
earlier.13 From this distance in time it is impossible to say with any certainty 
but family members living in Macao might have also had some useful 
connections with the local administration. 
On her homeward voyage, one of the other big junks from Batavia ran 
into a typhoon which forced her to take refuge in Quinam.14 The third 
changed her course to Patani and finally sailed to Shang-ch’uan Island 
(Sancqqan[D.]), just off Macao in the estuary of the Pearl River where she 
was caught in the same trap as the first one.15           
In the spring of 1632, these junks set sail on the north monsoon, while 
Iquan was called to Fu-chou to combat the raids of the pirate, Liu Hsiang, 
who had set foot in the Wu-hu Island. The defeat of Ch’u T’sai-lao had 
suddenly stirred up a fresh ambition to trade abroad when the maritime 
prohibition was lifted by the imperial authorities. The smuggling trade of 
Fu-chienese merchants, who bartered silks for Japanese silver, regained its 
prosperity. These route followed by these smuggling junks to Japan passed 
along the north coast of Fu-chien and the south coast of Chê-chiang. No 
doubt vendors in coastal villages also enjoyed some pickings. During the late 
summer of 1631, the pirate Liu Hsiang launched a raid on the Chiu-lung 
River before proceeding to the coast of Fu-chou, where his intention was to 
destroy Iquan’s armada.16 This is the reason Iquan had been summoned to 
                                                          
13 VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht der Goes liggende ter reede 
onder het eijlandt Lissuw[Lieh-yü] in de rivier van Chincheo aen Paulus Traudenius, 
Chiu-lung River, 14 Oct. 1632, fo. 202v. 
14 VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael 
Jacques Specx, Taiwan, 6 Nov. 1632, Fo. 218v. 
15 VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht der Goes liggende ter reede 
onder het eijlandt Lissuw[Lieh-yü] in de rivier van Chincheo aen Paulus Traudenius, 
Chiu-lung River, 14 Oct. 1632, fo. 202v.  
16 VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Putmans ende sijne presente raeden, Nan-ao 
Island, 22 Aug. 1632, Fo.224r. 
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Fu-chou and was finally granted permission to take up residence in the 
Wu-hu Island. Liu Hsiang was defeated at Hsiao-ch’êng near the Wu-hu with 
the help of the fishermen militia around the 7 December.17 Liu escaped and 
fled towards the south. Iquan was ordered by the Grand Co-ordinator of 
Fu-chien, Tsou Wei-lien, to chase after him and he was given the assistance 
of the Supreme Commander of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi provinces, his 
former superior, Hsiung Wên-t’san.18 A letter from Iquan dated 21 February 
1633 mentions this trans-provincial assignment to eradicate Liu Hsiang from 
the coast of Kuang-tung once and for all.19 On the 22 March, Iquan wrote to 
the Dutch, informing them that he was about to depart on this long-range 
expedition.20 He set sail and anchored at Chih-kang-t’ou, a place some 70 
kilometres from Macao and 50 kilometres from Kuang-chou (Canton), 
strategically located in the estuary of the Pearl River, in between Macao and 
Liu Hsiang’s base at Ta-hsing (which the VOC called ‘Pedra Branca’, 130 
kilometers north of Chih-kang-t’ou). It is now impossible to say with any 
certainty but Iquan might have been more concerned about protecting his 
junks returning from Batavia than about his military assignment.21 On 25 
                                                          
17  Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 81. 17 Dec. 1632; Wan, ‘Appendix I: 
Ch’ung-chên ch’ang-pien hsüan-lu’, 165. 
18  Anonymous, ‘ hai-t’ou liu-hsiang ts’an-kao i [Partial Remnants of a Letter 
referring to the pirate Liu Hsiang (I)]’, in TWYH (ed.), Chêng-shih shih-liao 
ch'u-pien, 140.  
19 VOC 1109, Missive van Iquan naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, Taiwan, [received 
on] 21 Feb. 1633, Fo. 237r. 
20 VOC 1113, Missive van Iquan aen Hans Putmans, [received in] Taiwan, 23 Mar. 
1633, Fo. 536r. 
21  About one year later, Iquan was accused of managing the foreign trade in 
Kuang-tung province under the pretext of earning profits to pay his troops. cf. The 
Minister of War, Chang Fêng-I, ‘Yen-chin Min-ch’uan Ch’u-hai Chieh-chi 
Chêng-chih-lung Wu-yü Nan-ao 18 May 1634 [A strict ban on the provisoning of out 
going Fu-chien sea ships. Cheng Chi-lung should not move south of Nan-ao]’, in: 
Ch'ên Yün-lin, Ming-ch’ing Kung-ts’ang t’ai-wan tang-an hui-pien, vol. 3, 299-313 at 
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March 1633, Iquan’s fleet defeated Liu Hsiang in the vicinity of this place.22 
However, according to the news the Dutch heard from Chinese merchants 
one month later, Iquan’s victory was by no means decisive. Initially it was he 
who had been attacked by Liu Hsiang, but, after he had detected Liu’s next 
ambush, he was able to turn the tables and win. Despite his victory, in the 
course of the engagement, his fleet had suffered serious damage.23 He 
probably thought this is a small price to pay because this victory would have 
been worth his while if he wanted to run his business on the Western Ocean 
route via Macao. Had he not been victorious, his junks would have run a 
great risk as long as the coast of Kuang-tung was not under his control. 
As mentioned earlier, while Iquan was leading his armada in his pursuit 
of Liu Hsiang, did not let this opportuntity to slip to manipulate public 
opinion in the hope of persuading the stubborn new Grand Co-ordinator, Tsou 
Wei-lien, to legalize his trade with Dutch in Taiwan. However, just as he had 
almost succeeded, Governor Hans Putmans lost patience and attacked Iquan’s 
armada in Amoy in July 1633 but luck was against him and he and his fleet 
ran into no fewer than two typhoons that summer and then had to endure the 
suicide attack of Iquan’s fire-junks in October.24 Although the Dutch did not 
achieve their goals, their raids had earned Liu Hsiang’s fleet some time to 
recover and plan a new attack on Iquan.25  
 
                                                                                                                             
305.  
22 Anonymous, ‘ hai-t’ou liu-hsiang ts’an-kao i’, 140. 
23 Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 91-2. 26 Apr. 1633. 
24 Leonard Blussé, ‘ The VOC as Socerer’s Appentice’, 87-105. 
25 Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 153. 21 Feb. 1634. Liu Hsiang and his men 
remained at the Pedra Branca and Brandsbaay, from where they captured 30 big junks 
and a city called Yen-chou ( written in Dutch as ‘Jamsieu’). Pedro Branco is ‘Ta 
Hsing’ and Brandsbaay is the bay outside Yen-chou (also written in Dutch 
as’Kamptsou’).. See picture 3.     
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Kicked off the Kuang-tung pirates 
When Governor Putmans returned from Batavia to T’ung-shan Island off the 
south coast of Fu-chien in the summer of 1633, he carried instructions to 
blockade all Chinese harbours and occupy either Amoy or Macao. In the 
hope of achieving these goals, he was advised to establish an alliance with 
the pirate Liu Hsiang. This strategy was thwarted because of the damage 
wrought by the two very powerful typhoons which hampered the 
co-operation between them. Later, when Putmans was chased away from 
Amoy Bay by Iquan, Liu Hsiang’s fleet failed to offer him any constructive 
assistance either,26 because the basis for this alliance between the Dutch and 
Liu Hsiang never really had a solid foundation. Furthermore, there were signs 
that the Chinese side did not take the Dutch raids seriously. A Dutch yacht 
from Japan arrived in Amoy Bay in December 1633 unaware of the conflict 
between Iquan and the VOC. Because of the typhoons in the earlier southern 
monsoon season, no Dutch vessel had been able to carry any message to 
Japan about the fresh hostilities. As matters stood, the Chinese would have 
had a very good reason to confiscate the yacht, but they did not. Instead, they 
sent several junks to escort the ship to the Pescadores. The Chinese merchant, 
Hambuan, also sent a message from An-hai, mentioning that the Chinese 
officials there had agreed to allow junks to trade in Taiwan.27 Cogently, 
almost every mandarin reported to the emperor that the Dutch raid on Amoy 
was the direct result of adverse effects of the maritime prohibition. In other 
words, the views of Iquan’s party had won fervent support among the local 
gentry and the mandarins. Indeed their backing was so strong the Coastal 
Defence Circuit of Hsing-hua and Ch’üan-chou prefectures, Ts’êng Ying, 
dared to issue three provisional passes to the An-hai merchants who ran the 
Taiwan trade. This gesture ameliorated the feelings of hostility among the 
Dutch and Putmans decided to declare a temporary cease-fire and then decide 
                                                          
26 Generale Missive, 15 Aug. 1634, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 143. 
27 Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 149-50. 22 Jan. 1634. 
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what steps to take.  
Unfortunately just at this moment Liu Hsiang happened to seize the 
initiative again. After 30 December 1633,28 Iquan had dispatched part of his 
naval force to the Kuang-tung coast where it was defeated by Liu Hsiang 
sometime between January and March. On 15 March 1634 Liu Hsiang’s fleet 
anchored at the Pescadores bringing with it the richly laden trading junks it 
had captured off Quemoy (Chin-men, in the estuary of Chiu-lung River). Liu 
had been able to take these junks and their rich cargo, among them three 
which intended to sail to Batavia, one bound for Cambodia and six for 
Manila, without too much effort. 29  Liu Hsiang’s bold move now put 
Putmans’ design of blockading the whole Chinese coast into operation. To 
mentain his force, he made preparations to sell all the booty to the Dutch in 
Taiwan. Owing to a lack of cannon and gunpowder for the following raids, he 
needed Dutch supply in this aspect. On 22 March, Governor Hans Putmans 
wrote a letter in reply to Liu’s statement of requirements for trade, 
accommodation and provisions. He neither agreed to purchase the booty Liu 
had taken from the Amoy junks nor did he give his fleet permission to remain 
in Taijouan or Wang-kang (a nearby roadstead).30 He did not even react to 
the request for cannon and ammunition, declaring that the Dutch were 
honour-bound to respect a cease-fire while they awaited an answer from the 
Fu-chienese officials. This change of attitude caught Liu Hsiang on the back 
foot. Although he had assembled a fleet of eight big and thirty-five small 
junks, he did not dare to attack Amoy which was heavily guarded by Iquan’s 
musketeers and cannon. Furthermore, his stolen goods would not bring any 
profit unless they were sold to Dutch. When he realized that the northern 
monsoon season had drawn to an end and the possibilities to ship these goods 
were ebbing away fast, he decided to try his luck again and see whether he 
                                                          
28 Ibidem, 147-8, 30 Dec. 1633. 
29 Ibid., 150. 15 Mar. 1634. 
30 Ibid., 158-9, 22. Mar. 1634. 
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could storm the Dutch fort successfully with his force of 600 pirates. At dawn 
on the 9 April Liu Hsiang tried to surprise the small Dutch garrison of thirty 
soldiers but failed. Not long afterwards, the pirates had to depart as they were 
threatened by starvation.31 They returned to Ta-hsing.  
Around the middle of May, Liu Hsiang’s smuggling trade partner in 
Japan, the son of Iquan’s old boss Li Tan by the name of Li Kuo-chu 
(Augustin), decided to surrender to Iquan in Amoy.32 Liu Hsiang attacked 
Amoy again, but once again his attempt came to naught. Sometime later 
Iquan destroyed part of Liu’s force in the vicinity of T’ung-shan Island but he 
was not able to reach the main force.33 In between July and August, Liu 
Hsiang’s fleet made another big capture: he intercepted five Portuguese 
galliots en route to Japan with a rich cargo of silks onboard, when they were 
blown off course by a typhoon. One galliot was captured but the remaining 
four sailed on.34 Probably this capture astonished the Kuang-tung authorities 
because they offered Liu Hsiang a chance to be recruited as a naval officer 
just as Iquan had been in the past. Apparently he was not interested because, 
when the Supreme Commander of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi provinces, 
Hsiung Wên-ts’an, dispatched some mandarins to negotiate with Liu Hsiang, 
the latter took them hostage .35  
In the meantime, far from being at a stalemate the negotiations with the 
                                                          
31 Ibid., 162, 8 Apr. 1634. 
32  TWYH (ed.), Chêng-shih shih-liao ch’u-pien, 139. Dagregister Zeelandia, I 
1629-1641, 175. 20 May 1634. 
33  TWYH (ed.), Chêng-shih shih-liao ch’u-pien, 139; Dagregister Zeelandia, I 
1629-1641, 183-4. 29 June 1634. 
34 VOC 1114, Missive van Hans Putmans aen de Camer Amsterdam, Taiwan, 28 Oct. 
1634, fo. 14r-v. Boxer C. R. Fidalgos in the Far East, (Hongkong: Oxford University 
Press, 1968), 111. 
35 P'êng, Ching-hai chih, 5; VOC 1116, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen 
gouverneur generael Hendrick Brower, Taiwan, 9 Mar. 1635, fol. 329 v; Dagregister 
Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 207. 10 Jan 1635.  
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Dutch were also progressing. Although the Dutch were not satisfied with the 
conditions offered, they neither co-operated with the Chinese pirates nor did 
they intercept the junks from Manila. The reason the Dutch chose not to 
pursue their war with Iquan was that they simply did not have enough ships 
left to contemplate taking such a risk. Although the High Government in 
Batavia had decided to send several yachts to Taiwan as reinforcements, they 
could not take up a station between Manila and Amoy before the end of June 
when most of the Chinese junk would be returning, because the southern 
monsoon had begun late.36 The last but not the least reason was the sudden 
change in Japanese maritime policy. After 1634, no Japanese junk ever 
visited Taiwan again. On the 12 July 1634, Governor Hans Putmans wrote a 
letter to all mandarins in Fu-chien, including the Grand Co-ordinator of 
Fu-chien residing in Fu-chou, the Coastal Defence Circuit of Fu-ning, the 
Coastal Defence Circuit of Hsing-Ch’üan, the Coastal Defence Circuit of 
Chang-nan, Assistant Coastal Defence Circuit of Ch’üan-chou, the Assistant 
Coastal Defence Circuit of Chang-chou, the Magistrate of Chin-Chiang, the 
District Magistrate of T’ung-an, the District Magistrate of Hai-ch’êng, the 
Mobile Corps Commander of Ch’üan-nan, the Mobile Corps Commander of 
P’eng-hu. The letter announced: 
‘We also intend to anchor some of our ships at the Pescadores(P’eng-hu) so 
as to be able to serve the Chinese empire (should Liu Hsiang appear there 
again) and offer security to the good inhabitants there and those merchants 
who wish to come to trade with us.[I am sending this letter] especially to 
make sure there is not any any trouble, should some malicious people appear 
and report to Your Honours that we have come with some ulterior motive. 
Your Honours should not believe them, because as you will have noticed we 
have never raised our hand against the Chinese Empire as long as the trade 
                                                          
36 VOC 1116, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael 
Hendrick Brouwer, Taiwan, 28 Sept. 1634, fo. 338v; Generale Missive, 15 Aug. 1634, 
in: Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 151-2. 
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was granted to us and everything was abundantly provided in Taiwan.’37      
Although this was not a formal guarantee that the Dutch would never 
again return to the Amoy Bay, Putmans had clearly agreed to trade with the 
Chinese merchants in Taiwan if they could provide enough cargo.38 This 
claim fulfilled the conditions the emperor had told Regional Inspector Lu 
Chên-fei to impose when he asked for the legalization of the trade with the 
Dutch in Taiwan.39 The newly arrived Grand Co-ordinator, Shên You-lung, 
now approved the three provisional licences issued by the Coastal Defence 
Circuit, T’sêng Ying and even issued an extra licence on his own authority in 
October.40 
Once the Sino-Dutch relationship had been placed on a firm footing, 
the An-hai merchants were falling over themselves in their eagerness to 
extend their trade to Batavia. Chinese merchant Hambuan and Iquan’s 
servant, Cheng Tai, immediately asked Governor Putmans to issue each of 
them with a licence to trade with Batavia.41 The latter decided to sign these 
two licences, because ‘ they had offered the Company some 
services …therefore we cannot refuse them.’42 In the middle of February 
                                                          
37  VOC 1114, Missive van Hans Putmans aen diverse mandorijns van het 
coninckrijck van China, onder verscheijdene tijtels versonden [Letter written by Hans 
Putmans to Various Mandarins under the Chinese Emperor], Taiwan, 12 July 1634, Fo. 
74v. 
38 Tonio Andrade has correctly pointed out that the VOC authorities were always 
prepared to use violence strike up an alliance with new pirates in order to pressure the 
Chinese authorities to maintain this trade. This is the real meaning of above quote. Cf. 
Tonio Andrade, ‘The Company’s Chinese privateers: how the Dutch East India 
company tried to lead a coalition of privateers to war against China’, Journal of world 
history, vol.15, no. 4 (2004), 415-44 at.440.  
39 Fan Hsien, Ch’ung-hsiu tai-wan fu-shih, 588. 
40 Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 196-7. 
41 Ibidem, 198. 
42 VOC 1116, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael 
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1635, three big and one small junk sailed to Batavia.43 
When the Fu-chien authorities found out that there were some 
mandarins who had been taken hostage by Liu Hsiang and were still being 
held by him, they arrested his mother who lived near Ch’üan-chou and it was 
not long before Iquan led his armada from Amoy bent on attacking Liu 
Hsiang. The two fleets met in T’ien-wei waters on 23 May 1635.44 Seven 
thousand people including soldiers, sailors and fishermen militias found 
themselves pitched into the fighting. In the heat of battle Liu Hsiang blew up 
his own junk, jumped over board and drowned. Iquan was finally rid of with 
his greatest foe.45  
After this battle, the coastal routes were safe and the Fu-chienese 
merchants could again transfer their export commodities from Kuang-chou 
and Macao to Amoy. This happened just in time because the 
Portuguese-Japan trade was gradually tumbling into an irreversible crisis. 
According to Putmans’ letter to Governor-General Antonio van Diemen in 
Batavia: 
‘Since the pirate Liu Hsiang was defeated and one of his adherents, Kouhan,  
surrendered, we have constantly submitted the list of what we need from there 
(namely ginger, China root, galanga, zinc, all sorts of coloured or black satin, 
silk velvet, camlet, chauls-silk and armous-silk and other goods ) of the same 
quality and quantity as before. However, so far we have received no more 
than some silk goods and zinc. The merchant Hambuan promised us that, 
since the pirate has been destroyed, some junks will sail here, in this north 
monsoon season to bring above-mentioned goods without fail. This has 
                                                                                                                             
Hendrick Brouwer, Taiwan, 3 Nov. 1634, Fo. 309r. 
43 Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 210. 7 Mar. 1635. 
44 TWYH (ed.), Chêng-shih shih-liao ch’u-pien, 110. 
45 VOC 1116, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael 
Hendrik Brouwer, Taiwan, 19 Sept. 1635, Fo. 374v. 
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already been shown to be true by the news we received that some junks from 
Amoy Bay, said that they passed through the pirate’s waters and brought 
some powder sugar from some nearby places.’46            
As mentioned before, these Ch’üan-chou rice transporting junks had 
permission to sail to the eastern border of Kuang-tung to load rice and sugar 
from Ch’ao-chou. The above records show that the commodities they were 
collecting were gradually including wares which meet the standard demanded 
in foreign trade. Since the Kuang-chou silk industry had been flourishing 
with the help of the money made on the import of Japanese silver to Macao, 
it could also supply the demand of Fu-chienese merchants once the transit 
trade route to Japan via Taiwan was established.  
 
Stretching out to the terminals 
Since the 1631 ban on foreign trade had been lifted, several Fu-chienese 
junks were being fitted out to visit the coastal countries around the South 
China Sea. Two junks were bound for Patani, one to Sangora, two to Siam, 
five to Cambodia and five to Quinam.47 In totally thirteen junks were 
preparing to sail the Western Ocean Trade Route. No record survives to show 
whether all thirteen junks did indeed sail but, since the five junks bound for 
Batavia arrived, the others also probably reached their destinations. In the 
spring of 1632 Iquan dispatched three junks to Batavia and three big and nine 
small junks sailed to Quinam from Amoy Bay.48 As one of Iquan’s junks 
bound for Batavia actually changed course to Patani, thirteen junks in all had 
sailed as in the previous year. Quite possibly because Quinam was both the 
                                                          
46 VOC 1120, Missive van den gouverneur Hans Putmans naer Batavia aen den 
gouverneur generael Anthonio van Diemen, Taiwan, 7 Oct. 1636, fo. 269. 
47 Daghregister Batavia, 1631-1634, 9. 28 Mar. 1631.  
48 VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht der goes liggende ter reede 
onder het eijlandt Lissuw[Lieh-yü], Chiu-lung River, 14 Oct. 1632, fo. 202v. 
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first and last port of call visited by trading junks on the Western Ocean Route 
after they departed from or returned to China, this record might have only 
reported that they were bound for Quinam instead of another destination. 
During these two years, Japanese junks also visited the same area. In the year 
1631, three Japanese junks visited Quinam, Cambodia, and Siam respectively. 
One year later, another three junks sailed to Quinam and four to Cambodia.49 
This activity indicates that the traditional triangular Sino-Japanese trade 
revived in the countries on the Western Ocean Route at this time.  
In the years 1630-1632 the most welcome tropical commodities 
exported from Taiwan to An-hai were pepper and elephant tusks. Their 
popularity reflected the demand of the Chinese market. During the Dutch 
blockade in the summer of the year 1633, five of the six junks which had 
sailed to Quinam were captured on their voyage home.50 Governor Putmans 
compiled a pretty accurate invoice of the booty taken from these junks.  
From his invoice (see Appendix I) it seems the cargo capacity of these 
junks varied between 25 and 148 last. With one exception, the junks were all 
small-sized, between 50 and 30 last. The list of the cargo carried by Junk A 
demonstrates that even a junk of the size of around 50 last could carried a 
cargo valued at approximately 13,760 rials. The bulk of the load of the largest 
junk of 148 last (B) was composed of rice and ebony and its cargo valued at 
only one-quarter of that of the junk with a 50 last capacity (A). Size did not 
necessarily decide the value of the cargo. The bulkiness of the cargo was the 
determining factor in whether it should be carried by a large-sized junk. 
These largest junks usually carried pepper and elephant tusks as the following 
table shows:  
                                                          
49 Iwao Seiichi, Nan’-yō Nihon-machi no kenkyū [Study of Japanese Settlement 
around the South China Sea], (Tōkyō : Iwanami Shoten, 1966), 11. ‘Genkan nendai 
tokoosen kazu hyoo.’ 
50 VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, 
T’ung-shan, 30 Sept. 1633, fo. 229v.  
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Table 6-1: the percentage of Pepper plus Elephant’s tusk in total value of 
the cargo 












Pepper 5419.5 9980 15399.5
Elephant tusks 2025 182.5 1283 3490.5
Total 13760.7 471.67 13694.2 27926.57
Proportion 54.1% 38.7% 82.2% 67.6%
Source: Table A, C, D. 
The sum of these two commodities amounted to about 67.6 per cent of the 
total value of four junks (Junk D listed in 2 junks). No less than 1,980. 24 
piculs of pepper were sold to An-hai via Taiwan. The vast quantity of this 
was carried by Junk (A) and Junk (B), whose cargo amounted to 1,218.5 
piculs. It seems that the amount of pepper which could be absorbed by the 
Chang-chou market was approximately 1000- 2000 piculs or 50-100 last per 
year. During the summer of 1632, Iquan had dispatched two junks to Batavia 
where he had purchased about 300 last of pepper via his nachoda Liu-kuan 
(Lackquan[D]). Supposing Iquan had also received the confiscated cargo 
from the Supreme Commander of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi after April 
1633, he could have met the demand of the market for that whole year. The 
real victims of the Dutch blockade was not Iquan but those Chang-chou 
merchants who had dispatched junks to Quinam after the maritime 
prohibition was lifted because Iquan was not really deeply involved in the 
trade of Western Ocean as a few other clues reveal. In the autumn of 1634 
two junks were confiscated by the Dutch in the vicinity of Quinam. Neither 
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Iquan nor his servants showed any sympathy for those who had been affected 
by this incident, namely: the mandarins and gentry in Chang-chou who 
lodged a strong protest with the Dutch through the Chinese merchant 
Hambuan.51     
The Sino-Quinam trade was part and parcel of the trade to the ports on 
the Indo-Chinese peninsula, the areas around the gulf of Siam and the Malay 
Peninsula. Some of the booty mentioned above had originally been purchased 
from the Siam. Two junks from Quinam arrived in Siam from where they 
returned to China with some wares ordered by the Chinese (sappanwood, 
deerskins and Cambodian nuts, for example) on 30 June 1633.52  
 The pepper sold in Siam can be traced back to different sources, 
including Batavia. For example: there is a record that a junk of a Batavian 
Chinese sailed to Siam with pepper on 28 July 1633,53 which indicates that 
Siam could be an alternative port to Batavia for those Chinese merchants who 
wanted to purchase pepper. Iquan might have learned about his Kuang-tung 
assignment from his merchant and nephew, Liu-kuan.   
In these years of political disturbance, Japanese merchants fled from 
Siam to Quinam or Cambodia where their arrival contributed to the revival of 
the Sino-Quinam-Japan trade. Meanwhile, the absence of Japanese in Siam 
left a space which the new Sino-Siam-Japan triangular trade network could 
occupy. In the spring of 1634 two junks from Chang-chou carried copious 
                                                          
51 Generale Missive, 27 Dec. 1634, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 143, 
52 VOC 1113, Missive [van Joost Schouten] aen den gouverneur generael [Hendrik 
Brouwer], Siam, 8 July 1633, fo. 344v. VOC 1109, Extract uijt de journaelse 
aenteijckeninghe van 't notabelste, dat in 's Comps. affairen, onder de directie van mij 
Joost Schouten voorgevallen is[ Extract from Remarkable Happenings concerning the 
Company Affairs under my, Joost Schoten’s, command] (hereafter cited as 
Dagregister Siam), Siam, 29 May 1633, fo. 43v. According to the diary, the two junks 
were returning to Quinam. 
53 VOC 1109, Dagregister Siam, 28 July 1633, fo. 46v. 
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amounts of rough wares to Siam. Both of them were aiming to make a 
handsome profit, but instead of heading back towards China, that winter the 
Chang-chou junks remained in Quinam because they were anxious to avoid 
the Dutch attacks.54 In the same year, Liu Hsiang robbed junks bound for 
Batavia in the vicinity of Quemoy and consequently only one An-hai junk 
arrived in Batavia.55 On 30 March 1636, a junk under the command of one of 
Iquan’s naval officers arrived in the roadstead of Siam, just five days after 
another Chinese junk.56 This junk was a sign that Iquan and the An-hai 
merchants wished to expand their trade there at the expense of the 
Chang-chou merchants. Their rowdy, intrusive tactics to expand their trade 
did more than simply disgust the Chang-chou merchants, the rudeness and 
ruthlessness of the newcomers was also bound to stir up trouble.   
                                                          
54 VOC 1113, Missive [door den heer Joost Schouten] aen den gouverneur generael 
[Hendrik Brouwer], Siam, 26 July 1634, fo. 518v.   
55 Daghregister Batavia, 1631-1634, 278. 27 Mar. 1634.  
56 VOC 1119, Missive [door Joost Schouten] aen d’ E. Hans Putmans [in Taiwan], 




THE RISK OF POLITICS 
AND THE POLITICS OF RISK 1636-40 
 
The mercenaries become involved in politics 
After the Kuang-tung pirate Liu Hsiang had been swept from the seas by 
Iquan’s armada, through his own intervention Iquan and a group officers 
were incorporated into the coastal defence troops. Unfortunately all the 
official positions Iquan occupied from 1635 to 1640 have proved impossible 
to trace fully in the extant Chinese sources. The fate of these official records 
is uncertain. They could have been destroyed when the Manchus invaded 
Peking in 1644 or have been lost at any time since then in times of upheaval. 
It is known with certainty that Iquan was first raised to the rank of 
Commissioner-in-Chief (Tou-tu[C.]) in the year 1636. Following the general 
principle of the military institutions of the Ming Empire, commanders and 
troops belonged to different sections of the army. The commander only held 
his position for the duration of a particular mission. No matter whether a 
mission had been successfully accomplished or failed, the commander would 
be later dispatched on other missions, but the soldiers returned to their own 
garrisons.1 All the commanders with the rank of general were members of 
the Institute of the Chief Military Commission (Tou-tu-fu[C.]).2 The soldiers 
were a professional group stationed apart from civilian subjects in special 
camps called wei and so. 3  The offspring of soldiers inherited their 
professional and social status and hence remained soldiers. This principle was 
                                                          
1 Hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles, 79-80. 
2 Ibidem, 72. 
3 Chang T’ing-yü, Hsin-chiao-pên ming-shih, 1856-7; 1873; Hucker, A Dictionary of 
Official Titles, 79. 
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devised to avoid the menace of any growing military power which might 
pose a threat to the Emperor’s authority. After a prolonged period of peace, 
the system gradually became corrupted and after inflation had eroded their 
livelihoods, most of the soldiers deserted their posts.  
The number of coastal defence troops declined faster than that of their 
counterparts in land-based camps because they were forced to stand by and 
watch their vessels and weapons virtually rot away before their eyes in the 
salty sea air. The maintenance of the equipments became a heavy burden and 
hence resulted in more desertions. The rapid disappearance of the troops is 
the reason local officials had to set about organizing a civil militia when the 
pirate raids began to rampage the coast in the late sixteenth century. At the 
height of the Liu Hsiang’s raids on Fu-chou, one official at the Emperor’s 
court suggested the militia be reorganized and integrated into a new system 
of coastal defence troops.4 In other words, the barrier between civilians and 
the hereditary soldier class was not immutable and could break down under 
exceptional circumstances. This situation explains why able-bodied soldiers 
in the fishermen’s and the civil militia could be recruited so easily into the 
coastal defence under Iquan’s command. After Liu Hsiang was defeated, 
many of the soldiers and naval officers affiliated to Iquan had formal official 
                                                          
4 Wan, ‘Appendix I: Ch’ung-chên ch’ang-pien hsüan-lu’, 166-7. ’ In the long period 
of peace which now commenced, the number of standing soldiers and their junks have 
declined. The military officials have shown little enthusiasm to fight outside their city 
walls. The sea patrols have been halted. Nowadays to ensure security, we recruit civil 
militia, mercenaries and organize local self-defence corps, and fishermen’s militias. 
The army now consists of five categories of soldiers. In the past only one type of 
soldier proved an effective force, nowadays even five types are not sufficient to 
maintain a standing force. The pirates are on the rampage and the officials are 
frustrated. My recommendation is that the standing number of the army must be 
restored. The patrols must be carried out. The civil militia and mercenaries should be 




titles bestowed on them and embarked on a military career.5 
Iquan’s superior military skills were confirmed by his remarkable 
victories. He was assigned to the Chief Military Commission in Nanking, the 
vice-capital of the Empire.6 It was a major turning point in his career. In this 
capacity he was no longer subordinate to the grand co-ordinators but served 
directly under the Emperor himself. Although he would still listen to advice 
and obey certain orders from the Grand Co-ordinator, the latter could not 
dismiss him unless this decision was approved by the Imperial Council or the 
Emperor personally. The Dutch in Taiwan heard the following news from the 
Chinese merchant they called Hambuan: 
‘Via the Chinese merchants, the Chinese merchant Hambuan informed 
us how Iquan had became the Commissioner-in-Chief ( Tou-tu[C], 
Toutock[D]) of Fu-chien. He is entitled to a palanquin with eight bearers. 
But for the Grand Co-ordinator and the said Iquan nobody is allowed such 
honor. When he excused himself from an audience with the Emperor at the 
Imperial Court and sent instead one of his captains to represent him on the 
journey [to Peking]this disobedient behavior was condoned [ by the 
Emperor]. Consequently the said Iquan has now become a great master.’7            
The Grand Co-ordinator could no longer threaten Iquan’s position and 
the latter was secure in the knowledge that the Emperor recognized his 
                                                          
5 For example, Ch’en P’eng and Hu Mei, two quite able commanders among Chang’s 
troops were both recruited from the fishermen. 
6 Cheng P’êng-ch’êng (comp.), ‘ Appendix: Shih-ching pên-tsung tsu-p’u[Records of 
the Cheng Clan Pedigree in Shih-ching]’, in TWYH(ed.), Chêng-shih kuan-hsi 
wên-shu [Documents concerning the Cheng Family], TW no. 69, 36. ’In a certain year 
between 1628 and 1644, Iquan was given the title of Supreme Chief Military 
Commisioner (Ch’ien-chün Tou-tu) on account of his outstanding military 
achievements.’  
7 VOC 1120, Missive van Jan der Burch naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael 
Anthonio van Diemen en raeden van India, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1636, fo. 362. 
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substantial influence in Fu-chien. When it was all said and done, all the 
newly recruited coastal defence troops were his people and he even financed 
these troops personally. His position was so strong he could distance himself 
from the Wei-so system which was designed to minimize the affiliation 
between the troops and their leader. Furthermore, with the title of Regional 
Deputy-Commander of Nan-ao Island, which gave him control of the coastal 
waters stretching all the way from Chang-chou to Kuang-chou, he transferred 
his residence to this island. He retained this rank for sometime and was later 
raised to the rank of Regional Commander of Fu-chien and Kuang-tung at 
different occasions and retained this position until the Manchu invasion of 
Peking in 1644.8    
An outstanding figure as a maritime mercenary under the flag of the 
Dutch East India Company and later in his service to the Fu-chien Grand 
Co-ordinators in their campaign to pacify the pirates, over and again Iquan 
showed exceptional bravery and sharp ingenuity in dealing with the 
systematic failure of the institutions of the moribund Ming Empire and for 
this he was accorded exceptional treatment. Nevertheless, Iquan neither 
introduced any innovations in the coastal defence system or maritime trade 
system of the Empire nor did he devote his talents and indubitable ingenuity 
to creating any new or different institutions. He simply brought about that the 
                                                          
8 Wan Yen, Ch’ung-chên ch’ang-pien[Chronicle of the Ch’ung-chên], TW no. 270, 11. 
‘ On 14 Decmber 1643, the Regional Commander of Fu-chien, Cheng Chih-lung, 
requested an honourable discharge on the grounds of ill-health. The Emperor replied: 
‘Cheng Chih-lung has held the position of Ch’ao-Chang Regional Commander for a 
long time and has performed excellent service. If he would be pleased to remain with 
the garrison and not resign.’ In 1642 he was appointed Regional Commander of 
Kuang-tung, cf. The Ministry of War, Kuang-tung Tsung-ping Chêng-chih-lung 
Tai-tsui T’u-kung Ch’ing-ên-chun K’ai-fu, 4 May 1642 [The Regional Commander of 
Kuang-tung, Cheng Chih-lung requests to restore his position in order to excuse his 
fault]’, Ch’ên Yün-lin, Ming-ch’ing Kung-ts’ang t’ai-wan tang-an hui-pien, vol. 3, 
343-54 at 345. 
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people around him knew that he and only he could help them resolve the 
problems which beset them on all sides.  
When he is compared to his contemporaries in the area of the China 
Sea, his was not even a very special case. Other mercenaries also succeeded 
in gaining a certain autonomous economic status in the region under other 
sovereigns. Japanese mercenaries already enjoyed such a privileged position 
in Siam. In the latter half of the sixteenth century, Japanese junks had begun 
to venture to Southeast Asian countries, including Siam. The magnet which 
drew them was the deerskin-for-silver trade between Siam and Japan. This 
exchange proved so lucrative some Japanese merchants decided to settle 
down in Siam to throw themselves wholeheartedly into this trade. Because of 
their superior military skills as musketeers and doughty sword fighters, 
Japanese soldiers were appointed bodyguards to the Siamese King. 
Consequently some 500 Japanese were living in the capital of Siam, 
Ayutthaya by the beginning of the seventeenth century. Some of these men 
enjoyed the position of privileged merchants in the Siam-Japanese trade, 
known as the Vermillion Junk Trade (Goshuisen boeki), under the joint 
protection of the Siamese King and the Japanese Shogun. As long as the 
central authority in Japan remained vulnearble, this trade blossomed as a 
by-product of the competition raging between the daimyo or feudal lords. 
This situation changed after the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600, when all of 
Japan was unified under Tokugawa rule. One upshot of this increased 
integration was that the diverse foreign traders were more strictly regulated.  
Returning to Siam, a Japanese samurai named Yamada Nagamasa was 
elected head of the Japanese community in Siam in the year 1621. In that 
same year he set about the task of regulating the tributary-trade between the 
two countries.9 As the mediator between two sovereigns, he enjoyed certain 
                                                          
9 Chris Baker, Dhiravat na Pombejra, Alfons van der Kraan and David Wyatt (eds.), 
Van Vliet’s Siam, (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2005), 329-30. Appendix IV: 
Yamada Nagamasa.  
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political favours granted him by King Song Tham of Siam. This proved a 
poisoned apple as the King’s favour unavoidably dragged him into Siamese 
court politics after the death of the sovereign in 1628 and the struggle for 
succession to the throne began.10   
The risk of politics: 
Confronted by the Siamese King’s Kuang-chou trade 
Under the tributary system, the legitimacy of the trade was inexorably linked 
to the legitimacy of the throne and the intrusion of this institutionalizing 
feature compelled the Japanese mercenaries to take the side of the legitimate 
successor to the throne. Their dream collpased when a usurper finally gained 
the upper hand and ascended the throne as King Prasat Thong in September 
1629. Yamada was appointed to the position of Governor of Ligore under the 
new ruler,11 but he was poisoned in the summer of the following year. After 
his death, the new King issued secret orders to set fire to the Japanese quarter 
in Ayutthaya. This act of wanton destruction forced the Japanese inhabitants 
either to take refuge in Cambodia or to return to Japan in September of 
1630.12 The usurper king soon realized that, although he had removed the 
menace of the Japanese mercenaries, he had cut off his nose to spite his face 
because by this deed he had lost the lucrative trade with Japan as well. When 
the news that a usurper had become king was made known to Siamese 
vassals in the Malay Peninsula chaos broke out. Neighbouring countries like 
Patani, Pegu and Cambodia also challenged the authority of this illegitimate 
king and all declared that they would wage war against him.13 As expenses 
                                                          
10 Ibid. 
11 George Vinal Smith, The Dutch in Seventeenth century Thailand, (Detroit: The 
Cellar Bookshop, 1977), 22. 
12 Iwao Seiichi,‘Reopening of the diplomatic and commercial relations between 
Japan and Siam during the Tokugawa Period’, in Acta Asiatica: Bulletin of the 
Institute of Eastern Culture, 4 (1963), 2-3. 
13 Smith, The Dutch in Seventeenth century Thailand, 22-23. 
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rose exponentially in efforts to fill the war coffers, the revenue from the 
foreign trade assumed even greater proportions and this situation forced the 
usurper king hurriedly to pass care new measures which were hoped would 
breathe fresh life into the trade with China and Japan. Consequently, a 
Siamese tributary junk arrived in the Pearl River estuary in 1631, but was 
promptly seized by the Macau authorities in retaliation for the confiscation of 
a Portuguese ship by the Siamese king the year before.14 Despite this 
hiccough, the Siamese envoys were eventually allowed to pay their tribute to 
the Chinese Emperor in 1634.15  
Meanwhile, owing to the waves of piracy which were quelling the 
coastal areas of China, the Chinese junks from Chang-chou ceased to make 
their customary voyages to Siam in the period1628-1630. However, when the 
maritime ban was lifted in Fu-chien for a short time in 1631, two junks were 
fitted out to sail to Siam, but only one seems to have reached her 
destination.16 Two years later, in 1633, two Chinese junks sailed on to Siam 
from Quinam17 and the Siamese king simultaneously prepared to fit out a 
royal tributary junk for the voyage to Kuang-chou.18 The tributary embassies 
must have returned to Siam between 1634 and 1635 since the Chinese Court 
records mention that they had audiences in Peking in both years.19 After the 
accomplishment of the tributary mission to China had re-affirmed King 
Prasat Thong’s legitimacy in spite of his usurpation, he devoted himself 
assiduously to foreign trade.  
In 1634, while the Kuang-tung officials were trying to persuade Liu 
                                                          
14 VOC 1109, Dagregister Siam, 18 Sept. 1633, fo. 48r.  
15 Chang, Hsin-chiao-pên ming-shih, XXIII, 317. 
16 VOC 1113, Missive [door Joost Schouten van Siam] naer Japan, Siam, 8 July 1633, 
fo. 347r. 
17 VOC 1109, Dagregister Siam, 29 May 1633, 43v. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Chang, Hsin-chiao-pên ming-shih, XXIII, 317; 319.   
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Hsiang to surrender and accept an official petition following the precedent set 
for Iquan, a brief truce was signed between Iquan and Liu Hsiang, and two 
Chinese junks were able to visit Siam where they were able to obtain 
satisfactory cargoes.20 The peace was short-lived because in 1635 Iquan 
again concentrated his attention on fighting Liu Hsiang. Since the coastal 
seas of Fu-chien and Kuang-tung were all potential battle grounds, no more 
junks could run the risk of sailing to Siam until the sea route had been 
secured again. In its efforts to bring Liu Hsiang to heel, his action accorded 
with the maritime ban issued by the Ming Court. Indeed Dutch intelligence in 
Taiwan, reported that no more junks had set sail for Siam.21 Finally, in the 
spring of 1636, after the majority of Liu Hsiang’s force had collapsed, two 
junks from Chang-chou, one of which was affiliated to Iquan’s merchant 
group, arrived in Siam.   
The first junk from Chang-chou, under nachoda Bouwija, was a very 
leaky vessel which finally did make it to Bangkok on 25 March. Bouwija had 
applied to the Dutch for a pass to secure his voyage onwards to Batavia in the 
year 1635. The application was made through the Chinese Captain, Bencon 
(Su Ming-kang), in Batavia, and the pass was duly issued by the 
Governor-General. Since the maritime ban was strictly enforced during the 
year 1635, Bouwija had to postpone his plan to visit the Indies but it did not 
deter him from using his old pass to sail as far as Siam, although the Dutch 
factory in Siam suspected that he had only made use of this pass as a device 
to intrude the Siamese trade. He behaved in a strangely hurried manner and 
sold all his goods (mostly coarse wares) at such a cheap price that no Siamese 
vendor would bother to come and purchase the same wares from the Dutch.22  
                                                          
20 VOC 1113, Missive [door den heer Joost Schouten] aen den gouverneur generael 
[Hendrik Brouwer] , 26 July 1634, Fo. 518v. 
21 VOC 1116, Missive van Hans Putmans Naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael 
Hendrick Brouwer, Taiwan, 9 Mar. 1635, fo. 329v. 
22 VOC 1119, Missive aen [gouverneur van Taijouan] d' E. Hans Putmans, Siam, 20 
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After his arrival he spread the news that a forthcoming junk would be 
carrying a very luxurious cargo composed of fine porcelain and silk textiles.23 
Bouwija played some nasty tricks on Iquan’s junk which arrived after his. It 
is hard to tell whether he meant to ruin Iquan’s trade in Siam or had merely 
been loose-lipped and suffered from verbal diarrhoea. Whatever was going 
through his mind at that distant time, since the Siamese King was also busy 
preparing his next Kuang-tung trade expedition, this news really threw the 
royal factory into a nervous panic. Five days later, when the junk commanded 
by nachoda Gbouneeuw finally arrived, the factors of the Royal Factory 
immediately dispatched the royal guards to take the junk into custody and 
declared that the captain would not be allowed to sell his goods other than at 
the royal factory.24 The Dutch recorded the incident as follows: 
‘… the junk was kept under strict watch by the King’s staff when it appeared 
at Bangkok and the nachoda was ordered not to dare to open any package or 
sell anything, no matter how small, to anyone other than at the royal factory. 
However this nachoda, who had been a pirate and one of Iquan’s captains, 
was not willing to kowtow to such an unusual reception and subsequently 
weighed anchor and sailed away from the roadstead, declaring that he would 
gladly toss everything he had brought overboard, and he swore to take 
revenge on Siamese property, if they wanted to rule in this way.   
The Siamese staff were so terrified by such threats the Governor of 
Bangkok sailed to the junk followed by a retinue of all his vessels, 
accompanied personally by the Chinese interpreter, in an effort to persuade 
the nachoda to return. He promised him every assistance and favour and the 
liberty to sell his cargo[as he wished]. 
                                                                                                                             
May 1636, fo. 1396. 
23 VOC 1125, Missive van Jeremias van Vliet aen Johan van der Burch raet van India 
ende gouverneur in Taijouan, Siam, 9 May 1637, fo. 564r. 
24 VOC 1119, Missive aen [gouverneur van Taijouan] d' E. Hans Putmans, Siam, 20 
May 1636, fo. 1396. 
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Accepting such a perfidious promise, the nachoda returned and sailed 
upstream. However, once this junk had arrived in the roadstead of Ayutthaya, 
it was again taken into custody by the royal guards. The Chinese were again 
ordered to sell their commodities to no one but the royal factory. 
The nachoda lost patience, but kept his mouth tightly shut, swearing 
that there were no silk textiles, raw silk or another silk wares in the junk. He 
had been set-up in such a way by these duplicitous factors the imprudent 
King gave orders to put the nachoda behind bars and dispatch some 
prosecutors to the junk to carry out his orders.           
The nachoda and his crew were lucky, because a Chinese (Olong Tziat, 
who resided here, and as a mandarin at the court had some influence with the 
King) was present on board the junk and by handing over gifts persuaded the 
prosecutors (to stay away.) They remained on board the junk during the 
evening but did not examine anything. Later they went directly to the court 
and reported what had happened. The King ordered members of his court to 
form an unbiased committee and enquire into the matter. After examining all 
the information in detail, it was found that the nachoda was innocent and that 
the King’s accusation had been unfounded.  
Nevertheless, the junk remained under watch as before and the 
supervision was so strict the Chinese were not able to sell their coarse 
porcelain wares. But the nachoda gave the guards some pennies so they could 
buy some Chinese beer and have a drink from time to time. In this fashion he 
secretly sold his fine wares to the Muslim merchants at a very high price.  
The duplicitous factors found out when they were frustrated by their 
lower than expected revenues. They sought every possible opportunity to 
denigrate the nachoda in the presence of the King and to take revenge on him. 
They found that one of the Chinese who had arrived here as one of the 
nachoda’s sailors had gambled with another Chinese, ( a Court silversmith). 
The sailor lost his stake and beat the silversmith up. While they were 
wrestling with each other, a silver statue (which had been made for the King) 
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was knocked over. The silversmith (urged on by these factors) thereupon 
notified His Majesty that the newly arrived Chinese had committed a crime 
against His Majesty’s statues and slaves.   
By the King’s order, the nachoda was summoned to appear before the 
chief justice. He (without knowing anything about it) appeared in his usual 
clothes accompanied by the Shabandar and an interpreter. He was 
immediately flung into gaol with his followers. The chief justice wanted to 
summon all his crew, so that he might (so he claimed) examine them properly. 
Which request, the nachoda politely refused, declaring that only he, and no 
member of his crew, knew about the quarrel and he would not subject them to 
such improper coercion. Meanwhile the silversmith and his followers 
slandered the nachoda so badly for his alleged crime of disobedience that in 
a burst of fury His Majesty sentenced the nachoda and all his crew to death, 
and confiscated the junk, bringing everything intohaving everything brought 
to his royal factory.’ 25 
                                                          
25 VOC 1125, Missive van Jeremias van Vliet aen Johan van der Burch, raet van 
India ende gouverneur in Taijouan, Siam, 9 May 1637, fo. 564r. According to earlier 
records, in 1636 the royal guardians were called ‘bras pintados’, men with tattooed 
arms. Cf. VOC 1119, Daghregister gehouden bij den E. Jeremias van Vliet van 10 
Maert tot 14 November 1636 [Hereafter cited as ‘Dagregister Siam 1636’]. Siam, 17 
Apr. 1636 , fo. 1345 ; Baker, Chris., ibid., 51. note 20. The chief justice was called 
Balleije van Ija Innaerath. The interpreter in the 1637 was Opraa Thonhuij and in 
1636 this position was held by Oprou Thonghu, Cf. VOC 1119, Dagregister Siam 
1636, Siam, 16 May 1636, fo. 1370. The Chinese merchant who rescued the nachoda 
twice from imprisonment was ‘Oloangh Tziat/Oloangh Tsiar’. Cf. VOC 1109, 
Dagregister Siam 1636, fo. 1345. 17 Apr. 1636; fo. 1370. 16 May 1636. Another 
influential local merchant who offered assistance called ‘Oloangh Sarpartiban’ is also 
recorded in above diaries. The ‘Tziat’, might be the ‘Chiat’ which, according to 
George Smith’s explanation, was the shabander (harbour master) of the Muslim 
community in Siam. The ‘sabartiban’ should be ‘Sombatthiban’, the Minister in 
Charge of the Royal Treasury. Cf. Smith, The Dutch in Seventeenth century Thailand, 
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This impetuous sentence was not carried out and the nachoda and his crew 
were released a few days later. This is how Iquan’s junk finally managed to 
escape the extortion of the Siamese Court. A local mandarin’s support had 
turned the tables in this case and it is just one instance which shows that the 
rise and decline of Chinese influence at court was also related to these 
influential grandees. The Dutch factories in  Taiwan and Siam recorded the 
prices of local commodities that same year. This list shows that if a junk 
sailed to Siam, it could expect a better price in Siam than in Quinam.     
Table 7-1.The expected profits of the Siamese Commodities in 1636 
 Prince in Siam 
Tael/ picul 
Expected profits in China  
Cambodia nuts 1.2-1.4  500-600%  
Shellac 13.5-14  200-500% 
Jammana 20-22 (per 100 pieces) 200-300 % 
(in Cochin China) 
Betel nut 12-16 maas/ picul 170%-230% 




4-6  100% 
Rattan 
(Patany) 
14  (100 pieces) 100% 
Lead 3.33 tael / picul 100-130%  
(in Cochin China ) 
Bird’s nests 
(Patani) 
2-2.5 (cattij) <80-90%  
Elephant tusks 50 (2 piece) 
48 (3 pieces)  









5 (3-4,000 pieces) 
40-60 % 




Source: VOC 1119, Missive van den coopman Jeremias van Vliet in Siam aen den gouverneur 
generael Van Diemen in Batavia, Siam, 13 Nov.1636, fos. 1278-80. 
As mentioned earlier, the most valuable commodities sold in the An-hai 
market were pepper and elephants tusks, but these goods were not as easy to 
obtain as the Chinese had originally thought. The junks which arrived in 1636 
had not been able to acquire these commodities in any great quantity. Instead 
of the expected copious cargoes of pepper and elephant tusks, they loaded 
other highly prized commodities like shellac. As a result, a quantity of shellac 
remained unsold in the Taiwan lodge, ‘ because a great amount of it had been 
brought onto the [Kuang-tung] market by the Chinese junks from Siam, 
Cambodia and some other places.’26  
Shellac purchased in Siam at 24 rials per picul could be sold in 
Kuang-chou for slightly less than triple this price at 60 rials. 27  Lead 
purchased at 6 rials per picul, was sold for more than double this sum at 15 
rials in Kuang-chou.28 These trading figures show how the Siamese market 
interconnected with the Kuang-tung market. 
In the summer of 1636 the Siamese tributary embassy arrived in Peking. 
The Siamese King and his brother had dispatched three big junks carrying 
cargoes of 13,000 picul of sapanwood and other fine goods for Kuang-chou.29 
Unfortunately there was a mutiny on one of the three junks and the nachoda 
was murdered by the crew in Cambodia waters, where the junk was also 
                                                          
26  VOC 1120, Missive van gouverneur Hans Putmans Naer Batavia aen den 
gouverneur generael Anthonio van Diemen, Taiwan, 7 Oct. 1636, fo. 279r. 
27 VOC 1125, Missive van Jeremias van Vliet opperhoofd des comptoirs Siam aen 
gouverneur Van der Burch raet van India ende gouverneur in Taijouan, Siam, 6 July 
1637, fo. 580v. 
28 Ibidem; VOC 1120, Missive van gouverneur Hans Putmans Naer Batavia aen den 
gouverneur generael Anthonio van Diemen, Taiwan, 7 Oct. 1636, fo. 279r. 
29 Chang, Hsin-chiao-pên ming-shih, XXIII, 320. 
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confiscated.30 The Siamese embassy departed from Siam in 1635 and finally 
returned home in 1639 with a letter from the Chinese Emperor (known as a 
Golden Letter). It was also accompanied by some Chinese delegates and bore 
some reciprocal presents. Although the letter intimated that the new Siamese 
King had been officially acknowledged by the Chinese court, the reciprocal 
gifts from the Chinese Emperor were not very generous and the Chinese 
delegates even had the temerity to tell the Siamese King to curb his desire to 
engage in lucrative trade.31 In 1642, the Siamese King and his brother once 
again dispatched two richly laden junks to Kuang-chou32 and the Chinese 
record confirms that a Siamese embassy had an audience in Peking in 1643.33 
Since the Siamese King had successfully carved out a fixed niche for himself 
in the Kuang-tung trade, the Fu-chien merchants, whether from Chang-chou 
or from An-hai, were no longer able to squeeze themselves into the profitable 
trade in Siam.  
Table 7-2 The Sino-Siamese junk trade 
 Junks from Chang-chou Siamese King’s junk 
to Kuang-chou 
1634 234 0 
1635 - - 
1636 235 336 
                                                          
30 VOC 1119, Missive van den coopman Jeremias van Vliet aen den gouverneur 
generael [Anthonio] Van Diemen, Siam, 13 Nov. 1636, Fo. 1286. 
31 VOC 1131, Missive van Van Vliet aen den gouverneur generael [Anthonio van 
Diemen], Siam, 10 Oct. 1639, Fo. 1042. 
32 VOC 1144, Missive van Reijnier van Tzum aen den gouverneur generael[Anthonio 
van Diemen], Siam, 13 Oct 1642, fo. 619r. 
33 Chang, Hsin-chiao-pên ming-shih, XXIII, 334. 
34  VOC 1113, Missive [door den heer Joost Schouten] aen den gouverneur 
generael[Hendrik Brouwer], Siam, 26 July 1634. fo.518v. 
35 VOC 1119, Missive van d' E. Jeremias van Vliet aen den gouverneur generael 
Henrick Brouwer, Siam, 28 July 1636, fo. 1253. 
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1637 337 0 
1638 138 0 
1639 139 0 
1640 - - 
1641 140 0 
1642 0 341 
 
The Chang-chou merchants avoided any confrontation with the 
Siamese King’s trade to Kuang-chou, because they were perfectly aware that 
the commodities they intended to purchase could only be obtained via the 
King’s factory and discretion was the better part of valour. In 1637, when 
another three Chang-chou junks appeared in Siam from China, the King’s 
factory restricted their purchases to sapanwood. The Dutch recorded that:  
‘ The nachoda was not able to lay his hands on any lead, elephant tusks, 
shellac, pepper or rhinoceros horns, because a few days ago the King had 
                                                                                                                             
36 Ibidem;VOC 1119, Missive[ van Jeremias van Vliet] aen d' E. Hans Putmans 
[gouverneur van Taijouan], Siam, 20 May 1636, fo. 1396. 
37 VOC 1125, VOC 1125, Missive van Jeremias van Vliet aen Johan van der Burch 
raet van India ende gouverneur in Taijouan, Siam, 14 May 1637, fo. 568r. 
38 VOC 1127, Missive [van Hendirk Nachtegael] aen den oppercoopman Abraham 
Ducker in Quinam [Letter written by Hendrik Nachtegael in Siam to Senior Merchant 
Abraham Bucker in Quinam], Siam, 3 May 1638, fo. 372v. 
39 VOC 1131, Missive van Van Vliet aen den gouverneur generael [Antonio van 
Diemen ende raaden in Batavia], Siam, 14 July 1639, fo. 1008. 
40 VOC 1139, Rapport van den commissaris Jeremias van Vliet aengaende sijn 
bevindinge in Siam ende bocht van Pattany [van Johan van Twist uijt Malacca aen 
gouverneur generaal Antonio van Diemen en raden in Batavia][Report written by 
Commissioner Jeremias van Vliet about His Experiences in Siam and the Bay of 
Patani, forwarded from Malacca to Governor-General Antonio van Diemen and 
Council in Batavia by Johan van Twist], Siam, 28 May 1642, fo. 802v. 
41 VOC 1144, Missive van Reijnier van Tzum aen den gouverneur generael [Antonio 
van Diemen], Siam, 13 Oct. 1642. fo.619r. 
THE RISK OF POLITICS 1636-1640 
 190 
forbidden anyone except the King’s factors to sell these goods (especially to 
the Chinese newcomers). The nachoda was also ordered to purchase these 
commodities from nobody but the King’s factors. For this reason, but 
especially owing to a lack of capital, these junks could obtain nothing but 
sappanwood.’42  
More than 12,000 picul of sappanwood, a cargo which ran totally 
counter to the original expectations of the Chang-chou merchants, was 
eventually exported to Chang-chou. What they desired above all else was 
pepper, but this was not obtainable because the plantations there had been 
destroyed during the war (1631-1636) between the Siamese King and his 
rebellious vassal in Ligore.43 In the year 1639, the Chang-chou junks could 
not even export elephant tusks, because the King had added four taels tax to 
every picul of this commodity. Hence it proved nigh on impossible to break 
into the Siamese King’s Kuang-chou trade since he needed to earn capital to 
replenish his own treasury. In a nutshell, politics in Siam ultimately 
conditioned Fu-chienese trade with that kingdom.    
 
The politics of risk: co-operation with the Dutch in the Japan trade 
In reply to Governor Hans Putmans’ letter to then ten Chinese officials in 
charge of the Ch’üan-chou and Chang-chou coastal defence forces, the 
Fu-chien authorities agreed to issue the An-hai merchants passes to enable 
them to deliver fine and delicate commodities to Taiwan. Undoubtedly, the 
richest exchange between Fu-chien and Taiwan was the silk-for-silver trade. 
The silk was not produced in Fu-chien, but came from Chê-chiang and 
Chiang-su (which were referred to by the Dutch at the time collectively as 
                                                          
42 VOC 1125, Missive van Jeremias van Vliet aen Johan van der Burch raet van India 
ende gouverneur in Taijouan, Siam, 14 May 1637, fo. 568r. 
43 VOC 1119, Missive van den coopman Jeremias van Vliet aen den gouverneur 
generael [Anthonio] van Diemen, Siam, 13 Nov. 1636, fo. 1278. 
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‘Nanking’ province). Every year the farmers had to begin to feed the 
silkworms in March or April. It took two months for the larvae to develop 
into a moth. The harvest season was heralded when the worms spun their 
cocoons in May or June. The farmers boiled the cocoons to loosen the glue 
which held the the precious filaments together and spun the silk threads they 
extracted from them. This procedure required purified water which was 
provided by the rainy season at its height during that month. The new silk 
would be put on the market in June.44 Well-versed in this time-table, in 
spring, the merchants of Fu-chien and Kuang-tung usually shipped sugar 
from the south to Chê-chiang so that they could begin to purchase raw silks 
after their sugar business had been concluded. Before the onset of autumn, 
they had to return to Fu-chien or Kuang-tung where they could either re-sell 
the product directly as raw silk or as woven silk textiles to the Dutch in 
Taiwan or the Portuguese in Macao. In this manner merchants could receive 
payment in Japanese silver, which enabled them in turn to locally purchase 
sugar in order to enlarge their capital or to purchase more silk for shipments 
to Japan in the following trading season.  
Since Iquan had cleared the sea route from Chê-chiang all the way to 
Kuang-tung in 1635 and was even then serving as officer-in-charge of 
supervising the traffic between the Fu-chien and Kuang-tung coasts, the sea 
routes of the Fu-chienese merchants were secured. Each year the four to six 
junks which put into Taiwan provided 60-90 per cent of the raw silk supplied 
to the Dutch. The rest was brought in on other junks which also carried rough 
wares such as sugar, earthenware and the like.   
 
                                                          
44 Chang Hai-ying, Ming-ch’ing chiang-nan shang-p’in liu-t’ung yü shih-ch’ang 
t’i-his[The Market System and the Circulation of Commodities around the 
Chiang-nan Region during the Ming and Ch’ing Dynasties],（Shang-hai: East China 
Normal University Publisher, 2001, 105-7. 
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Table 7- 3: The structure of the Chinese raw silk imports in Taiwan 
Season Raw silk 
imported from 
China in piculs* 
The proportion 
provided by the 
richest junks.*   
Chinese raw silk 
sold by the Dutch 
in piculs** 
1634-10/1635-10 1222 4(51%) 6(70%) 1309.49 
1635-10/1636-10 1590 3(63%) 5(96%) 1665.44 
1636-10/1637-10 1510.5  4(58%) 6(76%) 1496.69 
1637-10/1638-11 1305.5 4(52%) 6(62%) 1931.945 
1638-11/1639-11 1167 4(66%) 5(77%) 1462.89 
1639-11/1640-10 - - 1522.31 
Source: * revised from: Lin Wei-sh'êng, Hê-chü shih-ch'i tung-yin-tu kung-ssu tsai t'ai-wan tê 
mao-i（1622-1662）[The VOC Trade in Taiwan during the Period of Dutch Rule], (PhD diss., 
National Taiwan University, 1998),111-3. Table: 3-20, the raw silk carried by Chinese junks to 
Taiwan. This table is based on ‘the Dagregister Zeelandia’ and ‘the Daghregister Batavia’. 
**  Nagazumi Yoko, Liu Hsü-fêng (trans.), ‘You Hê-lan shih-liao k'an shih-ch'i shih-chi tê 
t'ai-wan mao-i[Taiwan Trade in the Seventeenth Century Based on Dutch Sources]’, in T'ang 
His-yung(ed.), 2 vols, Chung-kuo hai-yang fa-chan-shih lun-wên chi(VII), vol.1. 37-57 at 42. 
Table 1. The raw silk exports to Japan were carried on VOC ships. This table is based on the 
Negotie journaal 1633-1660.    
This situation meant that the An-hai merchants who traded with the Dutch in 
Taiwan were clearly divided into two different groups. One group consisted 
of the rich merchants who handled the luxury commodities, the other was 
composed of the petty vendors who dealt in coarse wares and small number 
of luxury commodities. The big merchants were expected to pay 400 taels to 
for their licences, but their lesser counterparts were only required to pay 80 
                                                          
45 Generale Missive, 22 Dec.1638, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 176. It records 
that 1421.94 picul of Chinese white raw silk had been shipped to Japan. The number 
differs slightly from Nagazumi’s figures derived from the diary kept on Deshima. 
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taels.46 Because the former fell under the regulations covering the category 
of overseas trade as the junks sailing to Manila and Batavia, they had to pay a 
national tax. The latter fell into the category of coastal traders like those 
involved in the rice and sugar trades between Kuang-tung and Fu-chien and 
therefore paid only a provincial tax.47 Strictly speaking, it was illegal for the 
latter to export the silk goods to the Dutch in Taiwan. However, since the 
Pescadores Islands formed the boundary of China and were under Dutch 
protection as the letter written to the Chinese Coastal Defence Circuits 
suggests, the authorities turned a blind eye to the trade. In fact, as the table 
above shows that the big merchants still supplied most of the fine goods and 
indeed their trade was actually expanding. An-hai merchants collected the 
Chê-chiang raw silk in May and shipped it immediately to Taiwan so that the 
Dutch could trade it for silver in Japan in September and early October. The 
silver would have been shipped south during the previous spring and stored 
in the Taiwan lodge until the current summer, when it was used to purchase 
the new silks. If the Dutch merchants spent too much Japanese silver 
elsewhere before August, there would not be enough silver in Taiwan to pay 
the incoming silk junks, and such squandering on their part inevitably 
resulted in financial problems for the Chinese merchants. 
Table 7-4:The revenue generated by selling Chinese silk products in 
Japan and the benefits to the Factory in Taiwan. 
                                                          
46 Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 210. 7 Mar. 1635. It records the sum of 50 
taels for a coastal pass; VOC 1116, Missive van Hans Putmans Naer Batavia aen 
gouverneur generael Hendrick Brouwer, Taiwan, 9 Mar. 1635, fo. 329v. 
47  The Minister of War, Hsiung Ming-yü, Ch’ou-i Fu-chien K’ai-hai Li-hai 
[Considerations on the pros and cons of opening the Overseas Trade in Fu-chien] 
September 1631’, in: Ch’ên Yün-lin, Ming-ch’ing Kung-ts’ang t’ai-wan tang-an 
hui-pien, vol. 3, 150-97 at 173. There were two kinds of licence:  
a) The ’Yin’ for overseas shipping that should be applied for annually, and  
b) The ’Chao’ for the coastal trade that should be applied for every few months.  
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 The revenue of Chinese silk 
products sold in Japan  
(florin.)* 
Benefits of the Dutch Factory in 
Taiwan  
(florin.)** 
1635 759,971 -93,492 
1636 1,135,187 91,207 
1637 1,926,997 -49,505 
1638 1,959,992 -84,325 
1639 2,712,273 -170,247 
1640 4,862,139 13,589 
Source:* revised from: Nagazumi Yoko, Liu Hsü-fêng (trans.), ‘You Hê-lan shih-liao k’an 
shih-ch’i shih-chi tê t’ai-wan mao-i’, 37-57 at 42-43. Table 1 the raw silk exports to Japan on 
VOC ships; Table 2: the silk product exports to Japan on VOC ships.  
** revised from: Tonio Andrade, How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch , Spanish, and Han 
Colonization in the Seventeenth Century[online], Appendix C: Income and Outlays in Dutch 
Taiwan, 1631-1661. 
Although the silk trade grew exponentially, the fixed investment required for 
the Formosan colony itself rose just as rapidly. As the table above shows, in 
most years in this period the VOC in Taiwan not only could not even scratch 
a profit, it even ran at a loss. As the revenue earned from the sale of the raw 
silk usually amounted to 50 per cent of its income, it should have been quite 
enough to pay for the next purchases the following summer,48 but part of the 
silver was either sent to Batavia or used to pay for the construction costs of 
Zeelandia Castle - slaking lime, making bricks and wages of the Chinese 
building-workers. If there was not enough cash to pay the Chinese merchants, 
they were not allowed to take back their silk goods to An-hai, for the reason 
that the Dutch were still at war with the Spaniards in Manila and Portuguese 
in Macao during this period and did not want the precious commodity to fall 
                                                          
48 VOC 1123, Missive van Jan van der Burch naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael 
Anthonio van Diemen ende raden van India, Taiwan, 12 Dec. 1637, Fo. 920r. 
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into enemy hands.49 The only solution was to take the goods on loan from 
the Chinese merchants and to pay them interest before the Japanese silver 
arrived in the depths of winter. In the August of 1637, Governor Johan van 
der Burg in Taiwan resorted to this method for the first time. His first step 
was to ask the Chinese merchant Hambuan what interest rate should be paid 
to the Chinese merchants and he then signed a formal contract as receipt for a 
loan.50 Later, when the news spread to An-hai and Amoy, the merchants all 
complained about this arrangement, because they had collected the raw silk 
on Hambuan’s promise that they would be paid in silver immediately.51 In 
total the capital borrowed from the An-hai merchants amounted to 585,000 
guilders (about 177,272 taels), which was paid at a monthly interest of 3 per 
cent interest when the Japanese silver arrived in Taijouan on a Company ship 
on 12 December.52 It was said that two junks which were on the point of 
leaving Amoy abandoned their plan to set sail to Taiwan as a direct 
consequence of the shortage of money at Zeelandia Castle.53 In the years 
which followed, if all the silver had been used up by the middle of July, the 
Dutch governor had to resort to borrowing the silk goods from the Chinese 
merchants again.54 By this time, the Dutch had decided to pay no more than 
                                                          
49 VOC 1123, Resolutie genomen bij den gouverneur Johan van der Burch ende raedt 
van Taijouan, Taiwan, 8 Sept. 1637, Fos. 831v-832 r. 
50 VOC 1123, Resolutie genomen bij den gouverneur Johan van der Burch ende raedt 
van Taijouan, Taiwan, Taiwan, 21 Aug. 1637, Fo. 825r-v; Dagregister Zeelandia, I 
1629-1641, 366. 
51 Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 368; VOC 1123, Resolutie genomen bij den 
gouverneur Johan van der Burch ende raedt van Taijouan, Taiwan, 8 Sept. 1637, Fos. 
831v-832 r. 
52 Generale Missive, 9 Dec. 1637, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 166; VOC 1123, 
Missive van Jan van der Burch naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Anthonio van 
Diemen ende raden van India, Taiwan, 12 Dec. 1637, Fo. 920r.   
53 VOC 1123, Resolutie genomen bij den gouverneur Johan van der Burch ende raedt 
van Taijouan, Taiwan, Taiwan, 8 Sept. 1637, fos. 831v-832r. 
54 Generale Missive, 22 Dec. 1638, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 173. It records 
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1.5 per cent interest per month on the loan. This decision cause enormous 
consternation among the Chinese merchants, because they had had to 
assemble the silk goods themselves by taking out individual private loans at 
an interest about 2.5 to 3 per cent.55 Both sides negotiated back and forth 
several times, until the Dutch finally suggested they should pay part of the 
amount in pepper and the rest in silver at an interest in the region of 3 per 
cent. Both sides compromised. The Chinese merchants agreed to take 2,500 
catties of pepper at the price of 15.5 rials and the remainder in silver at an 
interest of 2.5 per cent.56  
Governor Johan van den Burg adopted a firm stance in the negotiations 
and insisted that the An-hai merchants should accept part of the payment in 
tropical commodities which the VOC had shipped to Taiwan. His 
high-handedness irritated the Fu-chien merchants. They threatened that they 
would no longer support the gentry in An-hai in their bribery of the local 
officials, unless the Dutch promised to pay their overdue bills in silver and 
silver alone.57 It seems the Dutch authorities did not lose any sleep over the 
matter. They were very confident that Chinese would not be willing to risk 
their lives on the voyage to Japan. For them to have undertaken the voyage in 
the first place would have been illegal and, even if they did throw caution to 
the winds, they would run the risk that all their earnings from this trade might 
be confiscated by the mandarins. Above them loomed the spectre of the 
typhoons which were notorious during southern monsoon season in the East 
China Sea.       
The final shot the Dutch had in their locker was that, if Chinese were to 
engage in the direct trade with Japan, they might have to face the immediate 
                                                                                                                             
that all the revenue earned from the Japan trade had been completely spent by the 
middle of August 1638.  
55 Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 427-8. 12 July; 15 July 1638. 
56 Ibid., 429-30. 20 July; 22 July 1638. 
57 Ibid., I 1629-1641, 429. 20 July 1638.  
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threat of a Dutch blockade of Manila in revenge. A new maritime ban issued 
by the imperial court which follow such a disturbance was actually the last 
thing the An-hai merchants wanted to risk. A letter sent to the Gentlemen 
XVII makes no bones about this: 
‘We have to do our utmost to remove all obstacles and allow those 
Chinese junks sailing to Manila to pass through unharmed whenever they 
happen to encounter our ships, allowing them to continue their voyage. We 
should not do them any damage but help them and provide them with 
necessities, like water….because it is both obvious and without doubt that 
these junks have been fitted out by the richest merchants and provided with 
passes issued by the great and powerful prince, who would be bold enough to 
take revenge on any trespasses committed by vindictive patrols.’ 58        
As mentioned before, the Dutch authorities in Taiwan were aware of 
how ineffective any attempts to patrol the sea route between Chang-chou and 
Manila would be. They accepted that the price they had to pay for the 
legalized An-hai-Taiwan trade was to allow free Chinese shipping to sailing 
on Manila. Since 1636 various other factors might also have contributed to 
reducing the pressure on the An-hai-Manila trade. Newly elected 
Governor-General Antonio van Diemen had made the strategic decision to 
reserve most of his resources and ships to launch attacks on the Portuguese 
enemy in India. Hence his most prominent targets were Goa, Ceylon and 
Malacca.59 The customs records of Manila are another source which confirm 
that An-hai-Manila trade was prosperous between 1633 to 1639. 
                                                          
58 VOC 1128, Missive van Jan van der Burch naer Amsterdam aen de Camer 
Amsterdam, Taiwan, 28 Nov. 1638, Fo. 368r-v. Governor Johan van den Burch 
decided to allow all large Chinese junks sailing to Manila to pass unharmed, if they 
carried the legal passes issued by the Chinese Court.    
59 Ernst van Veen, Decay or defeat? : an inquiry into the Portuguese decline in Asia, 
1580-1645, ( Leiden : Research School of Asian, African, and Amerindian Studies, 
Universiteit Leiden, 2000), 200. 
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Table 7-5: The numbers of Chinese junks visiting Manila (1633-1640)  









Source: Pierre Chaunu, Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques(XVIe,XVIIe,XVIIIe 
siécles )[The Philippines and the Iberian Pacific Ocean], (Paris: S.E.V. P. E. N., 1968), 156-60. 
Série 13, Table 3. 
Although the records do not give the precise figures for the individual 
years, it is none the less possible to estimate the total value of the Chinese 
commodities imported by scrutinizing the customs duties paid. Between 1631 
and 1635, the total value of Chinese commodities was estimated to be 
571,396 rials, or an average of 114,279 rials each year. In the following 
section, 1636-1640, the value had fallen a little and was 458,063 rials, or 
91,612 rials on average each year.60  
Table 7-6:The price of raw silk shipped to Taiwan on Chinese junks        
                                                          
60  Wu Yü-ying, Hsi-pan-ya t’ung-chih shih-ch'i tê chung-fei-mao i[The 
Sino-Philippine Trade under Spanish Rule], (PhD diss., The New Asia Institute of 
Advanced Chinese Studies, 1992), 125. Table 7. The table is based on: Pierre Chaunu, 
Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques, 204. Série 14, Table 3. The table records 
the import duty on Chinese goods from 1646 to 1665. When the figures are divided by 
the tax rate of 6%, the total value of the imported Chinese goods can be estimated.   
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purchase price in 
Taiwan, in 




cost in rials 
1636-10/1637-10 1510.5  191 288,505.5 
1637-10/1638-11 1305.5 190 248,045 
1638-11/1639-11 1167 200 233,400 
Average   256,650 
Source: *Lin Wei-sh’êng, Hê-chü shih-c’i tung-yin-tu kung-ssu tsai t’ai-wan tê mao-i
（1622-1662）, 111-3. Table 3-20; 
** revised from: Peter W. Klein, ‘ De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel van de Verenigde 
Oostindische Compagnie en het inter-Asiatische verkeer in de 17e Eeuw [The Tonkin-Japanese 
Silk Trade of the Dutch East India Company and the Inter-Asian Traffic in the Seventeenth 
Century]’. in Willem Frijhoff and Minke Hiemstra (eds), Bewogen en bewegen: de historicus in 
het spanningsveld tussen economic en cultuur, (Tilburg: Uitgeverij H. Gianotten B.V., 1906), 
152-77 at 170. Table 2 De jaarlijks gemiddelde prijzen (gld.) per catty ruwe zijde in de factorij 
Deshima der VOC 1638-1668 [The Average Annual Price (Guilders) per Catty of Raw Silk in the 
Factory Deshima of the VOC 1638-1668 ].  
Given that all commodities sold in Manila were exchanged for silver, 
the amount of money spent there, compared with the capital that the Dutch 
reserved in Taiwan for purchasing raw silk, would have amounted only to 
about 35 per cent.61 Therefore the ratio of An-hai trade with Taiwan and 
Manila was 3:1. Since they were aware that the Taiwan trade already 
                                                          
61 Richard von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune, (California: University of California, 
1996), 232. In Table 23, Von Glahn also gives a separate estimates of the silver 
flowing into China from Japan and via the Philippines in these two different intervals. 
In the proportions of silver imported from those two places, the portions from Manila 
were lower, at 21% and 11%. These differences might have arisen from his estimates 
of the silver imported from Japan, which was based on 80% of the values of the 
imports.     
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absorbed the largest portion of Fu-chien exports, the Dutch felt no urgent 
need to ruin the An-hai-Manila trade at all costs.       
After the last Dutch ship left Taiwan for Japan in September of 1638, 
the An-hai merchants delivered silk goods valued at 300,000 rials on board 
three junks two months later in November. They were prepared to wait for 
their payment for the silver which would be shipped from Japan in December. 
Seven Dutch vessels arrived in Taiwan from Japan before the end of 
December and the 2,280,000 guilders (800,000 Japanese taels) of Japanese 
silver was more than adequate to satisfy them immediately.62  
As the Japanese authorities suspected them of having had a hand in the 
Shimabara Rebellion of 1637-8, the Portuguese were subsequently banned 
from the Japan trade. Two Portuguese galliots which arrived during the 
summer of 1639 were kept under strict surveillance and ordered to set a 
return course once the north monsoon had set in.63 Watching from the 
sidelines, the Dutch in Japan judged this would be the best opportunity for 
them to take over the Portuguese business in Japan, if they could offer silk 
goods of the same quality as the Portuguese had done. During the south 
monsoon season in 1639, the Dutch shipped 2,963,018 guilders’ worth of 
Chinese goods to Japan, expecting a 60 per cent profit.64 According to a 
                                                          
62 Generale Missive, 30 Dec. 1638, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 179.   
63 Charles R. Boxer, Fidalgos in the Far East, (Hongkong: Oxford University press, 
1968), 121. 
64 VOC 1133, Missive van Jan van den Burch naer Cambodja aen den oppercoopman 
Joannes van der Hagen, Taiwan, 31 Dec. 1639, Fo. 170v. However, in ‘ the Report of 
Commissioner Nicolaes Couckebacker’, the sum is recorded as 2,898,802:18:4 
guilders. Cf. VOC 1131, Rapport [van Nicolaes Couckebacker] aen den gouverneur 
generael Anthonio van Diemen ende de raeden van India, nopende Couckebacker’s 
besendinge naer Tonckin ende gedaene visite des Comptoirs ende verderen ommeslag 
uijt Taijouan, gelegen op het eijlandt Formosa [Report of Commissioner Nicolaes 
Couckebacker to Governor-General Anthonio van Diemen and the Council of the 
Indies, concerning His Mission to Tonkin and His Visit to the Taiwan Factory and 
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report of the same year, the Dutch were originally prepared to purchase 
4,000,000 guilders’ worth of Chinese goods, but the An-hai merchants were 
not willing to lend the Dutch 1,000,000 guilders’ worth of goods. They were 
only prepared to go as high as 224,959 guilders at an interest of 2 or 2.5 per 
cent for two months. Hence their financial caution prevented the Dutch from 
expanding their Japanese trade to the extent they desired.65 Although it 
seemed obvious that the An-hai merchants could not keep up with the pace of 
the rapid expansion of the Dutch trade, President François Caron, in charge 
of the Hirado Factory in Japan, still submitted an ambitious order for Chinese 
goods amounting to 5,000,000 guilders.66   
The sum of 1,050,000 taels in silver (2,992,500 guilders) arrived in 
Taiwan from Japan on board six Dutch vessels in the December of 1639.67 
Up to the end of April of 1640, another 1,130,000 taels (3,220,500 guilders) 
of silver arrived in Taiwan on three other ships.68 Although the supply of 
silver was greater than ever, the Dutch still purchased more than they actually 
paid for, so finally 5,164,371 guilders’ worth of Chinese goods were shipped 
to Japan in the autumn.69   
                                                                                                                             
Other Company Establishments in the Island of Formosa] (hereafter cited as ‘ Report 
of Commissioner Nicolaes Couckebacker’), [on the ship] de Rijp, 8 Dec.1639, fo. 
312. 
65 Ibid., fo. 312. 
66 Generale Missive, 18 Dec. 1639, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 188; VOC 1132, 
Missive van gouverneur Van der Burch aen Adam Westerwolt president van 't 
comptoir Persien, Taiwan, 30 Nov 1639, Fol. 307. 
67 Generale Missive, 8 Jan. 1640, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 190-191; VOC 
1133, Missive van Jan van Der Burch naer Cambodja aen den oppercoopman Joannes 
van der hagen, Taiwan, 31 Dec. 1639, Fo. 170v. 
68 Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 488. 26 Dec. 1639; 493. 13 Jan. 1640;495, 23 
Apr. 1640. 
69 Daghregister Batavia, 1640-1641,111. 6 Dec. 1640. It was estimated from the sum 
total of the cargoes of six junks, with the exception of the first ship, de Roch, the bulk 
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By indulging in these risky politics, the VOC factory in Taiwan 
succeeded in expanding its part in the Sino-Japan trade exponentially. When 
the Portuguese were expelled by the Japanese Shogun in 1639, the Dutch 
confidently expected to take over all of the rich trade the Portuguese had 
been forced to relinquish after their alleged support of the Shimabara 
Rebellion. Fate intervened and the political changes in Japan, China, and 
India affected the An-hai merchants in another way. The An-hai-Taiwan trade 
did not follow the path of Canton-Macao trade as the Dutch had hoped. The 
decisive difference between the Cantonese and Fu-chienese merchants was 
that the latter were granted passes which allowed them to sail to the South 
and East China Seas. In the other words, the adventurous Chinese merchants 
were granted the right to take a risk and they were quite willing to draw a 
bow at a venture as the next chapters will reveal.70  
                                                                                                                             
of whose cargo was from Tonkin. 
70  Leonard Blussé, ‘The VOC as Socerer’s Appentice’, 87-105 at 104. Blussé 
correctly points out that the VOC finally failed to force the Chinese Court to 
acquiesce in their role as just another element in the coastal order. Their failure to win 
imperial recognition created an essential position for a mediator like Iquan. The 
Fu-chienese merchants were not only able to play the mediator, they also had the right 
to sail and trade in other places in the South China Sea. Hence the contradictory 




IN SEARCH OF SILVER 
IN A CHANGING WORLD 1640-1646 
 
The usurpation of the silver trade from Macao 
There can be no shadow of doubt that the primary goal of the Dutch in 
Taiwan was to usurp the places occupied by both Macao and Manila in the 
silk-for-silver trade run by the merchants of Fu-chien and Kuang-tung. In the 
year 1639, when the Shogunal Government decided to expel the Portuguese 
and banish them forever from Nagasaki, the Dutch finally had the 
opportunity they had been waiting for to replace the Portuguese in Japan once 
and for all. As they were still not in a position to access the Cantonese silk 
traders and weavers who supplied the Portuguese in Macao in person, they 
urged their Fu-chienese partners in An-hai to meet the Japanese silk order. 
These An-hai merchants had already been supplying most of the raw silk it 
required to the Dutch Factory in Taiwan, but now the Japanese merchants 
wanted more than just the raw commodity and were also putting in orders for 
finished silk products such as damasks and satins.1 This expansion in silk 
exports was eventually accomplished in the south monsoon season of 
1639-1640, but not without conflict. On account of the sudden increase in 
orders, the Dutch could not pay for the goods required with silver in time and, 
feeling hard done-by, the aggrieved An-hai merchants supplied inferior 
merchandise, although this was the sort of risk that the An-hai merchants 
                                                          
1 VOC 1131, The Report of Commissioner Nicolaes Couckebaker, [on board the ship] 
De Rijp, 8 Dec. 1639, fo. 298r-v; Pol Heyns and Cheng Wei-chung (eds), Dutch 
Formosan Placard-book Marriage, and Baptism Records, (Taipei: SMC Publish, 
2005), 130; 132. The placards were issued on 6 April 1638 and on 13 August 1639 
respectively   
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could have expected to bear in this newly expanding commercial market. 
Still able to hang onto his prominent status in town, the protector of the 
An-hai merchants, Cheng Chih-lung alias Nicolas Iquan, had other tasks to 
perform and was ordered to carry out his military duties in the the border area 
between Fu-chien and Kuang-tung provinces in his capacity as Regional 
Deputy-Commander of Nan-ao. Naturally, his duty required that he be with 
his men and therefore he found himself forced to reside on the border rather 
than in An-hai. 
Around about this time it is said that the Emperor finally issued the 
passes required for the trade with Taiwan, as well as eight other destinations 
around the South China Sea.2 With the issuance of these imperial passes, the 
deal reached between Iquan and the provincial grandees became something 
of a problem. Once the trade was formalized, the tax revenues would also 
have to be distributed in a normal way.  
At this distance in time it is hard to fathom when exactly the An-hai 
merchants heard about the exclusion of the Portuguese from Japan. When 
Iquan received a message from Peking in September 1639 informing him that 
a Surveillance Commissioner (An-ch’a-shih[C] ) was on his way to 
Kuang-tung province to supervise the security on frontier, he left to join his 
forces on Nan-ao Island. 3  There, at the beginning of November, he 
encountered two Portuguese galliots which had run aground in these waters. 
Both ships had been turned back in August by the Japanese authorities. Iquan 
decided to confiscate both their cargoes and transported these valuable silk 
goods to An-hai. He gave orders that no one was permitted to send any goods 
to Taiwan until he had returned with the loot.4 At her own peril, in defiance 
                                                          
2 Generale Missive, 12 Jan. 1639, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 182. 
3  VOC 1133, Missive van gouverneur Joan van der Burch naer Batavia aen 
gouverneur general Anthonio van Diemen, Taiwan, 28 Jan. 1640, fo. 185r. 
4 VOC 1132, Missive van gouverneur Joan van der Burch naer Choromandel aen den 
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of Iquan’s advice, one junk did depart from An-hai around 27 November 
1640 and was duly impounded by a local official on Quemoy.5  
Informed that the Portuguese had been excluded from the 
Sino-Japanese trade, Iquan recognized that this was the perfect juncture to 
grasp the nettle and re-arrange his trading ventures. By giving orders to hold 
the junks up in An-hai, he eventually forced them to carry 10,000, 20,000 and 
30,000 taels’ worth of his own goods respectively. With the weight of 
advantage behind him, he not only ordered the Anahi merchants to advance 
him 20 per cent of the proceeds of successful sales but also to carry the risk 
of the loss should any accident befall the ships during their voyage across the 
Taiwan Strait.6  
At that moment, Iquan’s servants were also embroiled in quarrels with 
certain of the An-hai merchants, because they believed that their boss should 
receive a percentage for shipping their goods at the expense of those Nanking 
merchants who also wished to dispatch their goods on the ships of the An-hai 
merchants.7 On 6 January 1640, the silk goods seized from the Portuguese 
galliots were taken to An-hai, where Iquan also arrived in person, on one of 
                                                                                                                             
gouverneur Arent Gardenijs, Taiwan, 30 Nov. 1639, fo. 302; VOC 1132, Missive van 
gouverneur Joan van der Burch naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Anthonio van 
Diemen ende raden van India, Taiwan, 10 Dec.1639, fo. 284. 
5  VOC 1132, Missive van gouverneur Joan van der Burch naer Batavia aen 
gouverneur generael Anthonio van Diemen ende raden van India, Taiwan, 10 
Dec.1639, Fo. 285. The reason for this impounding was that the captain was not 
carrying the Emperor’s pass. Other records show this captain was named ‘Sualiangh’ 
and that he usually paid for and carried a pass. Cf. VOC 1131, Report of 
Commissioner Nicolaes Couckebaker, [on board the ship] De Rijp, 8 Dec. 1639, fos. 
297-8. 
6 VOC 1131, Report of Commissioner Nicolaes Couckebaker, [on board the ship] De 
Rijp, 8 Dec. 1639, fos. 297-8. 
7 VOC 1133, Missive van gouverneur Jan van der Burch naer Batavia aen gouverneur 
generael Anthonio van Diemen, Taiwan, 28 Jan. 1640, fos. 180v-181 r.  
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his vessels.8 Under his personal supervision, three big junks loaded to the 
gunnels left for Taiwan under the leadership of the merchant Hambuan. 
Hambuan was also charged with transmitting a message to the Taiwan 
authorities, intimating that Iquan guaranteed to supply high quality silk 
products in the latest fashion (exquize zijde stuckwercken op de nieuw moode) 
according to the requirements of Japanese customers and that he also 
intended to attract weavers and merchants wooing them to move to An-hai 
from Kuang-tung.9 Soon after he had settled these arrangements, Iquan 
returned to Nan-ao with his soldiers to take up his new military assignment 
which was to lead his troops to the mountain areas on the boundary between 
the provinces of Kuang-tung and Hu-kuang（nowadays Hu-pei and Hu-nan）
to put down a rebellion of the aboriginal tribes.10               
Ten days after his arrival in Taiwan, Hambuan paid a private visit to the 
Dutch Governor’s house. Iquan had entrusted him with yet another task, 
namely to propose drawing up a contract so that ‘this tremendous Chinese 
trade might have an eternal and durable basis.’11 Iquan had made this 
proposal when he summoned Hambuan to meet him personally at night. 
Hambuan had asked for a written version of the proposal, but Iquan thought 
the Dutch would trust Hambuan’s words since he had lent them so much 
capital in the past. In this proposal, Iquan suggested that: 
‘ 
1. He would supply the Company with fine silk and silk products on its own 
recognizance, in the same way as the Spaniards in Manila and the 
                                                          
8 Ibidem, fo. 181r. 
9 Ibid., fos. 186v-187v. ‘…in order to take of them out of the clutches of the 
Portuguese…’ 
10 Ibid., fo. 186v. According to the Chinese sources, it was located at Lienchou. 
TWYH(ed.), Chêng-shih shih-liao ch'u-pien, 178. 
11  VOC 1133, Missive van gouverneur Jan van der Burch naer Batavia aen 
gouverneur generael Anthonio van Diemen, Taiwan, 28 Jan. 1640, fo. 190 v. 
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Portuguese in Macao had enjoyed the trade in earlier days. 
2. The Company loan would be renewed annually. The Chinese wares 
would never fall short, if the Company paid a monthly 2.5 per cent 
interest on the money borrowed. 
3. Since the Company would be able to sell the Chinese wares at a good 
profit, about 10,000,000 to 12,000,000 guilders in Japan, no matter what 
damage the Company might suffer, 200,000 guilders should be sent [to 
Japan] annually on Iquan’s account.  
4.  More than 250,000 guilders which would therefore come from this 
[above] estimated amount would be reserved for annual presents to the 
grandees.’12 
On 2 November, after having taken care of the settlement of that season’s 
trade, Hambuan brought a written contract with revisions made by the 
Taiwan authorities back to An-hai.13 The revised version states as follows: 
‘ 
1. I, Iquan, shall send no more Chinese wares to Japan, although in the 
past I have fitted out junk cargoes amounting to 800,000 guilders´ worth 
[of these goods] for that destination. Furthermore, I shall stop sending 
any vessels over there. I shall not send or order any ship to sail to Japan 
on my own account. 
2. I shall not only cease such ventures, but also impose extremely strict 
sanctions on any other grandees who engage in this trade, as proof 
hereof the Company will see that Chinese wares [to Japan] will be 
                                                          
12 Ibid., fos. 191v-192r.  
13 Daghregister Batavia, 1640-1641, 112. 6 Dec. 1640; Generale Missive, 8 Jan. 1641, 
in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 198. Unfortunatelly Hambuan perished in a 
shipwreck, therefore the letter was delivered by another merchant at a later date. 
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reduced from the previous amount. 
3. I shall supply the Company with fine silk and silk products on its own 
recognizance, on the same terms as the Spaniards in Manila and 
Portuguese in Macao have enjoyed in the past. 
4. In time, I shall deliver to the Company such Chinese wares as His 
Honour [the Governor of Taiwan] thinks will be most profitable in Japan, 
or other destinations in Asia, or to Holland, and never neglect to satisfy 
its requirements. 
5. I shall renew the Company loan annually, so that it will never be short of 
Chinese wares, if it pays 2.5 per cent interest, even to the extent that 
goods will be delivered to the amount of 1,000,000 guilders [and the 
period sustained] three months. 
6. The Company will be able to sell and trade about 10,000,000 to 
12,000,000 guilders’ worth of Chinese wares in Japan. For its part, the 
Company will ensure that 50,000 rials in merchandise will be sent on 
Iquan´s account and another 50,000 rials in merchandise on the account 
of the Company (on which the proper transportation fee will be paid here 
and which should consist of requested and assorted wares) to be sent to 
Japan on the Company ships. This solution will bring honour to Iquan 
and the Company will obtain good profits. After the completion of the 
voyage, the Company will still be responsible for paying Iquan, the 
above sum plus 40 per cent profit. Every 50,000 rials should return a 
guaranteed 70,000 rials in total, without any risk of loss.’14  
The only difference between these two proposals was in fact the amount of 
Iquan’s personal allowance. In Hambuan’s version, Iquan demanded about 
                                                          
14 VOC 1134, Contract tusschen gouverneur [Paulus] Traudenius ende den Mandorijn 
Iquan getroffen anno 1640 [Contract between Iquan and the Governor of Taiwan 
Paulus Traudenis in 1640], Taiwan, 1640 [date not recorded], fo. 121r-v.  
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200,000 guilders of his be carried annually by the Dutch ships. Reviewing the 
800,000 guilders of goods which he had previously sent to Japan, he agreed 
to reduce his shipment to 25 per cent. But Governor Paulus Traudenius dug 
his toes in and would only agree to allow 50,000 rials (140,000 guilders) to 
be carried. On 21 December 1640, another letter from Iquan arrived in 
Taiwan in reply to Governor Traudenius’ proposal. Iquan asked the Company 
to give a shipment of 100,000 rials (280,000 guilders) in goods, thereby 
rejecting Traudenius’ proposal.15 His reason was that this would have been 
only 35 per cent of his current shipment. Finally both parties failed to reach 
an agreement in 1640.   
While these negotiations were going on, Iquan dispatched several junks 
to Japan laden with silk goods. Only two of them arrived, carrying the 
cargoes worth about 200,000 taels (or 660,800 guilders). In contrast the 
Dutch exported 5,164,371 guilders’ worth of all kinds of goods including silk 







                                                          
15 Daghregister Batavia, 1640-1641, 175. 29 Jan. 1641.  
16 VOC 1136, Missive van den Ed. president Franchois Caron aen den gouverneur 
generael [Anthonio] Van Diemen , Japan, 20 Nov. 1640, not foliated; Daghregister 
Batavia, 1640-1641,111. 6 Dec. 1640. The total of the cargoes of the Otter, the 
Oostcappel, the Broeckoort, De Rocht, De Rijp, and the Pauw carried to Japan from 
Taiwan. It should include the silk goods and other commodities. 
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Table 8-1: Chinese raw silk exported to Japan directly and via Taiwan 
 Chinese raw silk 
exported to 










1639-11/1640-10 1,522.31 1,852.2 
1640-11/1641-10  716.3 1,319.05
1641-11/1642-10   422.43 639.33
1642-10/1643-11     289.24 1,795.24
Source: Nagazumi Yoko, Liu Hsü-fêng (trans.), ‘You Hê-lan shih-liao k’an shih-ch’i shih-chi tê 
t'ai-wan mao-i [The Taiwan Trade in the Seventeenth Century Based on Dutch Sources]’, 37-57 
at 42. Table 1; 46. Table 3. 
The An-hai merchants exported slightly more raw silk than the Dutch, and 
Iquan’s exports occupied about 34 per cent of the total export of the An-hai 
merchants. The Dutch chief merchant in Japan, François Caron, seriously 
considered the possibility of signing a formal contract with Iquan. He agreed 
that competition between both parties would reduce the profits, but he 
wondered whether Iquan would be able to really keep his promise and 
prevent any other Chinese junks sailing to Japan from China. If he could not 
live up to his end of the bargain, there was still the nagging possibility that he 
might trade under someone else’s name. At this stage of play, the attitude of 
the Japanese authorities was still unpredictable since they had just banished 
the Portuguese and were adjusting their regulations deal with the Dutch, who 
had been ordered to demolish their factory at Hirado and to sell off their 
stores as soon as possible.17 Placed under such stress and facing competition 
from the Chinese merchants, the Dutch discovered that their pure profits 
                                                          
17 VOC 1136, Missive van den Ed. president Franchois Caron aen den gouverneur 
generael [Anthonio] Van Diemen , Japan, 20 Nov. 1640, fol. 771r-7v; Daghregister 
Batavia, 1640-1641, 147-8. 20 Aug. 1640;66. 13 Dec. 1641. The message was passed 
from Taiwan.  
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declined to only 850,000 guilders, which means they only earned a 13.5 per 
cent profit instead of the expected 60 per cent.18  
While the Dutch in Taiwan and the An-hai merchants were locked 
in their bargaining, the Japanese authorities had decided that the pacando 
system would be re-introduced. The upshot of this was that the Japanese 
merchants would be forced to trade with the Dutch collectively under the 
beady eye of the Shogunal authorities. This system precluded competition 
between the individual Japanese merchants at the public auctions and, as a 
consequence, the raw silk price dropped from 292 taels in 1639 to 204 taels 
per picul in 1641. Instead of an average profit of 67 per cent in 1639, the 
profits obtained on the sale of the raw silk dropped to a mere 21 per cent in 
1641.19  
The Dutch were not able to expand the Japan trade, because they 
did not have any large amounts of silver to take to Taiwan which would have 
enabled them to trade with the An-hai merchants. Although Iquan and his 
An-hai companions also suffered heavy losses, he still was able to dispatch 
three richly laden junks on his own account carrying cargoes of silk 
amounting to 1,600,000 guilders to Taiwan in the spring of 1641. Governor 
Paulus Traudenius required them to stay to wait for the silver cash transfer 
from Batavia to arrive. At this moment he was unaware that the Batavian 
                                                          
18 Oskar Nachod, Die Beziehungen der Niederländischen Ostindischen Kompagnie zu 
Japan im XVII Jahrhundert [The Relationship between the Dutch East India Company 
and Japan in the Seventeenth Century], (Inaugural Diss., Rostock University,1897), 
289. 850,000 guilders divided by the total import value of 6,295,367 guilders.   
19  Pieter W. Klein, ‘ De Tonkinees-Japanse zijdehandel van de Verenigde 
Oostindische Compagnie en het inter-Asiatische verkeer in de 17e Eeuw [The 
Tonkin-Japan Silk Trade of the Dutch East India Company and the Inter-Asian Trade 
in the Seventeenth Century]’. in Willem Frijhoff and Minke Hiemstra (eds), Bewogen 
en bewegen: de historicus in het spanningsveld tussen economic en cultuur[To Be 
moved and To Move: Historians in the Field of Tension between Economics and 
Culture], (Tilburg: Uitgeverij H. Gianotten B.V., 1906), 152-177 at 170. Tabel.2. 
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authorities preferred to supply the Japanese silver to the Coromandel Coast 
because they thought that the Chinese trade was not as promising as its 
Indian counterpart.20 The upshot of this stalemate was that, without being fed 
by a steady supply of silver, the Taiwan-An-hai trade came to a standstill. 
When Governor Traudenius again enquired what Iquan thought of his 
proposal, the latter remained silent.21 Iquan knew the Dutch had exported 
almost 4 million guilders in specie from Japan, but most of that silver had not 
ended up in Taiwan But had been whisked away to Batavia. 22 After the 
Governor Traudenius had enthusiastically reported the High Government in 
Batavia about the rich cargoes of the three junks, he had to face the 
disappointment of having to return the goods back to An-hai because the 
silver needed to pay for them had been sequestered by Batavia for use 
elsewhere, namely in India.23  
The Dutch records reveal that Iquan’s Japan trade rapidly expanded 
after 1640. Although generally more than thirty Chinese junks visited Japan 
every season, the bulk of the trade revenues were gradually concentrated in 
Iquan’s junks at this period. By the autumn of 1643, seven of Iquan’s junks 
were carrying 66 per cent of the silk goods carried by thirty-four Chinese 
junks in total.   
 
 
                                                          
20 VOC 665, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, 
Batavia, 20 Mar. 1641, not foliated.  
21 Daghregister Batavia, 1640-1641, 59. 6 Nov. 1641. An extract of the letter sent 
from Taiwan on 17 March 1641.  
22  Nachod, Die Beziehungen der Niederländischen Ostindischen Kompagnie, 
appendix, ccii-cciii. 
23 VOC 664, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, 
Batavia, 4 May 1641, not foliated. 
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proportion in all 
Chinese silk goods 
exported to Japan, 
of Iquan’s silk 
goods cargoes 
(percentage) 
1639-11/1640-10     74 2  200,00024 - 
1640-11/1641-10 89 6 (561,403)25 - 
1641-11/1642-10     32 326 500,00027 (52.8)28*** 
1642-10/1643-11   34 729 850,00030 6631 
                                                          
24 VOC 1136, Missive van den Ed. president Franchois Caron aen den gouverneur 
generael [Anthonio] Van Diemen, Japan, 20 Nov. 1640, not foliated.  
25 VOC 665, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, 
Batavia, 20 Mar.1641, not foliated. The return cargoes belonging to Iquan amounted 
to 1,600,000 guilders, which was equal to 561,403 Japanese taels. 
26 VOC 1140, Missive [van Johan van Elseracq] uijt het jacht Ackerslooth zeijlende 
door de straate Palimbangh aen den gouverneur generaal [Antonio] van Diemen, Strait 
Palimbang, 2 Dec. 1642, fo. 40v; VOC 1140, Missive [van den edelen Johan van 
Elseracq aen de edele heer gouverneur Paulis Traudenius] na Taijouan, Japan, 2 Oct. 
1642, fo. 47r. 
27 VOC 1140, Missive [van Johan van Elseracq] uijt het jacht Ackerslooth zeijlende 
door de straate Palimbangh aen den gouverneur generaal [Antonio] van Diemen, Strait 
Palimbang, 2 Dec. 1642, 40v; VOC 1140, Missive [van den edelen Johan van Elseracq 
aen de edele heer gouverneur Paulis Traudenius] na Taijouan, Japan, 2 Oct. 1642, fo. 
47r. 
28 VOC 1140, Missive [van Johan van Elseracq] uijt het jacht Ackerslooth zeijlende 
door de straate Palimbangh aen den gouverneur generaal [Antonio] van Diemen, Strait 
Palimbang, 2 Dec. 1642, 40v. It records that in all the Chinese cargo sold for a total of 
947,200 taels. Since the most valuable wares were the silk goods, I have taken these 
as a denominator to estimate the percentage of Iquan’s monopoly.  
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Source:* Nagazumi Yoko, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 1637--1833-nen, 330-2. 
Appendix A. 
*** The value of all Chinese silk exports including other low-value coarse wares.  
Although of the maritime ban (Kaikin[J.]) imposed by the Japanese 
authorities had opened the door for the Dutch to realize their ambitious plan 
of supplanting the Portuguese, their undisguised preference for the India 
trade made it impossible for Iquan to believe their sincerity about wanting to 
sign a reciprocal contract. The Dutch partiality for the india trade prompted 
the An-hai merchants under Iquan to decide to keep the silk-for-silver trade 
with Japan in their own hands and bypass the Dutch. All this happened just at 
a time that the strategic shift initiated by the Dutch in the direction of 
financing the India trade with Japanese silver and Chinese gold was actually 
forcing them to rely on the An-hai merchants for the supply of the relatively 
cheaper Chinese gold, which could be sold at a much higher price in India.32 
Because Governor-General Antonio van Diemen and the Council of 
the Indies in Batavia made the critical decision to shift the investments to 
Coromandel and failed to supply Taiwan with an adequate supply of silver, 
the three large junks belonging to Iquan mentioned earlier were ordered to 
                                                                                                                             
29 The Deshima dagregisters : their original tables of contents[hereafter cited as ‘the 
Deshima dagregisters’], Cynthia Viallé and Leonard Blussé (trans. from the Dutch and 
ed.), 12 vols, ( Leiden : Institute for the History of European Expansion, 1986-2005), 
XI:1641-1650, 112. 12-3 Aug. 1643.   
30 The Deshima dagregisters, XI 1641-1643, 112. 12-3 Aug. 1643. 
31 Generale Missive, 22 Dec. 1643, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 215. 
32 Tapan Raychaudhuri, Jan Company in Coromandel, 1605-1690 : a study in the 
interrelations of European commerce and traditional economies, (‘s Gravenhage: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), 140. Raychaudhuri claims that the export of Chinese gold 
from Taiwan to India ushered in a new phrase in which the VOC rapidly began to 
enlarge its investment in the Subcontinent. 
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sail on to Japan.33 In a nutshell, Iquan made up his mind to initiate this trade 
even though it meant he was disobeying an imperial ban on direct trade with 
Japan. His hand had been forced because the Dutch in Taiwan had not turned 
out to be reliable partners. Another additional reason behind his decision 
might have been the massacre in Manila in 1639, an incident in which the 
Spaniards slaughtered thousands of the Chinese inhabitants of the city. This 
outrage obviously upset the trade between An-hai and Manila and this 
interruption brought the supply of Mexican silver to a standstill. In view of 
these developments, it became more urgent than ever to obtain silver from 
Japan. Finally, since the Chinese Court still required Iquan carry out a large 
number of military duties, he could feel pretty secure that the local mandarins 
would not be disposed to disclose his smuggling trade to Japan. Not only was 
Iquan still engaged in pacifying the tribes in the mountains, just at that 
moment in June 1642 the Imperial Court was even planning to assign him to 
a mission devised to resist the Manchu invasion on the Northeasten border.34  
The Usurpation of the Pepper Trade of Macao 
 in the South China Sea Region 
In the light of all the commercial setbacks it had to encounter, the original 
Dutch-Fu-chienese plan, which was to supplant the Kuang-tung-Portuguese 
alliance in Japan trade, ended in failure after a short bargaining period. The 
Macao silver trade with Japan was gradually taken over by Iquan alone but, 
as will be explained below, the export of Chinese gold from Macao was 
gradually taken over by the Dutch East India Company after the Dutch had 
seized Malacca from Portuguese in January 1641.35 The Dutch began their 
                                                          
33 The Deshima dagregisters, XI 1641-1650, 5. 26 June; 7. 1 July; 8. 4 July 1641.  
34 TWYH(ed.), Chêng-shih shih-liao ch'u-pien, 174; Missive van Paulus Traudenius 
naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, Taiwan, 3 Nov. 1642, Fo. 451r. 
35 For a general impact of the capture of Malacca, see: Veen, Decay or defeat?, 201. 
However, the situation in the Chinese gold exports from Macao to India still requires 
more study. 
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siege of Malacca in 1639 and, as a result, the trade between Macao and India 
was cut off. At precisely the same time, in 1639, Governor-General Antonio 
van Diemen was demanding that the Taiwan Factory supply Chinese gold to 
provide the Coromandel factory with the financial wherewithal to purchase 
textiles.36 Obeying his orders, Zeelandia Castle did indeed begin to transmit 
some Chinese gold to India via the route through the Straits of Malacca.37 It 
is estimated that because of the difference in the purchase and sales price 
during the period 1636-1639, Chinese gold generated a 11-15 per cent profit 
in Masulipatnam and 35.5-38 per cent in Pulicat.38 When the trade between 
Taiwan and An-hai ground to a halt in 1640, the Dutch commissioner, 
Nicolaes Couckebacker, even entertained serious doubts about whether China 
could really provide the large order for gold for which Batavia asked. His 
doubts were based on that fact that as far as he was aware there were no 
gold-mines in China.39 The Dutch plan to take over the gold trade from 
Macao never became a realistic option until 1641 when Governor-General 
Antonio van Diemen asked the Taiwan Factory to ship the Japanese silver to 
Coromandel instead of using it as payment for Iquan’s silk junks.40  
 
                                                          
36 Generale Missive, 22 Dec. 1638, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 175.  
37 Generale Missive, 18 Dec. 1639, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 185-6. 
38 According to the research by Raychaudhuri, the Chinese gold from Formosa sold at 
a profit of 35 5/8% to 38% at Pulicat, and of 11% to 15% at Maulipatam during 1636 
to 1639. The general profit of Chinese gold was 21% to 30% in 1643, which once 
dropped to 6% to 9 1/2 % in 1643. Cf. Raychaudhuri, Jan Company in Coromandel, 
187. n 360; 190, n 363. 
39 VOC 1131, Rreport of Commissioner Nicolaes Couckebacker, [on board the ship] 
De Rijp, 8 Dec. 1639, fo. 300r. 
40 VOC 665, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, 
Batavia, 20 Mar 1641, not foliated. However, in order to retreat from Hirado, they 
were required to clear old debts and in return, the Japanese authorities offered them f. 
638,689 in gold. The Taiwan authorities only shipped away f. 501,665, which was 
50.2 % of the requirements of Coromandel. 
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Table 8-3: The demand and supply of gold for India shipped by VOC via 
Taiwan 






1639 600,00041 201,75942 33.6
1640 800,00043 500,00044 62.5
1641 1,000,00045* 501,66546 50.2
* This is a demand for cash, in either gold or silver 
If the Dutch had also been able to occupy Macao after their seizure of 
Malacca, any further co-operation with the Fu-chienese/An-hai merchants 
                                                          
41 Generale Missive, 22 Dec. 1638, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 175; VOC 661, 
Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 16 July 
1638, no foliated. 
42 Generale Missive, 30 Dec. 1638, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa,180. It recorded 
that 134,759 guilders’ worth of the Chinese gold was shipped to Surat; VOC 662, 
Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, Batavia, 1 Mar. 
1639, not foliated. It recorded that f. 67,000 in Chinese gold was shipped to 
Coromandel.  
43  VOC 1132, Missive van gouverneur Joan van der Burch naer Souratta aen 
directeur Barent Pietersz, Taiwan, 30 Nov. 1639, Fo. 310 r; Generale Missiven van 
gouverneur-generaal en raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische 
Compagnie, 11 vols., ed. W. Ph. Coolhaas, J. van Goor and J. E. 
Schooneveld-Oosterling (‘s-Gravenhage: Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, 
1960-2004), II:1639-1655, 60. 18 Dec. 1639. They expected that the Japanese silver 
sent from Japan via Taiwan plus the Chinese gold obtained in Taiwan would amount 
to 700,000 guilders in gold and 100,000 guilders in silver. 
44 VOC 1132, Missive van gouverneur Joan van der Burch naer Choromandel aen 
den gouverneur Arent Garadenijs, Taiwan, 30 Nov. 1639, fos. 302-3;Generale Missive, 
8 Jan. 1640, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 192. 
45 VOC 665, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, 
Batavia, 20 Mar. 1641, not foliated.   
46 Ibidem.  
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would have been pointless. Had their efforts been successful, the Dutch could 
have entered into a trade partnership with merchants in Kuang-tung province 
and supplanted the privileged position of the Portuguese in the Chinese 
Empire, which had been their original plan before they had decided to cast 
their lot in with the Fu-chienese in the 1620s. No wonder the Dutch began to 
lose their faith in Iquan during this period in which they had set their sights 
on the conquest of Macao, but the goal which was almost within their grasp 
was snatched away when Portugal regained its independence in 1640. When 
Portugal pried itself loose from Spain, the Dutch were left without a legal leg 
to stand on to continue their attempts to conquer any Portuguese colony. On 7 
October 1642, when message of this political change of circumstances was 
officially received in Batavia, the High Government there proclaimed a truce 
for a period of 10 years.47 The government of Macao had actually dispatched 
a delegate to Batavia and demanded a cease-fire even before the formal order 
had arrived in Batavia from Holland in April 1642. When the Macanese 
asked to be allowed to trade in Batavia, resume their trade with Malacca and 
be exempted from paying customs duties for three years, the Batavian 
authorities rejected their requests but welcomed any further negotiations 
which would allow them to obtain Chinese gold.48 At this point, because it 
had eventually not been possible to snatch the Macao gold trade by force, the 
persisting competition with the Cantonese-Portuguese alliance once again 
made partnership with the Fu-chienese merchants a feasible option. In a letter 
sent to Iquan, the Governor of Taiwan, Paulus Traudenius, asked his help in 
purchasing high quality gold: 
‘Your Honour, be so good as to arrange good quantities of gold. Any alloy 
lower than 20-24 carat will not be acceptable. We shall pay at the intrinsic 
                                                          
47 Veen, Decay or defeat?, 202. Dagregister Zeelandia, II 1641-1648, 146. 2 June 
1643. 
48 VOC 665, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, 
Batavia, 11 Apr. 1642, fos. 60v-61v. 
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value accordingly. The gold will be paid for in the same way as when you 
have supplied it in the past, please put your mind at rest about this.’49 
Therefore in contrast to the silk-for-silver trade which Iquan and the 
Dutch had decisively captured from the merchants of Macao, the gold trade 
of Macao still remained in Portuguese hands and the Dutch had to continue to 
rely on the An-hai merchants, who provided them with a steady supply of 
certain amounts of Chinese gold. 
Table 8-4: Chinese gold exported by the Dutch to India via Taiwan 






 Source: VOC 1222, Memorie der quantiteijt en reductie van het becomene Taijouanse schuijt 
gout [Memorandum of the Quantity of and Reduction in the Gold Received in Taiwan ], Taiwan, 
25 Feb. 1657, fo. 15v. 
The truce between the Dutch and the Portuguese reinforced these 
conditions because legally the Dutch could no longer intervene to cut off the 
Macao-India trade by force. Hence the truce had a wider significance for all 
the players in South China Sea region because it opened up room for free 
commercial competition. 
As mentioned earlier, the tropical goods most in demand in China were 
elephant tusks and pepper. The traders around the South China Sea, no matter 
who they were - the Siamese King, the Portuguese in Malacca and Macao or 
the Fu-chienese merchants - were all involved in dealing in these two 
commodities. During the 1630s when the An-hai merchants were gradually 
                                                          
49 VOC 1146, Missive van gouverneur Paulus Traudenius naer China aen den grooten 
Mandorijn Iquan, 15 Oct. 1642, fo. 747v. 
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expanding their trade as a consequence of their co-operation with the Dutch 
in Taiwan, they also tried to obtain those commodities under their own steam.  
Iquan had been trying to build up a direct link between Chang-chou and 
Ayutthaya since 1636, but successful Siamese tributary missions to 
Kuang-tung had squeezed him out of this rich trade. The pepper trade was 
also at a low ebb because the civil war in Siam had wreaked devastation on 
most of the pepper plantations. In that same year, Iquan therefore decided 
also to dispatch junks to the pepper-rich port of Jambi in Sumatra. Although 
this destination was situated on the traditional Hsi-yang route, the VOC had 
cut the Jambi pepper trade off and re-directed it to Batavia. Consequently, as 
she left Jambi Iquan’s junk was seized by a Dutch ship. The intention of the 
Dutch captain was to force the junk to visit Batavia, so he put some of the 
pepper, cash and crew on his own ship and transferred thirteen Dutch sailors 
to the junk to take charge of the Chinese crew. His plan came to naught when 
the junk and the ship encountered a typhoon on the way to Batavia and the 
Chinese crew cut the cable which connected the two vessels, killed the Dutch 
sailors and eventually succeeded in returning to China.50 The thirty-two 
Chinese on board the Dutch ship still remained in Dutch hands. In the autumn 
of 1636, Iquan’s agent Bendiok (Cheng Tai) sent a letter to Taiwan 
demanding the restitution of the booty by Governor Hans Putmans, and 
requesting that the captives be sent back, because some of the hostages were 
sailors belonging to Iquan’s navy. For example, one National Squadron 
Leader (Ch’in-tsung[C.] Sintiong[D.]) was one of his own relatives. In the 
letter it was stated: 
‘ I assure your Honour this letter comes not from me (Bendiok) 
personally but was dispatched by the Mandarin Iquan who has been 
appointed Provincial Military Commander(T’i-tu[C.]) in Fu-chou, a rank 
which is almost the equivalent of that of Grand Co-ordinator. He is eagerly 
                                                          
50 VOC 1120, Missive van jan van der Burch naer Batavia aen den gouverneur 
generael Anthonio van Diemen, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1636, fo. 367. 
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enquiring for information and requires me to give the names, because the 
junk, her crew and goods belong to him. Furthermore, I know that two of 
these persons have earlier served as captains on Iquan’s war-junks.’51           
The Dutch had taken only limited amount of pepper from the junk and 
it was uncertain whether the thirteen Dutch sailors on the Chinese junk had 
been slaughtered by the Chinese crew or had drowned when the junk 
foundered in the typhoon.52 Whatever might have happened to them, neither 
Iquan nor the Dutch were keen to see this incident lead to a total war between 
the two sides just at a moment the An-hai-Taiwan trade had reached to its 
zenith. Hence, both sides were willing to practice self-restraint. Failure to 
have done so would have provoked another declaration of the maritime ban. 
The An-hai merchants made no further attempts to sail to Jambi during either 
1637 or 1638. However, in the spring of 1639, when the Fu-chien authorities 
were offering the Chang-chou merchants passes to trade with the countries 
around South China Sea, Iquan’s agent Bendiok (Cheng Tai) immediately 
submitted a request to Taiwan, requiring two Dutch passes which would 
allow them to sail to Palembang and Jambi in Sumatra to purchase pepper.53 
The High Government in Batavia refused the request and at the end of 
January dispatched two ships to intercept Iquan’s junks. However, the 
Chinese had managed to steal a march and when the Dutch ships approached 
the coastal waters off Palembang, the two junks were already riding safely at 
anchor there. Since the Dutch were waiting outside the river estuary, the 
                                                          
51 VOC 1120, Missive van Jan van der Burch naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael 
[Anthonio van Diemen] en raeden van India, Taiwan, 19 Nov. 1636, fo. 329. The 
surname of this lieutenant was recorded as ‘Oiji’, which sounds like the Chinese 
family name ‘Wu’ or ‘Huang’. 
52 VOC 1120, Missive van Jan van der Burch naer Batavia aen den gouverneur 
generael Anthonio van Diemen, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1636, fo. 367. Two ‘petack’ of 
pepper have been taken. A ‘petack’ refers to two dividing bulkheads in a junk. 
53 VOC 662, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, 
Batavia, 24 Jan.1639, not foliated. 
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Chinese merchants decided to send delegates to Batavia to acquire free 
passes for their homeward-bound voyage to China. The High Government in 
Batavia knew that the An-hai-Taiwan trade was crucial to the VOC trade in 
the Far East and, in view of the fact that ‘ the above-mentioned junks have 
been fitted out by Iquan, who is very influential in our trade with the Chinese 
Empire,’ the authorities decided to grant the passes and allowed the junks to 
take on 5-600 last of pepper in Palembang, on the condition that they should 
return to Batavia the following year to purchase pepper there and would not 
visit any other harbours in the Archipelago.54 Unquestionably, this really 
exceptional gesture was only made because just at the moment the VOC was 
expecting a huge expansion in the Taiwan trade.  
When added to the 455 last of pepper purchased at Batavia, these 5-600 
last from Palembang added up to a total of 955-1055 last, an extraordinarily 
large amount. The reason for the An-hai merchants’ sudden desire to procure 
such large quantities of pepper was that it was required to fill the gap in the 
market left open since the Portuguese in Macao had been forbidden to trade 
with the Kuang-tung/Canton merchants. The Dutch in Taiwan were informed 
from An-hai, that: 
‘The mandarins of Kuang-tung will not allow the Portuguese to reside in 
Macao any longer, even though the mandarins have pressed the Portuguese 
to pay the annual imperial tax (by which they have secured their residence 
there in the past).’55 
This piece of information tallies with the Chinese archival records. In 
                                                          
54 VOC 662, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, 
Batavia, 30 Apr. 1639, not foliated; Generale Missive, 18 Dec. 1639, in Cheng, De 
VOC en Formosa, 185; Judith Schooneveld-Oosterling, Marc Kooijmans, 
VOC-glossarium, 67. A last equalled 20 piculs, about 1,250 kilograms. 
55  VOC 1133, Missive van gouverneur Jan van der Burch naer Batavia aen 
gouverneur general Anthonio van Diemen, Taiwan, 28 Jan. 1640, fos. 181v-182r. 
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March 1639 the Portuguese had killed some Chinese soldiers.56 An official 
report into what had happened depicted this incident as a rebellion because 
‘the greedy mandarins required so many bribes, the Portuguese were forced 
to resist and killed some soldiers.’57 No other records detail what measures 
were taken when the incident happened, but the same document points out 
that after 1640 the Portuguese were forbidden to enter the city of Kuang-chou 
(Canton). From that time, only Chinese merchants were allowed to convey 
goods down the Pearl River to Macao.58 This incident brought the traffic 
between Kuang-chou and Macao to a temporary halt and created a wonderful 
opportunity for the An-hai merchants to capture this share in the lucrative 
pepper trade.            
 
 
                                                          
56  Sun Chia-chi, ‘Ping-pu wei chiu-ts’an t’ung-i na-hui chih kuan-yüen shih 
hsing-kao[Accusation Written by the Ministry of War Levelled against Some Officials 
Who Have Accepted Bribes from Foreigners] 4 Mar. 1639’, in Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih 
tang-an kuan [First Archives of China], Ao-mên chi-chin hui [The Macao Foundation] 
and Chi-nan ta-Hsüeh ku-chi yen-chiu-so [The Research Institute for Ancient 
Documents of Chi-nan University] (Hereafter cited as CKTI et al)(eds), Ming-ch'ing 
shih-ch'i ao-mên wên-t'i tang-an wên-hsien hui-pien[Compilation of Official 
Documents concerning Macao during the Ming and Ch’ing Dynasties], 6 vols, 
( Pei-ching: Jên-min ch'u-pan-shê, 1999), I, 20-21. 
57  T’ung Yang-chia,’ Liang-kuang tsung-tu T’ung yang-chia t’i-ch’ing chun-hsü 
hao-ching ao-jên t’ung- shang mao-i i-fu ts’ai-yung pên [Suggestions Made by the 
Governor of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi, T’ung Yang-chia, to Allow Foreign 
Residents of Macao to Trade with the Chinese in order to Raise Tax Revenues] 5 June 
1647’, in CKTI (et al eds), Ming-ch’ing shih-ch'i ao-mên wên-t’i tang-an wên-hsien 
hui-pien, 22-3.  
58  T’ung Yang-chia,’ Liang-kuang tsung-tu T’ung yang-chia t’i-ch’ing chun-hsü 
hao-ching ao-jên t’ung- shang mao-i i-fu ts’ai-yung pên 5 June 1647’, in CKTI (et al. 
eds), Ming-ch’ing shih-ch’i ao-mên wên-t’i tang-an wên-hsien hui-pien, 22. 
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Table 8-5: The amount of pepper sold by the Dutch to the An-hai 
merchants 
Year Chinese purchase amount  
in Batavia (last) 
Dutch ship carried 
 to Taiwan (last) 
1639 45559 +(500-600)60  
1640 30061  
1641 17062  
1642 45063 30364 
1643 70065 32066 
1644 30067  
1645 15068  
1646 069  
Sum 2525+(500-600) 623 
 
The annual average amount of pepper imported by Fu-chienese merchants via 
                                                          
59 Generale Missive 18 Dec. 1639, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 184. 
60 Generale Missive 18 Dec. 1639, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 185. 
61 Generale Missive 9 Sept. 1640, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 196. 
62 Generale Missive 12 Dec. 1641, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 200. 
63 VOC 665, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, 
Batavia, 19 May 1642, fo.88 v. 
64 Generale Missive, 12 Dec. 1642, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 202. 
65 VOC 666, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, 
Batavia, 3 June 1643, not foliated. 
66 Generale Missive, 22 Dec. 1643, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 211. 
67 VOC 667, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, 
Batavia, 8 June 1644, not foliated. 
68 VOC 667, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, 
Batavia, 29 May 1645, not foliated. 
69 VOC 669, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, 
Batavia, 11 June 1646, not foliated. The Chinese junks carried very few commodities 
and pepper was not recorded on their cargo manifests. 
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the Dutch East India Company was about 346 last.70 Two-thirds of this were 
imported on the Chinese junks which visited Batavia. The number of junks 
was not far from the quota for Batavia fixed by the Emperor.71  
Table 8-6: Chinese junks arrived on Batavia  
Year Chinese junks arrived 
 in Batavia 
Chinese junk from An-hai 






                                                          
70 Two-thirds of the amount of pepper purchased from Batavia was lost at sea in 1643. 
This was not included in the number cited. 
71 According to the quota claimed in 1589, four junks were allowed to visit Bantam 
(the same area as Batavia) annually. Cf. Lin Jên-ch’uan, Ming-mo ch’ing-ch’u Ssu-jên 
hai-shang mao-i [Private Trade during the Late Ming and Early Ch’ing Dynasty], 
(Shang-hai: Hua-tung shih-fan ta- hsüeh, 1987), 262.   
72 Generale Missive, 18 Dec. 1639, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 184. 
73 VOC 662, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, 
Batavia , 11 Feb.; 25 Feb.; 5 Mar. 1639, not foliated.  
74 Generale Missive, 9 Sept. 1640, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 196. 
75 VOC 663 Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, 
Batavia, 9 Mar. 1640. This nachoda is son of An-hai merchant Bindiok. 
76 Generale Missive, 12 Dec. 1641, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 199. 
77 Generale Missive, 12 Dec. 1641, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 199. It belongs to 
Iquan. 
78 VOC 665, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, 
Batavia, 19 May 1642, Fo. 88v. 
79 VOC 665, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, 
Batavia, 8 Feb;12 Feb 1642, not foliated. 
80 Generale Missive, 22 Dec. 1643, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 214. 
81 VOC 666, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, 
Batavia, 10 Feb.; 25 Feb.; 6 Mar 1643, not foliated. 







Obviously the Chinese Pepper trade in both Taiwan and in Batavia was 
running pretty smoothly around 1642-1643. In 1642 and 1643, the gold 
export to India also reached its first peak.85 Although the Company missed 
out on the chance to establish a partnership with Iquan in the Sino-Japanese 
trade, it did succeed in making a link between the Chinese and Indian 
markets. In this respect at least the partnership between the An-hai merchants 
and the VOC in Taiwan was still useful.  
 
Chasing silver in a changing world in crisis 
On the northeastern frontier, the Ming army had been fighting the Manchu 
tribes for decades, but it was gradually losing its advantage even though its 
soldiers still outnumbered those who could be put in the field by the Manchus. 
During the 1630s, the Manchu cavalry had managed penetrate the border and 
even invaded Shan-tung  province and the coastline of Hê-bei province.86 
                                                          
82 VOC 667, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, 
Batavia, 8 June 1644, not foliated; Generale Missiven, II 1639-1655, 254. 23 Dec. 
1644. It recorded eight big junks and one small wankang. 
83 VOC 668, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Cornelis van der Lijn ende raden, 
Batavia, 29 May 1645, no folio number. 
84 VOC 669, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Cornelis van der Lijn ende raden, 
Batavia, 11 June1646, not foliated. 
85 Its zenith was around 1648, cf. Table 7-4.   
86 Frederick W. Mote, Michael Loewe, Paul Jakov Smith, Herbert Franke, Denis 
Twitchett, Willard J. Peterson, John K. Fairbank, Kwang-Ching Liu, Albert 
Feuerwerker, Roderick MacFarquhar (eds), The Cambridge History of China, 15 vols, 
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Since this manoeuvre cut off the supply-lines of the Chinese frontier troops, 
fearing an inevitable outcome some of the Ming coastal defence troops 
decided to desert and join the Manchu side.87 Their disloyalty meant that 
control over the Gulf of Po-hai fell into the lap of the Manchus like a ripe 
plum. This gift from the gods allowed them to acquire provisions from Korea 
by sea as they continued to raid the Chinese supply-lines on the northeastern 
frontier. In the early 1640s, the Peking court began to be seriously worried 
that the Manchu would launch an attack via the Po-hai Gulf. Some officials 
proposed calling in Iquan to halt the Manchu force at sea. Hence, during the 
summer of 1642 the Emperor summoned Iquan, who was still occupied 
pacifying the rebellious aborigines at Lien-chou in mountains of 
Kuang-tung,88 and ordered him to dispatch two capable commanders to take 
charge of 3,000 newly recruited soldiers. Iquan replied immediately that he 
needed to have new guns cast and to build new war-junks if he were to be 
able to carry out this mission.89 He lost no time in returning to Fu-chien at 
the end of October 1642.90 Governor Traudenius in Taiwan had this to say 
about the matter:  
‘There were rumours that the Emperor had personally summoned 
him[Iquan] to the court for the purpose of enlisting his aid against the 
Manchus…. others have said that he will send his money north rather than go 
there himself, because he has little faith in the grandees of this Empire.’91  
                                                                                                                             
(Cambridge, Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1978-), VIII the Ming 
Dynasty 1368-1644, part I, 615-617. 
87 Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett (eds), The Cambridge History of China, 
(Cambridge, Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1988), VIII the Ming Dynasty 
1368-1644, part I, 688-9. 
88 TWYH(ed.), Chêng-shih shih-liao ch’u-pien, 174; 178. The battlefield is located at 
Lien-chou in Kuang-tung province. 
89 Ibidem. 
90 Ibid., 175; 181. 
91 Letter from Taiwan to Amsterdam Chamber, 1642-11-12, VOC 1140, Fol. 451r. 
IN SEARCH OF SILVER 1640-1646 
 228 
As far as it can be pieced together, both the Grand Co-ordinator in Fu-chien 
and the Supreme Commander of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi were in a 
quandary as they tried to calculate how the expenses which were bound to be 
incurred could be paid from the empty treasury. It had been drained despite 
the fact that Iquan’s own trade revenues had assumed ever larger proportions 
during 1643. Iquan replied to the Emperor informing him that the new guns 
would be ready around May 1643, but he himself was ill and would not be 
able to lead this campaign.92 He suggested that his younger brother, Cheng 
Hung-k’uei, should take command but by that time the communications 
between Fu-chien and Peking had already been cut off by peasant uprisings. 
While bandits under Li Tzu-ch’êng plundered the cities in the area of the 
Yellow River, the Fu-chien authorities lost contact with Peking for about four 
months.93 By the time communications were restored, the court had already 
shelved its previous plan. Nevertheless, the Emperor still needed the Cheng 
force to quell the rebellion and in November 1643 summoned the 3,000 
soldiers under Cheng Hung-k’uei. This summons was soon followed by 
another asking for another 2,000 soldiers in February 1644.94  
In April 1644 the rebels took Peking by storm and the Ch’ung-chêng 
Emperor committed suicide on Coal Hill just before they arrived. The news 
of this collapse reached the second capital, Nanking, in the middle of May. 
On 19 June 1644, the new Emperor, Hung-kuang was elected by senior 
grandees. As Nanking was surrounded by a loop of the Yang-tze River, the 
                                                          
92  Anonymous, ‘Wei tsun-shang ch’ao-chang fu-tsung-ping chêng chih-lung 
têng-yüen yin-liang têng-shih [Report about Awarding Silver as a Prize to the 
Deputy-Commander of Ch’ao-chou and Chang-chou Cheng Chih-lung]’, in TWSL 
(ed.), Ming-ch’ing t’ai-wan tang-an hui-pien , I 1621-1644, 438. 
93 Dagregister Zeelandia, II 1641-1648, 142. 23 May 1643; Frederick W. Mote (et al. 
ed.), The Cambridge History of China VIII: the Ming Dynasty 1368-1644, part I, 
634-6. 
94 Anonymous, Ch’ung-chên shih-lu[Court Records of the Reign of the Ch’ung-chên 
Emperor ], TW, No. 294, 302; Wan, Ch’ung-chên ch’ang-pien, 64.  
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new court summoned Cheng Hung-k’uei to station his soldiers at a strategic 
location to prevent either the bandits or the Manchus from crossing the river. 
Far away from the areas laid waste by the peasant uprisings and the Manchu 
invasion, Fu-chien and Kuang-tung provinces became the pillars of the 
re-organized Southern Ming Empire. To secure this backyard, the new 
Emperor awarded Iquan an aristocratic title and acknowledged his prominent 
status in Fu-chien province. After 31 October 1644, he was granted imperial 
permission to take charge of all coastal defences, including those in 
Chê-chiang province.95 Henceforth Iquan controlled the coastal strip most 
strategically situated for running the silk trade between China and Japan. 
With an eye to the main chance, at that time he actually opened a direct link 
between Chê-chiang and Japan.  
The disturbances at the heart of the Chinese Empire in the first few 
months of 1644 weakened any control the Court could exert over the illegal 
trade. Crucial evidence of this was provided when a group of Nanking and 
Fu-chou junks carrying silk goods visited Japan in the spring of 1644 during 
the north monsoon.96      
                                                          
95 Li Ch’ing, Nan-tu lu[Court Records of the Reign of the Hung Kuang Emperor], 
(Chê-chiang: Chê-chiang ku-chi publisher, 1988), 95. There is a record that Cheng 
Chih-lung was granted the noble title of the count of ‘Nan-an’ on 26 September 1644. 
Later, on 30 October, he was appointed commander in charge of Fu-chien and 
somewhere else. In a preface to a newly published book, he had signed his full title as 
‘ Ch’in-ming chen-shou fu-chien têng-ch’u ping chê-chiang chin-wên ti-fang 
tsung-pingp-kuan, t’ai-tzu t’ai-shih, ch’ih-tz’u mang-i nan-an-pa’, which can be fully 
translated as ‘Imperially Appointed Regional Commander of Fu-chien and Nearby 
Areas Including Chin-hua and Wên-chou at Chê-chiang, Grand Preceptor of the Heir 
Apparent, Earl-Pacifier of South, Wearer of an Imperidal Robe. Chêng Ta-yü, 
Ching-kuo hsiung-lüeh[The Great Plans for Re-invigorating the Empire], 2 vols, 
(Peking: Shang-wu yin-shu Kuan, 2003), I, 5.  
96 The Deshima Dagregisters, XI 1641-1650, 16 Feb./11 Mar./ 20 Apr./ 27 Apr./ 28 
Apr./30 Apr. 1644, 159-60. 
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The sudden increase in the number of Chinese junks visiting Japan 
during the north monsoon can also be construed as a reaction to the Dutch 
threats because, after the negotiations between Iquan and the Dutch about 
sharing the Sino-Japan trade had failed, the Dutch decided it was time to take 
some measures to lure Iquan back to the negotiating table. On 2 June 1643, 
the Governor of Taiwan, Maximiliaan Le Maire, told the Chinese merchants 
who were visiting Taiwan that:  
‘The Governor-General does not understand why they [the Chinese] 
have created difficulties for the Company in Japan and have sent junks laden 
with all sorts of commodities to trade with our enemy in Manila, in direct 
contravention of the Emperor´s ban. We have been suffering great losses 
because of those junks. In order to prevent further damage, he will dispatch a 
fleet to patrol the sea-routes between China and Japan. As you will have 
noticed, we have sent two junks and one Dutch ship to patrol the northern 
waters off Luzon. These actions will continue throughout the whole year, … 
please make this known and warn every merchant in China that they should 
not try to visit these places.’97  
Taking a modicum of notice of this threat, Iquan sent some 
commodities on junks which departed at that time, notwithstanding the 
northern monsoon, to reduce the risk of vessels being captured by the Dutch 
fleets. The two Dutch junks sent to the Philippines from Taiwan did indeed 
manage to capture a Chinese junk near Luzon on 4 June, and confiscated all 
the silver on board, warning the crew never to trade with Manila again.98 The 
High Government in Batavia attempted to deploy some yachts to patrol 
against Chinese junks again during the summer of 1642, but the typhoons and 
the generally bad weather conditions prevented them from putting this plan 
                                                          
97 Dagregister Zeelandia, II 1641-1648, 145-6. 2 June 1643. 
98 Dagregister gehouden door opperstuurman Simon Cornelissen Clos, 25 mei tot 30 
juni 1643, 4 June 1643[diary kept by senior captain Simon Cornelissen Clos, from 25 
May to 30 June 1643], in: Dagregister Zeelandia, II 1641-1648, 160. 
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into action.99 As the Dutch authorities were also wondering in the backs of 
their minds how the Japanese would react, in the summer of 1643 they 
informed the Japanese government of their plan. On 1 August, a letter written 
by Governor-General Antonio van Diemen was delivered to the Mayor of 
Deshima, Ebiya Shiōemon, in an attempt to consult him about the Japanese 
reaction to this plan to mount a patrol.100 The latter answered ambiguously 
one month later saying that the Japanese would not intervene if the patrols 
did not take place in Japanese territorial waters but acts of piracy were out of 
the question.101 Word of this request soon reached the ears of the local 
Chinese community and they protested furiously to the Governor of Nagasaki. 
Consequently, the Governor issued an order to the Dutch on Deshima 
warning them not to seize any junks sailing from China to Japan or Japan to 
China. 
‘If the junks which sail from Nagasaki to Ch’üan-chou and other ports 
north of Ch’üan-chou return here next year and declare that some have not 
arrived in these ports and that some are missing, an investigation will be held 
here to find out if the Dutch have captured or destroyed them…’102    
Although this warning to the Dutch came only from the Governor of 
Nagasaki rather than from the Shogun himself, the message was clearly 
understood. Thereafter no Chinese junk was harmed by Dutch ships. This 
agreement developed into a tacit understanding between the Chinese and the 
Dutch which was honoured until the surrender of Taiwan in 1662. 103 
                                                          
99 VOC 666, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Antonio van Diemen ende raden, 
Batavia, 10 Apr. 1643, not foliated. 
100 The Deshima dagregisters, XI 1641-1650, 106. 1 Aug. 1643. 
101 Ibidem, 118. 12 Sept. 1643. 
102 Ibid., 123. 29 Sept. 1643. 
103 Boxer correctly points out the attitude of the Japanese authorities was one of the 
decisive elements in warding off any VOC blockade of Iquan’s monopoly of 
Sino-Japanese trade. Cf. Charles R. Boxer, ‘The Rise and Fall of Nicholas Iquan 
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Furthermore, it is impossible to overlook the fact that Iquan was still offering 
huge amounts of Chinese gold to Taiwan and was purchasing pepper from 
Batavia in the period 1643-1644. All these reasons made it possible to 
contain the conflict at a low level.  
Table 8-7: The Chinese junks arriving in Japan from harbours to the 
north of Ch’üan-chou.    
Year Number of Chinese 
junks arriving in 
Japan* 
Chinese junks 
arriving in Japan 
which departed from 




1642 34 6 18% 
1643 34 2  5% 
1644 55 18 33% 
1645 82 32 39% 
1646 54 39 72% 
1647 31 8 26% 
1648 20 11 55% 
1649 59 23 38% 
Source: * Robert LeRoy Innes, The door ajar, 636. Table A. Shipping traffic between Japan and 
the outside world (excluding Ryukyu and Korea) from 1604 to 1715.   
** The Deshima Dagregisters, XI 1641-1650, XII 1650-1660, passim. 
Despite the settlement about the Japan trade reached rather laboriously, 
there were still two different trading routes about which the Dutch and An-hai 
merchants were in conflict with each other: The first of these was the trade 
with Manila which the Dutch had patrolled seasonally from Taiwan since 
1643. When one of Iquan’s junks was captured in 1645, he flew into a rage 
and sent a letter in which he threatened the Chinese inhabitants in Taiwan that 
                                                                                                                             
(Cheng Chih-lung)’, T’ien Hsia Monthly, Apr.-May (1941), 1-39, at 33-5. 
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they would run the risk of punishment if they assisted the Dutch when they 
patrolled in search of Chinese junks with hostile intent. The harsh tone he 
adopted was an expression of how powerless he felt in this matter.104 
The other less important route in which both sides were involved was 
the deerskin trade to Japan. Since the end of the sixteenth century, the 
Japanese had imported large numbers of deerskins of which the chief purpose 
was to manufacture Samurai armour. Before the Shogun suppressed Roman 
Catholicism and virtually closed off the country in 1640, this trade used to be 
managed by Japanese residing in overseas ports and the Portuguese. The bulk 
of the deerskins originated from Taiwan, Siam and Cambodia. According to 
the records of the Dutch trade factory in Deshima (see table below), the 
deerskin trade gradually increased.  
Table 8-8: Junks from Quinam, Cambodia in Siam and Japan carrying 
deerskins  












1638 - 3105 -
1639 - - 14,050
1640 - 1106 23,890
1641 2107 2108 41,550
                                                          
104 Dagregister Zeelandia, II 1641-1648, 406-7. 7 July 1645.  
105 VOC 1127, Missive [van Henrick Nachtegael in Siam] aen den edelen Abraham 
Ducker in Couttchin-China, Siam, 3 May 1638, fo. 363v. One of the two junks 
brought 10,000 pieces of deerskin to Quinam and the other junk carried no deerskins.  
106 VOC 1139, Missive uit Siam[ van Reijner van Tzum ] aen den gouverneur 
generael[ Antonio van Diemen ], Siam, 7 Nov. 1641, fo. 744v. 
107 Nagazumi Yoko, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 1637--1833-nen, 36.  
108 VOC 1139, Missive uit Siam[ van Reijner van Tzum ] aen den gouverneur 
generael[ Antonio van Diemen ], Siam, 7 Nov. 1641, fo. 744v; VOC 1139,  Rapport 
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1642 3109 2110 183,216
1643 1111 1112      - 
1644 3113 2114  67,832
1645 3115 -  25,730
1646 3116 1117  54,270
1647 1118 - -
Source:** Nagazumi, You Hê-lan shih-liao k’an shih-ch’i shih-chi tê t’ai-wan mao-i, 46. Table 3.  
Earlier it was pointed out that Iquan had failed in his attempt to get a 
                                                                                                                             
van den commissaris Jeremias van Vliet aengaende sijn bevindinge in Siam ende 
bocht van Pattany [van Johan van Twist uijt Malacca aen gouverneur generaal 
Antonio van Diemen en raden van India in Batavia], Siam, 28 May 1642, fo. 803r. 
109 The Deshima Dagregisters, XI 1641-1650, 22 July; 17 June; 26 July 1642, 63; 69; 
70.   
110 VOC 1139, Rapport van den commissaris Jeremias van Vliet aengaende sijn 
bevindinge in Siam ende bocht van Pattany [van Johan van Twist uijt Malacca aen 
gouverneur generaal Antonio van Diemen en raden van India in Batavia][Report 
written by Commissioner Jeremias van Vliet about His Experiences in Siam and the 
Bay of Patani, Sent from Malacca by the Said Johan van Twist to Governor-General 
Antonio van Diemen in Batavia], Siam, 28 May 1642, fo. 803r; VOC 1144, Missive 
van Reijnier van Tzum [in Siam] aen den gouverneur generael [Antonio van Diemen 
in Batavia], Siam, 13 Oct. 1642. fo. 619 r.  
111 The Deshima Dagregister, XI 1641-1650, 112. 16 Aug. 1643. 
112 Ibidem, 108. 11 Aug. 1643. 
113 Ibid., 164; 169; 170. 8 July; 9 Aug ;27 Aug 1644. 
114 VOC 1151, Missive door het opperhoofd Reijnier van Tzum aen den gouverneur 
generael [Anthonio van Diemen], Siam, 25 Nov. 1643, fo. 661v; VOC 1157, 
Journaelse aenteeckening van 15 Januarij tot 8 September 1644 [The Ship’s Log 
Signed between 15 Jan. to 8 Sept. in 1644], Siam, 23 Feb. 1644, fo. 658r. 
115 The Deshima Dagregisters, 208; 209. 16 July; 21 Aug, 22 Aug. 1645. 
116 Ibidem, 231; 234. 27 July; 18 Aug. 1646. 
117 VOC 1157, Missive [uit Jan van Muijden in Siam aan] aen Reijnier van Tzum 
president van Japan, Siam, 26 June 1646, fo. 494. 
118 The Deshima Dagregisters, 288. 7 July 1647. 
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grip on the Sino-Siamese trade because the Siamese King was busy 
developing his own crown trade with China. The Siamese King was able to 
establish this crown trade with Kuang-tung on a firmer base after 1643, but 
his trade was not the only outlet for Siamese deerskins which were also 
exported to Japan via Cambodia and Quinam. After the disturbances in Siam 
during 1630s, many resident Japanese had felt unsafe and subsequently 
moved to Cambodia and Quinam, from where they continued to purchase 
deerskins from Siam. They sold these skins to Chinese merchants in Quinam 
and Cambodia because they themselves had been excluded from the Japanese 
trade by the bans on overseas trade (Kaikin) since 1636. In the period 1637 to 
1640, the Dutch merchants in Ayutthaya complained constantly about the 
‘Cochin-China Japanese’ who came to collect deerskins in Siam. Although 
there are no specific archival records about the number of Chinese junks 
which visited Quinam and Cambodia during those years (1636-1640), it is 
recorded that in 1639 the Chinese officials issued ten passes to junks 
allowing them to trade in Quinam (eight passes) and Cambodia (two passes). 
One of the consequences of a huge sea battle which was fought between 
Tonkin and Quinam in 1643 was that no deerskins were exported to Japan by 
Chinese junks that same year.119 In 1642, two Dutch vessels which stranded 
on the coast of Quinam were captured by Portuguese vessels and their 
cargoes were sold as booty. The Dutch seized this opportunity also to declare 
war on Quinam and captured three Chinese junks which happened to be 
sailing to or from its ports in 1643.120 According to the information the 
Dutch received in Taiwan, Chinese junks were being dispatched directly from 
Quinam to Japan in 1644. Knowing that the VOC had declared war on 
Quinam in 1643, Iquan also requested Dutch passes so as to be able to trade 
                                                          
119 VOC 1151, Missive door het opperhoofd Reijnier van Tzum aen den gouverneur 
generael [Anthonio van Diemen], Siam, 25 Nov. 1643, fo. 661v. 
120 Generale Missiven, II 1639-1655, 259. 20 Jan. 1644.  
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with Quinam in 1644.121  
Shortly after Iquan asked for these passes, after crossing the Yang-tze 
River on 3 June 1645, Manchu troops occupied Nanking. His position now 
untenable, Iquan’s brother Cheng Hung-k’uei retreated to Fu-chou with his 
soldiers, bringing with him a Ming prince who had sought refuge under his 
protection. Iquan and Hung-k’uei decided to make this prince the new Ming 
Emperor with the title of Lung-wu and established the new Imperial Court in 
Fuchou on 21 August 1645. Iquan’s son, Cheng Ch’eng-kung, was recruited 
by this new court as one of the Emperor’s bodyguards. Aware of how crucial 
it was to keep the the old troops up to scratch and train fresh recruits to keep 
numbers up, the new court acknowledged the importance of the foreign trade 
as a source for raising the funds to accomplish this purpose, hence no 
maritime ban was to be promulgated during this period of crisis and direct 
trade was allowed between China and Japan. 
‘The Grand Mandarin Iquan has opened up the trade and traffic with 
Japan because of the profit this brings in, on condition that a certain tax is 
paid. Previously this [trade] was forbidden under penalty of death, although 
he secretly kept it for himself by bribing the coastal grandees.’ 122      
‘The cargoes brought to Batavia [from China] were poor in respect of 
the orders from Batavia and from Patria, mostly because of the protracted 
huge war in China and the malice of Mandarin Iquan who tries to obstruct 
the trade in Taiwan and reinforce his own trade on account of the lucrative 
profits to be made in the Japan trade, which he intends to keep solely for 
himself from now on. In return for rich payments, he has permitted all the 
merchants to sail to Nagasaki, and has also assembled a huge cargo himself. 
Therefore last year [1645], seventy-six fully laden Chinese junks went to sea 
                                                          
121 Daghregister Batavia, 1644-1645, 161. 11 Mar. 1645. 
122 VOC 1160, Missive van Francois Caron [naer gouverneur generael Cornelis van 
der Lijn], Taiwan, 31 Jan. 1646, fos. 166v-167r.  
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and exported more than 5,200,000 guilders’ worth of goods. The prices of 
many commodities dropped causing the Company a serious loss. We cannot 
bear this constant competition with the Chinese.’123 
The new court in Fu-chien also revived the tributary mission as an 
important channel for crown trade. For example, in September 1645 it 
opened negotiations with delegates from the Liu-ch’iu (Ryūkyū[J.]) Kingdom 
in expectation of setting up a tributary trade in silk-for-sulphur.124  
Iquan even planned to build a formal alliance with the Japanese Shogun 
in the Emperor’s name. He hoped to employ diplomatic means to persuade all 
the rulers around the South and East China Seas to acknowedge his rights and 
thereby obviate any armed intervention against his junks by the VOC. He 
allowed one of his naval general Ts’ui Chih, to send a message to the Shogun 
in which he solicited formal trade and military aid. The Dutch on Deshima 
                                                          
123  VOC 870, Missive van Batavia[van Cornelis van der Lijn] voor den 
oppercoopman Willem Verstegen ende de verdure opperhooffden van ‘t jacht de 
Zeerobbe ende de fluijt de Salm, waernaer hun in ‘t seijlen van hier tot de Pescadores 
ende Taijouan sullen hebben te reguleren [Letter from Batavia Written by 
Governor-General Cornelis van der Lijn to Chief Merchant Willem Verstegen and 
Other Chief Men on the Yacht The Zeerobbe and the Flute Ship de Salm, Assigning 
Them Tasks during their Voyage from Batavia to Taiwan and the Pescadores], Batavia, 
18 June 1646, fo. 180. 
124 Ts’ai To (comp.), Li-tai pao-an[Tributary Documents Preserved in Liu-ch’iu], in 
Yang Yün-p’ing, cited in ‘Nan-ming shih-tai yü liu-ch’iu kuan-hsi chih yen-chiu [A 
Study of the Relationship between the Southern Ming Court and the Liu-ch’iu 
Government]’, in id., Nan-ming yen-chiu yü t’ai-wan wên-hua[Studies of the Southern 
Ming and the Culture of Taiwan], (Taipei: T'ai-wan fêng-wu, 1993 ), 307-40 at 316-28. 
18 Oct 1645; Moreover, the Liu-ch’iu had ceased their trade with South-East Asian 
countries around the 1570s. Later, because of the deterioration in Sino-Japanese 
relations in the first few decades of the seventeenth century, the Liu-ch’iu tributary 
mission was discouraged by the Ming court. After their final attempt to revive the 
trade in 1637 proved a failure, the tributary trade between China and Liu-ch’iu was 
also ruined. Cf. Chang, ’Maritime Chinese Trade’, 195-7.   
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found out that one delegate from Iquan had sent a letter to the Bakufu on 26 
January 1646 requesting military assistance against the Manchus.125 This 
semi-official letter to the Japanese authorities was dated 28 January 1646.126 
The letter was rejected by the Council of Elders (Rōjū[J.]), because by then 
the ‘national isolation policy’(sakoku[J.]) had been implemented and 
squeezed out any possibility of a tributary trade between China and Japan.127 
Undeterred Iquan persisted in his attempt. In July 1646 he required the 
permission of the Lung-wu Emperor to mount a formal diplomatic mission to 
Japan. He personally wrote a letter to both the Japanese Emperor and the 
Shogun and delivered the documents attached with the express permission of 
the Lung-wu Emperor. This time the message reached the Shogun but he and 
the Council of the Elders still repudiated the request.128 News of this affair 
even reached the ears of the Dutch on Deshima because the Shogun 
dispatched some courtiers to reject Iquan’s requests, a gesture which attracted 
public attention.129 Whatever the Japanese side might have felt, the trade 
with Japan had been legalized by the Emperor Lung-wu. 
In May and June 1646 a Chinese envoy, said to have been dispatched 
by Iquan, also presented himself at the Tonkin Court. The delegation which 
accompanied him brought silk goods valued at approximately 20,000 taels. 
The envoy declared that his mission was to remind the King of Tonkin not to 
forget to pay tribute to the new Emperor in Fu-chien. They actually 
                                                          
125 The Deshima dagregisters, XI 1641-1650, 231. 13 Apr. 1646. 
126 Hayashi Gaho, Hayashi Nobuatsu, Ura Renichi (eds), Kai Hentai[The Change of 
Dynasty from Ming to Ch’ing], 3 vols, ( Impressum Tokyo: Toyo bunko, 1958),I, 
11-14; Ishihara Michihiro, Nihon kisshi no kenkyu[Studies of Cheng’s Request for 
Military Aid from Japan], (Tokyo : Fuzanbo, 1945), 32.  
127 Yang Yün-p’ing, ‘Nan-ming shih-dai yu Jih-pên de kuan-his [The Relationship 
between the Southern Ming and Japan]’, in Id., Nan-ming yen-chiu yü t'ai-wan 
wên-hua, 279-306 at 283-288. 
128 Yang, ‘Nan-ming shih-dai yu Jih-pên de kuan-hsi’, 283-288. 
129 The Deshima dagregisters, XI 1641-1650, 245. 9 Nov. 1646. 
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exchanged 600 taels of gold and some muskets, lances, and swords before 
leaving on 3 July 1646. The gift of gold for the Lung-wu Emperor was 
handed over with the ulterior motive of being granted a higher title in 
China.130 Iquan also wrote a personal letter to the King of Tonkin couched in 
such terms ‘ as if he (Iquan) was his (the Tonkin King’s) brother.’ 131  
These missions to Japan, Ryukyu and Tonkin during 1645 and 1646 all 
issued invitations to enter into a new tribute trade centred on Fu-chou. 
Iquan’s project was to re-affirm the diplomatic bonds with these vassal 
kingdoms and to utilize these diplomatic means to monopolize all Chinese 
trade. He had devised it as a blunt instrument which he could wield to break 
up all the privileges the Dutch had won at the expense of the Chinese 
merchants. He was bound for disappointment because the new Emperor was 
not convinced that Iquan’s project was of crucial importance to his new Court 
and ordered him to make himself ready to wage war against the Manchu 
force as quickly as possible. Iquan knew that it was impossible for him to 
provide finance and troops for such a mission without first securing an 
economic base and he chose to secure his own navy and property at the 
expense of that of the Lung-wu Emperor. When the Manchu force 
approached Fu-chien province, he ordered his troops to retreat city by city, 
because he was convinced that his new trade-system in the making would 
also be valuable to the Manchu rulers. Iquan introduced himself to the 
                                                          
130 VOC 1160, Missive uijt Tonquin [door Antonio van Brouckhorst] aan François 
Caron gouverneur van Taiwan, Tonkin, 31 July 1646, Fos. 177v-178v. 
131 VOC 1160, Missive uijt Tonquin [door Antonio van Brouckhorst] aan François 
Caron gouverneur van Taiwan, Tonkin, 31 July 1646, Fos. 177v-178v The Chinese 
record about this mission is very ambiguous and obscure. It says that the Lung-wu 
Emperor had dispatched a mission to Tonkin in January or February 1646. It had 
returned to Fu-chou in June or July without even landing on the Vietnamese soil. Chü 
Chi-mei,’Yüeh-you chien-wên [Journal of a Journey in Kuang-tung]’ in Liu-yün 
chi-shih (ed.), Ming-chi pi-shih hui pien[Compilation of Unconventional Historical 
Sources of the Ming Dynasty], 12 vols, (Shang-hai: Sao-shê shan-fang, 1900),IX, 1. 
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Manchu Emperor some years later in a letter, in which he unintentionally 
revealed how he defined his career in the last phase of his life: 
‘Your Humble Servant was granted title of “duke”(P’ing Kuo-kung) 
when I was serving the Ming court, because I pacified the bandits in the 
mountains and the pirates on the high seas off Chê-chiang, Fu-chien and 
Kuang-tung, and because I also defeated the red-haired barbarians (the 
Dutch) and showed foreign kingdoms the right way to pay tribute to 
China.’132 
A mercenary could hardly achieve more than this while serving a Chinese 
dynasty.        
                                                          
132 Cheng Chih-lung,’ Chêng-chih-lung t’i-wei tsun-chih chao-fu shih-pên [Cheng 
Chi-lung’s Reply to the Royal Command Summoning Cheng Chengkung] July 1651’ 
in CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an 
i-pien[Compilation of the Manchu Archives Referring to the Cheng Family during the 
Early Period of the Ch’ing dynasty], T'ai-wan wên-hsien hui-k’an(hereafter cited as 




THE OPEN COAST 
OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE 1646-1650 
The interlude of Nanking and Chê-chiang merchants 
The advance of the Manchu invasion from Nanking into Chê-chiang province 
damaged the An-hai silk trade, because the land routes which the An-hai 
merchants took to collect the silk from Nanking and Chê-chiang were 
transformed into battlefields. One man’s meat is another man’s poison and 
these developments allowed the Chê-chiang merchants to free themselves 
from the An-hai merchants’ monopoly in the Sino-Japanese trade. After the 
summer of 1645, there was an interruption in the maritime trade between 
Fu-chien and Chê-chiang. The junks departing from Fu-chou, Chang-chou 
and An-hai with their destination Nanking were forced to redirect their course 
to Nagasaki.1 This sudden disruption jeopardized the sources of income 
which Iquan had tapped into to pay his soldiers’ wages. Iquan had succeeded 
in legalizing the Sino-Japanese trade and had begun to dispatch his 
silk-carrying junks in ever greater numbers from Fu-chou and Nanking in an 
attempt to circumvent the potential threat presented by the Dutch fleet. The 
war which raged in Chê-chiang also posed a threat to Iquan’s investments in 
Nanking. As the Manchus steadily pushed the frontier southwards, the land 
routes which were essential to transporting silk between Fu-chien and 
Nanking via Chê-chiang were blocked off. In the spring of 1646, word of this 
situation also reached the ears of the Governor of Taiwan, François Caron: 
‘This is of great concern. Rumours have reached us that the war in 
China will prove an obstacle to the junks from Chang-chou, An-hai, 
Ch’üan-chou, and Fu-chou visiting Japan. It will hinder the supply of goods 
                                                          
1 The Deshima dagregisters, XI 1641-1650, 209. 16 Aug. 1645. Most of these junks 
were loaded with sugar.  
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offered on the market in Nagasaki, and the price might rise somewhat higher. 
However, on mature consideration this might not happen because if the silk 
exports from An-hai are reduced on the one side, on the other the silk exports 
from the Nanking areas might well increase in abundance.     
Therefore, I believe that Your Honour [the Governor-General] will 
understand that, if the An-hai shipping is interrupted , the Nanking merchants 
will profit from it. This is something which has never happened before and is 
unheard of. 
I am therefore confident that silk in and around An-hai will become more 
expensive, because it cannot be transported over there.’2 
This rumour proved true. Ten months later, Caron wrote another report to 
explain the situation. 
‘The supply of silk and the silk piece-goods which were transported to 
Japan by Iquan or in his name during last southern monsoon did not flow [as 
in the past]. The silk was not obtained as it was previously through ordinary 
trading channels, but has been scraped together from all the merchant houses 
and towns under Iquan’s command. He has also given express orders to draw 
money from the countryside instead of hoarding silk as a guarantee for 
paying the wages of the soldiers. Furthermore, some quantities of silk from 
the northern provinces have been transported to the south on condition that 
certain duties be paid on the [provincial] boundary or at the frontier gates 
which were being guarded by Iquan’s brother in the name of the Emperor and 
at his command. As a consequence of the plundering carried out by Iquan’s 
brother, these quantities of silk fell into Iquan’s hands and have all been sent 
to Japan. Therefore, I would like to testify that not only the Company but also 
Iquan himself and every merchant in the coastal provinces have been 
excluded from the silk trade. 
                                                          
2 VOC 1161, Misive van Pieter Antonissen Overwater naer Batavia aen Cornelis van 
der Lijn, 31 Jan. 1646, fo. 682v. 
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The truth is as clear as day, not one single length of silk is to be 
obtained in the southern provinces of Chinese Empire owing to the war. 
Therefore Iquan has sent just as little silk to Japan as we have. Time will be 
our best teacher about what will happen next . The dirty trick that Iquan’s 
brother has fraudulently played on those merchants has stirred up such fear 
and resentment among the merchants under the Manchus [in Chê-chiang], no 
one dares to do business there again. The traffic is also stringently obstructed 
by their enemy [the Manchus]’ 3       
The actions stated in Caron’s report corroborate what is recounted in 
the Chinese records. In February 1646 at Iquan’s request the Lung-wu 
Emperor sent a delegate to press the Kuang-tung provincial government for 
financial aid. Iquan also urged that all the officials should donate money to 
the imperial treasury according to their rank.4After Iquan was appointed to 
the Ministry of Revenue and the Ministry of Works in April 1646, he 
dispatched tax officials to examine the land-tax registration in every district 
in Fu-chien province, hoping to squeeze yet one more penny from the 
Emperor’s subjects.5           
On 5 April 1646, the Lung-wu Emperor ordered Iquan’s brother, Cheng 
Hung-k’uei, to aid the resistance in Chê-chiang. He was commanded to lead 
his troops to Chê-chiang taking the route by the northern boundary of 
Fu-chien province and drive the Manchus out. As soon as his troops arrived 
on the border, he announced that there was no money to pay the soldiers’ 
                                                          
3 VOC 1160, Rapport van ’t gepasseerde op t eijlant Formosa ’t sedert 27 Februarij 
1646 tot 13 November daeraen volgende door den gouverneur François Caron, 
Taiwan, 13 Nov. 1646, fo. 76r-77r. 
4  Ni Tsai-t'ien, Hsü ming-shih chi-shih pên-mo[Continued Compilation of the 
Chronicles of the Ming History by Events], TW no 133, 141. 
5 Anonymous, Ssu-wên ta-chi[Simplified Chronicle of the Reign of the Ch’ung-chên 
Emperor], TW no.111, 84. 
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wages and that he would therefore not venture beyond the border-gate.6 In 
fact, instead of assisting the Chê-chiang forces, Cheng Hung-k’uei dispatched 
soldiers to collect land tax from those counties across the border under the 
jurisdiction of the Chê-chiang government.7        
In May 1646, Iquan lost no time in presenting the Lung-wu Emperor 
with a budgetary plan, declaring he would need 1,560,000 taels per year to 
pay for all the weaponry, wages and provisions for his troops if they were to 
repel the Manchus.8 All this points to the fact that, because the Chê-chiang 
merchants had wrestled the silk-for-silver trade between China and Japan 
from Iquan’s hands, he and his brothers were now reluctant to lend their 
commercial competitors any assistance. In the year 1646, thirty-four junks 
departed for Japan from the coast of Fu-chien, but all the raw silks they were 
able to carry from Fu-chou (eked out with a little from Ch’üan-chou) 
amounted to a mere 201 piculs, only about 17 per cent of the total Chinese 
raw silk imports to Japan that year.9 The only conclusion which can be 
drawn is that about 83 per cent of the raw silk that year must have been 
exported by merchants from Chê-chiang.10  When this compelling truth 
                                                          
6 Anonymous, Lung-wu chi-lüeh [Simplified Chronicle of the Reign of the Lung-wu 
Emperor], TWH, I no 1, 137.  
7 Sung Yüen-wên, Tsun-jang lüeh[Succinct Account of Royal Attempts to Halt the 
Invasion of the Manchus], TWH, I no 9,180. ‘They did not dispatch any troops to the 
area of the Ch’ien-t’ang River, but only collected food provisions from the Chin-hua, 
Chü-chou and Wên-chou areas.’ 
8 Anonymous, Ssu-wên ta-chi, 95; Ni, Hsü ming-shih chi-shih pên-mo, 144. 
9 This calculation is based on the records in the Dagregister Deshima. According to 
Nagazumi, in the year 1646, approximately 117,475 catties of Chinese raw silk were 
still being exported by the Chinese junks. Moreover, information from Taiwan shows 
that Chinese merchants sold about 1,200 piculs (equal to 120,000 catties) in Japan. Cf. 
Nagazumi Yoko, Liu Hsü-fêng (trans.), ‘You Hê-lan shih-liao k’an shih-ch’i shih-chi 
tê t’ai-wan mao-i, 37-57 at 42 Table 1; 46. Table 3.     
10  The Japanese government forbade the traders under the Manchu (Ch’ing) 
administration to trade in Japan in 1645 and 1646. See below. 
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dawned, it decided Iquan to enter into negotiations with the Manchus rather 
than financing a war which was not going to contribute anything to his own 
pocket. The archival records of the Manchu Court, show that Iquan contacted 
the Manchu officials as early as April 1646.11 This was approximately the 
time he must have realized how the subterfuges of the Chê-chiang merchants 
were damaging his silk trade with Japan. Between May and July, Iquan did 
all he could to stimulate the ardour of the tax-collecting system so as to 
squeeze tax revenues up as high as he could, just as is mentioned in Caron’s 
report. Despite his manouevres, the Chê-chiang competitors proved to be an 
unmovable obstacle because they were nominally allied with the Fu-chien 
government. The resistance in Chê-chiang held out steadily while the the 
nominal leader, Lu prince, was kept detained at Shao-hsing and they 
continued to defend their camps along the southern bank of the Ch’ien-t’ang 
River. Unfortunately, during the summer of 1646, a drought lowered the 
water level and it was easy for the Manchu cavalry to cross the river on 18 
July 1646,12 after which the Chê-chiang resistance soon collapsed. Now that 
both Nanking and Chê-chiang provinces were in Manchu hands, Iquan had 
no choice but to negotiate with Manchus sooner or later if he was to obtain 
the raw silks he needed for his trade with Japan. In August, he withdrew all 
his troops from the border of Fu-chien.13 The Manchus crossed the border in 
the first half of October 1646, the Emperor Lung-wu was opened to be 
hunted and die in chasing soon afterwards.14  
                                                          
11  Huang Hsi-yün, ‘Huang his-yün wei chao-fu chêng-chih-lung ch’ing-hsing 
shih-pên[Report Written by Huang his-yün Recounting Cheng chih-lung’s 
Submission] Sept.1646’, in CKTI(ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu 
man-wên tang-an i-pien, TWH, I no 6, 1. 
12 Wang Kuang-fu, ‘Hang-hsieh i-wên [A Forgotten History since Our Departure 
from Hsieh-Mên ]’, in Ch’ên-hu i-shih (comp.), Ching-t’o i-shih[ Forgotten Histories 
of Ching-t’o], (1911), 1. 
13 Anonymous, Lung-wu chi-lüeh, 147. 
14 How Iquan withdrew all his soldiers who were garrisoned in cites is told by: Hsü 
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In the meantime, Iquan had put all his military provisions in order, had 
stowed his capital on board the junks anchored in Fu-chou Harbour and 
sailed to An-hai with all his fleet on 22 October 1646.15 Although Iquan had 
no direct communication with the Manchu commander, General-in-Chief of 
the Southern Expedition the To-lo Prince Polo in Fu-chou, he had earlier 
promised the Manchu court that he would withdraw all his soldiers if he was 
confronted by Manchu troops. This is how Iquan signalled his true intentions 
while apparently still operating as a Ming resistance leader. On 10 November 
1646, a junk from Fu-chou visited Nagasaki and reported Iquan’s plans and 
his failure to conclude a peace agreement when he first met the Manchus in 
Fu-chou. 
‘It brought the news that Iquan had sent three or four envoys from 
Fu-chou to the Manchus… to make a deal with them…. [By proposing that] if 
he [Iquan] subjected himself to the Manchu’s rule and shaved himself in their 
fashion, then he should be created a great mandarin, ruling over the three 
provinces, Kuang-tung, Fu-chou, and Ch’üan-chou. They [Manchus] would 
not listen to this and without giving any forewarning, marched straight for 
Fu-chou.’16 
When the Manchu troops began their final approach on An-hai after 
they had occupied Ch’üan-chou, Iquan hesitated about whether he should 
abandon An-hai before he had officially subjected himself to the Manchu 
                                                                                                                             
Hsiao-wang,‘ Ch’ing-chün ju-min yü chêng-chih-lung chiang-ch’ing shih-k’ao [A 
Study of How the Ch’ing Forces Entered Fu-chien and How Cheng Chih-lung’s 
Submission to Them Took Place]’, Fujian Tribune:the humanity and social science 
monthly , 7 (2007), 70-77. 
15 Anonymous, Lung-wu chi-lüeh, 155. 
16 The Deshima dagregisters, XI 1641-1650, 245. 10 Nov. 1646. Some Chinese 
records actually announce that the Manchu grandees had proposed appointing Iquan 
Viceroy over three provinces; Yang-ying, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu[Veritable records of 
Coxinga], TW no. 32, 42; Chiang Jih-shêng, T'ai-wan wai-chi, 86. 
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Emperor. Some days earlier, on 16 October 1646, Iquan’s youngest brother, 
Cheng Chih-pao, withdrew to An-hai from Ch’üan-chou with his soldiers.17 
After he had done this, the Manchu troops engaged the Cheng troops near the 
bridge which connected the southern region of Ch’üan-chou to An-hai Castle. 
Skirmishes occurred for almost one month until the Manchu commander 
gave the order to cease fire.18 According to François Caron’s report, the 
An-hai troops under Iquan’s command finally retreated on board his ships 
when the Manchus headed for An-hai Castle: 
‘Iquan fled away from An-hai (which was his headquarters) to an 
island. Possessing about 600 junks in total, he had burned all the other junks 
and vessels anchored nearby, or wherever he could reach, in order to secure 
himself from any harm from those who might want to sail on these vessels. It 
was not confirmed [whether it is true] that the Manchus held a huge and 
honuorable reception (because he [Iquan] had submitted to them). However, 
it was obvious that, in order to humiliate and insult Iquan, the Manchus 
allowed their troops to rape the women and girls of An-hai. They the 
commenced a slow withdrawal to Fu-chou with these hostages.’19       
Iquan must have revealed his true intentions to his fellow military 
officers, including his brothers, cousins and eldest son. He issued the order to 
retreat from his own private castle in An-hai. Iquan’s proposal to submit to 
the Manchu Court shocked his followers. Because he had been a great 
supporter of Ming Emperor Lung-wu, most of them did not trust that 
                                                          
17 Li T’ien-kên, Chüeh Huo-lu[Consuming as Fire : An Account of the Southern 
Ming Court], TW no. 177, 869. 
18 Hua T’ing-hsien, ‘Min-you yüeh-chi [Monthly Accounts during My Residence in 
Fu-chien]’, in Ch’ên-hu i-shih (comp.), Ching-t’o i-shih, 50. 
19 VOC 1160, Rapport van ’t gepasseerde op ’t eijlant Formosa ’t sedert 27 Februarij 
1646 tot 13 November daeraen volgende door den gouverneur François Caron [Report 
about What Happened in Formosa from 27 Feb. to 13 Nov. 1646 by Governor 
François Caron ], Taiwan, 13 Nov. 1646, fo. 78r. 
THE OPEN COAST 1646-1650 
 248 
Manchus would accede to Iquan’s request that he retain all his current 
privileges. Only after Iquan set sail with all his capital in his final withdrawal 
from An-hai did the Manchu General-in-Chief, Fucho Polo, send Iquan a 
message conveyed by a member of the gentry of Ch’üan-chou who happened 
to be a close friend of his. Polo confirmed that the Manchu Court was willing 
to negotiate with Iquan and promised that he could retain his current status 
and that he should send his troops to conquer Kuang-tung province in the 
name of the Manchu Emperor.20 On 21 December, Iquan arrived in Fu-chou 
to initiate the formal negotiations. 21  Meanwhile, the Manchu 
General-in-Chief had also launched an investigation to discover who were the 
most representative members of the gentry living in the vicinity of Fu-chou 
and sent messages to summon them to his headquarters. On 14 January 1647, 
this group of Fu-chienese grandees was taken hostage and dispatched to 
Peking by order of the Manchu Emperor. Iquan was among their number.22  
Iquan was suddenly borne away from Fu-chien by the Manchu 
General-in-Chief, Polo, before any substantial agreement had been concluded. 
Nor had any arrangement been made by the Manchu commander to put the 
regulations on the overseas trade in any sort of order. In short, the An-hai 
merchants still had no legal means to prevent the Nanking or Chê-chiang 
merchants from cutting into in the Sino-Japan silk trade.  
Yet, there was a solution. Although the Manchu Court had not yet 
                                                          
20 Anonymous, ‘Appendix: Lung-wu i-shih [Forgotten Events during the Reign of the 
Lung-wu Emperor]’, in TWYH (ed.), Shêng-an pên-chi [ Biography of the Lungwu 
Emperor], TW no. 183, 205; Li, Chüeh Huo-lu, 885; Lin Shih-tui, Hê-ch'a ts’ung-t’an 
[Fragmentary Memorandum], TW no. 154, 156; Chi Liu-chi, Ming-chi 
nan-lüeh[Rough Historical Description of the L ate Ming in the South], TW no. 148, 
328. 
21  Anonymous, Lung-wu chi-lüeh, 159; Li, Chüeh Huo-lu, 885; Chi, Ming-chi 
nan-lüeh, 328; Anonymous, ‘Appendix: Lung-wu i-shih’, 218. 
22 Anonymous, Lung-wu chi-lüeh, 164. 
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decided on what its maritime trade policy would be, the Shogunal 
government in Japan made no bones about despising any Chinese merchants 
who had shaved their heads in the Manchu fashion after submitting to the 
invaders. On 17 June 1646, a richly laden Nanking junk which had carried 
65,500 taels’ worth of cargo to Nagasaki was denied permission to trade 
because its crew had shaved their hair in the Manchu style.23 Later they were 
allowed to sell their goods on condition that they would never return.24 It 
seems feasible to assume that, if the An-hai merchants from the Cheng clan 
maintained their status as Chinese loyal to the Ming instead of submitting to 
Manchu, they might have been able to achieve the position of being the only 
Chinese who were allowed to continue to trade in Japan.      
In 1647, when the coastal areas in Chê-chiang and Fu-chien were all 
opened up, many merchants from the two provinces fitted out junks for the 
Japan trade. On 13 May 1647, a junk from Nanking with a ‘shaven’ crew 
visited Nagasaki carrying 45-46,000 taels’ worth of cargo, but owing to 
Japanese contempt for them was forbidden to sell anything. However, after 
her nachoda had spread the news that by now all of China would have been 
conquered by the Manchus and that Iquan had been captured and taken to 
Peking,25 the Shogunal government underwent a change of heart and allowed 
this nachoda to sell his cargo in July.26 This change of policy was officially 
acknowledged that same year, henceforth junks from Ch’ing China would be 
welcome.27 Even before the Shogunal government had adjusted its position, 
Iquan had also dispatched several junks to Japan. One of his naval 
commanders, Ts’ui Chih, returned to Fu-chou in April 1647 and took up a 
position at Hai-k’ou (nowadays Fu-ch’ing city.）28 He fitted out four junks to 
                                                          
23 The Deshima dagregisters, XI 1641-1650, 231. 17 June 1646. 
24 Ibidem, 236. 10 Sept. 1646. 
25 Ibid., 284. 13-4 May 1647.  
26 Ibid., 287. 1 July 1647.  
27 Generale Missiven, II 1639-1655, 324. 31 Dec. 1647. 
28 His-t’ing ling-hsüeh, Nan-t’ien-hên[Traces of Southern Courts], TW no. 76, 414. 
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trade with Japan in the name of the Lu Prince, who had been the nominal 
leader of the Ming resistance in Chê-chiang. These junks arrived in Nagasaki 
on 15 and 18 May 1647. They even brought an envoy:  
‘The envoy who has came on this junk is not taken seriously, although 
he seems to be the Governor of Fu-chou's younger brother and he behaves 
with enough pomposity. He has brought several women and a carriage in 
their fashion, three donkeys, and three buffaloes. When the governor's 
interpreter went on board, he seated himself in an armchair on the poop of 
the junk and had two men hold a canopy above him. He had the anachoda, or 
the skipper of the junk, speak with the interpreter, implying that he considered 
the interpreter too much beneath himself to open his mouth to him. Three 
times a day they fire their muskets and play their instruments. The flag is 
hoisted in the morning and lowered in the evening.’29    
Compared with the richly laden junk from Nanking, those from 
                                                                                                                             
‘In April 1647, he occupied Hai-k’ou and dispatched his adopted son with the King of 
An-ch’ang to require Japanese military aid.’ ; Nan-sha san-yü-shih, Nan-ming 
yeh-shih[Unconventional Historical Accounts of the Southern Ming], TW no. 85, 256; 
Shao T’ing-ts’ai, Tung-nan chi-shih[Records of Activities in the Southeastern 
Regions], TW no. 96, 126; Ni, Hsü ming-shih chi-shih pên-mo, 113; Hsü Tzu, 
Hsiao-t’ien chi-ch’uan[Chronicles of Smaller Courts], TW no. 138, 955; Chang 
Lin-pai, ‘Fu-hai chi [Journal of the Flooding upon the Sea]’, in TWYH (ed.), T'ai-wan 
kuan-hsi wên-hsien chi-ling[Compilation of Fragmentary Historical Materials relating 
to Taiwan], TW no. 309, 11. 
29 The Deshima dagregisters, XI 1641-1650, 284. 18 May 1647. This description also 
agrees with the Chinese sources. Ch'a Chi-tso, Tsui-wei-lu hsüan-chi[Selections from 
A Certain Historical Book Forbidden by Imperial Court], TW no. 136, 269. ‘The Lu 
Prince stationed on Choushan dispatched the Prince of An-ch’ang to Japan with a 
donkey and an ox-cart .’ Li, Chüeh Huo-lu, 913. Therefore the ‘governor Fu-chou’s 
younger brother’ referred to in the Dutch records was actually the ambassador, the 
Prince of An-ch’ang, who was also a member of the royal family which explains why 
he is recorded as a ‘brother’.  
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Fu-chou carried only a few goods. Apparently Iquan’s monopoly on the 
Sino-Japan raw silk trade had slipped out of his hands after his failed 
negotiations with the Manchus. On 7 and 9 July, two more junks dispatched 
with an ambassador representing the Lu Prince arrived in Nagasaki, they 
were crewed by Ming loyalists who were still putting up a resistance on 
Chou-shan Island.30  They carried no silks but did bring some pepper, 
medicines and black sugar, for there was little else they could offer.31  
The Navy Commander（Shui-shih Tsung-ping） , Ts’ui Chih, was 
expelled from Fu-chou by the Manchu troops on 8 May 1647.32 However, in 
the following August Iquan’s nephew, Cheng Ts’ai, who had been appointed 
Admiral by the Lu Prince led his ships in an attack on Fu-chou and, while the 
city was still under siege in the following three months, his troops occupied 
the surrounding towns and the northern border region of Fu-chien province.33 
In his efforts to curb the export of silk from Nanking, Cheng T’sai now asked, 
just as Iquan had done earlier, the Liu-ch’iu Kingdom to send a tribute 
mission and he also sought to conclude an agreement about the crown trade 
with the Shogunal government in Japan.34 Cheng Ts’ai’s troops managed to 
keep control of most of the areas along the northern border of Fu-chien for 
                                                          
30 The Deshima dagregisters, XI 1641-1650, 288. 7 July 1647.  
31 Ibidem. 9 July 1647. 
32 Chang Ts’un-jên, ’Wei t’ang-pao kuan-ping shui-lu lien-chan ta-huo ch'üan-chieh 
Shih [Report about the Great Victory Won at Sea and on the Land] 21 July 1647’, in 
TWSL(ed.), Ming-ch’ing t’ai-wan tang-an hui-pien, II 1645-1653, 98. 
33 His-t’ing, Nan-t’ien-hên, 39; Nan-sha, Nan-ming yeh-shih, 257; Shao , Tung-nan 
chi-shih, 133; TWYH(ed.), Ch’ing-shih-tsu shih-lu hsüan-chi[Selection of the 
Veritable Records of the Shünshih Emperor], TW no. 158, 44; Sung, Tsun-jang lüeh, 
190. Cheng Ts’ai was not a sibling of Cheng Chih-lung, but only bore the same 
family name ‘Cheng’. Since they were close to each other, they usually pretended to 
be from one family. 
34 Yang, ‘Nan-ming shih-tai yü liu-ch’iu chih kuan-hsi yen-chiu’, 328-333. 
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about one year.35 In the year 1648, the Chinese (no matter where from) 
exported 19,415 catties of raw silk in total to Japan, which amounted to only 
10 per cent of the Chinese raw silk exports in 1643.36 Hence, although 
Cheng Ts’ai had undisputedly gained control of the coastal regions, the 
collection of raw silk for the Japan trade from the inland regions of China 
was still obstructed by war. The Manchu troops eventually re-occupied most 
of the towns in northern Fu-chien in 1649.37  
Once again, the trade between Nanking and Japan was forbidden by the 
Ch’ing Court and, when one of the Chinese junks returned from Japan on 18 
March 1649, its crew was arrested by the Manchu coastal defence troops.38 
Hence, through intervention from Peking, in 1649 the serious competition 
between the Fu-chien and Chê-chiang merchants was brought to an end and 
the Fu-chien merchants temporarily regained their monopoly by the simple 
expedient their home region had still not been conquered by the Manchus.39   
   
Hunting silver and rice for the newly established Coxinga force 
Iquan’s failure to reach an agreement with the Manchu Court was a disaster 
for all his followers but the An-hai merchants continued to pursue their trade 
                                                          
35 TWYH(ed.), Ch’ing-shih-tsu shih-lu hsüan-chi, 48. 23 Sept. 1648.  
36 Nagazumi Yoko, Liu Hsü-fêng (trans.), ‘You Hê-lan shih-liao k’an shih-ch’i 
shih-chi tê t’ai-wan mao-i [The Taiwan Trade in the Seventeenth Century Based on 
the Dutch Sources]’, in T’ang His-yung (ed.), 2 vols, Chung-kuo hai-yang 
fa-chan-shih lun-wên chi(VII) [Proceeding of Studies in Chinese Maritime History 
(VII)], vol.1, 37-57 at 44. 
37 His-t’ing, Nan-t’ien-hên, 40. 12 Aug. 1649. 
38 T’u Kuo-pao, ‘Wei-pao-ming p’an-huo yang-ch’uan yang-ch’i shêng-chien-shih [A 
Letter Reporting the Capture of Trading-Junks and Suggesting How They Should Be 
Dealt With] 10 Jan. 1650’, in TWSL(ed.), Ming-ch’ing t’ai-wan tang-an hui-pien, II 
1645-1653, 221.  
39 Nagazumi, ‘You Hê-lan shih-liao k’an shih-ch’i shih-chi tê t’ai-wan mao-i’,44. 
CHAPER NINE 
 253 
from Quemoy and Amoy. Even though they were no longer able to collect 
sufficient quantities of raw silk and silk products to satisfy the Japanese 
market, they refused to give in and continued to run the gold for pepper trade 
with Taiwan. Between April and August 1647, the An-hai merchants 
delivered some 700,000 guilders’ worth of gold in all to Taiwan, which the 
Dutch paid for in silver, spices, and rice.40   
































1647-4 594,00041 48,00042* 0 326,920*43 568,120 883,89844 
                                                          
40 VOC 1164, Resolutie genomen [door Pieter Antonissen Overtwater] in ’t Casteels 
Zeelandia, Taiwan, 8 Aug. 1647, fo.532 r. 
41 Generale Missive, 14 Apr. 1647, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 245. 
42 This is because from July to November the Factory in Taiwan maintained a 
constant debt of about 20,000 rials. I have assumed it was cash reserved for 
purchasing deerskins and sugar. VOC 1164 Resolutie genomen [door Pieter 
Antonissen Overtwater] in ’t Casteels Zeelandia, 19 July 1647, fos. 530v-531 r ; 8 Aug. 
1647, fo. 532r; 9 Nov. 1647, fo. 553v. 
43 Generale Missive, 31 Dec. 1647, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 249. Adding 
together the 52 chests from the Jonker, the 55 chests from the Berckhout, the 35chests 
from the Hillegaersbergh, the sum is 142 chests. Meanwhile, 1 rial equals 52 stuijvers; 
1 tael 57 stuijvers, hence every tael equals 1.1 rial, and each rial equals 2.6 guilders. 
142 chests=142000 taels, which equals 406,120 guilders. Among them were some 
chests of silver, worth 30,000 taels, which equals 79,200 guilders, were dispatched to 
Siam, therefore only 326,920 guilders remained in Taiwan.    
44 VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, 
Taiwan, 30 Mar. 1657, fo. 15v. 










1648-12 770,00050 - - - - - 
           
To cut a long story short, while the silk-for-silver trade with Japan 
ground to a halt through a lack of supplies, the An-hai merchants continued to 
obtain silver from VOC factory in Taiwan by shipping out gold. In the 
summer of 1647, 65 per cent of this export gold was paid for in silver; in 
1648 it was some 45 per cent. Apparently silver was the most highly prized 
commodity among the An-hai merchants. 
While all this was going on, a new force emerged under the command 
of Iquan’s son Coxinga (or Cheng Ch’eng-kung).51 Coxinga did not follow in 
                                                          
45 Generale Missive, 31 Dec. 1647, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 250. 127,000 
rials equals to 304,800 guilders. 
46 VOC 671, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Cornelis van der Lijn ende raden, 
Batavia, 11 Apr. 1648, not foliated. After the ship the Berchout departed from Taiwan 
on 25 Feb. 1648, only 12,000 rials which was equal to 31,200 guilders (1 rial = 2.6 
guilders) were left. 
47 Generale Missive, 18 Jan. 1649, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 253. 155,270 rials 
in silver coinage was equal to 372,648 guilders and 131,571 taels were equal to 
315,770 guilders. Added together these give the sum of 688,418 guilders. But this 
batch silver coins were debased for bullion because they can no longer be circulated 
as currency and thus lost 20,000 guilders in value. After deducted of this amount, the 
silver aid to Taiwan was: 668,418 guilders.  
48 Generale Missive, 26 Jan. 1649, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 259. 150,000 
taels of silver equals 396,000 guilders.  
49 VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, 
Taiwan, 30 Mar. 1657, fo. 15v. 
50 Generale Missive, 26 Jan. 1649, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 259. The 900,000 
guilders excluded the 130,000 guilders in gold. 
51 ‘Coxinga’ can be translated literally ‘Lord of the Imperial Surname’. Cf. Boxer, 
CHAPER NINE 
 255 
the footsteps of his cousin Cheng Ts’ai who had chosen to focus on the 
Chê-chiang competitors. As a former member of the Lung-wu Emperor’s 
guard,52 he was not a member of the army establishment like Cheng Ts’ai, 
but he could at least claim to be the possessor of An-hai Castle and of the 
private wealth left behind by Iquan when he was taken to Peking. According 
to the memoirs of one of his contemporaries, Juan Min-hsi, he employed 
these resources to organize a private army:  
‘Coxinga planned to fight, but he commanded neither soldiers nor 
vessels. Therefore he went to Nan-ao and recruited troops. …. 300 people 
later followed him and he trained them on [the island of] Ku-lang-yu near 
Amoy. He ordered Huang K’ai in An-hai to raise money for the army 
supplies.’53 
This picture is confirmed by the Dutch sources: 
‘…I was told that Iquan's son and his younger brother have 
rendezvoused in the Pescadores with at least 700 junks and a host of men. 
They have been able to take with them many of the most prominent merchants 
and a substantial hoard of money and goods.’54 
It is plausible to assume that the silver which was flowing in from Taiwan 
was used to pay for these newly trained troops.  
In the spring and summer of 1647, the An-hai merchants also managed 
                                                                                                                             
Charles Ralph, ‘The Rise and Fall of Nicholas Iquan (Cheng Chih-lung)’, T’ien Hsia 
Monthly, Apr.-May (1941), 1-39 at 36.  
52 Yang Yün-p’ing, ‘Chêng ch'êng-kung fên ju fu k'ao’ in: id, Nan-ming yen-chiu yü 
t’ai-wan wên-hua [Studies about the Southern Ming and the Culture of Taiwan], 
(Taipei: T'ai-wan fêng-wu, 1993 ), 375-91 at 383-6. 
53 Juan Min-hsi, Hai-shang chien-wên lu[Observations about All the Events in 
Coxinga’ Maritime Career], TW no. 24, 5. 300 persons may only referred to the 
officials, not including the attached soldiers. 
54 The Deshima dagregisters, XI 1641-1650, 285. 29 May 1647. 
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to appropriate another crucial military resource: rice from Taiwan. The Diary 
of Zeelandia Castle records that between May 1 and July 1, Chinese traders 
exported 2,636 big bales and 1,372 sacks of rice and 2,560 sacks of paddy to 
the China coast.55 This trade assumed such alarming proportions that, at the 
end of 1647 the Dutch Council in Taiwan had to issue a placard forbidding 
any further exports of rice.56 
As always happens in conflicts, the civil war brought widespread 
famine to the areas around the battlefields in Fu-chien and Kuang-tung. In 
April of 1648, in the areas around Fu-chou the rice price rose to between 
‘1,000 wen per Tou (10 taels per picul)’ and ‘20 taels per picul ‘.57 Cheng 
Ts’ai was forced to send junks as far as Kao-chou, almost in Kuang-hsi 
province, to purchase rice. As the areas around Ch’üan-chou and Chang-chou 
were also famine stricken,58 Coxinga found himself compelled to resort to 
                                                          
55 Dagregister Zeelandia, II 1641-1648, from 1 May 1647 to 1 July 1647, 568-82; 
From 15 July 1647 to 24 July 1647, 584-5; 1 Sept. 1647, 592; 11 Oct. 1647,599; Nov. 
1647, 605-7.  
56  VOC 1164, Resolutie genomen [door Antonissen Overtwater] in ‘t Casteel 
Zeelandia, 9 Oct. 1647, fo. 545v. On what date the placard was announced,is not 
recorded by the Zeelandia Diary. But the Chinese junks which departed from Taiwan 
after April 1648 carried only the rice for crews.   
57 Sung, Tsun-jang lüeh, 194-5. ‘In April 1648, a serious famine occurred in Fu-chou, 
the rich price rose to twenty taels per Tan, and forty taels inside the city, starving 
people wandered on streets. … The soldiers [under Cheng Ts’ai] imported rice from 
Kuang-tung, and thus avoided starvation.’ Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu, 6. ‘The rice 
price reached 1,000 maas per Tou in Fu-chien’; one Tan equals about 60 kilograms, 
hence a Tan was more or less equal to one picul (62.5kilograms). Because one Tan 
equalled 10 Tou, one tael equalled 1,000 wen, ‘1,000 wen(maas) per tou’ equals ’10 
taels per Tan.’ 
58 Shên Ting-chün, Chang-chou fu-chih[Local Gazette of Changchou Prefecture], 50 
vols,（T’ai-nan, Têng-wên publisher, 1965）, vol. 47, 10. ’In 1648, every county 
suffered from famine, the rice price reached 6 maas per tou.’; Huang Jên, 
Ch'üan-chou Fu-chih [Local Gazette of Ch'üanchou Prefecture], 73 vols, (T'ai-nan, 
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the same measures. 59  The Portuguese in Macao, who depended on 
Kuang-chou for their food supplies, were likewise staring starvation in the 
face.60 They dispatched two junks to Siam carrying an enormous sum of gold 
to purchase rice there. On the way back, both vessels foundered because they 
were so overloaded.61 Despite the placard which forbade the export of rice to 
China, the Dutch in Taiwan detected plenty of smuggling activity. 62 
Governor-General Cornelis van der Lijn in Batavia ordered the Dutch factory 
in Siam to ship 200 to 300 last of Siamese rice (about 250-375 metric tons) to 
Taiwan.63 Because a mass of Chinese refugees poured into Taiwan seeking 
shelter, this large cargo of rice was consumed in no time at all. At his wits’ 
end, the Dutch Governor of Taiwan, Pieter Overtwater, had to ask for aid 
                                                                                                                             
Têng-wên publisher, 1965）, vol.73, 12. ’In 1648, … there was a famine.’ 
59 Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu, 6. ‘In the year of 1648, Fu-chien was afflicted by a 
severe famine, Coxinga and Cheng Ts’ai dispatched junks to Kao-chou to purchase 
rice.’ 
60 Ch’êng His-tso, Wu-ch'uan hsien-chih [Local Gazette of Wu-ch'uan Distrct], in The 
Palace Museum Committee (ed.), Ku-kung chên-pên ts'ung-k’an[Collectanea of Rare 
books in Palace Museum](Hereafter cited as KKCP) no. 183, (Hai-k’ou: Hai-nan, 
2001), 458. ‘In 1648, the rice price soared and reached 7 maas per tou. Some families 
gave their children for cannabalism.’ 
61 NFJ 282, [Missive]aan d E heer Frederick Coijett, President in Japan, van Jan van 
Muijden in Judia op ’t Coptoirs Siam [Letter to the President of the Factory in Japan, 
Frederick Coijett, Written by Jan van Muijden in Ayutthaya in Siam], Siam, 24 June 
1648, not foliated.  
62 VOC 1170, Resolutie des Casteel Zeelandia [genomen door Pieter Antonissen 
Overtwater], Taiwan, 8 May 1648, fo. 524r. 
63 VOC 1170, Brieff door den coopman Jan van Muijden opperhooft in Siam 26 Junij 
1648 aen den praesident Pieter Antonisz [Overtwater] [Letter sent by Chief Merchant 
Jan van Muijden in Siam to the Taiwan President Pieter Antonize Overwater], Siam 
[in’t fluijt schip de witte duijf ter rhede voorde Reviere van Siam on the ship the Witte 
Duijf in the roadstead of the Siamese River)], 26 June 1648, fo. 484 v. One last 
equalled 1,250 kilograms, Cf. Judith Schooneveld-Oosterling, VOC-glossarium, 67.  
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from Japan.64 In November 1648, the Dutch merchants in Nagasaki were 
permitted to ship 6,000 bales (309 metric tons) of Japanese rice to Taiwan.65  
While Cheng Ts’ai and Coxinga were dispatching junks to purchase 
rice in Kao-chou, Iquan’s brother Cheng Hung-k’uei sailed from Nan-ao to 
Chieh-yang where Iquan and he used to purchase rice in the 1630s. Now the 
circumstances had changed and, instead of purchasing the rice, he used force 
to subjugate several independent towns and castles. When this step had been 
accomplished, he urged the peasants to pay their land-tax to him in paddy.66 
This region, which is located in the eastern part of Kuang-tung, had not been 
affected by a bad harvest so Cheng Hung-k’uei had ample access to rice and 
sugar in 1648. In the following years, news reached Fu-chien that another 
claimant Ming Emperor,Yung-li, had established a court in Kuang-hsi 
province in the southwest. A little later the Manchu Regional Commanders Li 
Ch’eng-tung in Kuang-tung and Chin Sheng-huan in Chiang-hsi rebelled 
against the Ch’ing court in Peking. Their defection meant that although the 
war raged on in central China but the coastal areas remained relatively 
                                                          
64  NFJ 282, Missive van Pieter Anthonisz. Overtwater naer Japan aen den E. 
Frederick Coyett, oppercoopman en operhooft in Japan en den voorderen raedt des 
Comptoirs aldaer [Letter from Pieter Anthonisz Overtwater in Taiwan to Chief 
Merchant Frederick Coyett and the Council in Japan], Taiwan, 24 Aug. 1648, not 
foliated; The Deshima dagregisters, XI 1641-1650, 322. 15 Sept. 1648.  
65  The Deshima dagregisters, XI 1641-1650, 329. 8 Nov. 1648; VOC 11207, 
Uijterekening Van de Goude en Silvere Munts Waardye, Inhout der Maten en Swaarte 
der Gewichten, in de respective Gewesten van Indiën[Calculation of the Value of the 
Gold and Silver, Content of Weights and Measures in Different Regions of East India], 
(Middelburgh: Johannes Meertens, 1691), 11. In Nagasaki, one bale weighed 82-83 
catties, while one catty weighed 0.625 kilograms. Therefore one bale weighed about 
51.5 kilograms. 
66 Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu, 6; Tsang Hsien-tsu, Ch’ao-yang hsien-chih[Local 
Gazatte of Ch’ao-yang District], KKCP, No.176, 463. ‘In 1648, Chêng Hung-k’uei 
dispatched Ch’ên Pao to this town to levy taxes and collect rents. Local bandits tried 
to lay a siege to them, but the siege collapsed after about one month.’ 
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peaceful. Emperor Yung-li of the Southern Ming dynasty dispatched a 
delegate to recognize Coxinga’s private army as a formal Ming force and to 
welcome the assistance he was prepared to give his new court.67 Coxinga 
now had a legal basis from which to conquer the still independent districts 
around Ch’ao-chou which he set out to do with the assistance of his uncle, 
Cheng Hung-k’uei. They were quite successful because on 11 December 
1649 Coxinga sent his Tax Levying Official (Tu-hsiang-kuan), Huang K’ai, 
to Amoy with a rich cargo of about 10,000 piculs (625 metric tons) of 
paddy. 68  In January 1650, Coxinga assigned Hung Hsu to reside in 
Ch’aoyang (the harbour of Ch’aochou) and put him in charge of the rice 
exportation there.69 Consequently, another several tens of thousands of piculs 
of paddy were shipped to Amoy in May.70 The Dutch sources reveal that the 
rice trade along the coast of China was very profitable during these years. In 
March 1649, the High Government in Batavia decided to ship 600-700 last 
(750-875 metric tons) of rice to Taiwan, because it desired to maintain the 
price at about 60 rials per last (2.5 taels per picul) in Taiwan.71 Governor 
Pieter Overtwater wrote to Japan in 1649 saying that he believed that the rice 
price in Japan had also begun to rise. However he advised, ‘ It is only 
advisable to purchase rice and wheat if the rice price is lower than one tael 
two maas per bale (1.46 tael per picul)…. which was the price last year and 
the year before.’72 The Chinese junk traders in Nagasaki also testified that 
                                                          
67 Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu, 6; The Deshima dagregisters, XI 1641-1650, 355. 
17 July 1649. ‘Iquan’s son - who is said to have become a great mandarin of Canton a 
short while ago.’ 
68 Yang Ying, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, TW no. 32, 5.  
69 Ibidem, 7. 
70 Ibid., 9. 
71 VOC 672, Resolutie van gouverneur-generaal Cornelis van der Lijn ende raden, 
Batavia, 13 Mar. 1649, not foliated. 60 rials per last equals 50.7 taels per last. 
Therefore it was equal to 2.5 taels per picul. 
72 NFJ 282, Missive van Pieter Anthonisz. Overtwater naer Japan aen den E Dircq 
Snoucq, oppercoopman over ‘s Compagnie ommeslagh in ‘t keijzerrijck Japan, 
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‘on June 29, 1649, no fewer than seven ships had arrived in [Taiwan] from 
Batavia, the bulk of their cargo being rice for China.’73 In October 19, the 
Dutch Chief Merchant in Nagasaki obtained permission from the Japanese 
authorities to export 6,000 bales (309 metric tons) of rice.74 How much rice 
was transported to Taiwan is unknown, but Governor Pieter Overtwater 
commented that this supply: ‘ had greatly contributed to the welfare of this 
place,’ and that it constituted a ‘desirable business.’75  The high price of rice 
might be the explanation of why An-hai merchants like Huang K’ai and Hung 
Hsü never had any difficulty in laying their hands on Chinese gold in the 
years 1648-1650. The opening of the Ch’ao-chou- An-hai route came to the 
notice of the Dutch merchants when some commodities from Kuang-tung 
also began to flow into Taiwan.76        
The lucrative pepper trade targeted against Macao 
The spices still in store in Taiwan were almost sold out between during 
March and June 1647.77 The pepper price rose and fell depending closely on 
the news from China. 
 
 
                                                                                                                             
Taiwan, 26 July 1649, not foliated. 
73 The Deshima dagregisters, XI 1641-1650, 355. 17 July 1649. 
74 Ibidem, 371. 19 Oct. 1649. 
75 NFJ 283, Missive van Nicolaes Verburgh naer Japan aen d’ E. Anthonio van 
Brouckhorst, oppercoopman en opperhooft over ‘s Compagnies negotie in ‘t 
keijzerrijck Japan [Letter from Nicolaes Verburgh to Chief Merchant Anthonio van 
Brouckhorst about the Company Trade in Japan], Taiwan, 21 July 1650, not foliated. 
Every ‘bal’ should equal 40 ‘ganting’.  
76 VOC 1170, Missive van Pieter Antonissen Overtwater naer Batavia aen Cornelis 
van der Lijn, Taiwan, 2 Nov. 1648, Fo. 573v. 
77 VOC 1164, Missive van Pieter Antonissen Overtwater naer Batavia aen gouverneur 
generael Cornelis van der Lijn, Taiwan, 24 Sept. 1647, Fos. 624 v-625r. 
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Table 9-2: The pepper price in Taiwan from March to September 1647 
Month Price  
(rial per 
picul) 
Pepper sold  




(picul) (sack)     
1647-3 15 5/8 
15 3/4  
400 piculs   
1647-4 18 1/2 
14 1/2 
Two junks would return from 
Batavia 
A Quinam junk arrived in 
Kuang-tung 
165  30  
1647-5 15 11/16  142  42  
1647-6 -  20  225  













1716 1452  
1647-8 19 1/2  1145 230  
1647-9 16 
16 3/8 
Rumours about instability in 
China  
900   
1647-10   17  195  
1647-11   32  59  
sum   4137 2233 
Source: VOC 1164, Missive van Pieter Antonissen Overtwater naer Batavia aen gouverneur 
generael Cornelis van der Lijn[Letter from Pieter Antonissen Overtwater to Batavia for the 
Governor-General Cornelis van der Lijn], Taiwan, 24 Sept. 1647, Fos. 624 v-625r; Dagregister 
Zeelandia, II 1641-1648. 
Before September 1647, the An-hai merchants had apparently had high 
expectations of the profits to be made in the pepper trade, because Manchu 
troops had bungun to invade Kuang-tung since January 1647. It seems 
plausible that, because some of Iquan’s former troops had participated in this 
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expedition, the An-hai merchants would have been well-informed about the 
general conditions in Kuang-tung. 78  Although the city of Kuang-chou 
surrendered when the Manchu cavalry arrived before its gates in January, the 
troops loyal to the of Ming cause laid siege to the city on 16 March 1647. The 
siege lasted one month.79 The resistance struggle spread all over the coastal 
area and as a consequence Tung-kuan, Hsin-an and Ch’ing-yuan districts 
were re-occupied by the Ming forces in April.80 They even attempted to take 
Kuang-chou in August.81 In the meantime, the area between Kuang-chou and 
Macao had become an extended battlefield, effectively barring the trade route 
between Kuang-chou and Macao. The situation in Fu-chien remained fairly 
peaceful, although An-hai Castle had had to endure an attack by the Manchu 
troops. The Dutch chief of the Deshima factory in Nagasaki described the 
situation as: 
‘The Manchus are progressing peacefully, bringing everyone under 
their yoke. The Tartars(Manchus) offered to free Iquan and give him a high 
office on the condition that this [Iquan’s] sons surrendered. His Japanese 
wife has died. The great conquests of the Tartars(Manchus) are carried out in 
the most civilized manner to the satisfaction of the subjugated: no one may 
rob anyone of a single penny or commit any theft.’82 
                                                          
78 Anonymous, Lung-wu chi-lüeh, 165. ’The Bolo prince of Ch’ing dispatched his 
subordinate officer, Shih Fu, to lead the cavalry and Chêng Hung-k’uei to direct the 
navy towards Kao-chou, Lei-chou and Chi’ung-chou. Cheng Hung-k’uei excused 
himself on the grounds of ill health, so that Shih Fu and Cheng Chi-pao moved first.’   
79 T’ung Yang-chia, ‘Liang-kuang tsung-tu ts’n chieh-t’ieh [Remaining Part of a 
Letter sent by the Govvernor of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi, T’ung Yang-chia] 10 Aug. 
1647’, in TWYH (ed.), Nan-ming shih-liao[Historical Sources of the Southern Ming 
period], TW no. 169, 70; Anonymous, Hsing-tsai yang-ch’iu[Events at the Yungli 
Emperor’s Court], TW no. 234, 9. 
80 Anonymous, Hsing-tsai yang-ch’iu, 12-15.  
81 Ibidem, 17.  
82 The Deshima dagregisters, XI 1641-1650, 286. 29 May 1647. 
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Under such conditions, the pepper trade could be pursued without a 
hitch and this boosted the price of pepper in Taiwan. The boom did not last. A 
steep decline set in at the beginning of September when Cheng Ts’ai 
launched an attack on Fu-chou which was located along the main trade 
corridor connecting Chê-chiang with Chiang-hsi provinces. Coxinga also 
attacked Ch’üan-chou and Hai-ch’êng during the same period but he was not 
able to take a single district until the beginning of the following year. 
All other commodities shipped to Taiwan by the Dutch, such as lead, 
cloves, myrrh, amber, wax, camphor and sappanwood, were sold out by the 
end by the year.83 The VOC ships generally purchased pepper in Jambi and 
Palembang in the island of Sumatra at a price of 10 rials per picul, and sold it 
for almost double that price in Taiwan. About 70 per cent (109,643 guilders) 
of the pure profit earned by the Dutch in Taiwan in that year (155,655 
guilders) came from the sales of pepper.84       
In 1648, heavily overshadowed by the civil war in China, the trade 
situation in Portuguese Macao was still gloomy. Informed of what was 
happening in China, Governor-General Cornelis van der Lijn in Batavia 
believed that this was the reason the Taiwan trade had risen: 
‘The longer the war in China continues, the more the trade in Macao 
declines. They [the Portuguese]have received very few provisions and 
commodities this year. Therefore the Company commodities have enjoyed a 
better market in Taiwan.’85 
It is true that with the exception of gold hardly any of the Chinese 
goods for which orders had been placed reached Taiwan, but most of the 
tropical commodities the VOC had shipped from the Indonesian Archipelago 
to Taiwan were sold to Chinese merchants at a high price.  
                                                          
83 Generale Missive, 31 Dec 1647, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 248. 
84 Generale Missiven, II 1639-1655, 328. 31 Dec. 1647.  
85 Ibidem, 343. 18 Jan. 1649. 
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Table 9-3: The profits of some tropical commodities sold in Taiwan in 
1648   
 Purchased 
Price  
per picul  
in rial 
Sold price 
per picul  
in rial 
Profits 
Lead  (f.) 5.5 (f.)11 100% 




11   
800% 








Wax 20  35  150% 









































Source: Missive van Pieter Anonissen Overtwater naer Batavia aen Cornelis van der Lijn, 
Taiwan, 2 Nov. 1648, VOC 1170, Fo. 567r-569r. (f) means it is counted in guilders. 
In total 1,645,982 catties (= 882.91lasts) of pepper were carried to Taiwan in 
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1649, which amounted to 40 per cent of the value of the cargo of the fifteen 
VOC ships dispatched to Taiwan from Batavia and Siam.86 Most of these 
commodities were exchanged for Chinese gold.87  
 
The Re-organization of the Min-nan monopoly 
on Chinese overseas trade under Coxinga 
In the summer of 1649, the export of new silk from Fu-chien province to 
Japan picked up again for a number of reasons: some of the Manchu generals 
in Kuang-tung and Chiang-hsi rebelled thereby moving the battlefields of the 
civil war farther inland and, as a consequence, the export of Nanking silk was 
forbidden by the Manchu coastal defence troops. In July, one junk belonging 
to Coxinga and two junks the property of Iquan arrived in Japan.88 In the 
meantime there had been signs that An-hai merchants were expanding their 
trade with Quinam and Cambodia. The Dutch Chief Merchant in Nagasaski 
reported that thirteen Chinese junks had suddenly brought large quantities of 
deerskins to Japan from these two countries: 
‘We are unable to say whether the Company will make large profits on 
its Siamese wares, because so many goods have been brought by thirteen 
Chinese junks (all very large vessels) from our enemies, Cambodia and 
Quinam. This not only thwarts our trade in Japan, it is also a daily 
undermining of the Company profit by the treacherous grandees in this 
country.’89      
As long as it was at war with Quinam, the VOC did its best to intercept 
                                                          
86 Generale Missive, 31 Dec. 1649, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 261. 
87 Ibidem, 263. 
88 The Deshima dagregisters, XI 1641-1650, 355. 23; 26 July 1649. 
89 NFJ 282, Missive van Dircq Snoucq naer Taijouan aen de heer Pieter Anthonisz. 
Overtwater, Japan, 24 Oct. 1649, not foliated. 
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all junk shipping from there, but to little avail.90 Apart from that, the 
Fu-chien merchants were now also the only corridor through which the 
Siamese King could run his crown trade with China. Because the Manchu 
troops were marching towards Kuang-tung at the end of 1649 and again laid 
a siege to Kuang-chou in March 1650, the Siamese crown trade with that city 
was severely impeded. Seizing the opportunity created by this situation, the 
An-hai merchant fitted out ten junks to visit Siam right away.91 The siege of 
Kuang-chou also seriously obstructed the trade of Macao. This is what a 
Portuguese merchant, Francisco Bravo, who arrived in Malacca from Macao 
had to say about it: 
‘He told us how the Manchus had taken Kuang-chou by force in 
December last year (1650) after a nine-month siege. They forced the 
inhabitants of the city to the sea shore and massacred most of them. …Once 
Kuang-hsi province shall be conquered too, the whole of China will be under 
Manchu domination. Furthermore, he told us that the Portuguese situation in 
Macao is critical as no business is being conducted in the city because of the 
turmoil created by the war. But now Kuang-chou has surrendered to the 
Manchus, they[the Macauese] are hoping that the commerce will recover in 
the coming year.’92                 
The Fu-chienese merchants not only spoiled the Company trade in 
Japan because of their importation of large cargoes of deerskins,93 their 
competition was felt elsewhere by the Dutch. Because An-hai merchants had 
                                                          
90  Generale Missiven, II 1639-1655, 351. 18 Jan. 1649. The VOC had also 
established a factory in Cambodia in 1636-1644, and in Quinam in 1634-1639. But it 
later withdrew from both places and began to carry out frequent patrols. 
91 Ibidem, 448. 20 Jan. 1651. 
92 VOC 1187, Missiven [aen haer Eds.gouverneur generael Carel Rijniersz te Batavia] 
[door Joan Thijssen, Joan Verpoorten en Jan Willemse], Malacca, 26 Jan. 1651, fos. 
794v-795r. 
93 Generale Missiven, II 1639-1655, 448. 20 Jan. 1651. 
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dispatched two junks to Ligor to purchase pepper and tin, a Dutch ship which 
arrived slightly later was unable to purchase sufficient amounts of these 
commodities. 94  Not surprisingly, the sale of pepper and other tropical 
condiments fell short of expectations in Taiwan in 1650.95    
Apparently the An-hai merchants were able to capture the bulk of the 
Chinese foreign trade thanks to the maritime ban in force in Chê-chiang and 
the siege of Kuang-chou. The only Chinese harbour left which could offer a 
safe anchorage to the largest trade-junks plying the Siamese route was Amoy. 
If the An-hai merchants wished to preserve and enlarge their trade, the 
security of Amoy harbour was the prize. Therefore the local garrisons were 
assigned a key role in their project. In his memoirs, Juan Min-hsi recounts 
that Coxinga’s commercial agent and naval commander, Cheng Chih-wan, 
quarrelled with the regional commanders of the garrison troops in Amoy and 
Quemoy, Iquan’s nephews Cheng Ts’ai and Cheng Lien, over the question of 
the control of the foreign trade based in Amoy Harbour.96 In May 1650, 
Governor Nicolas Verburgh of Taiwan received complaints from An-hai 
merchants, who accused Cheng Lien (alias Salackia [D.]) of dispatching an 
officer to the Pescadores to levy a tax on all the junks there, especially those 
bound for Taiwan. 97  Cheng Lien later offered Verburgh his excuses, 
                                                          
94  VOC 1175, Missiven door den gouverneur Joan Thijssen aen de Ed. heer 
gouverneur generael [Carel Rijniersz] ende heeren raaden van India, Malacca, 26 Nov. 
1650, fo. 389r. 
95 Generale Missive, 20 Jan. 1651, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 274. 
96 P'êng, Ching-hai chih, 20. ‘In Amoy, Cheng T’sai and Cheng Lien had a conflict 
with Cheng Chih-peng… ‘I assume that ‘Cheng Chih-peng’ refers to Cheng Chih-wan 
who was also fourth in Command of the Naval Force (Shui-shih Ssu-chên) under 
Coxinga and responsible for the rice import to Amoy from Chao-chou. Yang, 
Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 5.  
97 Dagregister Zeelandia, III 1648-1655, 127. 8 May 1650. In the letter sent by 
Salackja to Nicolas Verbugh, 2 July 1650, the signature ‘Teibing, Thunbingh, 
Thseij-souw Tingwanhouw’ refers to Cheng Lian’s official title and noble rank 
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explaining that he would issue passes to the Taiwan-bound junks and that no 
junk would suffer any harassment in the future. He explained that he needed 
to collect taxes from the local fishermen who were under his jurisdiction at 
Amoy. He could use these funds to offer some financial aid to the Ming 
Emperor Yung-li:   
‘It is said that the cousin of our late Emperor has re-conquered the 
province of Kuang-tung from the Manchus. He requires all the support he can 
get in order to wreak even more havoc on the Manchus, who to our great 
sorrow have captured our illustrious country.…I have decided to support him 
with well- equipped troops and junks. We are short of money to pay the many 
expenses, hence I must levy an annual tax for the Emperor. The inhabitants of 
the Pescadores are counted the same as other subjects…. Therefore I have 
sent my men to the Pescadores to collect the annual tax.’ 
All junks, departing from here bound for that destination must carry a 
pass issued by me and pay a certain tax. Those who do so are exempt from 
any further taxes and will not be harassed. All these junks will not be 
required to pay any other tax, not even as much as a single straw. I have 
forbidden my inferiors to demand any such on pain of death, I shall never 
allow such abuses to occur.98         
Since Cheng Lien had the authority to control all Amoy junks, 
including the right to issue passes and levy taxes, the An-hai merchants must 
have been afraid that they might be arbitrarily supplanted by some other 
merchants who pleased Cheng Lien more. They felt someone should take 
                                                                                                                             
‘Ta-ming tsung-ping t’ai-shih ting-yüen-hou’[The Ming Regional Commander, Grand 
Preceptor of the Heir Apparent, the Marquis-Pacifier of the Far Frontier]. Hence it is 
evident that ‘Sablackja’ is another of Cheng Lian’s names. 
98 VOC 1176, Translaat missive door de groot mandorijn Sablacja uijt Emoij aen den 
gouverneur Nicolaes Verburch geschreven [Translated Letter Written by the Great 
Mandarin Sablacja to the Governor of Taiwan Nicolaes Verburch from Amoy], Amoy, 
2 July 1650, fo. 877r. 
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action to prevent the realization of this nightmare. Therefore, after the junks 
sailing to Siam and Ligor had returned to Amoy in the summer of 1650, the 
An-hai merchants persuaded Coxinga to seize control of Amoy. On 10 
September 1650, Coxinga returned to Amoy from Chieh-yang, under the 
pretence of escorting a convoy of rice junks. He murdered Cheng Lien by a 
treacherous ruse and incorporated his cousin’s troop into his own army.99 
Soon afterwards a richly laden junk belonging to Coxinga departed from 
Amoy setting course for Nagasaki, where it duly arrived on 18 October 1650. 
A formidable trading power was in the making. Possession of a naval force, 
the facilities offered by the deep-water harbour in Amoy and the rich trading 
capital of the An-hai merchants were now combined under one leader: 
Coxinga.  
                                                          
99 Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu, 9; P'êng, Ching-hai chih, 20. 





TRANSFORMED INTO A POLITICAL PROJECT 
1650-1654 
The Renewed Struggle for the Monopoly on the Export of Silk 
In September 1650, Coxinga murdered his courtesy-cousin, Cheng Lien, and 
seized control of Amoy and its garrison troops, while the victim’s elder 
brother, Cheng Ts’ai, was still busy patrolling the coast of northern Fu-chien. 
Of the 963 piculs of raw silk exported to Japan that year, at least 50.4 per cent 
(485.5 piculs) was shipped from An-hai and Chang-chou, 7 per cent came 
from Nanking and Chou-shan and 16.7 per cent from Fu-chou.1 Obviously 
Prince Lu on Chou-shan and Cheng Ts’ai in Fu-chou were still managing to 
produce about 22.7 per cent of the Chinese raw silk export in 1650. Shortly 
                                                          
1  Generale Missiven, II 1639-1655, 423. 10 Dec. 1650, mentions that 963 piculs of 
raw silk from China, including An-hai and Fu-chou, were exported to Japan. The 
amounts of raw silk imported into Japan were respectively, 138.5 piculs from An-hai, 
347 piculs from Chang-chou, 160.7 piculs from Fu-chou, 59.7 from Chou-shan, and 
7.5 from Nanking, figures taken from the cargo manifests of the junks. Yoko 
Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 1637-1833: fukugen tōsen kamotsu 
aratamechō, kihan nimotsu kaiwatashichō[Overview of Commodities Imported into 
and Exported from Japan on Chinese Junks 1637-1833], ( Tokyo, Sōbunsha: 1987), 
42-8. The Dutch sources also give the total amount of raw silk imported to Japan in 
1650, including that exported from Southeast Asia as 1081.2 piculs. Ibid, 336. If the 
total of 963 piculs refers only to An-hai and Fu-chou exports, the export from there 
could have made up 90 per cent of the Chinese raw silk exports to Japan that year. 
Because the numbers in the total amounts do not tally with the sum given on the 




afterwards, in March or April 1651 followers of Prince Lu defeated Cheng 
Ts’ai’s fleet at sea off the Fu-chien-Chê-chiang border.2 Cheng Ts’ai’s power 
was seriously diminished as a consequence of this defeat but, despite his 
victory, Prince Lu did not manage to carve out a better niche in this trade for 
himself. Nature also put her oar in. Owing to a persistent drought the 
following summer, a famine which undermined the export network based on 
the support of the Nanking (Chiang-su) and Chê-chiang merchants held 
Chê-chiang province in its grip.3 The Manchu coastal defence troops gladly 
seized this opportunity it offered and, in the second half of September 1651, 
managed to defeat the main fleet stationed off Chou-shan and thereafter 
occupied the archipelago.4 In February 1652, the remaining ships of the 
defeated Chou-shan fleet sailed to Amoy where they submitted to Coxinga.5 
Prince Lu had fled with his fleet leaving his court on Chou-shan in a state of 
total collapse.6 Some of Cheng Ts’ai’s fleet chose for the other side and 
surrendered to Manchus after the Battle of Chou-shan.7 One of his naval 
commanders, Chang Yün-fei, was assigned to the newly established coastal 
defence force. Before he went over to Cheng Ts’ai’s camp, Chang had been 
part of the Manchu garrison troops in Fu-chou.8 Consequently, after his 
                                                          
2 Sung, Tsun-jang lüeh, 201. 
3 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 17. 18 June 1651. 
4 Sung, Tsun-jang lüeh, 203. 
5 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 20. 
6 Sung, Tsun-jang lüeh, 203. 
7 Ch’ên Chin, ‘Wei hsü-ch’ên chui-ch’ao pu-k’ou ch’ing-hsing chi chao-fu liu-wang 
an-ch'a chou- shan shan-hou chi-i yang-ch’i shêng-chien shih [Orders from the 
Emperor to Pacify Pirates in the Chou-shan Archipelago and Arrange the Settlement 
of Refugees] 23 Nov. 1651’, in TWSL (ed.), Ming-ch’ing t’ai-wan tang-an hui-pien, 
II 1645-1653, 354. 
8 Ch’ên Chin, ‘ Chê-min tsung-tu ch’ên-chin ts’an chieh-t’ieh [Remaining Part of a 
Letter from Governor Chê-chiang and the Fu-chien Ch’ên Chin] 31 Mar. 1649’, in 
TWYH(ed), Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien[The Second Compilation of Historical 
Documents referring to the Cheng Family], TW no. 168, 26. 
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return he was re-appointed to his old position and was once again able to take 
control of the Fu-chou raw silk export.    
Considering that the negotiations between the Manchu authorities and 
Iquan had been interrupted since 1648, the relationship of the An-hai 
merchants with their northern neighbours in Fu-chou and Ch’üan-chou under 
the domination of the Manchus should also have been suspended since that 
year. Obviously they paid little heed to this and, according to the Dutch 
sources, before October 1654 the An-hai merchants carrying passes issued by 
Iquan were still allowed to trade in all the territories under Manchu control.9 
The junks which sailed to Japan were sometimes even listed under Iquan’s 
name, although his stepmother, Madam Huang, and his younger brother, 
Cheng Chih-pao, were the true owners . When Coxinga seized the fleet of 
Cheng Lien whom he had murdered, he had probably been incited to take this 
step by his step-grandmother and uncle.10 In December 1650 or January 
1651, Coxinga led the newly recruited, well-trained and experienced naval 
force southwards, claiming he was on a mission to rescue Ming troops who 
were still holding out in the siege of Kuang-chou by the Manchus.11  
In fact, there was an even more urgent mission. Since Manchu troops 
had already penetrated into Kuang-tung and Ch’ao-chou had announced that 
it was prepared to surrender to the Manchus, the defence of the southern 
territory already conquered by Cheng Hung-k’uei and Coxinga had top 
priority. Thinking out his strategy carefully, Coxinga resorted to conservative 
measures and kept his troops in the border area between Fu-chien and 
Kuang-tung with the idea of preventing the Manchu troops from penetrating 
                                                          
9 NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Japan aen den E. Leonard 
Winninx, opperhooft over des Compagnies ommeslagh in Japan, ende den raat aldaar, 
Taiwan, 3 Aug. 1655, Taiwan, fo.1. 
10 Both of them contributed their trade revenues to Coxinga directly after the incident. 
11 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 13. 
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into Fu-chien.12 His fleet lay anchored off the border area for five months. 
Rather than launch an outright assault, he opted to collect rice from the 
eastern part of Kuang-tung province as he had done in previous years rather 
than to speed to the rescue of Kuang-chou city. 
Unperturbed by these military excursions, the An-hai merchants 
continued to run their trade as usual, which enabled the Dutch in Taiwan to 
ship about 600,000 guilders’ worth of Chinese gold to Coromandel at the end 
of 1650. Although this was a large amount, it was only about 52 per cent of 
what Batavia had ordered.13 Coxinga’s expedition to Kuang-tung did not 
throw up any obstacles to impede this trade. In other words, the trade 
between An-hai and the northern parts under Manchu rule was still permitted. 
Since the An-hai merchants had made the pretence of having submitted to the 
Manchu regime, which is why they had been granted this trade, the Manchu 
authorities even used them to transport their troops to Amoy during 
Coxinga’s absence. On 20 April 1651, the Regional Commander of the newly 
arrived Manchu Ch’üan-chou Garrison Troops, Ma Te-kung, was ordered to 
mount a raid on Amoy by Grand Co-ordinator, Chang Hsüeh-sheng. This was 
to be done under the guise of levying taxes from his ‘subjects’.14 Therefore, 
the Manchu Coastal Defence Circuit of Hsing-hua and Ch’üan-chou 
Prefectures, Huang Shu, ordered the leader of the An-hai merchants, Iquan’s 
younger brother Cheng Chih-pao, to arrange the junks for transportation, 
                                                          
12 Ibidem. 
13  VOC 1183, Missive van Nicolaes Verburch naer Batavia aen [gouverneur 
generael]Cornelis van der Lijn, Taiwan, 20 Dec. 1650, fos. 542-3. The estimate should 
also include the orders for silver from different factories, therefore it is only a 
approximation. 
14 Wang Ying-yuan, ‘Wang ying yüen t’i-wei sha-mên têng-ti tê-shih ch’ing-hsing 
pên [Report by Wang Ying-yüen about the Situation around Amoy ] 12 Feb. 1653’, in 
CKTI(ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien, I no.6, 
6. 
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while he held Iquan hostage.15 Just one day before Regional Commander Ma 
arrived in Amoy, he was still fighting against Coxinga’s garrison in 
Liu-wu-tien. Finally forced to meet the Manchu troops face to face, the Amoy, 
Garrison Commander, Cheng Chih-wan, deserted his post and most of the 
garrison and the inhabitants fled away on ships.16 Hence, the Manchu troops 
landed without meeting any resistance and in the days following 20 April 
furiously plundered Amoy.17 Upon hearing this news, Cheng Hung-k’uei 
rushed his fleet from Quemoy to blockade Amoy three days later but 
Regional Commander Ma threatened to kill his mother whom he had taken 
hostage in An-hai and, holding this over his head, forced him to arrange the 
transportation of the Manchu troops back to Ch’üan-chou on 16 May 1651.18 
Two days later, Coxinga rushed his fleet back to Amoy after receiving an 
urgent call for assistance from Cheng Hung-k’uei.19 The Dutch in Taiwan 
were also informed about this incident: 
‘We certainly knew that, having levied tax from almost everywhere 
around the coastal areas, the Manchus conquered Amoy city last April and 
seized loads of booty. But [soon afterwards] they were expelled [again] by 
Coxinga, the son of Great Mandarin Iquan . He is now residing there and 
employing as much violence as the Manchus did on his own subjects as he 
forces An-hai under his control.’20      
                                                          
15 Pa Hana, ‘Pa-ha-na têng t’i wei lieh-fu ch’ing-t’an ch’i-hsin sha-mên têng-ti 
shih-hsien shih-pên [Accusation Written by Pa Ha-na about How the Corrupt Grand 
Co-ordinator Caused the War and the [Subsequent] Loss of Amoy ], 6 Nov. 1653’, in 
CKTI(ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien, I no 6, 
28; Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 16-7. 
16 Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu, 10-11. 
17 Pa, ‘Pa-ha-na têng t’i wei lieh-fu ch’ing-t’an ch’i-hsin sha-mên têng-ti shih-hsien 
shih-pên, 6 Nov. 1653’, 6. 
18 Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu,10. 
19 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 16. 
20 VOC 1183, Missive van Ncolaes Verburch naer Batavia aen Carel Reniersz, 
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Cheng Chih-wan was sentenced to death and beheaded by Coxinga on 
28 May 1651.21 Coxinga raided several enemy camps around the shores of 
Ch’üan-chou Bay on 22 June, an action which finally gave him control of 
An-hai. Since the Manchu troops had plundered several tens of thousands 
piculs of rice from Amoy, Coxinga had to take this booty back by force. He 
landed in Hai-ch’êng in July but not long after withdrew to Amoy from 
where he launched another raid on T’ung-an in December 1651.22  He 
engaged the Manchu garrisons in both Ch’üan-chou and Chang-chou, and 
cleared an area into which the Manchu force was unable to make a 
break-through. While Coxinga was engaged in waging this war from 
February to August 1651, the An-hai merchants did not dare to do any 
business. The Dutch in Taiwan received no more than 200,000 guilders in 
Chinese gold during these seven months, far less than they had expected.23 In 
a breathing space between these two expeditions, Coxinga had returned to 
Amoy for a short while to reward his army. The An-hai merchants(who 
should have been moved to Amoy by Coxinga) brought another 72,000 
guilders’ worth of Chinese gold from An-hai and Amoy to Taiwan on 8 
November.24 For their return cargoes, they purchased 1,518.6 piculs of 
pepper, sold at 14¼ rials per picul during the same month, 56,264 guilders in 
all.25 As they purchased hardly any other goods, the remaining 15,736 
                                                                                                                             
Taiwan, 25 Oct. 1651, fo. 888r. 
21 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 18. 
22 Ibidem, 20. 
23 VOC 1183, Missive van Ncolaes Verburch naer Batavia aen Carel Reniersz, 
Taiwan, 25 Oct. 1651, fo. 867v. . 
24 Dagregisters Zeelandia, III:1648-1655, 284. 8 Nov. 1651; VOC 1194, Missive van 
Nicolaes Verburgh naer Batavia aen Carel Reniersz, Taiwan, 16 Dec. 1651, fo. 51r. 
The letter recorded that 272,000 guilders’ worth of gold would be sent to Coromandel. 
Since an earlier letter mentions that they collected fewer than 200,000 guilders 
between February and August 1651, they must have gathered more than 72,000 
guilders between November and December. 
25 VOC 1183, Missive van den commissaris Willem Verstegen naer Batavia aen den 
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guilders was probably paid by the Dutch in silver.  
As mentioned earlier, Kuang-chou lay under the Manchu siege from 7 
March to 24 November 1650. When it was finally taken by the Manchu 
troops, about 40,000 citizens were either expelled from the city or killed.26 
The Portuguese in Macao delivered their letter of surrender to the Manchu 
commander, the Ching-nan Viceroy, Keng Ching-chung, on 20 December 
1650, to which he replied in a formal letter on 31 January 1651.27 After 
enduring three years of serious troubles (1648-1650), the Kuang-tung-Macao 
business gradually began to bounce back. Perhaps this change of fortune also 
explains why the gold exports declined to only 46 per cent since the end of 
1651, compared with the previous year when Kuang-chou was still under 
siege. Nevertheless, the same low level still persisted the following year 1652, 
when three Portuguese vessels brought sandalwood and pepper from 
                                                                                                                             
gouverneur generael Carel Reniers [Letter from Commissioner Willem Verstegen to 
Governor-General Carel Reniers in Batavia], Taiwan, 24 Oct. 1651, fo. 842v; 151.4 
piculs were sold between May and October; VOC 1183, Missive van Nicolaes 
Verburch naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Carel Reniersz, Taiwan, 24 Nov. 
1651, fo. 514v. 1,670 piculs were sold at 14¼ rials per picul. Therefore 21,640 rials of 
pepper had been sold in all.   
26 Lin Tzu-hsiung, ‘Ch’ing-ch’u liang-fan kung-chan kuang-chou shih-shih t’an-wei 
[An Examination of How the Two Viceroys Occupied Kuang-chou]’, Ling-nan wên- 
shih [Literature and History of the Regions South of the Wu-ling Hills], no. 3, ( 1996), 
8-11. 
27 Ch’ên Wên-yüen, ‘ Nan-ming yung-li chêng-ch'üan yü ao-mên[The Yongli Regime 
of the Southern Ming Dynasty and Macao]’, Chi-nan hsüeh-pao[Journal of Jinan 
University], 22:6 (2000), 61-5 at 64; VOC 1184, Missive uijt Tonquin [bij Jacob 
Keijser] aen den gouverneur generaal Carel Reijniersz. ende raden van India, Tonkin, 
8 Aug 1651, fos. 46r-v; Li Ch'i-fêng, ‘Kuang-tung Li-ch’i-fêng t’i-pao ao-mên i- mu 
ch’êng-wên t’ou-ch’êng ch’i-ch’ing i-shih têng ch'ing-pên [Report by the Grand 
Co-ordinator of Kuang-tung, Li Ch’i-fêng, about the Submission of the Portuguese in 
Macao ] 2 Apr. 1651’, in CKTI (et al. eds), Ming-ch’ing shih-ch’i ao-mên wên-t’i 
tang-an wên-hsien hui-pien, I , 23-4. 
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Makassar back to Macao, thereby offering China an alternative source of 
tropical goods over and above those which the Dutch in Taiwan had to sell.28  
Although Coxinga was not able to rescue the resistance fighters in 
Kuang-chou his naval commander, Lin Ch’a, had been active on the 
Kuang-tung coast. The local gazette of Tien-pai District records that Lin Ch’a 
occupied Tien-pai, which is situated not far from Kao-chou, in late August 
1650.29 Following hard on the heels of this development, a junk from 
Kao-chou arrived in Nagasaki on 3 September 1650.30 The leader of the 
resistance in Kuang-chou, Tu Yung-he, did not surrender to the Manchus 
when the city was overrun but sailed to Hai-nan Island before he finally 
surrendered to the Manchu Viceroy, Keng, in October 1651. Even when he 
was holding out in Hai-nan, he still managed to play a role in Kao-chou trade. 
No fewer than three junks sailed from Kao-chou to Japan under his aegis.31 
One of these belonged to Coxinga, evidence that he was still actively 
participating in the Kuang-tung trade even while he was fighting the 
Manchus in Fu-chien. 32  
As the Chê-chiang resistance gradually fell to pieces in 1651, the 
Manchu coastal defence troops steadily gained control of the coasts of 
Chê-chiang and northern Fu-chien, Kuang-tung also fell into their laps. 
Despite their steady encroachment, the Dutch records show that 937¾ piculs 
of raw silk were exported to Japan by Chinese junks in 1651, almost equal to 
                                                          
28 VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, 
Taiwan, 10 Mar. 1657, fo. 15v; VOC 1197, Missive van Nicolaes Verburch near 
Batavia aen den gouvernuer generael Carel Reniersz, Taiwan, 29 Dec 1652, Fo. 769r; 
Generale Missiven, II 1639-1655, 658. 31 Jan 1653. 
29 Hsiang Tou-nan, Tien-pai hsien-chih[Local Gazette of Tien-pai District], in the 
Palace Museum Committee (ed.) (here after cited as PM), KKCP no. 183, 330. The 
precise rank and title of Lin Ch’a has yet not been identified. 
30 Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 47.  
31 Shao, His-nan chi-shih, 94. 
32 The Deshima dagregisters, XI 1641-1650, 17. 4 Aug 1651; . 19-20; 7 Aug. 1651. 
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the amount of the previous year.33 Although junks departed from different 
places along the China coast in the summer of 1651 and were sailing for 
different parties, by the time they returned from Japan at the beginning of 
1652 Amoy was the only harbour left open along the whole coast of China. 
Besides the resurgence in the Japan trade, the commerce between An-hai and 
Manila was also resumed. After the Dutch Republic and Spain concluded the 
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the Dutch were deprived of their legal basis to 
mount patrols and stop Chinese junks sailing to Manila. This was a lucky 
break for two junks owned by Cheng Chih-wan (Chao-ming-yeh[C.], 
Sammia[D.], which means the Honourable ‘Marquess of Chao-ming’) which 
could bring wax, sugar, venison, deerskins and rice to An-hai from Manila in 
1651.34 The following year, 1652, the An-hai merchants brought about 300 
piculs of raw silk to Manila at 350 rials per picul.35 Manchu coastal defence 
fleet challenged the supremacy of the Amoy fleet after they apprehended the 
blooming commercial development in Amoy. In April 1652, Chang Yün-fei 
led a Manchu naval force from Ch’üan-chou for the specific purpose of 
attacking Coxinga’s Amoy fleet, but he was defeated two months later. 36 
This is one clue which indicates that Coxinga’s naval force was gradually 
gaining the advantage on the Fu-chou coast and had been able to impound 
one junk which had returned from Japan in December of 1652. 37  
After the Manchu troops garrisoned in Hai-ch’êng city had surrendered 
on 11 March 1652, from his headquarters on the coast, Coxinga pushed the 
frontier 30 kilometres inland through Chang-tai district. On 20 April 1652, 
outside Chang-tai he won a victory over the Manchu troops from Fu-chou led 
                                                          
33 Generale Missiven, II 1639-1655, 542. 19 Dec. 1651. 
34 VOC 1183, Missive van den commissaris Willem Verstegen naer Batavia aen den 
gouverneur generael Carel Reniersz, Taiwan, 24 Oct. 1651, fo. 841v. 
35 Generale Missiven, II 1639-1655, 658. 31 Jan. 1653. 
36 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 22, 25. 
37 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 101. 14 Feb. 1653. 
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by the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Ch’ên Chin.38 Coxinga now laid a 
siege to Chang-chou which lay even farther inland and this siege lasted from 
May to the end of October, when Manchu reinforcement troops arrived. This 
time the Emperor had dispatched native-born Manchu tribal troops from 
Nanking and Chê-chiang.39 When the two armies clashed on the 1 November 
1652, Coxinga lost the battle and had to retreat to Hai-ch’êng.40  
Although defeated, Coxinga’s troops had no worries about food 
supplies because the towns in the area between Chang-chou and Ch’ao-chou 
had all been under his control just before the siege of Chang-chou began. 
Coxinga’s personal authority had expanded by the expedient of unleashing 
several waves of raids on the area and he had succeeded in building up a 
centralized military establishment. Clearly the struggle fought out along the 
Chinese coast had contributed to his financial base in Amoy and the An-hai 
merchants had been steadily able to extend their grip on foreign trade, with 
the exception of the Portuguese in Macao.       
Expansion of the ‘Western Ocean’ Trade in China and Japan 
Even before Coxinga had gained control of Amoy, An-hai merchants were 
engaged in fitting out some of the ten Chinese junks which eventually arrived 
in Siam in 1650.41 They sailed just at the point at which the Manchus began 
to lay siege to Kuang-chou city. In Siam large amounts of tropical 
                                                          
38 Yang, Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu, 27. 
39 Ibidem, 28-31. 
40 Yang, Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu, 32. 
41 VOC 1175, Missive door Volckerius Westerwolt aan de Ed. heer Anthonij van 
Brouckhorst president in Japan, Siam, 4 July 1650, fo. 547v; NFJ 284, Missive in dato 
4en Julij anno 1650 aen ‘d Edle Hr Gouverneur Generael Cornelis vander Lijn ende 
d’E Hrn Raden van India ter rheede voor Siam door Pieter Sterthenius int schip de 
Vrede, Siam, 4 July 1650, fo. 3r. Although it records that the Chinese junks came from 
different areas, some of junks must have come from China itself. 
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merchandise including sapanwood, borijborij unction42, thin, lead, saltpetre, 
Cambodia nuts, black lacquer (namrack), rice, cow hides, buffalo horns, 
rattan, deerskins in various sizes, sugar and pepper were purchased.43 The 
appearance on the scene of these junks threw a spanner in the works of the 
Dutch merchants who were consequently not able to purchase their planned 
quantities of rayskins (rochvellen), buffalo horns, Patani rattan, wax and tin. 
Their records reveal that large-scale purchases by the Chinese pushed prices 
up, even exhausting the supply of some commodities. 44    
In 1646 the VOC had been granted the monopoly on the export of 
deerskins from Siam. 45  Since the Chinese usually fetched their export 
deerskins not from Siam but from Quinam or Cambodia, there had never 
been any real reason to enforce the monopoly right but, just as these ten 
Chinese junks were on the point of departure, the local Dutch merchants 
urged the Siamese officials to do their duty and examine the Chinese junks to 
see whether they had infringed on Dutch privileges. The Siamese officials did 
indeed confiscate 551 pieces of cow hide, but soon after returned all these to 
the Chinese by the order of the Okya Sombatthiban (an official at the Royal 
Treasury).46 The merchant reported to Batavaia:  
                                                          
42 A concoction of coconut and sandelwood oil and crocus.  
43 VOC 1175, Missiven uijt Judia aan de Ed. heer Carel Reniersen gouverneur 
generael ende d'Ed. heeren raden van India door Volckerius Westerwolt, Siam, 13 Oct. 
1650, fo. 530r. 
44 NFJ 284, Missive in dato 4en Julij anno 1650 aen d’Edle Hr Gouverneur Generael 
Cornelis vander Lijn ende d’E Hrn Raden van India ter rheede voor Siam door 
opperhooft Pieter Sterthenius int schip de Vrede, Siam, 4 July 1650, fo.1r. These 
commodities were rayskins, buffalo horns, and Patani rattan. 
45 Smith, George Vinal, The Dutch in Seventeenth-Century Thiland, (Northern Illinois, 
Northern IIlinois University:1977), 60-1. According to Smith, the Company had been 
trying to compete with Chinese merchants in the China trade since 1635, but it had 
been being forced to retreat from the China market (via Taiwan) since 1643.  
46 Smith, The Dutch in Seventeenth-Century Thiland, 180. 
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‘We believe that all this came about because of the gifts the Chinese 
had given him. Despite the privileges granted us by the Siamese king, if the 
Chinese can make a great profit from the cow hides and deerskins and give 
presents to the grandees, these privileges will not be worth the paper they are 
written on. Furthermore, although we were allowed to carry out an 
investigation at Camon Bantenauw, what would happen if they shipped 
illegal deerskins and cow hides from Bantienpia on Pegu vessels? Or after 
they [the ships] had been examined were to pick skins and hides up at Camon 
on some other day as happened this year? We were informed that 
one–quarter of the cargo holds of some junks had been reserved for stowing 
deerskins and cow hides downstream.’47    
Besides the ten Chinese junks which visited Ayutthaya that year, 
another two Chinese junks visited Ligor, where they purchased a huge 
amount of tin. After the Chinese had left, the VOC merchants realized that 
they could not possibly fulfill the order from Batavia because not enough tin 
was left.48 Information gathered in Ayutthaya led the Dutch to believe that 
six Chinese junks were planning to sail directly to Japan from Siam.49 The 
VOC records in Nagasaki of 1650 do indeed show that six junks carrying 
animal skins arrived in Japan, four from Quinam and two Cambodia.50 
Apparently they were the six junks which visited Siam. They had put in at 
                                                          
47 VOC 1175, Missiven uijt Judia aan de Ed. heer Carel Reniersen gouverneur 
generael ende d'Ed. heeren raden van India door Volckerius Westerwolt, Siam, 13 Oct. 
1650, fo. 530r. 
48  VOC 1175, Missiven door den gouverneur Joan Thijssen aen de Ed. heer 
gouverneur generael[Carel Reniersen] ende heeren raaden van India, Malacca, 26 Nov. 
1650, Fo. 385r. 
49 VOC 1175, Missive door Volckerius Westerwolt aan de Ed. heer Anthonij van 
Brouckhorst president in Japan, Siam, 4 July 1650, fo. 547v.  
50 Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 46-7.The Quinam junks arrived on 
13, 20 and 23 August and 2 September 1650. The Cambodia junks arrived on 17 
August and 4 September 1650.  
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Quinam and Cambodia first before heading for Japan.  
The competition between Chinese and Dutch merchants to offer 
tropical commodities on the Japanese market began in real earnest in1649, 
when thirteen Chinese junks from Quinam and Cambodia arrived in Nagasaki 
carrying what were basically the same goods as those the VOC imported 
from Siam.51 The Dutch had also captured two Chinese junks in the Bay of 
Saint Jacques (Vũng Tàu[V.]) near the Mekong estuary in September of 
1649.52 The Chief of the Deshima Factory, Dircq Snoecq, did his best to put 
his finger on the attitude adopted by the Japanese authorities to this action. 
He received the reply from the Nagasaki Governor stating that: 
‘As long as it happened outside Japanese territory, the Dutch can do what 
they think best’ 53 
Snoecq therefore wrote a letter to Governor Overwater in Taiwan asking him 
to fit out some armed junks which could reinforce the patrols in Cambodian 
waters. 54  Most of the Dutch ships sailing along the Siam-Japan or 
Malacca-Japan corridors anchored at Pulo Candor (Côn Sơn Island) to take 
on fresh supplies of food and water. From Pulo Candor they could easily 
mount patrols in the vicinity of St Jacques Bay. Since Quinam and Cambodia 
were still at war with the Dutch at this period and as the routes taken by the 
Chinese junks and the VOC vessels overlapped, the latter frequently captured 
Chinese junks in this bay. 
                                                          
51 NFJ 282, [Missive aan gouverneur generael Cornelis van der Lijn op Batavia]uit 
Japan van Dircq Snoecq int Comptoir Nagasackij, Japan, 29 Oct. 1649, no foliated. 
The head page of this document is missing, but its contents indicate it was a letter sent 
to Batavia. 
52 VOC 1180, Missive uijt Taijouan aen seigneur Jan van Muijden opperhooft van 's 
Comps. negotie in Siam, Taiwan, 30 Sept. 1649, fo. 602r. 
53 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 357. 8 Aug. 1649. 
54 NFJ 282, [Missive aan gouverneur generael Cornelis van der Lijn op Batavia]uit 
Japan van Dircq Snoecq int Comptoir Nagasackij, Japan, 29 Oct. 1649, no foliated.  
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After the six large junks arrived in Nagasaki, the Chinese captains 
realized that there was a good chance that the Dutch might intercept them in 
Cambodian waters in the vicinity of the Mekong estuary on their return 
voyage. In an effort to take precautions before they left Japan in the winter of 
1650, the captains of the four Quinam junks asked the Dutch Chief of 
Deshima, Pieter Sterhemius, to issue them with four passes and Prince’s flags 
(VOC flag). He refused their request but did give them a promise that no 
junks returning to Quinam would be attacked.55 The Chinese merchants also 
appealed to the Nagasaki Governor for protection. The VOC records reveal 
that the petitions of the Chinese captains might even have reached the 
Shogun’s court. 56  The Governor of Taiwan, Nicolaes Verburgh, was 
informed by his colleagues in Japan that the Japanese had announced that ‘no 
more Cambodian junks bound for Japan should be captured or harassed by 
the Dutch.’57              
Six Chinese junks visited Siam in the spring of 1651.58 Once again, 
notwithstanding the Dutch monopoly, the Chinese entered into open 
competition with the Dutch merchants in the purchase of skins and hides. 
Again the VOC factory in Ayutthaya found itself in the awkward position of 
not being able to acquire the planned numbers of rayskins and buffalo 
horns.59 In spite of this bold-faced attempt to trespass on the monopoly, 
Governor-General Carel Reniers in Batavia procrastinated about giving 
orders to commence patrols as he was afraid of upsetting the susceptibilities 
                                                          
55 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 3. 22 Nov. 1650. 
56 Ibidem, 8. 5 Feb. 1651. 
57 VOC 1183, Missive van nicolaes Verburch near Batavia aen gouverneur generael 
Cornelis van der lijn, Taiwan, 20 Dec. 1650, fo. 542r. 
58 VOC 1187, Missiven [aen haer Eds. te Batavia] [door Hendrick Creijers en 
Volckerus Westerwolt], Siam, 20 Oct. 1651, fo. 664v. 
59  NFJ 284, Copie Missive door den E Hendrick Craijers oppercoopman en 
opperhooft des Comptoirs Siam aen de Hr Pieter Sterthenius president in Japan, Siam, 
30 Juni 1651, fo. 51. 
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of the Japanese authorities.60   
Under the protection of the Japanese Bakufu and the Siamese grandees, 
the Chinese merchants succeeded in breaking through the commercial 
barriers built by the VOC. Four Chinese junks visited Siam in 1652 and again 
caused difficulties for the Dutch by not leaving them sufficient quantities of 
cow hides to purchase.61  
In 1653 six Chinese junks visited Siam. Worried about the market in 
deerskins, Director Volckerus Westerwolt in Siam appealed directly to the 
King, insisting that the Siamese government should honour the Dutch 
monopoly on the export of deerskins. He visited the Oya Phrakhlang 
(Minister of Foreign Affairs) several times and informed him that he had seen 
with his own eyes that the Chinese junks did carry away deerskins. The 
Phrakhlang went to appeal to the King, taking with him the royal charter, and 
advised his royal master to allow the Dutch to examine those junks. When the 
six Chinese junks left the capital Ayutthaya and sailed downstream along the 
Chao-phraya River, the Dutch Director and the Phrakhlang immediately 
sought the King’s permission to carry out an examination. However, the King 
always managed to avoid tackling this subject, by announcing that he was not 
in the mood to deal with it.  
On 20 May, the Dutch merchants went to the check point Canon 
Batenauw to see whether the Chinese junks had been detained by the Siamese 
officials. Obviously the Phrakhlang had not taken the Dutch petition 
                                                          
60 NFJ 285, Extract uijt de Generale Missive van ‘d Ed heeren bewinthebberen, ter 
vergaderingh van seventhiene binnen amsterdam aen haer Ed op Batavia geschreven, 
Amsterdam, 14 Oct. 1651, fo. 67. The extract was done by Andries Frisius.  
61  NFJ 285, Copie missive door ‘t opperhooft [Henrick Craijers, Volckerues 
Westerwolt, Jan van Rijck] uijt Siam per deselven Coningh van Poolen en Trouw nae 
Japan gesonden [Letter from Senior Merchants Henrick Craijers, Volcker Westerwolt 
[and] Jan van Rijck Sent to Japan on the Ships the Coningh van Poolen and theTrouw], 
Siam, 3 July 1652, fos. 75-6.  
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seriously because the junks were gone. Aware that this might happen, the 
Dutch merchant Jan van Rijk had sent a written call for help to the VOC 
establishment in Malacca. In response, the Governor of Malacca, Balthazar 
Bort, dispatched the ship Gecroonde Liefde on to Siam after she had 
completed her mission to Ligor. When the ship arrived at the mouth of the 
Chao-phraya River, the five junks were still at anchor off the coast. Seeing 
the Dutch ship drop anchor and lower a sloop, the five junks immediately 
raised anchor and set sail. The Dutch ship was apparently anticipating such a 
manoeuvre and also set sail. She caught up with three of them on the high 
seas about 7 to 8 Dutch miles from the shore on 14 July 1653. After having 
summoned all the anachodas on board, the Dutch sailors examined the junks 
and confiscated 26,366 pieces deerskins from two of them.62     
When they arrived in Japan at the end of July 1653, the Chinese 
merchants lodged a complaint with the Bakufu. 63  Because the Dutch 
confiscation had damaged the investments of some Japanese and Siamese 
courtiers, the Nagasaki Governor demanded the Dutch desist from these 
actions in the interests of all the parties concerned.64 On 10 November, the 
Merchant of Deshima Frederick Coyet was told that:     
 ‘They were not pleased with our account of why we had taken the 
deerskins from the junks which planned to sail hither from Siam. If we had 
the sole right to export deerskins from Siam, we should have stopped the 
purchase there and not harmed the Chinese who had already left that 
kingdom and were out at sea. We could attack the Quinamese, with whom we 
were again at war at will. But they ordered us explicitly not to harm in any 
way the Chinese, our friends, who trade only in these places and supply the 
                                                          
62 VOC 1197, Missiven [aen haer Eds. te Batavia [door den raedt te Siam], Siam, 31 
Oct. 1653, fo. 497r-498v ; The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 108. 20 Aug 
1653; 114. 28 Sept. 1653. 
63 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 105. 27 July 1653.  
64 Ibidem, 112. 21 Sept. 1653. 
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Shogun and his subjects with the silk and calambac they require on their 
voyages here, in compliance with what Ambassador [Andries] Frisius had 
promised when he was in Edo, if we want to continue to be welcome in this 
Empire.’65 
The Nagasaki officials were seriously concerned about this affair. The 
Chinese merchants must have also begged the services of the Japanese 
authorities in an effort to force the Dutch to compensate their losses. Since no 
records about these matters have been preserved, it is possible that the Bakufu 
turned their request down and chose to maintain neutral.  
It seems Coxinga was kept in the dark by his merchants about this 
dispute. Although the suppression of a Chinese peasant revolt had ended in a 
bloody massacre in Taiwan in 1652,66 he offered shelter to some Dutch 
sailors who had survived a shipwreck on the Chinese coast and arranged 
transportation for these survivors to return to either Taiwan or Batavia in that 
same year.67 Towards the end of October 1653, Coxinga and his uncle 
(Cheng Hung-k’uei or Cheng Chih-pao) wrote separate letters to the 
Governor of Taiwan Cornelis Ceasar:   
‘ Containing nothing but compliments and declarations that they 
                                                          
65 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 120. 10 Nov. 1653; VOC 1197, Letter 
from Japan to Taiwan, Japan, 12 Nov. 1653, fo. 820r-v. 
66 A thorough study of this rebellion has been written see: Tonio Andrade, ‘Chapter 8, 
The Only Bees on Formosa That Give Honey’, in id., How Taiwan Became Chinese: 
Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century, (New York, 
Columbia University Press: 2008), http://www.gutenberg-e.org/andrade/print.html; 
Johannes Huber, ‘Chinese Settlers Against the Dutch East India Company: The 
Rebellion led by Kuo Huai-I on Taiwan in 1652’, in Development and Decline of 
Fukien Province in the 17th and 18th Centuries, Eduard. B. Vermeer ed., (Leien: E. J. 
Brill, 1990), 265-96. 
67 Daghregister Batavia, 1653, 1-15. 3 Feb.1653; Johannes Huber, ‘Chinese Settlers 
Against the Dutch East India Company’, 265-96 at 286-7. 
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intended to live in friendship with Company, and that they would like to 
continue their current trade[with Taiwan]. Therefore they had asked the 
merchants to lend a helping hand as far as this was in their power. Coxinga 
had also fitted out ten big junks for trade with Taiwan.’68          
Because he had heard a rumour that a Dutch ship had been wrecked 
near Nan-ao, Governor Cornelis Cesar also wrote a letter to Hung Hsü (alias 
Gampea [D.]) asking for his help. In his letter, he mentions Coxinga’s 
intention expressed in a previous letter: 
‘We are keenly conscious of the contents [of Coxinga’s letter] and are 
most appreciative of the greetings transmitted by both Your Honour and 
Coxinga. We shall also treat all Chinese merchants, especially those 
recommended by Your Highness [Coxinga], with all due courtesy. Your 
Highness should have complete trust in our promises and our reputation.’69 
In other words, although the original letter Coxinga wrote to the 
Governor of Taiwan has not been preserved, it seems that it contained not 
only greetings but also listed the official merchants in Coxinga’s service. The 
VOC administration would therefore have handled them with kid gloves. In 
the following north monsoon season, Coxinga sent a similar letter to Batavia 
and requested Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker conclude an alliance with 
him.70 These letters are express signs that Coxinga had been trying to build 
up a new trading system ever since Iquan had lost his leadership of the 
                                                          
68 VOC 1197, Missive van Cornelis Caesar near Batavia aen Joan maetsuijcker, 
Taiwan, 24 Oct 1653, fo. 803r. 
69 VOC 1207, Brieff aen den mandorijn gampea door den gouverneur Cornelis 
Caesar , 16 Nov. 1653, fo. 546r. 
70 VOC 878, Letter from the Governor-General in Batavia to Cheng Ch’eng-kung, 29 
June 1654, fo. 193-195, re-cited from Johannes Huber, ’Relations between Cheng 
Ch’eng-kung and the Netherlands East India Company in the 1650s’, in Leonard 
Blussé (ed.), Around and About Formosa: Eassys in honor of Professor Ts’ao Yung-ho 
(Taipei: Ts’ao Yung-ho fundation for Culture and Education, 2003), 209-41, at 228-9. 
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An-hai merchants. 
The Politization of Fu-chien Exceptionalism 
On 10 June 1653, Manchu troops who had now been buttressed with 
reinforcements laid siege to Hai-ch’êng in a desperate effort to expel 
Coxinga’s force from the coast. The Manchu troops were led by an ethnic 
Manchu Commander (Gusa or Banner). Their initial tactic was to bombard 
the palisades surrounding all the camps with cannons for a period of one and 
half days before launching a cavalry charge. Coxinga had predicted their 
tactics and had buried landmines to forestall them. His strategic thinking 
made it possible to repel the Manchu assault successfully and he was said to 
have eliminated 30,000 Manchu soldiers in this battle; another 10,000 
soldiers fled away.71 After this momentous battle, the Governor-General of 
Chê-chiang and Fu-chien (Chê-min Tsung-tu[C]),72 Liu Ch’ing-tai , decided 
to re-open negotiations between the Manchu Emperor and Coxinga. 
According to the daily records of the Manchu Court, on 11 October 
1652 Emperor Shun-chih ordered Iquan who was being kept hostage in 
Peking to write a letter to his son and act as mediator in the negotiations. The 
Emperor set four conditions: first, if Coxinga surrendered to the Manchu 
coastal defence troops, he could continue to reside where he was now living; 
second, he would not, like his father, be summoned to Peking; third, he 
would remain in charge of levying the taxes from all trading-junks; fourth, he 
should guarantee to pacify all the pirates in Fu-chien and Kuang-tung coastal 
waters.73 Not until September 1653, almost one year later, did his father’s 
                                                          
71 VOC 1202, Missive van Joan Thijsen tot Malacca aen gouverneur generael Joan 
Maetsuijker, Malacca, 28, Feb 1654, fo. 313r. 
72 Hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles, 534. The same title was translated as 
Supreme Commander in the Ming dynasty, but as Governor-General in the Ch’ing 
dynasty as its functions had changed slightly. 
73 TWYH(ed.), Ch’ing-shih-tsu shih-lu hsüan-chi, 75. 
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servant reach Coxinga with this letter.74 Although the original letter from 
Iquan has not been preserved, there is a record which says that Iquan 
mentioned the Manchu Court would be willing to concede him a prefecture 
(Fu, lower than province but higher than district) as a place of residence.75  
Coxinga sent a reply to his father and began to bargain with the 
Manchus in the same letter. He took the offensive and began with the 
criticism that Iquan’s words did not tally with those of the Emperor in the 
letter which had been delivered under separate cover by the 
Governor-General of Chê-chiang and Fu-chien, Liu Ch’ing-t’ai. Perplexed by 
the discrepancy, he wanted to make sure which place, how large a region and 
how much authority he would be granted by the Manchus. He emphasized 
that ‘the coastal areas had belonged to us originally’ and implied that they 
should not be included in the bargain but were his possession unconditionally. 
He argued that, on the basis of the number of his current troops, he should 
have at least Fu-chou prefecture from which he would enjoy a legal tax 
revenue as his place of residence.76 These negotiations were not confidential, 
because even the Dutch in Taiwan soon heard about them from Chinese 
merchants who visited there frequently. 
‘Lately a rumour has begun to circulate saying that Coxinga, the son of 
Mandarin Iquan, has entered into negotiations to conclude peace with the 
Manchus. And it is said that the great Manchus will offer him authority over 
Fu-chou and Ch’üan-chou prefectures, including all subjugated towns and 
villages.’77        
During the period of negotiations, Coxinga and the Manchu did 
                                                          
74 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 42-4. 
75 Ibidem. 
76 Ibid., 43.  
77 VOC 1197, Missive van Cornelis Caesar near Batavia aen Joan maetsuijcker, 
Taiwan, 24 Oct 1653, fo. 803r. 
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manage to conclude a truce. Coxinga took full advantage of this and 
dispatched his officials to collect taxes from all the subjugated towns and 
villages in the coastal areas of Fu-chien. In October he collected 200,000 
taels of silver from the towns under Ch’üan-chou and in November 50,000 
piculs of rice from the hinterland districts of Chang-chou. In December he 
levied another 300,000 taels of silver from the hinterland of Ch’üan-chou.   
In the meantime, the Ming resistance fighters in Kuang-hsi under 
General Li Ting-kuo pushed their forces eastwards along the coast making 
for Chao-ch’ing in Kuang-tung.78 If Chao-ch’ing was taken, the fall of 
Kuang-chou would be inevitable, so Li Ting-kuo urged Coxinga to dispatch 
troops to strengthen his action. Honouring the truce, Coxinga set this request 
aside.  
After the Shun-chih Emperor had read Coxinga’s reply to his father 
Iquan, he declared that he would not concede any jurisdiction to Coxinga. 
However, he was willing to assign four coastal prefectures, namely: 
Ch’üan-chou, Chang-chou, Ch’ao-chou and Hui-chou, as an area in which 
Coxinga’s troops could reside and from which they would then enjoy the tax 
revenues. In choosing this arrangement, the Ch’ing Court was following in 
the footsteps of the Ming Court in the agreement the latter had reached with 
Iquan in the years 1629-1636. That agreement had acknowledged Iquan’s 
substantial influence and had permitted his troops to be absorbed into the 
coastal defence establishment. It had also sagaciously allowed Iquan a certain 
degree of autonomy to engage in foreign trade. The Grand Co-ordinators had 
been pretty close-lipped about this latter arrangement as it was they who had 
functioned as mediators with Iquan at the provincial level with the consent of 
the Emperor.    
The arrangement which Coxinga had visualized was completely 
                                                          




different from that proposed by the Manchu Emperor and his court. He asked 
that Fu-chou be his city of residence and that he be allowed full jurisdiction 
over the land. His demand shows that he was sticking to the conditions 
agreed between the Emperor Lung-wu and Iquan after 1646. Under the terms 
of that agreement, Iquan was to reside in Fu-chou and have jurisdiction over 
Fu-chien province, including the rights to levy taxes and maintain an army 
and a civil administration. Coxinga had insisted that this legitimate power 
had been granted by the Ming Lung-wu Emperor and therefore he assumed 
that the Manchu Court would accept this 1646 arrangement as a basis for the 
negotiations. On the level of provincial political affairs, there were no 
substantial difference between the two proposed arrangements since they 
were both based on using the foreign trade revenues to maintain the coastal 
defence troops, but they did diverge widely when it came to foreign trade. 
Under the terms of the 1646, arrangement Iquan had both legalized the 
post-1644 Sino-Japan trade and he developed a new tributary system centred 
on Fu-chou in the name of the Ming Lung-wu Emperor, as an instrument to 
resist the pressure of the growing competition presented by the VOC in the 
East and South China Seas. The Manchu Court was apparently well informed 
about the legalization of the Sino-Japanese trade in the post-1645 period, 
because in a letter written to the Shun-chih Emperor by the Provincial 
Administration Commissioner of Fu-chien (Pu-chêng Shih[C.]), Tung 
Kuo-ch’i , in April 1653, the suggestion was made that the Ch’ing Emperor 
should open up the Sino-Japanese trade to the inhabitants of Fu-chou, 
Ch’üan-chou and Chang-chou under the terms of this previous arrangement 
with the Ming court orchestrated by Lung-wu and Iquan.79 They were 
certainly not ignorant of the fact that Iquan had initiated the tributary trade, 
since envoys from Liu-ch’iu (Ryūkyū[J.]) had visited Peking earlier on a 
                                                          
79 TWYH(ed.), Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien, 109. ‘After the new dynasty was 
installed, it was forbidden to go aboard or to trade from the coastal areas… my 
suggestion is to lift this ban and allow all merchants from Fu-chou to Chang-chou to 
trade abroad with legal passes… ’  
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tribute mission.80  
After he had gained control of Amoy, Coxinga tried to revive this 
tributary trade system and establish formal relationships with the rulers 
around East and South China Seas. Although the Chinese sources do not 
mention this attempt of his, the Dutch Factory in Malacca was informed 
about official communications which had taken place between Coxinga and 
various other countries in the region. On 24 February 1654, a Chinese 
wangkang arrived in Malacca which brought news that: 
 ‘ Ambassadors from Siam and Cambodia had arrived[in Amoy]. The 
former carried rice as present and the other brought two elephants as well as 
other valuable curiosities to do honour to Coxinga.'’81 
As mentioned earlier, the letter Coxinga addressed to the Governor of 
Taiwan, Cornelis Ceasar, might offer a clue that his tributary trade had 
reached this stage in the summer of 1653. Certainly, towards the end of the 
spring of 1654 Coxinga dispatched nineteen junks southwards. These 
included eight junks bound for Batavia, seven junks for Siam, two junks for 
Cambodia, one junk for Ligore and one junk for Patani, all of them richly 
laden.82 The number of the junks tallies with the extant Dutch records. 
Therefore this information must be reliable.83 Furthermore, Coxinga also 
                                                          
80 Ts’ai To (comp.), Li-tai pao-an [Tributary Documents Preserved in Liuch’iu], I, 
189. 
81 VOC 1202, Missiven van Joan Thijsen tot Malacca aen gouverneur generael Joan 
Maetsuijker, Malacca, 28 Feb. 1654, fo.313r-v. 
82 Ibidem. 
83 Eight junks did indeed arrive in Batavia, see: VOC 1206, Missive van den 
coopman Volckerius Westerwolt uijt Judea aen den gouverneur generaal Joan 
Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, Siam, 28 Oct. 1654, fo. 2r; also eight junks visited 
Batavia, see: Generale Missive, 7 Nov. 1654, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 364; 
VOC 1202, Missiven van Jacob Nolpe aen de gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker, 
Jambi, 17 Apr. 1654, fo. 378v. It reported two Chinese junks visited Palembang, but it 
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wrote in his letter to Iquan in which he said that:’ The foreign soldiers from 
Japan and Cambodia might arrive in [Amoy] at any moment.’84 This could 
be seen as an expression of his claim that he was operating a substantial 
crown trade as Iquan had done in the tributary system in Lung-wu’s name in 
the post-1647 period. If this surmise is correct, it is an unequivocal indication 
that Coxinga must have to require the highest authority in Fu-chien province 
and exercised command over the coastal defence troops of Chê-chiang, 
Fu-chien and Kuang-tung as well as over the crown trade. Coxinga’s aim was 
to be recognized as ruler of a subordinate kingdom like Korea. In February of 
1654, the Manchu delegates dispatched by the Emperor from Peking arrived 
in Fu-chien province, Coxinga told the delegates personally and publicly that:  
‘His troop numbers were so large that he required the area of several 
provinces to maintain them. Any political arrangement between him and the 
Imperial Court should follow the same pattern as that between the Manchus 
and Korea.’85 
This announcement made no bones about the fact that Coxinga wished 
to preserve all the institutional arrangements which Iquan had been granted 
by the Ming Emperors in the period 1643-1647. The only thing which was 
not explicitly mentioned was that the crown trade (in the form of tributary 
missions) could only exist if Coxinga ruled an independent kingdom.  
When the delegates arrived in Fu-chien, Coxinga’s fleet had already 
sailed north to Chê-chiang coast.86 The true mission of this fleet was to 
penetrate the Chê-chiang coast and suppress the vessels of the Manchu 
coastal defence troops stationed there and escort the trading-junks which 
exported silks to Japan. The Chief of Deshima, Gabriel Happart, noted a 
                                                                                                                             
also pointed out that they were based in Quinam. 
84 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 43. 
85 Ibidem, 48. 
86 Ibid., 48. 
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group of junks carrying silks and news from An-hai which arrived in 
Nagasaki during the same period: 
‘Loads of commodities, including quite a large amount of silks and silk 
goods, were brought in by some junks from An-hai and other places a few 
days ago. They brought the rumour that Coxinga was about to make his 
peace with the Manchus. He will be appointed Mandarin of several harbours 
and part of Kuang-tung province.’87   
This piece of news gathering is also proof that most merchants serving 
under Coxinga had been informed about the conditions agreed in the peace 
negotiations. In the records of one of his contemporaries, Ch’ien Su-t’u, 
Coxinga’s intention is set out unequivocally:  
‘In the year 1654…Coxinga asked that Fu-chien province to be ceded 
to him, a request which was rejected by the Manchu Emperor.’88 
The delegates transmitted Coxinga’s conditions to the Shun-chih 
Emperor who repudiated them and proceeded to initiate negotiations in a 
slightly revised version of the original one. In September 1654 another group 
of delegates, including Coxinga’s youngest brother who was living with 
Iquan in Peking, arrived. Since the Manchu delegates had no intention of 
entering into any bargains, the gap between both sides grew so wide as to be 
irreconcilable. Coxinga was confident about maintaining his independent 
financial source from foreign trade and persisted in his demand that the 
Manchu Emperor would eventually have to conclude a peace treaty with him 
because the Manchu Grand Co-ordinators would not be able to find any other 
source of wages more stable than those which he had at his disposal.  
                                                          
87 NFJ 286, Missive van Gabriel Happart naer Taijouan aen de Ed. Heer gouverneur 
Cornelis Caesar, Japan, 12 May 1654, fo. 57. The news about the negotiations had 
been spread in Japan; The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 150. 25 Apr. 1654. 
The above news should have arrived in Japan around April 1654.  
88 Sung, Tsun-jang lüeh, 207. 
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In 1567 the Ming Court had allowed its subjects in Fu-chien to pursue 
foreign trade, as it recognized the need to create a stable revenue with which 
to support the coastal defence troops and their vessels. This privileged trading 
system created Fu-chien exceptionalism, setting it apart from all the other 
coastal provinces. As a mercenary, after 1636, Iquan had manipulated politics 
and personal relationships to create a niche through which his private troops 
could be granted official status as coastal defence troops and continue to be 
supported by foreign trade. The original status of economic exceptionalism 
now began to take the shape a political shell. After 1646, by dint of 
developing the crown trade model under the tributary system in Lung-wu’s 
name, Iquan gave Fu-chien exceptionalism its political form. As his successor, 
his son Coxinga wanted to preserve this exceptional political status of 
Fu-chien province with at least the toleration, if not the approval, of the 
Manchu Court. He never actually planned to contest the central power of the 
Manchu Court over China although he publicly claimed this to be his 
ultimate goal. In reality, all he wanted was to hold on to his own power in 
Fu-chien and be acknowledged by the Manchu Court. In short, his ultimate 
goal was to see Fu-chien exceptionalism be accepted in its political form. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
THE PASSIONS OF 
A MERCHANT PRINCE 
1655-1662 
Challenging all limitations, 1654-1656 
At the beginning of 1650s, firmly in command of his newly recruited private 
soldiers and by exploiting the rich Taiwan trade Coxinga managed to 
supplant the Macao trade where was under Manchu siege. His unremitting 
exertions also enable him to incorporate the Ming garrison in Amoy into his 
private army. By choosing the Ming Yung-li Emperor as the symbol to 
legitimate his local leadership, he ensured the consolidation of his combined 
army corps by throwing it into several battles against the Manchus in the 
Chang-chou region in 1652 and 1653. By the time the Manchu Emperor 
Shun-chih sent delegates to negotiate with him, his status as the leader of the 
An-hai merchants and Amoy troops was already uncontested. On the other 
hand, change of the Chinese foreign trade was already on the horizon because 
the Ming resistance in Chê-chiang collapsed in 1651 and Kuang-chou 
(Canton) and Macao were besieged by the Manchus. Hence, when the bans 
on foreign trade were implemented along most of the Manchu coast, Amoy 
was left as the only active overseas trading port and consequently the 
overseas silk export was concentrated there.   




Exported from Coxinga’s 
areas (catty)* 
percentage 
1651 66,717 5,950  
(An-hai+ Chang-chou ) 
8% 





















Source:* Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran,336-7;48-50;52-8;58-61. The total 
amount is cited directly from the report in the VOC account. The numbers for the separates areas 
are the sums of the single inventories of each junk, but do not cover every junk arriving in Japan. 
Therefore, the amounts from the different areas are the lower estimates. The raw silk and white 
silk in the different inventories are all counted as raw silk. 
The largest shift in the export-volume happened in 1652, when 
Coxinga and the Manchus were engaged in fighting in the vicinity of 
Chang-chou and Hai-ch’êng. The proximity of these battlefields distracted 
the Manchu troops from supervising the main overland trading route which 
led from An-hai to Fu-chou. Freed from this burden, An-hai merchants armed 
with the passes issued by Iquan in Fu-chou continued to enjoy free access to 
raw silk and silk goods throughout an area reaching as far as Nanking 
(including all of the Chiang-nan region, the prime production site of silk in 
China).1 When the terms of the truce came into force after September 1653, 
the An-hai merchants stepped up their activities and Coxinga’s tax collectors 
scattered all over the coastal areas, covering all the districts and villages in 
the Chang-chou, Ch’üan-chou, and Hsing-hua prefectures. Limited garrisons 
of Manchu soldiers closed themselves up behind the walls of the main cities 
so Coxinga’s officials could post placards wherever they arrived and 
                                                          
1 NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Japan aen den E. Leonard 
Winninx, opperhooft over des Compagnies ommeslagh in Japan, ende den raat aldaar, 
Taiwan, 3 Aug. 1655, fo. 1; Dagregisters Zeelandia, III 1648-1655, 526. 28 June 
1655.  
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harvested rice from the fields as tax in kind. 2  In this fashion, the 
Sino-Japanese silk trade fell like a ripe plum into the hands of the An-hai 
merchants, as the table shows.   
Frustrated and dissatisfied, the Manchu delegates left An-hai on 3 
November 1654. 3  Coxinga steadfastly refused to give the Shun-chih 
Emperor any official reply but did write to his father Iquan and had the letter 
delivered in Peking by his private servant. His message was passed on to the 
Shun-chih Emperor by Iquan on 22 December. Five days later, the Emperor 
and his Court concluded that the empire should no longer permit Coxinga’s 
merchants to range any more of the coast, but this is as far as he went.4 He 
had not yet devised any further plan for a new campaign. 
In the south, Coxinga did his best to continue carry out the usual 
rice-collecting operations and to keep the rice trade going in the Ch’ao-chou 
area. He sent his troops into the Ch’ao-chou region as the Cheng clan used to 
do in the 1630s and, on 30 November 1654, dispatched troops overland to the 
Chieh-yang and Ch’ao-yang regions to purchase or levy rice.5 These troops 
ran the risk of naval attacks because a local fleet of 150 junks which had 
surrendered to the Manchus was actively carrying out operations in the area. 
The fleet was under the command of Su Li (Soulacq[D.]) who resided in 
                                                          
2 Chi-êrh ka-lang, ‘Chi-êrh ka-lang têng-t’i wei chêng-ch’êng-kung fu-tzu shu-shên 
lai-wang shih-pên[Report Written by Chi-êrh ka-lang about the Correspondence 
between Chêng Chih-lung and Cheng Ch’eng-kung], 26 Dec. 1654’, in CKTI (ed.), 
Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien, TWH, I no 6, 
82-84.  
3 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 67. 
4 TWYH(ed.), Ch’ing-shih-tsu shih-lu hsüan-chi, 102-4. 
5 Li Ch’i-fêng, ‘Li-ch’i-fêng t’i wei chêng-chün chin-ju ch’ao-hui shu-i chêng-liang 
shih-pên [Letter Written by Li Ch’i-fêng Reporting that the Cheng Army Had Levied 
Rice from Ch’ao-chou and Hui-chou] 27 Jan 1655’, in CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u 
chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien, TWH, I No. 6, 94-5.  
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Chieh-shih.6 This Su Li had originally been the leader of an independent, 
native group which had organized itself in the wake of the collapse of the 
Ming administration. The Dutch sources report: 
‘ … He used to be a friend of both the Manchus and of Coxinga, but recently 
he has surrendered to the Manchus.’ 7  
The Chinese sources state: 
‘Su Li is from a family with its roots in Chieh-shih. His soldiers or 
self-defence corps are all natives and most of them have private junks at their 
disposal. They earn their their livelihood by fishing and exporting salt’8 
After the Manchu troops had invaded Kuang-chou city in 1651 and 
expelled the defeated Ming troops to Hai-nan Island, Su Li put his junks at 
the disposal of the Manchus.9 In May of 1654, the Kuang-tung Manchu 
authorities submitted a petition to the Shun-chih Emperor, asking permission 
to recruit Su Li’s people to act as coastal defence troops on their own turf.10 
After their formal submission, they were expected to remain in their home 
harbours and earn their living as usual, unless ‘the situation should require 
otherwise’. 11  The Manchu Court would grant them some autonomy in 
exchange for their naval assistance in fending off Coxinga’s irruptions into 
Kuang-tung.  
Chieh-shih is located on the coast of Hui-chou near T’ien-wei-yang 
where Coxinga’s father Iquan had once defeated his Kuang-tung foe, the 
notorious pirate Liu Hsiang in 1633. This body of water is part of the 
                                                          
6 Dagregisters Zeelandia, III 1648-1655, 526. 27 June 1655. 
7 VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den 
gouverneur generael Joan maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 323r. 
8 TWYH(ed), Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien, 230.  
9 Ibidem, 251.  
10 Ibid., 230. 
11 Ibidem. 
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sea-route from Macao to Japan and from Hai-nan to Amoy and represented a 
focal point for Coxinga’s trade network with Kuang-chou and the ‘Western 
Ocean’ (Southeast Asia). As he wished to gauge the strength of Su Li’s fleet, 
Coxinga dispatched 100 war-junks under Naval Commander Lin Ch’a to 
patrol the coastal waters and blockade Su Li’s force. Lin Cha’s fleet left 
Amoy sometime around the first day of 1655 and arrived in T’ien-wen-yang 
waters around 12 January 1655.12  
In the meantime, Chang-chou city had surrendered to Coxinga on 10 
December 165413 and the surronding districts and villages soon followed suit. 
Coxinga now directed his troops towards Ch’üan-chou prefecture and laid 
siege to the cities of Ch’üan-chou and Hsing-hua on 17 January 1655.14 His 
strategy meant that the Manchu troops still occupying towns in southern 
Fu-chien were confined to several isolated spots, a situation which allowed 
Coxinga’s merchants to go about their business freely. 
In March 1655, Coxinga reached the conclusion that the Manchu Court 
in Peking would not respond to his political proposals if he did not make any 
military threats. He therefore decided to establish a well-organized cabinet 
around himself, moulding it into the form of the Ming Court.15 The tax 
revenues he levied from all the subjected areas proved extremely rich: 
1,080,000 taels from Chang-chou city and its six districts and 750,000 taels 
from the seven Districts in Ch’üan-chou prefecture.16 He might have used 
                                                          
12 Li Ch’i-fêng, ‘Li-ch’i-fêng t’i wei chêng-chün chin-ju ch’ao-hui shu-i chêng-liang 
shih-pên’, 94; 97.; Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 68. 
13 Yang, Ts'ung-chêng shih-lu, 71.  
14  T’ung kuo-ch’i, ‘T'ung kuo-ch’i t’i-ch’ing su-fa man-shih i-chieh hsing-hua 
ch’üan-chou chih-wei shih-pên [Letter from T’ung kuo-ch’i Requesting the Emperor 
to Dispatch Manchu Troops to Rescure Hsing-hua and Ch’üan-chou Prefectures] 27 
Jan. 1655’, in CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an 
i-pien, TWH, I no. 6, 92. 
15 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 85. 
16 Ibidem, 72; 73.; Chi-êrh ka-lang, ‘Chi-êrh ka-lang têng t’i-wei ch’ing-fa ta-ping 
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part of this revenue to equip the twenty-five junks which sailed southwards 
during the northern monsoon season that year: eight to Batavia, two to 
Tonkin, ten to Siam, four to Quinam and one to Manila.17  
These richly laden trading-junks had to sail past T’ien-wei-yang where 
Su Li’s naval force was on the look out for them. Indeed he might have 
attempted to intercept them, but the flotilla commanded by Lin Ch’a 
successfully warded off the attacks. This is what the Dutch sources reported: 
‘There is a certain Chinese pirate named Su Li (Soulack), a mandarin 
from Hai-nan, who is a friend of the Manchus. He has been commanding a 
large number of war-junks which have been plundering the coastal areas for 
quite some time. They were met by the above-mentioned Admiral [Lin Ch’a] 
who was assigned by Coxinga to deal with them off south Nan-ao. After 
heavy fighting and the loss of forty junks,[Su Li] was chased away and is 
believed to have been swept from the sea. This news gladdens the hearts of 
                                                                                                                             
shou-fu chang-ch’üan shih-ti shih-pên [Letter from Chi-êrh ka-lang Requesting the 
Emperor to Dispatch Troops to Retake Chang-chou and Ch’üan-chou Prefectures]6 
Mar. 1655’, in CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an 
i-pien, TWH,I no 6, 114; Li-chi,‘ Li-chi t’i-wei hsing-hua chang-chou ch’üan-chou 
san-fu shu-hsien shih-shou ch'ing-hsing shih-pên [Report Written by Li-chi about 
How the Areas Surrounding Hsing-hua, Chang-chou, Ch’üan-chou Prefectures ost] 2 
Aug. 1655’, in CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an 
i-pien, TWH, I, no 6, 181-6. 
17 Dagregisters Zeelandia, III 1648-1655, 466. 9 Mar. 1655. VOC 1209, Missiven 
aen Joan Maetsuijker gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijcker] door Joan Thijssen en 
raad, Malacca, 15 Mar. 1655, fo. 220v. The former source reported seven junks bound 
for Batavia, the latter sources reported eight. It was confirmed by Governor-General’s 
letter to Coxinga: VOC 869, Letter from Governor-General Maetsuijcker and 
Councillors of India to Cheng Ch’eng-kung, Batavia, 17 Jun. 1655, fo. 296-298; 
re-cited from Johannes Huber, ‘Relations between Cheng Ch’eng-kung and the 
Netherlands East India Company in the 1650s’, in Leonard Blussé (ed.), Around and 
About Formosa: Eassys in honor of Professor Ts’ao Yung-ho (Taipei: Ts’ao Yung-ho 
Fundation for Culture and Education, 2003), 209-41, at 232-3. 
THE PASSIONS 1655-1662 
 302 
the maritime merchants, because this pirate used to endanger the sea-route 
and played havoc with the merchants.’18  
More or less around the same time, the Manchus gradually managed to 
close the trading route from both Ch’üan-chou and An-hai to Fu-chou again. 
Their move meant that the maritime trading route used to fetch raw silks in 
Chê-chiang (and farther away in Nanking) was also cut off.   
‘…because all routes in China were barred by Manchus, no more 
goods could be sent to Fu-chou by Coxinga’s merchants in An-hai and 
Ch’üan-chou. The moment any of his merchants appeared in areas where the 
Manchus were in control, all their goods were confiscated… This situation 
has lasted eight to ten months [since August of 1654].’19 
Although the An-hai and Ch’üan-chou merchants had already ceased 
purchasing silk because of the rising tension, they were still able to ship 
131,600 catties of raw silk on twenty-one junks (the majority belonging to 
Coxinga) to Nagasaki between January and March, even though they had to 
sail against the north monsoon.20 Because this was an abnormally large 
amount of silk, the Japanese merchants were reluctant to pay the set pancado 
price. This was afixed price decided upon according to the amounts of silk 
imported during the past south monsoon season until 28 September 1654, but 
the unexpectedly large quantity of newly arrived silk in the spring of 1655 
would have depressed the market price of later domestic distribution. The 
twenty-one junks were held in Nagasaki Harbour by the Governor of 
                                                          
18 Dagregisters Zeelandia, III 1648-1655, 514. 5 June 1655.  
19 NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Japan aen den E. Leonard 
Winninx, opperhooft over des Compagnies ommeslagh in Japan, ende den raat aldaar, 
Taiwan, 3 Aug. 1655, fo. 1. Less detail records see: Dagregisters Zeelandia, III 
1648-1655, 526. 28 June 1655. 
20  NFJ 287, Missive vant Comptoir Nagasackij [Leonard Winnex] aen 
haer[ gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker ] tot Batavia per de schepen Arnmuijden, 
Vlielandt en Zoutelande over Taijouan gesonden, Japan, 19 Oct. 1655, fo. 20. 
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Nagasaki until the Shogunal Court had had time to permit the Japanese 
merchants to lower the price at the end of May 1655.21 Coxinga received 
news of this price crack-down from a returning junk about June 1655. He 
considered that he had been hardly done by by the Shogunal Court and was 
soon claiming that, as a counter action, he would forbid any Chinese junk to 
carry to Japan ‘a single thread of white raw silk on penalty of death’ in the 
following southern monsoon season.22 As the main trading route between 
Fu-chien and the silk-production areas in Chiang-nan had been cut off by the 
Manchus, this order meant that all he had to do was to exclude other silk 
exporters from elbowing in on the silk Japanese business. Hence, this was the 
first time Coxinga imposed an embargo as a measure to maintain his 
monopoly on this export commodity. The amount of raw silk exported was 
indeed sharply reduced, but the An-hai and Ch’üan-chou junks were not 
strictly forbidden to carry it.      
The siege of Ch'üan-chou was lifted at the end of March.23 Meanwhile 
the Manchu Court had given orders to unite the troops stationed in 
Chê-chiang province and Nanking and dispatch them to Fu-chou to prevent 
any further incursions by Coxinga. The main body of the troops arrived on 21 
May 1655.24 According to a contemporary Chinese source, at this juncture 
the total number of soldiers under Coxinga’s command amounted to 100,000 
men.25 The Dutch sources report that 40,000 to 50,000 Manchu soldiers and 
                                                          
21 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 209. 22 May 1655; 214, 9 July 1655.  
22 Ibidem, 214. 9 July 1655. 
23  Li-chi,‘ Li-chi t'i-wei hsing-hua chang-chou ch’üan-chou san-fu shu-hsien 
shih-shou ch'ing-hsing shih-pên 2 Aug. 1655’, 184. 
24 T’ung kuo-ch’i, ‘ T’ung-kuo-ch’i t’i-wei chêng-chün kung-ta lung-yen hui-ch'ü 
chang-p’ing ning-yang shih-pên [Letter Written by T’ung-kuo-ch’i Reporting that 
Cheng’s Force Had Made a Fresh Attack on Lung-yen and Attempted to Capture 
Chang-p’ing and Ning-yang Counties] 25 May 1655’, in CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u 
chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien, TWH, I, no 6, 146. 
25  Li-chi,‘ Li-chi t’i-wei hsing-hua chang-chou ch’üan-chou san-fu shu-hsien 
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another 20,000 cavalry men were dispatched to Fu-chou in June 1655.26 
Because of the onerous cost of financing this ongoing war, Coxinga must 
have hoped that the twenty-two junks due to return from Japan in the spring 
of 1655 could relieve his financial burden somewhat. As he had to give 
matters some serious thought in an attempt to allocate his resources more 
efficiently, Coxinga decided not to spend money on the strengthening the 
fortifications of the inland cities in Chang-chou and Ch’üan-chou prefectures 
but directed his troops to focus on more rewarding goals. He demolished the 
small forts around the shores of An-hai Bay, including the An-hai, 
T’ung-an(Thota[D.]) and An-hsi ( Lamsing[D.]) Forts.27 He used the bricks 
and stone from the demolished structures to build a new castle named 
‘Ping-chou’ to be used as a bridgehead in the Wei-tou Bay (Erasmus Bay), on 
the opposite shore from Quemoy, to protect Pai-sha (Peswaa[D.]) Harbour 
where most of Coxinga’s uncle’s (Cheng Hung-k’uei) trading-junks were 
anchored.28 He also demolished Kao-p’u Fort on the shore opposite Amoy, 
using its materials to rebuild three redoubts around Amoy to block the 
advancing Manchu troops.29 While all this construction work was going on, 
all the rice and paddy within a radius of 50 kilometres of Amoy was collected 
and stockpiled in Amoy and in Hai-ch’êng Fort.30 To ensure that Hai-ch’êng 
                                                                                                                             
shih-shou ch’ing-hsing shih-pên 2 Aug. 1655’, 182. 
26 Dagregisters Zeelandia, III 1648-1655, 526. 28 June 1655. 
27 Ibidem, 517. 15 June 1655; T’ung Tai, ‘ T'ung-tai t’i-wei chêng-chün ch’ai-hui 
yung-ch’un-ch'êng chun-pei t’ui-shou shih-pên [Report Written by T’ung Tai relating 
How the Cheng Forces Demolished Yung-ch’un Fort and Prepared to Withdraw] 30 
May 1655’ in CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an 
i-pien, TWH, I no. 6, 150. 
28 NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Japan aen den E. Leonard 
Winninx, opperhooft over des Compagnies ommeslagh in Japan, ende den raat aldaar, 
Taiwan, 3 Aug. 1655, fo. 2. 
29 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 53-4. 
30 VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den 
gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fos. 290v-291r. 
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Fort was a part of an extensive defence scheme, Coxinga constructed a line of 
defence which encircled Amoy Bay and included the islands of Amoy and 
Quemoy. This would give him control of all the shores on which the 
Manchus might land. Later he ordered the walls of Chang-chou city be torn 
down, so that the Manchus troops would have no walls within which to 
establish an army camp.31 He used the bricks and stones from the walls to 
enlarge the walls of Hai-ch’êng .32   
Just as Coxinga was spending all his captial on relocating and 
fortifying his strongholds, he had to swallow another disappointment, the 
silver from the Sino-Manila trade fell short of expectations. This trade had 
been an important source of income for An-hai merchants during the 1630s, 
but the Sino-Manila trade had increasingly been hampered by the Dutch since 
1642. The truce concluded between the Dutch and the Portuguese gave the 
Dutch a free hand to attack Spanish Manila and, in the course of their 
prosecution of their old enemy the Dutch also attacked Iquan’s Manila-bound 
junks in an effort to try to force him to sign the contract which would give the 
Taiwan factory the sole right to engage in the Sino-Japan silk trade. Although 
the An-hai merchants stubbornly continued to sail to Manila between 1644 
and1648, the Dutch continued to threaten them from time to time. However, 
after Spain concluded the Treaty of Westphalia with the Dutch Republic in 
1648, the legal basis for patrolling against Chinese junks trading with the 
enemy was vitiated.    
 
Table 11-2. Number of Chinese junks visiting Manila 
                                                          
31 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 89；VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis 
Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 
1655, fos. 288v-289r; NFJ 287, Missive van Pieter de Goyer en Jacob Keijser naer 
Taijouan aen den Ed. Heer gouverneur Cornelis Caesar, Canton, 4 Dec. 1655, fo. 50. 
32 TWYH(ed.), Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien, 517. 
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Source: Chaunu, Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques(XVIe,XVIIe,XVIIIe siécles ),148-60. 
There are no reliable statistics available about the quantities of silver 
carried away from Manila on Chinese junks but the customs records of 
Manila do give some impression.  
Table 11-3. The tax revenues of silver imports and Chinese commodities 
imports 
Year Tax revenue from the 
silver imports 
(rial) 
Tax revenue from 
the Chinese commodities 
(rial) 
1631-1635 6,321 22,673.2 
1636-1640 2,551.8 23,831.8 
1641-1645 2,464.2 12,249.4 
1646-1650 2,857 9,991 
1651-1655 1,488.6 4,905 
1656-1660 2,553.8 2,786.2 
Source: Chaunu, Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Iberiques(XVIe,XVIIe,XVIIIe siécles ), 
200-219. 
As the table shows, the amounts of silver shipped to Manila from 
Acapulco were low in the first half of the 1650s, exacerbating the 
unsatisfactory economic situation caused by the fact imports of Chinese 
commodities had already been declining since the last half of the 1640s. In 
short, the supply of silver which had been abundant during 1646-1650 and 
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became tighter during 1651-1655. Between 1651 and 1653 a scarcity of silver 
occurred because, as Dutch records show, no silver galleons visited Manila 
during these three years.33 The situation improved in the spring of 1654 
when two silver galleons finally arrived. The Sino-Manila trade should have 
picked up but no Acapulco galleon appeared again in 1655.34 Of the three 
junks which visited Manila in 1655, at least one belonged to Coxinga. Given 
the shortage of silver, the return cargo must have fallen below Coxinga’s 
expectations.  
In the middle of July 1655 angry Coxinga placed a strict embargo on 
the Manila trade, just as he had done earlier against Japan. He accused the 
Spanish merchants of postponing payment or paying only half the price the 
commodities shipped were worth. He argued that having had to endured such 
ill-treatment for several years in a row, the Chinese merchants were fed up 
and no longer prepared to accept it lying down.35 Pertinently, the key issue in 
his accusation was the not ill-treatment meted out to the merchants but the 
disappointing amount of the payment in silver. Coxinga also pleaded for 
assistance from the Dutch Governor in Taiwan, Cornelis Caesar, hoping that 
he would also proclaim his edict to Chinese subjects living on Dutch soil.36 
Coxinga’s request reveals the essence of his embargo. The crucial point was 
not to take revenge on Manila but to state his ultimate authority over any 
Chinese maritime merchants who might decide to engage in this trade in 
some way or another. Another possibility is that the embargo was issued in a 
                                                          
33 Generale Missiven, II 1639-1655, 704. 19 Jan. 1654. 
34 VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den 
gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 317r. 
35 Dagregisters Zeelandia, III 1648-1655, 557-8. 17 Aug. 1655; VOC 1213, Letter 
from Cheng Ch’eng-kung to Governor Caesar in Taiwan, July 1655, fo. 554-5, 
re-cited from Johannes Huber, ’Relations between Cheng Ch’eng-kung and the 
Netherlands East India Company in the 1650s’, in Leonard Blussé (ed.), Around and 
About Formosa, 209-41, at 233-5.  
36 Dagregisters Zeelandia, III:1648-1655, 557-8. 17 Aug. 1655.  
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desperate move to conceal the real problem which was that Coxinga was no 
longer able to acquire the supplies of silk he needed. 
While arranging the supply of provisions for his newly established 
administration and his troops, Coxinga ordered his army of 30,000 soldiers to 
march slowly through the fields between Chang-chou and Ch’ao-chou and 
levy rice to supplement the food supply and perhaps also some sugar for the 
Japanese market. 37  Since the overland silk route was blocked by the 
Manchus in Fu-chou, he dispatched a fleet with 30,000 solders northwards to 
the coast of Chê-chiang, bypassing Fu-chou, so that purchases of silks could 
be made direct from the Nanking area.38  
While preparing the essential trading commodities for this fleet, 
Coxinga had to bear in mind that he would need to provide silver bullion and 
such tropical goods as pepper and sandalwood. These commodities could be 
purchased from a fairly wide range of places: Japan, Taiwan, Batavia, 
Quinam, Cambodia and Siam. Most pepper came from the more southerly 
places, more particularly from the western part of Sumatra, where it was 
cultivated. Since the Dutch had occupied Malacca in 1642 and had gradually 
extended their domination over the pepper-producing areas, Coxinga had no 
                                                          
37 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 89; VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis 
Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 
1655, fo. 291r; Dagregisters Zeelandia, III 1648-1655, 561. 22 Aug. 1655. The rice 
shortage might have been a particularly curial reason. Cf. The Deshima dagregisters, 
XII 1650-1660, 214. 9 July 1655. ‘…rice was being sold for 15 rixdollars a picul on 
account of the shortage.’  
38 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 90. VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis 
Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 
1655, fo. 291r; Dagregisters Zeelandia, III 1648-1655, 561. Although the Dutch 
sources record there were 300,000 soldiers in total under Coxinga, this does not tally 
with the Chinese records, which say that twelve camps of soldiers participated in both 
actions. Since each camp housed about 2,500 soldiers, 30,000 soldiers would be a 
more appropriate estimate.  
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choice but to consult with the VOC if he were to obtain a lower price for it. 
The anachodas of the eight junks dispatched to Batavia from Amoy in the 
name of their lord, Coxinga, submitted a petition to the High Government in 
Batavia on 23 April 1655, in which they asked for a lower purchase price for 
pepper and lead. They were granted a one rial discount per picul of pepper or 
seven rials per picul, by the High Government. The Batavian authorities had 
hoped that offering this discount price would attract Amoy merchants to 
Batavia rather than having them deal directly with the Pepper Coast.39 
Compared to the pepper sold in Taiwan (which was 13.5 to 14 rials per picul), 
this was almost almost half the price,40 but it was still almost twice as 
expensive compared with the 4 rial pepper price in Jambi (on the Pepper 
Coast).41 Thanks to its contracts with the ruler of Palembang, the VOC itself 
could purchase pepper at the low price of 2.5 rials per picul, which allowed it 
to make a 440 per cent profit in Taiwan.42   
Apart from his sparring partners the Dutch, Coxinga also regarded the 
Macaonese merchants as rivals in Pepper- trade. Although the Portuguese had 
lost Malacca to the Dutch, Macao still managed to keep connections with the 
trading networks on the Pepper Coast. A small wankang visited Jambi in 
February 1654, carrying Japanese, Portuguese mestizo and Chinese 
merchants from Macao. To exchange for the pepper, they brought 
double-sided satins, Chinese gold thread, porcelain, iron pans and 
earthenware. The rumour spread that four more Macao vessels which had 
obviously also come with the idea of purchasing pepper were anchored at 
                                                          
39 VOC 677, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maesuijcker ende raden, Batavia, 
23 Apr. 1655, not foliated. 
40 VOC 1206, Missiven door den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar en raedt uijt Taijouan 
aen den gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, Taiwan, 19 Nov. 
1654, fo. 201. 
41 VOC 1209, Missiven aen gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker en raden van India 
door Jacob Nolpe, Jambi, 23 Feb. 1655, fo. 288v. 
42 Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 17. 24 Dec. 1655.  
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Palembang.43  
This was also the point in time at which Coxinga was harbouring 
dreams of expanding his ‘crown’ trade. At more or less the same moment as 
the Macao vessels were visiting Palembang a wankang from Amoy was 
arriving in Malacca. She carried similar commodities: 34,000 pieces of 
coarse porcelain, 50 picul of copper, 810 large and small iron pans, umbrellas, 
Chinese gold thread, radix China, raw silk and 24 catties of colourful satins, 
3,000 pieces of cotton cloth and so on.44 It is possible that Coxinga’s junks 
also visited Palembang that year. In April 1654, one big junk and a small 
wankang visited Palembang to trade pepper and cotton. It was said that they 
were from Cochin-China. One Chinese resident of Palembang even planned 
to send pepper to China on this wankang. Later in her voyage, its crew 
intended to visit Jambi, where the local ruler had given them permission to 
trade in the past.45   
When the wankang put in to Malacca, its anachoda claimed he carried 
a pass issued in 1652 by the Dutch merchant in Jambi who had invited the 
Chinese merchants to return to Malacca in the future.46 After protracted 
negotiations, the Governor of Malacca allowed them to trade. They sold most 
of their cargoes and purchased pepper at the price of 8 rials per picul on 
condition that they would not return again.47 It was said most of the return 
                                                          
43 VOC 1209, Missiven aen gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker en raden van India 
door Jacob Nolpe, Jambi, 21 Feb. 1654, fo. 286v. 
44 VOC 1202, Missiven van Joan Thijsen tot Malacca aen gouverneur generael Joan 
Maetsuijker, Malacca, 28 Feb. 1654, fo. 312v. 
45  VOC 1202, Missiven van Jacob Nolpe aen de gouverneur generael Joan 
Maetsuijker, Jambi, 17 Apr. 1654, fo. 378v. 
46 VOC 1202, Missiven van Joan Thijsen tot Malacca aen gouverneur generael Joan 
Maetsuijker, Malacca, 28 Feb. 1654, fo. 312v. It is said he departed from Hai-nam 
(Aijnam). Perhaps the junk set course to Malacca at Hai-nan, but had actually begun 
their voyages in Amoy. 
47 Generale Missiven, II 1639-1655, 753. 7 Nov. 1654. 
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cargo consisted of rattan.48 
Coxinga’s desire to purchase pepper at a lower price strengthened 
perceptibly in 1655. Besides the eight junks which visited Batavia, the Amoy 
wankang which had visited Malacca the previous year returned again on 20 
February 1655. It brought two letters from Coxinga and his ‘uncle’, Hung 
Hsü (signed ‘Chung-chên[C] Kingingh[D]’ his honorific title ) respectively. 
In his letter Honshu questioned the  regulations the Dutch had imposed on 
trade:  
‘What is the motivation behind the Dutch forbidding their [ junks]to 
trade in Malacca? Malacca does not differ from Taiwan and Batavia with 
which we have always maintained neighbourly relations and a 
correspondence. People who have sent innumerable junks to trade there 
could not understand why he [Hung hsü] had been treated so peculiarly. He 
could not see any reason people should consider it beneficial to exclude his 
vessels from there. He also mentioned that Coxinga had written a letter to 
Batavia, to apologize about sending this wankang to Malacca again, asking 
[the Dutch] not to impound it. He had sent this junk because he [Coxinga] 
needed to obtain some rattan to make shields for his soldiers.’49  
The Dutch Governor eventually allowed this wankang to return to 
Amoy on 12 July 1655, on condition next time she should sail to Batavia 
instead. She carried away 650 piculs of pepper sold at 8 rials per picul and 
some rattan.50  
                                                          
48 VOC 1202, Missiven van Joan Thijsen tot Malacca aen gouverneur generael Joan 
Maetsuijker, Malacca, 10 Sept. 1654, fo. 341v. 
49  VOC 1209, Missiven aen Joan Maetsuijker gouverneur generael door Joan 
Thijssen en raad, Malacca, 15 Mar. 1655, fos. 220r-v. Hung Hsü is not a member of 
Coxinga’s family, but considering his age and relationship with Coxinga, it is no 
exaggeration to introduce him in this way.   
50  VOC 1209, Missiven aen Joan Maetsuijker gouverneur generael door Joan 
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As the eight Chinese junks were on the point of leaving the roadstead 
of Batavia on 17 June 1655, Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker wrote a 
letter in reply to Coxinga’s request for cheaper pepper in both Batavia and 
Malacca. In this letter he expresses his position in no uncertain terms, 
stipulating that no Chinese vessel would be allowed to trade in either 
Malacca or Palembang. He insisted that Coxinga’s junks should trade only in 
Taiwan and Batavia. Joan Maetsuijker believed that the Chinese merchants 
‘…would not find another place where they could earn more profit or be 
treated better’.51 He refused to make any concession on the pepper trade with 
Coxinga, despite the fact that he was an ally and good neighbour of the 
Dutch.          
Joan Maetsuijker did not confine himself to a verbal statement, he took 
action on the matter. In July 1655, VOC Merchant Antony Boey took a big 
junk to Batavia with him on his return trip from Palembang.52 Discovering 
three Chinese junks loaded with 1,900 piculs pepper and 400 piculs of cotton 
in the roadstead, Boey urged the Pangeran of Palembang to impound these 
junks, citing as his legal basis the contract concluded between Palembang and 
the VOC. Boey insisted that because the junks had come from Quinam which 
was currently in war with the Dutch, as a loyal ally of the Dutch the 
Pangeran should impound the vessels of their common enemy. Boey took the 
one big sturdy junk to Batavia, but burned the two other older ones after he 
had confiscated their cargo, including cottons which were sold right away.53 
                                                                                                                             
Thijssen en raad, Malacca, 17 Aug. 1655, fos. 246v-247r.  
51 Letter from Governor-General Maetsuijcker and Councillors of India to Cheng 
Ch’eng-kung, Batavia, 17 Jun. 1655, VOC 869, fo. 296-298; cited from Johannes 
Huber, ’Relations between Cheng Ch’eng-kung and the Netherlands East India 
Company in the 1650s’, in Leonard Blussé (ed.), Around and About Formosa, 209-41, 
at 232-3. 
52 VOC 677, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maesuijcker ende raden, Batavia, 
13 July 1655, not foliated. 
53 Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 17. 24 Dec. 1655. 
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Four hundred piculs of the 1,900 piculs pepper were assigned to the 
Pangeran of Palembang as his share. He re-sold this party to the Dutch under 
the terms of the sole-right contract he had concluded with them. After he 
arrived in Batavia, the anachoda lodged an appeal with the Council in 
Batavia and affirmed that this junk did indeed belong to Coxinga. He also 
argued that, since the VOC still maintained an alliance and a friendship with 
Coxinga, the Council should return the cargo and junk to him. The anachoda 
insisted she had not come from Quinam but had anchored there only 
temprarily before continuing her voyage to Palembang. After its own 
investigation, the Council found out that this anachoda had lived in Quinam 
and that therefore this junk was liable to be impounded. Consequently the 
junk including her cargo were sold at auction.54  
When Governor-General Maetsuijker’s letter reached Amoy in the 
middle of August 1655, Coxinga was assembling commodities for sale in the 
Chê-chiang and Nanking markets.55Almost at the same time as the fleet led 
by Hung Hsü left Amoy sailing in a northly direction, Coxinga wrote a letter 
to the leaders of the Chinese community in Taiwan and asked them to pass 
his message word-for-word to Governor Cornelis Caesar of Taiwan. In his 
first point in this letter Coxinga required the VOC should treat his merchants 
in Batavia more courteously. He must have been referring to the petition 
about reducing the pepper price submitted by the anachodas. His second 
point was that the VOC should not exclude Chinese junks from Malacca, 
Ligore, Pahang and other nearby locations. These were all ports around the 
‘Pepper Coast’ where this commodity was sold at only 20 per cent of the 
Company fixed price in Taiwan. Coxinga was also concerned about the junks 
                                                          
54 VOC 677, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maesuijcker ende raden, Batavia, 
13 July 1655, not foliated. 
55 Dagregisters Zeelandia, III 1648-1655, 557. 16 Aug. 1655. Most of the junks 
dispatched to the South China Sea had returned home. Of the eight junks which 
returned from Batavia, three had lost their masts. 
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which the Dutch merchant Anthony Boey had detained in Palembang. He had 
not yet been informed about what had become of them in Batavia. If his 
requests were not met, he would put an embargo on Batavia and Taiwan in 
the following monsoon season.56   
A couple of weeks before the main fleet of the northern expedition led 
by Commander Hunghsu departed in the middle of July 1655, the vanguard 
fleet carrying 15,000 soldiers had landed in Sha-ch’eng (Swatea[D.]), the 
most important harbour on the border between Chê-chiang and Fu-chien 
provinces.57 Dutch sources mention that even though this harbour had been 
maintaining a neutral status in its relations with the Manchus and Coxinga, 
the latter’s troops had occupied it.58 This fleet continued to patrol the coast 
of Chê-chiang and kept a grip on several sites on shore until November 
1655.59 Besides escorting the the Japan-bound junks and pursuing their 
rice-collecting mission, the soldiers with this fleet ‘plundered’ about 200,000 
taels of booty in the course of their mission.60 Coxinga had assigned other 
troops to march southwards. These soldiers reached the southern border of 
Fu-chien on 20 August 1655.61 With the assistance of the fleet, this army laid 
siege to Chieh-yang and encircled it on 8 September 1655.62 One month later, 
                                                          
56 Ibidem, 582-3. 21 Sept. 1655.  
57 TWYH(ed), Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien, 296. 
58 VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den 
gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 287v. 
59 Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu, 19. 
60 VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den 
gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 288v. 
61 Li Ch’i-fêng, ‘ Li-ch’i-fêng t’i wei chêng-chün pao-wei chieh-yang shih-pên 
[Letter from Li Ch’i-fêng about the Cheng Force which Laid Siege to Chieh-Yang 
City] 1 Oct. 1655’, in CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên 
tang-an i-pien, TWH, I no. 6, 203. 




on 6 October 1655, Coxinga’s troops seized the town. 63  The soldiers 
remained there and occupied most of Chao-chou prefecture for half a year 
until 15 March 1656, after which they brought 100,000 piculs of rice 
provisions and 100,000 taels of silver back to Amoy.64 In the meantime, in a 
tactical manoeuvre the naval force which had been escorting the 
southward-bound junks was again assigned by Coxinga to patrol T’ien-wei 
Bay to ward off Su Li’s fleet. It reached its destination on 9 May 1656.65 
According to the Dutch:  
‘The 300 junks had sailed southwards, intending to levy rice along the 
coast below Nanao. Manned with Coxinga’s best soldiers, they were well 
supplied with weapons and ammunition. However, this was all just a pretext. 
They were actually preparing to make an assault on the junks of the pirate Su 
Li, who had his lair in the Chieh-shih  Guard (Kitsjehoij[D]) around 
Tien-wei Bay (Groeningens baij). Coxinga’s first strike at Su Li was very 
successfully, because many of Su Li’s junks which were lying pulled up dry on 
the beach were set on fire. About 100 junks were taken away back to Amoy 
with the fleet.66               
                                                          
63 Li Shuai-t’ai, ‘Li shuai-t’ai t’i wei chêng-chün kung-ch’ü chieh-yang shih-pên 
[Letter from Li Shuai-t’ai about the Cheng Force’s Attack on Chieh-yang County ], 24 
Oct. 1655’, in CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an 
i-pien, TWH, I no. 6, 209. 
64 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 98. 
65 Ibidem. Li Shuai-t’ai, ‘Li shuai-t’ai t’i wei shou-fu ch’ao-chou shu-i chi min-ch'uan 
you-i nan-hai shih-pên [Report Written by Li Shuai-tai about the Re-capture of the 
Ch’ao-chou Area and Spotting Fu-chien Junks Patrolling the Coast Nearby] 22 May 
1656’, in CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an 
i-pien, TWH, I no. 6, 322.  
66 NFJ 287, Appendix tot de missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar uijt Taijouan 
naar Japan [aan Joan Boucheljon] [Appendix: Letter from Governor Cornelis Caesar 
in Taiwan to Joan Boucheljon in Japan], Taiwan, 18 July 1656, fo. 74. It also recorded 
that these 400 junks later ran into a very fierce typhoon on their way to Amoy and 
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During Iquan’s several battles in 1630s it had been proved that from 
technically speaking, the Wu-wei or black-stern junks of Su Li were superior 
to the Fu-chienese war-junks. Although Su Li’s naval force consisted of only 
about 5,000 men and 200 junks, it was the only naval force which ever really 
threatened Coxinga’s base in Amoy and his comparatively more lightly 
armed junks.67  
On land, the Manchu troops attempted to break through Coxinga’s 
defence line. In November 1655, the new Manchu General-in-Chief of the 
Southern Expedition, Heir of the Imperial Prince of Cheng 
(Chêng-ch’in-wang shih-tzu), Chi-tu, arrived in Fu-chien with 100,000 
soldiers. Shortly after his arrival he gave orders for the rebuilding of the walls 
of Chang-chou city as well as those of various other cities which had earlier 
been demolished by Coxinga’s army.68 Chi-tu sent a conciliatory letter to 
Coxinga hoping to re-open peace negotiations.69 According to the Dutch, 
Coxinga intimated that the Manchu Court should concede two more 
prefectures to him, namely Hsing-hua (Ginwa[D.]) and Hui-chou.70 A truce 
which lasted several months was concluded between Ch’üan-chou and Amoy, 
so that Coxinga’s merchants were allowed to trade freely in Fu-chou and 
                                                                                                                             
most foundered. Dagregisters Zeelandia, VI: 1655-1662, 84. 16 Aug. 1656.   
67 VOC 1218, Missive van den ondercoopman Hendrick Leverij naer Taijouan aen 
den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar, Chieh-shih, 11 Mar. 1656, fo. 410r; TWYH(ed), 
Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien, 322. 
68 Ch’ên Shou-ch’i, Fu-chien t’ung-chih t’ai-wan-fu[A History of Fu-chien Province 
(Taiwan Division)], TW no. 84, 943; NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis 
Caesar naer japan aen den E. Joan Boucheljon, opperhooft over des Compagnies 
ommeslagh in Japan, ende den raet aldaer, Taiwan, 8 July 1656, fo. 55 
69 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 93. 
70 Dagregisters Zeelandia, III 1648-1655, 607. 30 Oct. 1655; VOC 1212, Missive van 
den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan 
Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 345v. 
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Sha-ch’êng (which was then under Manchus).71 In April 1656, the Manchu 
General-in-Chief, Chi-tu, broke the truce without prior warning, and 
immediately impounded all the trading- junks to use them as troop carriers 
for the Manchu cavalry and soldiers for a landing in Amoy.72 This Manchu 
fleet departed on 9 May 1656 but ran into a very fierce typhoon. The bold 
attempt failed and most of the vessels fell back into Coxinga’s hands. 73    
During this short truce, the trade embargo against Manila and Batavia 
came into force. In the spring, a news spread around Mindanao claiming that 
Coxinga was preparing a large fleet to conquer the Philippines.74 Later it 
turned out to be a rumour spread by an indigenous king (King of Coralatt) 
who wanted to use this situation to weaken the alliance of one of his rivals 
with the Spanish.75 The situation in Manila remained pretty much as usual, 
                                                          
71 VOC 1218, Missive van Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael 
Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 20 Nov. 1656, fo. 33v. Han Tai, ’Han-tai t’i wei chi-pao 
p’u-mên pei-wei shih-pên [Emergency Report Written by Han-tai about the Cheng 
Force’s Siege of P’u-mên], 22 Mar. 1656’, in CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u 
chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien, TWH, I no. 6, 291. Coxinga’s 
fleet occupied Schach’eng on 28 December, 1655.  
72 NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer japan aen den E. Joan 
Boucheljon, opperhooft over des Compagnies ommeslagh in Japan, ende den raet 
aldaer, Taiwan, 8 July 1656, fos. 55-56; VOC 1218, Missive van Cornelis Caesar naer 
Batavia aen den gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 20 Nov. 1656, fos. 
33v-34r.  
73 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 100; NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis 
Caesar naer Japan aen den E. Joan Boucheljon, opperhooft over des Compagnies 
ommeslagh in Japan ende den raet aldaer[Letter from the Governor of Taiwan, 
Cornelis Caesar, to Joan Boucheljon in Charge of all the Company Property in Japan 
as Chief Merchant and His Council], Taiwan, 8 July 1656, fos. 55-56. 
74 VOC 1216, Missive door Arnold de Vlamingh van Oudtshoorn aen haer Eds. [Joan 
Maestuijcker] tot Batavia [Letter Written by Arnold de Vlamingh van Oudtshoorn to 
Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker in Batavia], Ambon, 24 Apr. 1656, fo. 169v. 
75 VOC 1216, Missiven door gouverneur Simon Cos en raad aen de Ed. heer Joan 
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one silver ship was scheduled to arrive from Acapulco but she ran aground 
near Aparri (Takang[C.],Twakan[D.]) on the northern tip of Luzon.76 The 
Manila authorities later tried to salvage the silver from the shipwreck.77  
As the embargo held, no junks from Amoy visited Malacca and Batavia 
during the north monsoon season of 1656.78 However, Coxinga had sent a 
letter to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker by way of the Chinese Captain 
of Batavia, P’an Ming-yen ( Bingam[D.]) and Yen Erh-kuan( Giequa[D.]), in 
which he lodged a protest with the High Government in Batavia about 
Antony Boey’s confiscation of 400 piculs of pepper from his junk in the 
roadstead of Palembang in 1655. He also requested the restitution of the 
deerskins which had been confiscated from his junk off the coast of Siam in 
1653. On 7 March 1656, the Council agreed to the first request and showed 
its willingness to restitute the pepper according to the price in Palembang, if 
the anachoda came to present his case in person. It refused to acquiesce in 
the second request because this case had been closed a long time ago by 
verdict handed down by the Siamese Court, and it had issued a warning to the 
Chinese traders not to purchase deerskins before it took action. It seized the 
opportunity to accuse the Chinese anachodas of having tried to intimidate 
Dutch merchants during this incident.79Although the contents of the original 
                                                                                                                             
Maatsuijcker gouverneur generael ende Ed. heeren raaden van India tot Batavia, 
Ternate, 31 Aug. 1656, Fo. 221r. 
76 Dagregisters Zeelandia, IV:1655-1662, 75. 28 June 1656.  
77 VOC 1216, Missiven door gouverneur Simon Cos en raad aen de Ed. heer Joan 
Maatsuijcker gouverneur generael ende Ed. heeren raaden van India tot Batavia, 
Ternate, 31 Aug. 1656, Fo. 221v. 
78 VOC 880, Missive van Batavia [van Joan Maetsuijcker] naer Taijoan aen den 
gouverneur [Cornelis Caesar]ende den raet, Batavia, 13 June 1656, fos. 229-235. 
79 VOC 677, Resolutie van gouverneur-general Joan Maesuijcker ende raden, Batavia, 
7 Mar. 1656, not foliated. According to a later letter sent to Taiwan from Batavia, the 
restitution had been made to Coxinga’s authorized representatives in Batavia, but they 
had taken another 3,000 rials as surety that the junk would not abuse their restrictions 
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letter are no longer available in any of the archives, it is clear that Coxinga’s 
intention was to challenge the Dutch monopoly on deerskins and pepper, two 
very lucrative items on the Japanese and Chinese markets.                 
While Coxinga was fitting out his fleet for his routine northern 
expedition on 27 June, although he had not yet received any reply from 
Batavia, he issued a placard announcing that the embargo on Taiwan would 
begin in a hundred days’ time (5 October 1656).80 The placard set out the 
two-fold reasons for his action. On the one hand the embargo was a measure 
against the Dutch to squeeze a better price and was aimed directly at the 
Batavian authorities; on the other hand it was a measure addressed at the 
Chinese community in Taiwan to give them a shake up, because Coxinga was 
worried that this community would create the only loophole in his monopoly 
on Chinese trade and make good profits from Taiwan-Manila trade, taking 
advantage of the fact the Dutch were prevented by the terms of the Treaty of 
Westphalia from opening the trade with Manila. Coxinga threatened this 
small Chinese community, giving it a choice between joining his camp or 
abandoning its share in the Chinese trade.81   
Although Prince Chitu’s attempt to land in Amoy had failed, he refused 
to give up his aim of capturing Ping-chou Fort, Coxinga’s bridgehead on the 
mainland. He was to be disappointed because its garrison was well 
entrenched and the Manchus had to return to Fu-chou empty-handed.82 Three 
                                                                                                                             
again. See: VOC 880, Missive van Batavia [van Joan Maetsuijcker] naer Taijoan aen 
den gouverneur [Cornelis Caesar]ende den raet, Batavia, 13 June 1656, fo. 234.   
80  Dagregisters Zeelandia, IV:1655-1662, 80-1. 9 July 1656. The yacht, the 
Leeuwinne, carrying the letter from Batavia about this matter arrived Taiwan on 28 
July 1656. Dagregisters Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 89. 28 July 1656. 
81 As the Dutch and Spanish had concluded peace in 1648 with the signing of the 
Treaty of Westphalia, any direct trade between Batavia and Manila would have 
violated the treaty. However, the Chinese communities under Dutch were not 
restricted by this Article. 
82 NFJ 287, Missive van gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Japan aen den E Joan 
THE PASSIONS 1655-1662 
 320 
months later, an internal crisis unexpectedly broke in Coxinga’s ranks. One of 
his Defence Commands, Huang Wu (Huang Erh-yeh[C], Onnia[D]), 
suddenly surrendered Haich’eng city including its garrison to the Manchus on 
12 August 1656, fearing the wrath of Coxinga on account of his recent 
serious defeat in a battle with the Manchus.83 His defection not only opened 
up a break in Coxinga’s sealed defence line, but the Dutch records state it 
also caused him a loss of valuable resources: 
‘The same person [Huang Wu] has also taken his [Coxinga’s] money. It 
was indeed a huge loss for Coxinga as this city was said to be unassailable, 
because it is surrounded by open sea on the outer side and enclosed by three 
layers of walls inside. Coxinga’s principal treasures, which had been 
accumulated over a [long] period of time, were also kept there and an 
incredibly huge amount of paddy and military resources, according to 
Chinese sources. Coxinga therefore has lost more than two-thirds of his 
fortune. Problems have also arisen as it was the only place from where he 
could supply his junks with all their necessities. Therefore his junks will soon 
be in urgent need of masts, planks, nails and other supplies, which he will not 
be able to procure from anywhere else.’84       
This dire picture might not have been an overexaggeration. Chinese 
records report that the 374,000 piculs of paddy and 410,000 catties of 
gunpowder from this city fell into the laps of the Manchus like a gift from the 
gods.85 Most of the commodities were stored in Amoy and Quemoy, but 
more trade would be needed before this merchandise could be transformed 
                                                                                                                             
Boucheljon, opperhooft over des Compagnies ommeslagh in Japan, ende den raet 
aldaer, Taiwan, 8 July 1656, fo. 56. 
83 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 101. 
84 VOC 1218, Missive van Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen den gouverneur generael 
Joan maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 20 Nov. 1656, fo. 35r. 
85 Li Huan, Ch’ing-c’i-hsien lei-chêng hsüan-pien[Selections from the Biographies of 
Individuals under the Ch’ing Dynasty], TW no. 230, 331. 
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into military supplies. This realization made Coxinga rely even more heavily 
on his trading activities as the vehicle through which to achieve his political 
ambitions.  
Now that Coxinga had risen to power as the sole leader of the Amoy 
naval force, a position from which was able to monopolize the Chinese trade, 
he did not scruple to use both military and economic power in his pursuit of 
his goals. To sum up: he challenged the Manchu political structure by 
inventing a new political framework comparing the situation of Fu-chien 
province with that of Korea; he challenged the settled price required by the 
pancando system in Japan by unexpectedly dispatching junks to Japan in the 
teeth of the north monsoon; he challenged Spanish control of the Mexican 
silver supply by declaring an embargo on all Chinese junk shipping to Manila; 
he also challenged the Dutch monopsony on Sumatran pepper and Siamese 
deerskins by conducting official negotiations to purchase commodities and 
once again imposing an embargo. As his only hope was to push all these 
enterprises through to keep all his subjects together, he occasionally had to 
play the tyrant over his own people. For Defence Command Huang Wu, the 
choice was obvious: since living under Coxinga was no easier than to 
submitting to the Manchus, why bother continue to fight the Manchus?  
Expanding war and trade 1656-1659 
The loss of Hai-ch’êng may put an end to Coxinga’s plans to enlarge his 
trading fleet, because he had lost most of the materials to maintain and repair 
his ships. As these items were essential, he immediately decided to raid and 
try to occupy the coast of Fu-chou (from where all kinds of timber were 
exported), so that his ship-building programme would not be thrown out of 
joint and his ambitions not be thwarted. The plan was that his troops would 
gain control of all the ship-building sites and seize any materials which were 
needed. As this was what he had set his sights on, Fu-chou prefecture was the 
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primary goal of the next northern expedition.86 Coxinga’s fleet sailed into the 
Min River and occupied Min-an-chên (now Ma-wei ) on 23 August 1656. 87 
Alerted by this attack, the Manchu General-in-Chief quickly assembled all 
his soldiers, withdrewing his men back to Fu-chou which he fortified from 
various scattered outposts.88 As Min-an-chên is situated on the northern bank 
of the Min River between Fu-chou city and the coast, Coxinga’s troops were 
in a prime position to blockade any attempt the Manchus might make to fight 
back by the Min River estuary. Besides occupying the estuary, they opened a 
series harbours along the coast including Sha-ch’eng. Coxinga arrived in 
Min-an-chên on 20 October 1656 and immediately arranged for the building 
of several forts from which to blockade the Manchu troops in Fu-chou city.89 
In November he ordered his fleet to sail to San-tou Island in preparation for 
the siege of Ning-te District (Lintekwan[D.]) which is located between 
Fu-chou and Sha-ch’eng. If he gained control of both Ning-te and San-tou, 
which lies opposite it, Coxinga would be able to secure the sea route from 
Amoy to Sha-ch’eng and this would give him access to the land route via 
Chê-chiang which connected up with the Chiang-nan silk market.90 Once the 
Manchu soldiers were sealed off by Coxinga’s blockade of Fu-chou, the trade 
between Amoy and Chê-chiang was re-opened. The Chief of Deshima, 
                                                          
86  I T’u, ‘i-t’u têng wei ch’ih kai-tou-fu yü huang-wu t’o-i chin-hai shih-pên 
[Suggestions from I T’u about the Imperial Edict Regulating the Enforcement of the 
Maritime Ban by Huang Wu and Related Governors and Grand Co-ordinators] 15 Aug. 
1657’, in CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an 
i-pien, TWH, I no. 6, 377. ‘The pirates [Coxinga’s navy] seized the rice from 
Ch’ao-chou and Hui-chou which provided them with adequate supplies; they stole the 
commodities from Hsin-hua, Chang-chou and Ch’üan-chou which they sold at a 
satisfactory price; they purloined the ship-building materials from Fu-chou, Fun-ning 
and Wen-chou which were ample for their needs.’  
87 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 102. 
88 Ibidem,103. 
89 Ibid., 104.  
90 Ibid., 105. 
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Zacharias Wagenaer wrote : 
‘The Chinese brought the news that the war in their region had ended. 
The Tartars (Manchus) were holding on to where they were and were keeping 
quiet. Coxinga on the contrary was taking advantage of this lull in the 
fighting and was busying himself with trade, sometimes sending two or three 
junks simultaneously to one place or many more richly laden ones to another 
place.’91 
Between 1 February and 15 September 1656, fifty-two junks from 
China and Southeast Asia visited Nagasaki. All the thirty-four junks which 
came directly from China this monsoon season were from the areas under 
Coxinga’s control (An-hai, Chang-chou, Fu-chou), with the exception of two 
junks from Nanking which carried only a few goods.92 In a word, Coxinga 
had gained complete control over the Chinese silk exports to Japan. For the 
first time the Dutch merchants in Japan noted that the junks carried passes 
issued by Coxinga.93 During the time he spent in San-tou, he consummated 
his plan and was able to collect enough timber to carry out his ship-building 
project satisfactorily.94 
When Coxinga launched his raid on Ning-te on 11 February 1657, the 
Manchu cavalry and infantary troops led by a Banner 
Vice-Commander-in-Chief  (Mei-Lê Chang-ching), A-Kê-shang , left 
Fu-chou to curb the invasion by Coxinga’s troops. While Coxinga’s main 
                                                          
91 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 280. 26 Dec. 1656; NFJ 288, Missive 
aan haer Edelen[gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker] tot Batavia [door Zacharias 
Wagenaer] dato ultimo December per Chinese jonck over Siam geschreven, Japan, 31 
Dec. 1656, fo. 8. 
92 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 271. 1 Nov. 1656.  
93 NFJ 288, Missive aan haer Edelen[gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker] tot 
Batavia [door Zacharias Wagenaer] dato ultimo December per Chinese jonck over 
Siam geschreven, Japan, 31 Dec. 1656, fo. 8. 
94 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 104. 
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corps laid the siege to Ning-te, other soldiers of his defeated the Manchu 
cavalry in a surprise attack.95   
As soon as the Chêchiang route became accessible again, Coxinga 
dispatched two junks carrying all kinds of commodities, including Chinese 
gold, to Batavia with a letter addressed to the Chinese Captains of Batavia, 
P’an Ming-yen and Yen Erh-kuan, asking them to forward his message to 
Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker.96 He explained that he had no intention 
of attacking Taiwan, even though he had issued a placard banning Chinese 
trade to Taiwan. His motive for this had been purely to ensure his traders in 
Taiwan were treated better. In his second point, he implied that the Batavian 
authorities should also reduce the price of some commodities (apparently he 
was referring to pepper) or he would no longer send any junks there. In this 
letter, the requests he had made earlier asking that the pepper price be 
lowered and that his junks should be allowed to sail to the Pepper Coast were 
omitted. The purpose of this letter was to avoid the conflict escalating into an 
all out war. While maintaining his embargo, Coxinga was also looking for 
better means to protect his junks against Dutch harassment.   
Perhaps Coxinga did not really have any clear picture of what he might 
gain from this embargo, but it was absolutely certain that it was not going to 
hurt his trade. In 1655, one wankang carried a letter from Hung Hsü to 
Malacca, another richly laden Amoy junk and two Quinam junks with 
cargoes of equal wealth visited Johor and three other junks sailed to Ligore, 
Sangora, and Patani.97 Some rumours mentioned other Chinese visits to 
Pahang and Palembang too.98 It would be hard to believe that most of these 
                                                          
95 Ibidem, 105; Dagregisters Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 141. 1 Apr. 1657.  
96 Daghregister Batavia, 1656-1657,100-101. 18 Feb. 1657. 
97  VOC 1209, Missiven aen Joan Maetsuijker gouverneur generael door Joan 
Thijssen en raad, Malacca, 15 Mar. 1655, fos. 221v-222r. 
98 VOC 1216, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Malacca aen den 
gouverneur Jan Thijsen, Taiwan, 26 Nov. 1655, fo. 405r-v. 
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junks did not buy pepper, tin and rattan at low prices, even though the eight 
junks which visited Batavia in the same year had also purchased more than 
16,000 piculs at a relatively higher price.99 The Dutch Governor of Taiwan, 
Cornelis Caesar, estimated that Coxinga’s junks must have purchased the 
same or slightly more than the usual amount the Dutch generally provided to 
Amoy by way of Taiwan.100 Although one of these junks had been captured 
by the VOC merchant Antony Boey near the roadstead of Palembang, 
Coxinga did not feel any need to stop dispatching junks to the Pepper Coast. 
For example, in the spring of 1656 one Chinese wankang from either 
Cambodia or Quinam still visited Jambi.101        
The most important trade item exchanged between Coxinga and the 
VOC in Taiwan was Chinese gold. The trade in gold, which was shipped to 
India, was the real centre of gravity in the Sino-Dutch trade in Taiwan. 
Table 11-4: Gold exports from Taiwan by the VOC 
Year Chinese gold exported via Taiwan 
(f.)* 
1646-1647 291,665
1647-1648              910,595
1648-1649            1,962,697
1649-1650            1,321,351
1650-1651            1,423,761
1651-1652              668,410
1652-1653              629,086
1653-1654            1,110,525
1654-1655              312,229
                                                          
99 Ibidem. 
100 VOC 1216, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Choromandel aen 
den gouverneur Laurens Pith, Taiwan, 26 Nov. 1655, fo. 409r.  
101 VOC 1214, Missiven door Jacob Nolpe aan haar Eds. tot Batavia geschreven, 
Jambi, 22 Feb. 1656 ,fo. 182v. 
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1655-1656              104,497102
1656-1657              168,200103
1657-1658              424,736104
1658-1659              525,000105
1659-1660              180,000106
1660-1661              141,901107
                                                          
102 NFJ 287, Missive door haer Edle [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker] uijt 
Batavia per ‘t schip Aernhem over Siam [aan oppercoopman Joan Bouchelion in 
Japan], 4 May 1656, Batavia, fo. 78. In the spring of 1657, the yacht Swarte Vos 
carried f. 48,000 Chinese gold to Batavia. Cf. Generale Missive, 31 Jan. 1657, in 
Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 409.  
103 VOC 1218, Missive door Frederik Coijet en verderen raad int Casteel Zeelandia 
aen d'Ed. heer Joan Maetsuijker gouverneur generael en d'Ed. heeren raden van India 
tot Batavia, Taiwan, 27 Dec. 1656, fo. 467r. In: Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 116. 
31 Jan. 1657. It was recorded as f. 168,113. 
104 At the end of 1657, 10,486 62/73 rials or 7,655 taels pure gold was sent to 
Malacca (1 tael=100 condijn, 1 rial=73 condijn), which equals 393,256 guilders (1 rial 
pure gold = 750 stuijvers. Cf. VOC 1212, Missive door Cornelis Ceasar en raad aan 
haar Eds. tot Batavia, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 305r) Cf. VOC 1228, Missive naer 
Batavia aen de heeren den gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijcker] ende raden van 
India door gouverneur Frederick Coijett en raet, Taiwan, 8 Dec. 1657, fo. 476r; VOC 
1228, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Malacca aen gouverneur Joan Thijssen, 
Taiwan, 8 Dec. 1657, fo. 551r. In the spring of 1658, 31,480 guilders of gold were sent 
to Batavia.Cf. VOC 1228, Factura van de poeijersuijcker en anderesints gescheept 
door ordre van Frederick Coyett in ‘t fluijtschip Breukelen, gaende van Taijouan naer 
Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 2 Mar. 1658, fo. 669r. The two numbers 
added together show that the gold export from Taiwan during 1657-1658 was worth 
424,736 guilders.  
105 General Missive, 16 Dec. 1659, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 462. 
106 Ibidem. 
107 VOC 1236, Missive van den gouverneur Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen den 
gouverneur generael joan maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 10 Dec. 1660, fo. 167. 1,759 taels of 
Chinese gold, which equalled f. 90,359, was sent to the Coromandel via Malacca. 
Added to the gold sent to Batavia from Taiwan,  which was 950.8 taels or 48,842 
guilders, the total is 141,901 guilders, c.f. Daghregister Batavia, 1661, 61. 22 Mar. 
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Source: *VOC 1222, Memorie der quantiteijt en reductie van het becomene Taijouanse zuijt gout 
[A Memorandum of the Quantity and Drop in Taiwanese Pure Gold Received], 25 Feb. 1657, 
fo.15v. note: most of the gold was transshipped from China, only a little came from Taiwanese 
gold-mines. 
As mentioned earlier, when Coxinga recruited his first group of soldiers 
he and the An-hai merchants exported extraordinary amounts of gold through 
Taiwan in the period 1648-1650, when Kuang-chou was under siege and the 
passes issued by Iquan were still valid in the areas under the Manchus. Since 
1651, after the Manchus occupied Canton and the Macao trade resumed, the 
exports of Chinese gold to Taiwan from Amoy had also been gradually 
declining. During the truce between Coxinga and the Manchus between June 
of 1653 and March of 1654, the gold exports jumped to a high level again. 
The VOC wanted Chinese gold to pay for the silks exported from Bengal and 
especially for the textiles from the Coromandel Coast. Rather than purchase 
the tropical commodities offered in Taiwan by the VOC, the Amoy merchants 
preferred to trade the Chinese gold for Japanese silver. They knew that the 
tropical commodities could be obtained cheaper elsewhere and the fact that 
the silver price in Taiwan had dropped below that in China since 1652 was an 
added incentive (they could barter more silver from Taiwan than before).108 
The High Government in Batavia decided that Japanese silver should be 
invested in other places (especially India) and therefore in the summer of 
1653 ordered the Governor of Taiwan, Cornelis Caesar, to stop paying for 
Chinese gold with silver. On his own discretion, Governor Caesar decided to 
follow the order only in part and paid the Chinese merchants half in silver 
and half in tropical commodities as a means to get rid of the goods which 
were not in demand and were clogging up the Company warehouse.109 This 
                                                                                                                             
1661. (1 tael= 100 condijns, 1 rial=73 condijns, 1 rial gold= 750 stuijvers, 1 
guilder=20 stuijvers)  
108 Generale Missive, 24 Dec. 1652, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 313. 
109 VOC 1206, Missive van Cornelis Caesar naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, 
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restricted policy certainly contributed to large exports of Chinese gold in 
1653, but it backfired on the Amoy merchants because the Dutch postponed 
payment and trapped them, forcing them to accept these goods for which 
there was no demand. Despite resorting to such ruses, heavy debts still forced 
Governor Caesar to use silver coins from the Company warehouse as 
payment to settle these debts in 1654.110  
Coxinga’s embargo on Japan and Manila and his policies to 
disadvantage Taiwan were devised to squeeze yet more silver out of his 
suppliers. Before a total embargo was announced in June 1656, since 
February of 1655 the trade between Amoy and Taiwan had been gradually 
falling into a decline.111 Just as when Coxinga had earlier announced the 
embargo on the trade in raw silk to Japan, the present embargo on Taiwan 
was also meant to conceal his incapcity to offer the goods demanded from 
China. Naturally, his own junks were excluded from the trade ban and he still 
sold gold to Taiwan. For example, in February 1657 several junks carried 
48,000 guilders’ worth of Chinese gold to Taiwan.112 Therefore even under 
Coxinga’s ban the gold exports were still maintained, though at a low level. 
Consequently, the restriction of the gold trade did his traders no special harm, 
for two reasons: he now purchased pepper directly from the 
pepper-producing areas at a lower price and the gold price in China had risen 
5 per cent, which made it less profitable as an export commodity. When the 
silver price in Taiwan rose in comparison to that in China after the March 
1657, the gold-for-silver trade became a less attractive prospect for the Amoy 
merchants.113 
                                                                                                                             
Taiwan, 5 Dec. 1653, fos. 134v-135r. 
110 VOC 1194, Missive van Nicolaes Verburch naer Batavia aen Carel Reniersz. 
Taiwan, 24 Nov. 1654, fo. 157.  
111 Generale Missive, 1 Feb. 1656, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 387. 
112 Generale Missive, 31 Jan. 1657, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 408-9.  
113 Generale Missive, 31 Jan. 1657, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 408-9. 
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The Dutch in Taiwan were anxious to be able to get their hand on 
increasing quantities of Chinese gold to fuel the expanding Coromandel silk 
trade. Since the beginning of 1650s, the VOC had increasingly depended on 
the raw silk exports from Coromandel to supply the Japanese market and, 
after 1655, the Coromandel Coast became the sole source for the raw silk 
trade with Japan. The VOC merchants in India expanded their credit by 
borrowing money from local merchants, thereby incurring heavy debts 
because of the interest. As the price of gold in India was higher than that of 
silver, the rich profits reaped in the gold trade helped the Company to quit its 
debts in India.    
Table 11-5:The VOC Exports of Bengal (Coromandel Coast) Raw Silk to 
Japan 
Year Bengal raw silk amount by 
the VOC in Japan (picul)* 
Percentage in total raw silk 
exports by the VOC in Japan** 
1652 525.22 43.6 
1653 979.69 64.9 
1654 453.86 56.3 
1655 810.77 100.0 
1656 1,394.82 75.1 
1657 1,097.03 88.2 
1658 1,446.83 100 
1659 1,321.42 81.7 
1660 1,567.18 100 
Source: *Nagazumi, ‘You Hê-lan shih-liao k'an shih-ch'i shih-chi tê t'ai-wan mao-i’,42. 
Table.1;**The denominator of this percentage is the total amount of silk exported annually to 
Japan by the VOC, which is the sum of exports from China, Tonkin and Bengal. The silk exports 
from other places have omitted because they were insignificant. 
Under these circumstances, the order sent from the Coromandel Coast 
to Taiwan in 1655 amounted to 1,000,000 guilders of Chinese gold, but only 
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10 per cent was actually delivered. 114  In the following year, 1656, 
Coromandel Coast required an even larger amount of up to 1,200,000 
guilders of Chinese gold.115 The Taiwan factory was only able to provide 
about 14 per cent of this amount as the above table shows. 
On 27 December 1656, Cornelis Caesar resigned and Frederick Coyet 
was appointed Governor of Taiwan. Seeking to redress the problem, Coyet 
dispatched a Chinese interpreter, He T’ing-ping (Pinquan[D.]), to Amoy at 
the end of March 1657.116 When the envoy arrived there on 4 April 1657, 
Coxinga and his main fleet were residing on San-tou Island outside the Min 
River estuary, from where they were preparing to sail farther north to trade on 
the Chê-chiang coast.117 He T’ing-ping delivered the letters from Caesar to 
Coxinga’s uncle, Cheng Hung-k’uei (whose name was written as 
‘Sikokon[D.]’, his noble title ‘Ting-kuo-kong[C.] (Duke of Ting-kuo)’ in 
Quemoy), and Cheng Tai (who was addressed by his nickname ‘Sauja[D.]’) 
respectively and lodged with them for five days.118 Although He T’ing-ping 
had tried to catch up with Coxinga by ship, he had been held up in Amoy for 
                                                          
114  VOC 1216, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Suratta aen 
directeur Hendrick van Gendt [Letter from Governor Cornelis Caesar to Director 
Hendrick van Gendt in Surat], Taiwan, 26 Nov. 1655, fo. 414v. 
115 VOC 880, Missive van Batavia [van Joan Maetsuijcker] naer Taijouan aen den 
gouverneur [Cornelis Caesar] ende den raedt, Batavia, 25 July 1656, fo. 324; NFJ 287, 
Missive van gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker naer Taijouan aen den 
gouverneur [Cornelis Caesar], Batavia, 25 July 1656, fo. 128. 
116 Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 157. 12 June 1657. 
117 VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, 
Taiwan, 19 Nov. 1657, fo. 38r; Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 110. 
118 VOC 1222, Translaat uijt zeekeren Chinesen brieff door den Chinese Tolcq 
Pincqua geschreven aen den Hr Fredrick Coyett Preseident deses Eijlants Formosa 
[Translation of a Certain Chinese Letter written by He T’ingpin to Governor Fredrick 
Coyett], not located, 22 May 1657, fo. 527r ; Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 
157. 12 June 1657. Mr. Chiang Shu-shêng pointed out that ‘Si’ may refer to ‘four’ 
according to his previous nick name ‘Si sia’ (the fourth son). 
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a fortnight because the sea route between Amoy and San-tou was under the 
threat from Manchu vessels.119 In late April, the unexpected strength of the 
north monsoon prevented the whole fleet from sailing north, so Coxinga had 
to return to Amoy.120 At the beginning of May, He T’ing-ping encountered 
Coxinga’s returning fleet and finally delivered Coyet’s letter to him. The next 
morning, Coxinga summoned a committee and asked He T’ing-ping about 
the unfulfilled contract between Iquan and the former Taiwan Governor, 
Johan van der Burg (although he did not mentioned the latter by name). 
Coxinga and his court doubted whether the contract had really been 
concluded and were dubious about whether the Dutch had bothered to pay 
their duty or rent to be handed over annually since 1647 after Iquan had left 
to Peking. This suspicion was allayed by He T’ing-ping, who assured them 
that he had never heard any whisper of this since he had taken up residence in 
Taiwan and that there were no records of it in the Dutch documents.121 
Coxinga took He T’ing-ping with him to Amoy where he summoned his 
Council to deal with this case on 25 May 1657.122 At this meeting, Coxinga 
                                                          
119 VOC 1222, Translaat uijt zeekeren Chinesen brieff door den Chinese Tolcq 
Pincqua geschreven aen den Hr Fredrick Coyett Preseident deses Eijlants 
Formosa[Translation of a Certain Chinese Letter written by He T’ingpin to Governor 
Fredrick Coyett], not located, 22 May 1657, fo. 527r. According to Chinese sources, 
these were vessels of the Ch’ao-chou Coastal Defence Fleet under Hsü Lung, sailing 
from Kuang-tung.  
120 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 110.  
121 Daghregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 161. 13 June 1657; VOC 1222, Translaat 
uijt zeekeren Chinesen brieff door den Chinese Tolcq Pincqua geschreven aen den Hr 
Fredrick Coyett Preseident deses Eijlants Formosa [Translation of a Certain Chinese 
Letter written by He T’ing-ping to Governor Fredrick Coyett], not located, 22 May 
1657, fo. 527r-528r. 
122  Translaat uijt zeekeren Chinesen brieff door den Chinese Tolcq Pincqua 
geschreven aen den Hr Fredrick Coyett Preseident deses Eijlants Formosa 
[Translation of a Certain Chinese Letter written by He T’ingpin to Governor Fredrick 
Coyett], not located, 22 May 1657, fo. 527r. Cheng Hung-k’uei passed away when 
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raised several trivial matters to do with the treatment of Chinese merchants in 
Taiwan and wondered why former Governor Caesar had forced all the 
Chinese merchants to accept payment in commodities rather than in silver?123 
Instead of writing all these matters down, Coxinga wrote to Governor Fredrik 
Coyet saying that he condemned all the wrong doings of his predeccessor and 
had high expectations that Coyet would set matters straight. Only two 
conditions did he mention for the lifting of the embargo (or ‘ for restoring the 
old friendship’). 
The first of these required the Dutch would not harm any Chinese junks 
visiting Siam, Cambodia and Palembang, or anywhere else in the South 
China Sea. The second required that the goods which had been confiscated 
from his junks by the Dutch should be restituted.124  
This message was carried to Taiwan by He T’ing-ping on 13 June 
1657.125 It was translated into Dutch and read in the Council of Taiwan. 
Governor Coyett and the Council of Taiwan immediately drafted a reply. 
Promising the Chinese merchants prompt payment, they promised that they 
would also forward Coxinga’s requests to the High Government in Batavia, 
but they remained silent about the restitution of the lost goods.126 In his letter 
to Cheng Tai, Governor Coyett stated he would ‘welcome a renewal of the 
old friendship ‘, and ‘the opening of free trade on this place (Taiwan) 
according to the old custom’.127 Shrewdly Coyett let He T’ing-ping handle 
                                                                                                                             
they arrived in Amoy, therefore Coxinga and Cheng Tai had set aside five days to deal 
with the funeral. Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 157. 12 June 1657.   
123 Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 159. 13 June 1657.  
124 VOC 1222, Translaet uijt zekeren Chinesen brief door den groot mandorijn 
Coksinja geschreven aan den heer Frederick Coyett [Translation of a Chinese Letter 
Written by Great Mandarin Coxinja to Frederick Coyett ], not located, 25 May 1657, 
Fol. 516v-517r. 
125 Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 158. 13 June 1657. 
126 Ibidem, 162-3. 14 June 1657. 
127 VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Aimuij aen Sauja, Tjonhoehse 
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the negotiations first before giving any firm promise. He T’ing-ping must 
have felt like pig-in-the-middle because Coxinga’s side was also expecting 
him to bargain for concrete concessions. Cheng Tai had drawn up a list of 
commodities for which he asked a discount ‘in order to trade with gold at the 
first [possible] opportunity’. He asked for 10,000 piculs of pepper, 2,000 
piculs of red sandalwood, 500 piculs of lead, 500 piculs of tin and such spices 
as cloves, putchak and incense. The Dutch discussed the list but refused to 
sell the commodities at the prices proposed by Cheng Tai, which were 
obviously too low to accept.128 He T’ing-ping left Taiwan for Amoy carrying 
the official letters and the oral communications. He arrived there on 14 July 
1657129 and was summoned to Coxinga’s court three days later. In the past 
weeks, Coxinga had received news that one of his junks had been captured by 
a Dutch yacht off the coast of Quinam.130 When he heard about this, 
Coxinga’s suspicions about the true intentions of the Dutch, who were talking 
about restoring the old friendships, deepened. He T’ing-ping replied that the 
Taiwan authorities had also heard about this incident and were willing to 
keep the confiscated goods until he could collect them. Coxinga thereupon 
put an end to the dispute and ordered his court to prepare a placard 
annoucning that the embargo had been lifted.131 The placard was officially 
stamped and proclaimed everywhere in Amoy on 6 August 1657.132  
Meanwhile, before he set off on his northern expedition to Chê-chiang 
Coxinga was preparing a huge banquet to treat all his captains, officials, 
                                                                                                                             
Theloia, mandorijn in Aimuij [Letter from the Governor of Taiwan Frederick Coyett 
to Cheng Tai], Taiwan, 2 July 1657, fo. 509v. 
128 VOC 1222, Resolutie des Casteels Zeelandia voorgevallen onder de regeringe van 
den president Frederick Coyett [Resolution Zeelandia Castle Issued during the Term 
of Office of President Frederick Coyet], Taiwan, 27 June 1657, fo. 72r-v. 
129 Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 185. 2 Aug. 1657.   
130 Ibidem, 168. 29 June 1657; 169. 30 June 1657. 
131 Ibid., 186. 3 Aug. 1657. 
132 Ibid., 204. 25 Aug. 1657. 
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soldiers and their families.133 Although He T’ing-ping was in a hurry to leave, 
he was invited to tarry and join the feast. Only one day after the placard was 
proclaimed, a Chinese junk returned from Siam and reported that another 
Chinese junk had been captured by Dutch ships on its homeward-bound 
voyage from Johor.134 This accident embarrassed Coxinga and he ordered the 
removal of all the placards posted. He was in a quandary. Because the 
northern expedition was at stake and the demands of the Chê-chiang market 
had to be met, he needed merchandise from Taiwan. Thanks to He 
T’ing-ping’s mediation, a reliable chain of communication with the Dutch in 
Taiwan had been opened and Coxinga therefore decided to set the dispute 
aside and lift the ban before the fleet departed on 19 August 1657.135 On 21 
August 1657 a Chinese junk belonging to the Mandarin of Nan-ao arrived in 
Taiwan (via Amoy) with 20 pieces of gold ingots and 1,005 taels of silver.136 
Her arrival meant the Chinese gold trade could be resumed. Up to the end of 
December, the Taiwan factory received 393,256 guilders in gold, while it sold 
11,000 piculs of pepper at the price of 10¾ rials to 12 rials per picul.137 He 
T’ing-ping carried letters from Coxinga and Cheng Tai as well as the Chinese 
                                                          
133 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 113. Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 199. 23 
Aug. 1657. 
134 Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 200. 23 Aug. 1657. 
135  Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 114. Perhaps on around 10 August 1657, cf. 
Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 193. 11 Aug. 1657. 
136 Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 196. 21 Aug. 1657.  
137 In the end of 1657, 10,486 62/73 rials or 7,655 taels pure gold was sent to Malacca 
(1 tael=100 condijn, 1 rial=73 condijn), which equalled 393,256 guilders (1 rial pure 
gold = 750 stuijvers, cf. VOC 1212, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer 
Batavia aen den gouverneur generael joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 14 Nov. 1655, fo. 
305r) cf. VOC 1228, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen gouverneur 
generael Joan maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 8 Dec. 1657, fo. 476r; VOC 1228, Missive van 
Frederick Coyett naer Malacca aen gouverneur Joan Thijssen, Taiwan, 8 Dec. 1657, fo. 
551r. VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, 
Taiwan, 19 Nov. 1657, fo. 35v. Generale Missive, III 1655-1674, 194. 6 Jan. 1658.  
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placards to Taiwan.138 In his letter Cheng Tai wrote that he had managed to 
calm Coxinga down when the news about the captured junk arrived. He 
trusted that the Governor Coyet would take care of the restitution of the Johor 
junk.139       
Around the end of September in 1657, the two junks dispatched by 
Coxinga to Batavia returned, bringing Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker’s 
reply.140 In his letter the Governor-General confirmed that the Dutch were at 
peace with Coxinga and would welcome his traders, but he made only minor 
concessions as far as the trade to the Pepper Coast was concerned. 
Nevertheless, the High Government in Batavia graciously permitted Coxinga 
to send two or three junks to Malacca.141 Although this was not mentioned in 
the above letter, the two junks which delivered this message had also been 
offered half a rial discount per picul on the pepper purchased.142  
Coxinga’s northern expedition to the Chê-chiang coast ran smoothly 
because only few Manchu banner troops had been posted in the province and 
most of the Ch’ing soldiers were Chinese who had surrendered to Manchus. 
Altogether there were only 35,000 to 39,400 Ch’ing soldiers scattered over 
the whole province. In contrast, Coxinga had at least 40,000 soldiers 
congregted at his disposal.143 Most of the Ch’ing garrisons at fortified sites 
                                                          
138 Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 199. 22 Aug. 1657. 
139 VOC 1222, Translaet uijt seeckeren Chinesen brief door den Mandorijn Suja 
geschreven aan Frederick Coyett, [1657-8], fos. 522v-523r.  
140 Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 225. 27 Sept. 1657.  
141 Daghregister Batavia, 1657, 188. 17 June 1657. 
142 Ibidem, 145-6. 24 Apr. 1657. 
143  Ch’ên Ying-t’ai, ‘Ch’ên ying-t’ai t’i wei ch’ing-fa man-ping chi hsi-pei 
lu-ying-ping fu-chê shih-pên[Written Petition Submitted by Ch’ên ying-t’ai 
Requesting the Emperor to Dispatch Chinese Troops from the Northwestern Camps 
and Manchu Troops to Chê-chiang] 24 Dec. 1657’, in CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u 
chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien, TWH, I no. 7, 69; I T’u, ‘I-t’u 
têng wei chê-shêng ti-kuang ping-tan hsü-yao tsêng-ping shê-fang shih-pên [Petition 
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did not carry more than 500 men, while Coxinga’s fleet would have no 
trouble transporting more than 10,000 soldiers at one time.144 Just at this 
critical juncture, Coxinga directed his troops to T’ai-chou ( Tjoetiauw[D.]).145 
On 21 September 1657, 20,000 soldiers landed in the vicinity of this city146 
and laid the siege to it four days later, on the 25th. Two days later T’ai-chou 
surrendered to Coxinga. 147  In the weeks which followed, all the 
neighbouring towns in the prefecture surrendered without offering any 
defence. As soon as the take-over had been completed by Coxinga’s officials, 
the markets were re-opened.148 Having discovered that Coxinga’s main force 
had moved from his base in Amoy to the Chê-chiang coast, the Manchu 
Governor-General of Chê-chiang and Fu-chien, Li Shuai-tai, shrewdly 
prepared a massive assult on Coxinga’s various bridgeheads in Min-an-chên. 
On 20 October 1657, his Manchu troops broke through the Min-an-chên 
fortifications which meant that the land route from Fu-chou to the 
                                                                                                                             
Submitted by I T’u Requesting that the Size of the Garrison Be Increased so that It 
Might be More Widely Deployed] 8 Jan. 1658’, in CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u 
chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien, TWH, I, no. 7, 77; Lang 
T’ing-tso, ‘Lang t’ing-tso t’i wei chêng-chün ssu-you chin-fan wu-sung ch’ung-ming 
chih-shih shih-pên [Report Written by Lang t'ing-tso about the Attempt by the Cheng 
Force to Attack the Town of Wu-sung and Ch’ung-ming Island] 15 Oct. 1657’, in 
CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien, TWH, 
I, no. 7, 430. 
144 T’ien hsiung, ‘T’ien-hsiung t’i wei chê-chiang yen-hai hsün-kuang ping t’an 
ch’ing tiao-ping hsieh-fang shih-pên [Petition Written by Tien-hsiung to Request 
Larger Garrisons to Defend the Coast of Chê-chiang] 1 Jan. 1658’, in CKTI (ed.), 
Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien, TWH, I, no. 7, 95. 
145 Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 214. 6 Sept. 1657; Yang, Ts’ung-chêng 
shih-lu, 114. 
146 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 115; I T’u, ‘I-t’u têng t’i wei huang-yen t’ai-chou 
shih-hsien shih-pên 4 Nov. 1657, in CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch'êng-kung 
chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien, TWH, I no. 7, 473. 
147 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 115. 
148 Ibidem, 116. 
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Chê-chiang coast could be re-opened and the aid to Chê-chiang coast from 
Fu-chou (both on land and on water) would be allowed.149 Coxinga therefore 
had to abort his advance and return to Amoy in November. 
Meanwhile, Cheng Tai had urged Governor Coyet to honour his 
promise to restitute the impounded junks and confiscated goods and to give a 
guarantee that Chinese junks would be able to visit any port in the South 
China Sea region. He also made it tactfully understood that Coxinga might be 
provoked to proclaim another embargo if these conditions were not met.150   
Governor Frederick Coyet and the Council of Taiwan had already 
discussed the seizure of the junks on 4 September 1657 and they believed 
that Cheng Tai had already been informed about the outcome by his agent. 
Their resolution declared that the confiscation of the Johor junk had been 
legal because the embargo was interpreted as a malicious action against the 
Dutch. Although they had given orders that the impounded Chinese junks 
should be brought to Taiwan, the Johor junk was lost in a typhoon and the 
Company would only return the cargo which had been captured and salvaged. 
In the case of the junk which had been captured off Quinam, the list of goods 
lost submitted by the Chinese owner was not accpted as accurate. 
Nevertheless, the Council had punished the captain who had seized the junk 
and Cheng Tai’s agent was free to sue him if he wished. Finally, the case of 
the junk captured in 1654 off the Kuang-tung coast had already settled by the 
Batavian authorities with Coxinga. For various reasons, the Taiwan 
authorities therefore repudiated Cheng Tai’s request for compensation.151  
As Coxinga was fitting out his trading-junks in the next monsoon and 
                                                          
149 Ibid., 118; VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan 
Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 19 Nov. 1657, fo. 38r. 
150 Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 256. 13 Nov. 1657.  
151  VOC 1222, Misive van Frederick Coyett naer Aimuij aen den mandorijn 
Sauja[Cheng Tai], Taiwan, 24 Nov. 1657, fos. 292v-293r. 
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preparing to escort them southwards, Cheng Tai asked Governor Coyet to 
grant four passes to Siam, Palembang, Malacca and Johor. 152  Perhaps 
because Governor Coyet was worried about having failed to satisfy all of 
Coxinga’s demands, he decided to comply with the request. In his letter to 
Cheng Tai, he emphasized that this should be seen as an exceptional 
gesture.153 Explaining his decision to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker, 
Coyet writes: 
‘If only the Kings of Cambodia, Palembang, and other places which 
have concluded contracts with the Company would honour their promises 
properly and order their subjects not to sell designated goods to anyone other 
than the Company, the Company would suffer no harm. They should also 
punish those transgressors in their own kingdoms, which is more fitting than 
that we should have to check the junks and confiscate their goods. This had 
reaped us more than enough odium in Japan and China, and it has also 
caused the loss of earlier privileges in Siam since 1653.’154      
Even the Japanese Shogun was aware of the recent Dutch patrol actions 
against Chinese junks. After she had been struck by a typhoon, some 
confiscated goods and the surviving crew of the Johor junk had been brought 
directly to Japan by the Dutch ship the Urk on 23 August 1657. This caused 
an uproar among the Chinese in Nagasaki who shouted ‘Death to you’ and 
‘Dutch robber ship’, as they pelted the crew of the Urk with stones, even 
though the latter were already in custody.155 After the Chinese merchants had 
                                                          
152 Ibidem, fo. 294r. 
153 Dagregister Zeelandia, IV 1655-1662, 256. 13 Nov. 1657. 
154 VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, 
Taiwan, 19 Nov. 1657, fo. 21r-v; VOC 1228, Resolutie in rade van Formosa, Taiwan, 
13 Nov. 1657, fo. 499r. 
155 NFJ 288, Missive door den E Zacharias Wagenaer en den raet deses Comptoirs 
aan haer Edts [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker]tot Batavia, Japan, 12 Oct. 
1657, fo. 34. According to the log of the Urk, the crew of this ship had disobeyed the 
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lodged an appeal with the shogunal court, the verdict was that the legal owner 
should be compensated in Taiwan for the loss of the junk and her cargo. The 
shogunal court also warned the Dutch not to commit any such acts of piracy 
again on pain of being expelled from Japan forever.156 The upshot was that 
the urgent need for Chinese gold and the pressure exerted by the Japanese 
authorities forced Governor Coyet to make some concessions.157 After he 
had received these four passes, in his reply the Official of Revenue, Cheng 
Tai, who was residing in Amoy (the Chu-shou Hu-kuan), revealed that 
Coxinga’s real intention was to challenge the pass system: 
‘Your Honour has sent me four passes, a splendid gesture and I feel 
highly satisfied with this treatment, even though Coxinga’s junks sailing to 
the east and to the west are more than several hundred. My agent, Pingsick, 
has written to me that you had told him our junks can sail freely to your 
places. Even if we encounter some of your ships, we shall be treated as 
friends and there will be no antagonism as there was before. This being the 
case, all the junks can now sail the sea freely and there will no longer be any 
bother with the[Dutch] passes here’158     
In 1646, Iquan had made an attempt to remould the Chinese tribute 
                                                                                                                             
instructions issued by Batavia. They not only chased junks far off their planned course, 
but also confiscated some goods for themselves. Cf. NFJ 288, Naerder bericht schrift 
gedaen door voornoemden E Zacharias Wagenaer aan haer Eedle [gouverneur 
generael Joan Maetsuijcker] tot Bataiva [Report Written by Zacharias Wagenaer to 
Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker in Batavia], Japan, 13 Dec. 1657, fos. 99-100.  
156 NFJ 288, Missive door den E Zacharias Wagenaer en den raet deses Comptoirs 
aan haer Edts [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker]tot Batavia, Japan, 12 Oct. 
1657, fo. 58. 
157 VOC 1228, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Malacca aen gouverneur Joan 
Thijssen, 8 Dec. 1657, fo. 552r. 
158 VOC 1228, Translaet uijt zeekeren Chinesen brief door den groot mandorijn Sauja 
geschreven naer Taijouan aan den gouverneur Frederick Coyett, Amoy, 2 Mar. 1658, 
fo. 656r. 
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system by absorbing the crown trade as a means to protect his business 
against the depredations of the patrols of the VOC. Between 1647 and 1653, 
Coxinga was still not aware of the fact that the VOC could use its privileges 
with local rulers as a legal basis to exclude him from certain lucrative trades. 
It was only after the VOC had confiscated deerskins from his junks off the 
Chao Phraya estuary in Siam, Coxinga and the Amoy merchants realized that 
the warning from the Japanese shogunal court was the only effective weapon 
which would give them any security. Hence, they began to require the VOC 
factory merchants grant them passes for their return journey to Amoy and 
their voyage to Japan. As early as May 1652, Chief Merchant Volkerus 
Westerwolt in Siam issued a pass to a Chinese anachoda for his return 
voyage to Ch’üan-chou.159 In the summer of 1654, the anachodas of eight 
Chinese junks again asked the Westerwolt to grant them passes to secure a 
safe voyage home. Although Westerwolt refused their requests for passes, he 
did give them a guarantee that no junks would be captured at sea in response 
to the Siamese king’s admonition of keeping Chinese junks secure. 160 In the 
summer of 1655 nine Chinese junks visited Siam and five of them intended 
to sail from there directly to Japan,161 but they ran into a typhoon and had to 
turn back, apart from a few which sought shelter in Quinam. When one of the 
junks finally arrived on Japan in July 1656, she carried the pass issued by 
                                                          
159 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 79. 2 Sept. 1652. 
160 VOC 1206, Missive van den coopman Volckerius Westerwolt uijt Judea aen den 
gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India [Letter Written by 
Volckerius Westerwolt from Ayutthaya to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker and 
the Council of the Indies], Siam, 28 Oct. 1654, fo. 13r-v. Serious tension had been 
mounting between the two groups because the anachodas tried to gain restitution by 
the expedient of threatening the Dutch merchants in Siam with violence. 
161 VOC 1209, Missiven aen Joan Maetsuijker gouverneur generael en raden van 
India door Volckerius Westerwolt, Siam, 12 Oct. 1655, fo. 945v; NFJ 287, Missive 
vant Comptoir Nangasackij [door Leonard Winninx] aen haer [gouverneur generael 
Joan Maetsuijcker] tot Batavia per de schepen Aremuijden, Vlielandt, en Zoutelande 
over Taijouan gesonden, Japan, 19 Oct 1655, fo. 27. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
 341 
Westerwolt and a prince’s flag bearing the motto ‘Vive Orangie’.162  
The support of the Siamese King was a very important element in the 
struggle waged by Coxinga’s merchants against the Dutch pass system. In the 
past, the Sino-Siamese trade had been monopolized by the Siamese King who 
dispatched junks with tributary embassies to Kuang-chou. When Iquan tried 
to break into this trade during the 1630s, he was excluded but, as soon as the 
Lung-wu Emperor was pronounced the legal Emperor of the moribund Ming 
Empire in 1645, Iquan seized his chance and tried to set up a crown trade 
under the cover of the tributary system. As mentioned earlier, Siamese 
envoys did indeed visit Amoy in 1653. At that moment in time it would 
appear that the Amoy merchants had temporally snatched the Sino-Siamese 
trade out of the hands of the Kuang-tung merchants. 
Table 11-6:The expansion of Chinese trade to Siam 1650-1661 
Year Chinese junk 
 visited Siam 
Chinese junk 
sailing  
directly to Japan 
 from Siam 
1650               10163  
1651                6164
1652                4165 1 166
                                                          
162 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 255. 7 July 1656; 256, 10 July 1656; 
257-8. 17 July 1656; VOC 1219, Rapport van de coopman Volckerius Westerwolt 
wegen den toestant van 's compagnies negotie in Siam [Report Written by Merchant 
Volckerius Westerwolt about the Situation of the Company Trade in Siam], Siam, 16 
Nov. 1656, fo. 803v. 
163 VOC 1175, Missive door Volckerius Westerwolt [van Siam] aan de Ed. heer 
Anthonij van Brouckhorst president in Japan, Japan, 4 July 1650, fo. 547v; Generale 
Missive, II 1639-1655, 448. 20 Jan. 1651. 
164 VOC 1187, Missiven [aen haer Eds. Joan Maetsuijcker te Batavia] [door Hendrick 
Creijers en Volckerius Westerwolt], Siam, 20 Oct. 1651, fo. 664v; Generale Missiven, 
II 1639-1655, 526. 19 Dec. 1651. 
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1653                6167
1654                8168
1655                9169
1656                9170
1657               10171 3172
1658               10173 6174
1659               21175 7176
1660               14177 7178
                                                                                                                             
165 VOC 1194, Missive [aen haer Eds. Joan Maetsuijcker te Batavia van Volckerius 
Westerwolt en Jan van Rijck te Siam], Siam, 22 Oct. 1652, fo. 248r.  
166 VOC 1194, Missive [aen haer Eds. Joan Maetsuijcker te Batavia van Volckerius 
Westerwolt en Jan van Rijck te Siam], Siam, 22 Oct. 1652, fo. 248r. 
167 Generale Missiven, II 1639-1655, 694. 19 Jan. 1654. 
168 VOC 1206, Missive van den coopman Volckerius Westerwolt uijt Judea aen den 
gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, Siam, 28 Oct. 1654, fo. 
2r. 
169 VOC 1209, Missiven aen Joan Maetsuijker gouverneur generael en raden van 
India door Volckerius Westerwolt, Siam, 12 Oct. 1655, fo. 945v.  
170 VOC 1219, Rapport van de coopman Volckerius Westerwolt wegen den toestant 
van 's compagnies negotie in Siam, Siam, 16 Nov. 1656, fos. 803v-804r. 
171 VOC 1223, Missive aen de edele heeren gouverneur generael ende raden van 
India residerende tot Batavia, Siam, 16 Nov. 1657, fo. 812v; but in: VOC 1223, 
Missiven aen opperhoofd Zacharias Wagenaer en raet tot Japan van Siam, Siam, 6 
July 1657, fo. 600v. recorded there were 13 Chinese junks arrived.  
172 Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 194. 6 Jan. 1658. 
173 NFJ 351, Missive uit Jan van Rijck in Judia opt Nederlants Comptoir Siam aan E 
Joan Boucheljon president ende opperhooft in Japan, Siam, 4 July 1658, not foliated.  
174 Ibidem. 
175 NFJ 351, Missive uit Jan van Rijck in Judia opt Nederlants Comptoir Siam aan E 
Zacharias Wagenaer President opperhooft over s’ Compagnies voortreffelijcke negotie 
als vorderen ommeslach int koninckrijcke Japan, Siam, 5 July 1659, not foliated. 
176 Ibidem.  
177 NFJ 351,Missive uit Jan van Rijck in Judia op t nieuw comptoir Siam aan den E 
Joan Boucheljon, president en opperhooft over compagnies voortreffelijcke negotie 
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1661                3179
The expansion of the Chinese junk trade to Siam was another outcome 
of the wars between the VOC and Quinam and Cambodia during the 1640s. 
VOC ships frequently blockaded the harbours of these two countries, so that 
the Chinese junks were obliged to sail elsewhere.  
Ever since 1646 when one of his vassals in the Malay Peninsula had 
rebelled, the Siamese King frequently required Dutch aid for the 
long-distance military expeditions he mounted to pacify these areas. In 1648 
the Company sent seven ships to attack Kedah, forcing its ruler to pay 
homage to Siam again. When Songkla, Ligor, Patani and Pattalung joined 
together to rebel in 1649, the VOC personnel in Ayutthaya assisted the King 
Prasat Thong to mount an expeditionary force with his army. By 1650 most 
of the rebellions had been supressed180 but the Siamese King demanded an 
even larger force from the Dutch in 1651 for another expedition against 
Songkla. It was not forthcoming as in 1652 most of the Dutch military 
resources were already invested in the Moluccas and Amboina.181  
As the Dutch were otherwise occupied and not able to help the Siamese 
Court in its pursuit of its expansionist policies, they found themselves 
alientated from the Siamese King.182 The new staff at the Deshima factory in 
Japan were informed that: 
‘He[the Siamese king] is upset because of the refusal to send military 
aid from Batavia. His displeasure has been intensified by several Chinese 
                                                                                                                             
als vorderen ommeslagh int koninckrijcke Japan, Siam, 10 Aug. 1660, not foliated. 
178 Ibidem. 
179 VOC 1236, Missive door den koopman Jan van Rijck aen haer Eds. tot Batavia 
geschreven, Siam, 10 Oct. 1661, fo. 672. 
180 Smith, The Dutch in Seventeenth century Thailand, 32. 
181 Ibid, 33. 
182 Ibid, 34. The reign of King Prasat Thong almost exactly parallelled the period of 
Dutch political involvement in Ayutthaya.  
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and Japanese who are ill disposed towards us [the Dutch] and who have 
taken this opportunity to curb our special freedoms.’183                   
As the Dutch-Siamese relationship deteriorated, Chinese and Japanese 
merchants gained more weight at the Siamese Court because the King 
fostered the ambition of personally controlling the Siam-Japan trade. In the 
early decades of the seventeenth century, the tributary trade between Siam 
and Japan had been pretty constant but it ground to a halt after Prasat Thong 
usurped the Siamese throne in 1629. He had poisoned the Japanese 
mercenary captain, Yamada Nagamasa, and had added insult to injury by 
burning down the Japanese residential area in Ayutthaya in 1630, effectively 
destroying the existing tie with Japan.184 Not surprisingly, the trading-junk 
and the tributary envoy he sent to Japan in 1634 in an attempt to resume 
relations were rejected out of hand. Between 1634 and 1655, Prasat Thong 
sent six different consecutive envoys to Japan, all of whom were either 
repudiated by the Japanese Court or were lost at sea, swallowed up by the 
fury of the typhoons.185 The two embassies dispatched in 1653 and 1656 
were mostly probably sent under an arrangement with Chinese merchants. 
The first was sent on a private junk but the second, accompanied by both 
Chinese and Siamese sailors, was accomodated on the King’s personal ship 
built in the Dutch style.186 This vessel left Japan in October 1656 and visited 
Amoy on her way home. She left there on 25 February 1657 with two other 
Chinese junks.187 This arrangement is a very strong clue that Coxinga was 
                                                          
183 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 104. 16 July 1653. 
184 Iwao Seiichi, ‘Reopening of the Diplomatic and Commercial Relations between 
Japan and Siam during the Tokugawa Period’, Acta Asiatica: Bulletin of the Institute 
of Eastern Culture, 4 ( 1963), 2. 
185 Ibidem, 18.  
186 Ibid., 16-7. 
187 VOC 1123, Missive aen de edele heeren gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijcker] 
ende raden van India residerende tot Batavia van coopman Jan van Rijck uijt Siam, 
Siam, 16 Nov. 1657, fo. 812v. 
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the organizer of this voyage, an exercise devised to build up a Japan- 
Amoy-Siam crown trading system.   
The passive attitude adopted by the Siamese Court towards honouring 
the Dutch monopsory on cow hides and deerskins reinforced the expansion of 
Coxinga’s trade and weakened the position of the VOC in Siam. In 1654, the 
head of the Ayutthaya factory complained that rivalry with the Chinese 
merchants was forcing the purchase prices to rise.188 A year later, in 1655 he 
had not been able to purchase the appointed quantity of skins for Japan.189 
The upshot was that the balance of the Dutch factory in Siam was negative in 
1652, 1655 and 1656.190 Apparently the Dutch monopsory on deerskins had 
outlived its effectiveness. The friendship and favours shown the Dutch by the 
Siamese King entered even more troubled waters when King Prasat Thong 
passed away and his youngest son was enthroned as King Narai in October 
1657.191 That year, not only did the Chinese purchase deerskins in large 
quantities but many Indian and Muslim merchants also entered the market in 
Siam to sell cotton textiles from India.192  
Again that same year, Coxinga’s junks obtained VOC passes for Siam. 
These junks enjoyed a very rare opportunity to trade because all the vassals 
of the Siamese King thronged to Ayutthaya to pay homage to the new 
incumbent on the throne. Vessels from all over the Malay Peninsula, Patani, 
Johor and Pahan, crowed the roadstead.193 The following year, 1658, the 
                                                          
188 VOC 1206, Missive van den coopman Volckerius Westerwolt uijt Judea aen den 
gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, Siam, 28 Oct. 1654, fos. 
11v-12r. 
189 VOC 1209, Missiven aen Joan Maetsuijker gouverneur generael en raden van 
India door Volckerius Westerwolt, Siam, 12 Oct. 1655, fo. 945v. 
190 Smith, The Dutch in Seventeenth century Thailand, 64. Table 3. 
191 Iwao,’ Reopening of the Diplomatic and Commercial Relations’, 20.  
192 NFJ 351, Missive uit Jan van Rijk in Judia opt Comptoire Siam aan den Zacharias 
Wagenaar president ende opperhooft in Japan, Siam, 6 July 1657, not foliated. 
193 VOC 1223, missive aen de edele heeren gouverneur generael ende raden van India 
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Chinese merchants were able to purchase no fewer than 70,000 pieces of 
deerskins and an equal quantity of cow hides because the privileges granted 
to the Dutch by King Prasat Thong ceased to be acknowledged after his 
decease.194 Obviously, it was an opportunity not to be missed and well aware 
of their chance, Coxinga’s merchants snatched away the deerskin trade from 
under the nose of the VOC.  
On the Philippines front, Coxinga lifted the ban on the trade to Manila 
in the spring of 1657 after some negotiation with Spanish priests who had 
been dispatched by the Manila government.195 When Cheng Tai asked the 
Taiwan factory to grant him several passes, the junks which had returned 
from Manila already begun to sell spices from the Moluccas.196 Even before 
Coxinga had lifted the ban on Taiwan at the end of 1656, his merchants had 
already purchased 300,000 taels’ worth of cotton textiles from Japan to 
supply the demand in Manila.197 In the following spring of 1658, twenty 
junks carried coarse goods like cangans (cotton textiles), iron utensils and 
wheat to Manila, expecting to be able to acquire more Spanish silver there.198  
In conclusion, Coxinga had not only succeeded in monopolizing the 
silk exports from China, but he also penetrated the Dutch trading bulwarks in 
                                                                                                                             
residerende tot Batavia van coopman Jan van Rijck uijt Siam, Siam, 16 Nov. 1657, fo. 
813r.  
194 NFJ 351, Missive uit Jan van Rijk in Judia opt Comptoire Siam aan den Zacharias 
Wagenaar president ende opperhooft in Japan, Siam, 6 July 1657, not foliated.  
195 VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, 
Taiwan, 10 Mar 1657, fo. 1r. 
196 VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, 
Taiwan, 24 Nov. 1657, fo. 46r-v. 
197 NFJ 288, Missive aan haer Edlen [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker] tot 
Batavia dato ultimo December per Chinese Jonck over Siam geschreven [door Joan 
Bouchelion], Japan, 31 Dec. 1656, fo. 8. 
198 VOC 1228, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, 
Taiwan, 11 Mar. 1658, fo. 492r. 
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Siam and the Malay Peninsula, and had begun to focus seriously on Japan 
and Manila. Buttressed by the large income pouring in from his expanding 
trading empire, he intended to strike the weakest coastal areas of the Ch’ing 
empire, thereby forcing the Peking Court return to the table for peace talks.          
Two ultimate strikes, 1659-1662 
Not long after they had broken through Coxinga’s blockade of Fu-chou 
Harbour, the Manchu tribal cavalry returned to Peking. At the end of 
December 1657, the Governor-General of Chê-chiang and Fu-chien, Li 
Shuai-tai, immediately sent a letter to the Manchu Emperor, Shun-chih, 
requesting that another troop of Manchu tribal cavalry again be dispatched. 
This request was turned down on 14 January 1658, because the Shun-chih 
Emperor had just decided to dispatch Manchu soldiers on a new mission to 
eradicate the remaining forces of Yung-li Emperor in Yün-nan and Kuei-chou 
in southwest China.199 The formal order for this was issued on 18 January 
1658. 200 At the end of February, two separate armies of Manchu troops went 
south and regrouped in the hinterland on the western border of Hu-nan 
province about 900 kilometres from Amoy.201 
On 5 December 1657 Coxinga led his fleet on a routine mission to 
Nan-ao Island,202 where rice was both purchased and levied during February 
and March.203 Before the junks left in June, they had conquered two districts 
                                                          
199 I T’u, ‘I-t’u têng t’i wei min-chê liang-shêng wu-hsü tsêng-chia ping-hsiang 
shih-pên [Statement Written by I T’u stating that There Was No Need to Increase the 
Military Budget in Chê-chiang ] 14 Jan. 1658’, in CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u 
chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien, TWH, I no. 7, 92-3. 
200 TWYH(ed.), Ch’ing-shih-tsu shih-lu hsüan-chi, 136-139. 
201 Ku Ch’êng, Nan-ming shih[A History of the Southern Ming], (Peking: Chung-Kuo 
Ch’ing-Nien, 1997), 901. 
202 Yang, Ts’ung-chêng shih-lu, 120. 
203 Ibidem, 121. 
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along the coast near Chieh-yang.204 They discovered that the fortifications in 
Chieh-yang and Ch’ao-chou were better reinforced than they had been in 
previous years. The Manchu authorities had built two bastions on the bank of 
the Jung River, which obstructed Coxinga’s naval troops from sailing 
upstream and reaching Chieh-yang.205  Coxinga must have detected the 
moves of the Manchus before March, because even the Dutch had heard 
about it by then: 
‘Yung-li, the opponent of the Manchus, is causing them so much trouble 
around Hu-nan (Honan[D]) they have had to dispatch many soldiers there. 
This has allowed the lower land far away from there to find some peace. The 
direct journey from here (Taiwan) to Sha-ch’eng and the land route beginning 
from An-hai (to the north)has all become safer.’206 
Since the Manchu garrison troops in Fu-chien and Chê-chiang provinces 
were scattered around various locations and could not be readily assembled 
to make the massive force needed to invade Amoy and Quemoy, Coxinga 
faced fewer risks than might have been thought in mounting a long-range 
expedition. Since 1654, his strategy had been to attract massive numbers of 
Manchu troops to Fu-chien and keep them away from the coastal areas. This 
tactic weakened any impact they might have had on the trading routes to the 
Chiang-nan area. This was an important move because now that he had 
collected adequate supplies of commodities from both Japan and Southeast 
                                                          
204 Ibid., 124. 
205 Wang Kuo-kuang,’Wang kuo-kuang t’i wei chêng-chün tsai ch’ao-chou nan-ao 
i-tai huo-tung ch’ing-hsing shih-pên [Report Written by Wang kuo-kuang about 
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Asia, the best way to expand his trade was to construct a direct link between 
the Chiang-nan region and Japan. If he laid siege to the city of Nanking and 
forced the Manchus to withdraw their scattered garrisons from the 
Chiang-nan region, he reasoned he could operate his trade at will in Su-chou 
and other locations in the vicinity of where the silk was produced. The siege 
would have the added advantage of forcing the Manchu Court in Peking to 
open peace talks with him.  
On 13 June 1658, Coxinga led all his ships northwards, towards the 
Chiang-nan region.207 The fleet sailed along the Chê-chiang coast where it 
was able to levy sufficient quantities of rice around Wen-chou prefecture. 
This was stored on San-p’an Island off the coast.  In August the ships sailed 
on to the Chou-shan Archipelago .208 Although Coxinga laid siege to the 
prefectural city of Wen-chou for one day, for unknown reasons he suddenly 
withdrew. The junk which arrived in Japan on 24 July carrying Coxinga’s 
ambassadors probably departed after this sudden withdrawal. Perhaps the 
Wen-chou authorities helped to fit out this valuable junk in exchange for a 
guarantee of the safety of their city. The junk arrived in Nagasaki flying 
‘many flags’ and bringing ‘beautiful gifts of curious silk fabrics worth about 
60,000 taels’.209 The Japanese records show the envoy’s suite consisted of 
147 people and he carried an official diplomatic letter addressed directly to 
the Shogun in Edo. 210  The Dutch Chief merchant, Joan Boucheljon, 
witnessed their unusual appearance: 
‘The suite, consisting of 40 persons, proceeded him and came on shore 
first. They were dressed in strange garb. Once ashore, they stood in order in 
neat rows with all their ornaments, flags, fans, spikes, cutlasses, chains, 
trumpets and such. Then the ambassador came in on a similar barge, sitting 
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on a chair, with his norimono and bodyguards. He rested for a while at the 
top of the stairs.’211  
In the letter, after addressing some words of praise to the Japanese, 
Coxinga implied that if he could defeat the Manchus successfully, he would 
restore the formal tributary relationship with Japan. 212  But this only 
scratched the surface of the bargain. According to the information Governor 
Frederick Coyet of Formosa received, Coxinga presented a direct request 
through this envoy. 
‘In this way he (although it is not a hundred per cent certain) would 
also send a junk carrying two his servants to Japan in order to bring his 
brother back, and he required a huge number of well-armed soldiers on 
condition that he could promise them (the Japanese soldiers) a piece of land 
to occupy as a reward. In fact, he would be willing to give them the best 
island in Nanking [province].’213   
This news was also later partly confirmed by Joan Boucheljon in Nagasaki: 
‘He also requested that permission be given to his half-brother (a son 
of the above-mentioned woman, who had been left with a Japanese and still 
lived in Nagasaki) to join him. Furthermore, according to our interpreter, 
because they were not sure whether the letter requesting assistance in their 
war against Manchus had been delayed, it was revealed to the interpreters 
that their envoy enjoyed as great an authority in China as the Shogun did in 
                                                          
211 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 355. 26 July 1658. 
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Japan.’214         
Coxinga needed Japanese aid to maintain the occupation of Ch’ung-ming 
Island. Since the 1650s, his forces had made several attempts to hold on to 
Ch’ung-ming Island because it was so strategically located in the mouth of 
the Yang-tze River. The distance between Nagasaki and Ch’ung-ming Island 
in the Yangtze River estuary was equidistant from this island and Amoy, 
about 800 kilometres in either direction, the crucial factor was that it was 
apparently easier to get provisions to maintain the garrison on Ch’ung-ming 
Island from Japan than from Amoy. The Dutch records report that in Nanking 
and the Chiang-nan area the price of silk was only half that in Kuang-chou 
and pepper could be sold at 25 taels (= 31 rials) per picul.215 Indubitably the 
direct trade between Ch’ung-ming and Japan would maximize the profits of 
the triangular Siam-Sino-Japan trade. The Shogunal Court passed over 
Coxinga’s bold request in silence and adopted a neutral stance towards the 
civil war on the continent. Before Coxinga’s delegates departed from 
Nagasaki on 8 October, he had already left with his fleet to sail north from 
Chou-shan. Unfortunately it was struck by a fierce typhoon on 6 September 
1658, a calamity which made any further expedition impossible because of 
the turn of the monsoon season was swiftly approaching.216  
Coxinga had to regroup his fleet using Chou-shan Archipelago as the 
gathering point and then commenced raiding several of the district towns 
around Ningpo. Since his departure from Amoy, until this raid no Manchu 
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garrison troops had actually been engaged in combat with Coxinga’s soldiers. 
Even after the raids began, the conflicts were pretty small-scale. When 
Coxinga laid a siege to the district city Hsiang-shan which was situated on an 
island, the local gentry sent some representatives to negotiate with him and 
promised their co-operation in his trading ventures. He therefore spared the 
town.217 Apparently trade loomed larger than war in the minds of both sides. 
Later, in October Coxinga’s troops also occupied the Wen-chou and 
T’ai-chou regions.218 Reports from Manchu scouts revealed that by and large 
his soldiers were engaging peacefully in trade in the countryside, after taking 
the precaution of shutting up the garrisons within in the city walls.219 
San-p’an Island was used as the base at which the provisions for all the 
troops were stored. Chou-shan Island was transformed into a base from 
which to operate the Japan trade and Sha-ch’eng Harbour was exploited to 
maintain communications with Amoy. According to Dutch sources: ‘Coxinga 
had occupied two cities in Chê-chiang and was planning to advance into 
Nanking province.’220 He maintained a truce with the Manchu garrisons 
when he was living in Wen-chou and Sha-ch’eng from October 1657 to May 
1658.221 In December and January he dispatched five large junks to Japan, 
carrying different sorts of silk piece goods and sugar valued at about 270,000 
taels altogether.222 Because the silk cargo was estimated at 200,000 taels, 
Zacharias Wagenaer, the Dutch chief merchant, began to worry about 
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whether this competition might not reduce the profits on Bengal silks.223 The 
following year 1659, Coxinga summoned the whole of his fleet and all his 
troops and assembled them on the coast of Wen-chou on 13 May. Once the 
south monsoon set in, he went ahead with his plans for the northern 
expedition.224 The cold-shoulder turned on him by the Shogunal Court 
forced him to shift his original plan of establishing a Japanese garrison on 
Ch’ungming Island to posting his best troops with their families there. 
Coxinga therefore gave the unusual order that his captains and soldiers 
should bring their spouses with them on this expedition.225 As he moved 
northwards, he dispatched another ten junks to Japan during the north 
monsoon. The Dutch records say this group of ten junks exported some 641.2 
piculs of raw silk in total, which was about 2/3 of the amount for one 
season.226 The Chinese raw silks exports must have been approaching their 
zenith because the main forces of the Manchus were destined to march on 
Yün-nan province from Hu-nan province and hence moved farther away from 
Chiang-nan region.             
Table 11-7. The Chinese and the Dutch Silver Exports from Japan and 








Chinese Raw Silk 
exports in Japan 
(picul) 
1650 6828 3940 963
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1651 4749 4896 937.75
228  
1652 5687 5719 881.5
229 
1653 3517 6191 719
230 
1654 8181 3848  1400
231 
1655 4655 4002  1401
232 
1656 5241 6190 1900
233 
1657 2450 7562 1120
234 
1658 11029 5640 1360
235 
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Source:* Von Glahn, Fountain of Fortun, 227.Table 21. 
Coxinga was very confident that he would be able to occupy 
Ch’ung-ming Island, which would give him control of the Nanking area, or 
more precisely what was known as the Chiang-nan region. The reason for his 
confidence was he was in secret contact with the commander of Ch’ing 
garrison named Ma Chin-pao in Su-chou. When his the van of his fleet 
anchored in the roadstead of Ch’ung-ming Island on 7 July 1659, he 
immediately announced: 
‘Ch’ung-ming and its sounding islands will be our real base, as 
important as Amoy, because we shall bring our families to live here. The 
troops should treat the inhabitants here mildly. Therefore, anyone harassing 
the inhabitants, including the others in his section, will be sentenced to 
death.’238     
The next day, Coxinga sent a messenger to Regional Commander Ma 
Chin-pao but the latter was hesitant about joining him and would only 
vouchsafe the reply that, if Coxinga approached the city of Nanking, he 
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would offer his assistance. 239  Since it was Coxinga’s plan to keep 
Ch’ung-ming Island as his own trading station, he decided not to subject it to 
a violent assault but to cower the residential garrison into surrender. He had 
few qualms that he would not succeed because he had brought some 100,000 
soldiers with his fleet. Time was pressing as the onset of the south monsoon 
season could expected at the end of September. If he could not obtain certain 
political concessions from the Manchu Court, he might have no option but to 
return south. Ch’ung-ming Island was difficult to defend during the strong 
north monsoon and the attenuated supply lines made it unlikely that a 
Manchu attack could be fended off. Therefore as his only reasonable option 
was to force the Manchu Court back to the negotiation table for peace talks 
within two months, Coxinga decided to trust the word of Regional 
Commander Ma Chin-pao and ordered his fleet upstream. The distance from 
Ch’ung-ming Island to Nanking along the Yang-tze River is about 380 
kilometres. At a distance of 270 kilometres lies Chen-chiang, which was 
considered the crucial jumping-off place for any invasion of Nanking. On 10 
August Coxinga defeated the garrison of Chen-chiang in front of that city.240 
His fleet finally anchored outside the Nanking on 25 August. On 29 August, 
he began to lay siege to the city walls of Nanking from the river banks: the 
northern and the western sides. The eastern side is hilly, but the southern side 
lay open. If Coxinga’s troop could scale the walls the city would be his, but 
Coxinga was still waiting Regional Commander Ma Chin-pao’s assistance to 
seal off the southern side of the city. His delegate to Regional Commander 
Ma Chin-pao left on 4 September and he planned to start bombarding the 
northern city gate on 8 September.241 Unfortunately the Manchu cavalry 
broke through the entrenchment before the bombardment could begin and 
created a gap in Coxinga’s siege lines. As these Manchu cavalrymen were no 
more than 3,000 Coxinga decide to lure them out into the open field and to 
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destroy them once and for all. He divided the whole army up in four parts on 
the hills along the Yangtze River and faced the Manchu cavalry in the open 
field. Seasoned soldiers, the Manchus did not fall into the mistake of rushing 
into the middle of his formation, but adopted a circuitous movement to attack 
the right flank. Coxinga’s heavily armoured soldiers moved too slowly to be 
able to reinforce their flank and consequently the formation collapsed under 
the charge of the cavalry. Most of Coxinga’s best soldiers and commanders 
fell in battle. On 13 September Coxinga decided to retreat with his whole 
fleet and on the way pick up the survivors from the river. His chief concern 
was to protect the families of the soldiers from the depredations of Manchu 
warships which were even then sailing downstream. 242  He arrived at 
Ch’ung-ming Island six days later and again sent a delegate to Regional 
Commander Ma Chin-pao, asking him to mediate in the negotiations with the 
Manchu authorities.243 On the 25th, Coxinga resumed his original plan of 
attacking Ch’ung-ming Island, but just one day later Commander Ma 
Chin-pao dispatched a delegate to Coxinga, asking him to abort this attack 
which would allow him to initiate peace talks with Manchu Emperor. 
Coxinga therefore retreated and led the fleet southwards to the coast of 
Wen-chou.244   
Although Coxinga’s plan to occupy Ch’ung-ming island was aborted 
by his defeat, Sino-Japanese trade still continued to expand successfully, 
undisturbed by the invasion. A report from Taiwan states that the Chinese 
trading route was left unimpeded: 
‘The land routes are pretty secure, the hostilities have recently halted 
and peace is being offered to Coxinga on good terms. He is on the island of 
Chou-shan just off the Nanking coast now and is residing there so as to 
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negotiate with Manchus.’245     
As the above table shows, the Sino-Japan silk-for-silver trade still 
maintained its momentum even though Coxinga had been defeated at 
Nanking. Furterhmore, during his retreat, Coxinga had also captured plenty 
of rice and provisions which had originally been gathered to pay the taxes to 
Peking.246 Therefore when Coxinga took his fleet and troops to Wen-chou 
this time, he did not have to send another fleet out to Ch’ao-chou to levy rice 
as he had done earlier. Since he had sent his delegate to engage in peace talks 
with the Shun-chih Emperor, trade was also tolerated to a certain extent. In 
1658, Coxinga chose to reside in Wen-chou rather than in Amoy and he no 
longer dispatched a well-equipped fleet to patrol the Kuang-tung coast. In the 
same year, the Ping-nan Viceroy in Kuang-tung had been ordered by the 
Manchu Emperor to attack the Ming loyalist troops of Yung-li in Kuang-hsi 
province on the western border of Kuang-tung, a diversion which afforded 
Coxinga’s forces some breathing space. Dutch sources record that Coxinga 
moved north since he ‘could not get a grip on the pirates around Nan-ao 
nearby Kuang-tung’.247 When Coxinga’s main force was in the northern 
expedition and absent from the Kuang-tung coast, the Ping-nan Viceroy had 
already established a naval force which was based in several harbours around 
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the Ch’ao-chou area during 1657-1659.248 The Dutch also witnessed a flurry 
of building activity in the Kuang-tung coast.249 Although under Manchu 
command, the naval force under Su Li still remained in communication with 
Coxinga’s force in Nan-ao and Amoy. For example, in May of 1657, when 
He T’ing-ping was in Amoy, he passed on some information about the 
situation in Kuang-tung obtained from four junks which had just arrived in 
Amoy from there.250Again, in the summer of 1658 the nachoda of a junk 
which had been battered by a typhoon and had drifted to Macao where she 
was impounded by the Manchu Coastal Defence Fleet, was released before 
the junk reached the shores of Kuang-chou. Therefore ‘in a roundabout way, 
the nachoda managed to join Coxinga, his master’.251 Furthermore, a big 
Kuang-tung junk loaded with all kinds of Chinese goods accompanied by a 
junk from Amoy also visited Johor in the spring of 1659.252 In July of 1659, 
a Kuang-tung junk visiting Japan also claimed that she had anchored first in 
Amoy.253 Both junks were actually part of the fleet of junks dispatched to 
Manila, Siam and Japan by the Ping-nan Viceroy. 254  No matter what 
arrangements were made between Coxinga and Su Li or the Ping-nan Viceroy, 
the Kuang-tung trade undeniably recovered while Coxinga was absent on his 
expedition to Nanking.    
                                                          
248 TWYH(ed), Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien, 971; 1000. 
249 Generale Missive, 4 Dec. 1656, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 426. 
250 VOC 1222, Translaet uijt zeekeren Chinesen brief door den Chinese tolcq Pincqua 
geschreven aen Frederick Coyett [translation of a certain Chinese letter written by the 
Chinese translator Hê T'ing-ping to gouvernor of Taiwan Frederick Coyett], Amoy, 22 
May 1657, fo. 528. 
251 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 375. 3 Jan. 1659. 
252 VOC 1229, Missive door d’Ed. Joan Thijsz. en raet naer Batavia geschreven 
[Letter written by the Gouvernor Joan Thijsz. from Malacca to Batavia], Malacca, 10 
Apr. 1659, fo. 442r. 
253 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 389. 6 July 1659. 
254 Generale Missive, 16 Dec. 1659, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 470. 
THE PASSIONS 1655-1662 
 360 
As long-standing competitors of the Portuguese in Macao, in 1653 and 
1655 the Dutch also dispatched envoys to contact the Manchu authorities in 
Kuang-tung. 255  What prompted this move was that the ending of the 
Dutch-Portuguese truce in 1652. Freed from its constraints, the Dutch again 
began to raid Portuguese settlements in Asia. The Kuang-tung authorities 
arranged to have the Dutch envoys who arrived in 1655 welcomed as a 
tributary embassy. The envoys, Pieter de Goijer and Jacob de Keijser, arrived 
in Peking on 17 July 1656.256 Before they returned to Kuang-chou with a 
formal reply from the Manchu Shun-chih Emperor, the Ping-nan Viceroy 
asked De Goijer and De Keijser to grant him a pass to trade in Cambodia. 
The junk assigned to be the bearer of this pass returned to Kuang-chou fully 
laden and was accompanied by another junk belonging to the King of 
Cambodia, carrying rattan, sandalwood, ray- and deerskins.257 The following 
year, the King of Cambodia dispatched another big junk to Kuang-tung laden 
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with pepper, benzoin and lacquer (gemelak).258  
Meanwhile, the end of the Anglo-Dutch war in 1654 terminated the 
Dutch right to prevent the English from taking a share in the Southeast Asian 
and the China trade. In 1657, three English ships which had departed from 
Bantam, Surat and England respectively paid a successful visit to Macao. 
They initiated a reciprocal trade with the mediation of the Chinese merchants 
serving under the Pingnan Viceroy.259 In 1659, another two English ships 
visited Kuang-chou but left without engaging in any trade and thirteen small 
Portuguese vessels brought commodities from Makassar, Siam and Cambodia 
to Macao. The Ping-nan Viceroy controlled the Kuang-chou trade with an 
iron fist, preventing the local people from trading with foreign vessels, 
restricting this privilege to the owners of his own junks .260 The tributary 
junk dispatched to Kuang-chou by the Siamese King also fell victim to this 
monopoly policy. Her crew was detained in Kuang-chou for three years and 
did not return to Siam until January 1660 with nothing to show for their 
detention.261 
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Another party interested in the Macao trade was Spanish Manila. After 
the conclusion of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the intermittent wars 
between the Dutch Republic and the Kingdom of Spain, which had lasted 
eighty years, were over. In 1659, the Spanish merchants in Manila dispatched 
a yacht to Macao where she was loaded with typical Chinese goods like silk 
and iron pans. She then continued her voyage south to Johor in a quest to 
purchase pepper. The crew of the yacht intended to take that cargo of pepper 
back to Macao.262 In the meantime, the Manchu Emperor had turned down 
the Dutch request for free trade which the latter had submitted during their 
‘tributary’ embassy in 1655. Instead granting them free trade in Kuang-chou, 
he allowed them one tributary embassy every eight years. Smarting the Dutch 
found themselves saddled with an inferior position in the Kuang-tung trade. 
The Spanish country trader Joan Verguesse was allowed to leave for Manila 
from Macao and visited Johor again in January 1659.263 When the Viceroy of 
Kuang-tung also showed his eagerness to participate in this trade, this 
situation became even worse. 
Against this background, further negotiations between the VOC and 
Coxinga began to unfold. After the Coxinga had lifted the ban against Taiwan, 
he wrote a letter to Governor-General, Joan Maetsuijker dated 7 February 
1658. In this letter he stressed that he had lifted the ban because the 
interpreter He T’ing-ping told him that the Governor of Taiwan, Frederick 
Coyet, had arrested those captains who had captured his junks and had 
guaranteed that the VOC would pay a proper compensation of 180,000 
taels.264 He also dispatched three junks to Batavia to express his appreciation 
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of the presents sent to him by the Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker. It 
seems only two junks arrived. They were carrying 30 pieces of gold ingots, 
some gold thread, coarse porcelain and Japanese copper staves.265 The 
contents of the letter Coxinga sent via the two Chinese Captains or Headmen 
in Batavia were the same content as those in the letter addressed to 
Maetsuijker, but this time he required 200,000 instead of 180,000 taels in 
compensation. He also added one more line at the end of the letter, 
announcing that, if the Dutch did not honour their promises,   
‘…[I, Coxinga] shall never again send junks to Taiwan and Batavia. Besides, 
I shall send letters everywhere proclaiming that the Dutch are such an evil 
people they are no longer worthy trading partners.’266 
Coxinga’s junks carried 3,323 piculs of pepper when they left from 
Batavia on 8 June 1658.267 They also carried a letter from Governor-General 
Joan Maetsuijker which stated that the Dutch ship captains had been 
punished but argued that the required compensation was highly exaggerated. 
He took the chance to point out that the Dutch had earlier been obliged to use 
force to gain the right of free trade with China: 
‘Proof will be found if Your Highness will examine the old records of 
the history of the Chinese coast. You will discover we have sought to use 
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every courteous means to seek the free trade with China, as China has 
permitted some other nations, for sixty years. According to the rights enjoyed 
by all civilized people, [the Chinese]could not refuse this to us without great 
injury to themselves and deep disgrace. Being honest merchants, we shall not 
do harm to anyone else but neither do we like to be wronged or harmed by 
anyone else. This is why, when we found out that very friendly talks with the 
authorities in China had not been efficacious, we seized our weapons without 
a moment’s hesitation, to achieve a better understanding. After some victories 
and defeats, eventually an agreement or contract was reached with the 
authorities. So we shelved the hostilities, and enjoyed free trade in Taiwan 
and Batavia [by all junks] from all Chinese harbours. This can be verified 
from our records over and over again.’268               
Joan Maetsuijker considered that Coxinga’s ban on the Taiwan and 
Batavia trade had violated this ‘agreement’, therefore the Dutch had the right 
to take arms against him if necessary.  
‘If Your Highness wants to persist with your pretensions and announce 
to all countries and people that we are evil people and boycott us, as Your 
Highness has threatened in your letter to Pan Ming-yan and Yan Er-kuan, we 
shall take due note of that. But Your Highness should also know that there 
will be plenty of means for us to take revenge and to discommodes Your 
Highness’ overseas commerce.’ 269   
The two Chinese junks returned to Amoy safely in July.270 The Dutch 
in Taiwan did not receive a reply about these matters until 1660, but 
nevertheless obtained a continuous supply of Chinese gold before the 
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summer of 1659 as the above table shows. On the surface, the dispute was 
temporarily put aside. While this was happening, the Amoy merchants traded 
freely on the Pepper Coast of Sumatra with passes issued by Governor 
Frederick Coyet and in 1658 dispatched three junks to Ligore to purchase tin, 
another very lucrative commodity.271 When an English ship visited Amoy 
she was welcomed by the merchants there.272 Now free to trade in East, the 
English merchants were also trying to sell their pepper in Amoy and Canton. 
Actually the gold trade did not run as smoothly as the table indicates. 
Because the Chinese gold prices were rising, the Amoy merchants preferred 
to pay in Taiwan with silver rather than to hand over their gold. Governor 
Frederick Coyet and the Council of Taiwan therefore decided to forbid any 
silver imports from China after the spring of 1658.273 In search of a higher 
price for their gold, the Amoy merchants dispatched one junk to Johor and 
one junk to Malacca in the spring of 1659. The gold could be traded for 12.5 
taels silver per tael in Taiwan but fetched 14 taels in Malacca. Another 
incentive was that the Chinese merchants could meet Muslim merchants from 
Coromandel in Malacca who were willing to purchase the gold for as high as 
15.5 taels. Eventually, they sold for 97¼ rials of gold (=f. 3636.8) to the 
Dutch in Malacca but 28 rials of gold (=f. 1050) to the Coromandel 
merchants.274  
Now joining the throng of Chinese, Portuguese, Spanish and English 
competitors, Muslim merchants from Coromandel were also busy gradually 
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expanding their cotton textile trade with Southeast Asia. They exported cheap 
cottons to Siam via Tenasserim (present-day Taninthary in Burma) in 
1655275and continued to export from Machilipatnam and Bengal via the same 
route.276 In 1659 they were even spotted in Jambi and Kedah.277        
King Narai of Siam was eager to secure his crown trade so that he 
could finance his troops he needed to combat two threats on the Siamese 
border. In 1659 the invasion of Cambodia by Quinam forced the Siamese 
King to lead 100,000 soldiers to his eastern border to protect his country .278 
The Manchu troops hunting the last Ming Emperor Yung-li to Burma, also 
pressed King Narai to send 60,000 soldiers to the northern border in 1660.279 
Partly because of disappointment in the unpropitious course of the crown 
trade with China and Japan, in 1659 King Narai approved the Dutch request 
for the sole right to purchase the deerskins and cow hides.280 The Siamese 
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King ordered all deerskins and cow hides to be removed without warning 
from the Chinese junks and the warehouses in the Japanese quarter, and let 
the Dutch pay the same price for the confiscated skins as the Chinese had 
purchased them for from the local people.281 Now that they had been cut out 
of the competition for deerskins, the Chinese merchants seized upon a new 
opportunity and gradually opened up a new business link with the Indian 
Muslim merchants. The following year, a group of twenty-two Muslim 
merchants was even transported to Japan from Siam on a Chinese junk. They 
brought Bengal cotton textiles imported via Tenasserim to the Nagasaki 
market, stealing a march on the Dutch.282 Dutch sources claim that the 
Chinese merchants under Coxinga were planning even greater co-operation 
in the Japan trade with the Coromandel Muslim merchants: 
‘The trade by Chinese junks from Siam has begun to increase year by 
year and has obstructed the honourable trade of the Company. They live in a 
prodigious style, keep large houses with their own servants and employ some 
Japanese to serve them, as if they will immediately bring larger quantities of 
all kinds of cloths and also part of the Bengal silk hither.’283 
The Chief Merchant of Nagasaki, Joan Boucheljon, wrote a letter to his 
colleague Laurens Pitt in Coromandel disclosing his concerns: 
‘It is a shame that we have not been provided with more white cotton 
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cloth this year, otherwise we should have made rich profits… Now the 
Muslims have brought quite a quantity from Siam on a Chinese junk …. I am 
afraid that these people have shared the rich profits and now, once they have 
tasted the sweetness of success,they might immediately import many more 
Bengal and Coromandel cotton textiles, as well as silk and other goods, from 
elsewhere. This heavy burden could force the Company to lower the price of 
its exports.’284    
Apparently either Coxinga himself or his merchants had begun to toy 
with the idea of using Siam as a transit harbour in plans to initiate the 
triangular Chinese gold- Bengal silk-Japanese silver trade which the VOC did 
as well via Malacca. If the Shogunal Court and the Siamese King would 
throw their weight behind the idea of Chinese junks sailing between their 
ports, the VOC would have its hands tied and be bereft of any means to curb 
this plan. If it were successful, the Chinese gold exports would no longer 
flow into Taiwan, but would be channelled directly to either Siam or the 
Pepper Coast and end up largely in the hands of Indian Muslim merchants.            
Even if Coxinga had decided to shift the gold flow from Taiwan to the 
Coromandel merchants in Siam or to the Pepper Coast around Sumatra, he 
would not have had it all his own way. The Dutch would still do all in their 
power to force him to maintain the gold supply to Taiwan until they were 
able to take over Macao, which would have guaranteed them access to the 
Chinese gold supply. Hence the Dutch base in Taiwan turned into a possible 
thorn in Coxinga’s side, since the Dutch could well become his direct 
competitors once they had taken Macao. Come what may, without this 
gold-for- pepper trade between Amoy and Taiwan, the alliance between 
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Coxinga and the Dutch would be meaningless. In that case, war would be 
unavoidable. Sooner or later, either Coxinga or the VOC would take action 
against the other party. 
A Chinese source relates that after Coxinga’s delegate returned from 
Nanking in January 1660 and reported that his request for peace talks had 
been refused, he put forward a proposal to attack Taiwan.285 A Dutch source 
also reports that Coxinga had arranged for some fishermen to join the fish 
tax-farm auction on the fishing grounds around Taiwan in December 1660, in 
a manoeuvre to seize secret control of the fishing harbours in preparation for 
an invasion on the southwest coast of Taiwan.286 While he waited, he ordered 
all Chinese junks to return to Amoy, probably to reduce the damage to his 
trading-junks in the South China Sea once the VOC began to take retaliatory 
actions.287  The Dutch authorities in Taiwan believed that Coxinga had 
planned to invade the island on 10 March 1660 and had sent an emergency 
message to Batavia at about the same time.288  
On 25 August 1659, the Emperor Shunchih dispatched 10,000 Manchu 
cavalrymen to Fu-chien. They finally arrived in Fu-chou on 2 March 1660, 
having travelled all the way from Peking on horseback.289 This deliberate 
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move by the Emperor Shun-chih forced Coxinga to respond by postponing 
the invasion for the moment. In April, the Manchu General of An-nan 
(An-nan Chiang-chün), Ta Su, arrived in Ch’üan-chou and set plans in 
motion to prepare all vessels for war.290 Coxinga judged that the best 
opportunity to ambush Taiwan had passed. If the Dutch interpreted his 
preparations as a declaration of war, he would not be able to wage two 
simultaneous wars against both Manchus and the Dutch. Probably at his 
instigation, Hung Hsü (Gampea), the most senior merchant and old trading 
partner of the Dutch, sent a letter from Amoy to Taiwan on 25 May 1660, 
informing Governor Frederick Coyet that all rumours about Coxinga’s 
invasion plan were false and that ‘ Coxinga had never entertained any idea of 
undertaking a venture against the Company’.291 Meanwhile, Coxinga was 
busy reorganizing his troops and raising their low morale.292 By May 1660, 
Coxinga had prepared his defence. He had ascertained that the Manchu force 
lacked large junks and hence planned to carry the Manchu cavalry on smaller 
vessels to storm the shores of Amoy. Therefore, on 11 May 1660, he 
proclaimed that all the families of soldiers and officials should move to 
Quemoy.293 He was determined to take advantage of his superior large-size 
junks to strike all the Manchu troops while they were at sea. The Manchu 
troops departed on the morning of 19 June 1660, in an endeavour to cross the 
narrowest strait between Amoy and Chang-chou Bay from the north and west. 
Coxinga’s strategy proved very effective. The Manchu cavalry could not 
approach the shore because the smaller vessels could not break through the 
cross-fire from Coxinga’s cannons on his large junks.294 Coxinga gained the 
day in this sea battle. It is said that more than 10,000 soldiers on both sides 
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were killed during the battle, but the proportional loss of Coxinga’s men and 
the Manchu forces were about 3:7.295 After this defeat, the Manchu General 
led the remaining Manchu cavalry to Fu-chou and returned to Peking in 
November. The Fu-chien authorities decided to beach all the vessels of the 
Ch’ing coastal defence force, fearing they might otherwise be captured. 
Coxinga allowed the civilians to return to Amoy after 6 October 1660. 296 
The biggest threat to Quemoy was the Ch’ao-chou naval force under the 
Ch’ing Regional Commander Su Li. But, although he received the order from 
the Governor-General of Fu-chien to send his ships in 1659, he failed to 
appear around Quemoy, offering the excuse that the Ping-nan Viceroy needed 
them in Nan-ao to guard his position against Coxinga’s force.297  
On the Dutch side, the High Government in Batavia had decided to 
send a fleet of twelve ships and 600 soldiers to guard Taiwan on 6 July 
1660.298 Yet the question of whether it was essential to the VOC to keep 
Taiwan as a base for the China trade at all costs had already emerged as an 
issue since the Dutch had obtained an official reply from the Emperor 
Shun-chih in 1658. The Batavia authorities reported to the Gentlemen 
Seventeen that: 
‘We should consider carefully whether it is more important to occupy 
Macao than to trade peacefully in the northern areas[China and Japan]. 
Even if we are allowed to trade in China, the trade will face huge obstacles. 
In order to eliminate these troubles, we should occupy a place nearby like 
Macao which is occupied by the Portuguese... We believe that there is no 
place more suitable than Macao. The Company should reduce its operations 
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on Taijoun and in Formosa, or withdraw from there once the business which 
can be done there has dried up. The Company would then have to leave this 
place anyway.’299       
In the resolution to dispatch a fleet to Taiwan, the Governor-General 
and Council also showed their preference to mount an attack on Macao rather 
than keep Taiwan as ordered by the Gentlemen Seventeen: 
‘According to the letter of Our Lords[Gentlemen Seventeen], whatever 
force the Company has should inflict all possible damage on the Portuguese 
as soon as possible, who cause the greatest obstacles to the Company trade 
and therefore are our enemies, so that the island and the city of Macao 
inhabited by Portuguese will no longer give the Company cause to be suspect 
by the Manchus or Chinese through their servants, and obstruct the Company 
trade in the Empire.’300     
In short, the High Government ordered the fleet to attack Macao from Taiwan 
after the north monsoon began to blow.301 The commander of this fleet, Joan 
van der Laan, was experienced in the combat against the Portuguese army on 
the Coromandel Coast. His deputy was Jacob de Keijser, who had been the 
envoy in the tributary embassy to Peking in 1656-1657.302 Van der Laan’s 
mission was to defeat the Portuguese and occupy or destroy Macao, De 
Keijser’s mission was to persuade the Ping-nan Viceroy that the Dutch would 
be worthy successors to the Portuguese, able satisfy all the services the 
Emperor Shun-chih might require.303 
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The ships departed on 17 July and arrived in Taiwan on 19 September 
1660.304 The fleet should have been prepared to attack Macao in October, but 
Governor Frederick Coyet and the Council of Taiwan insisted that the ships 
linger around Taiwan and the Pescadores. To solve the discord which had 
arisen between Van der Laan and Coyet, in a somewhat naive move, two 
delegates were sent to Amoy with three ships for the express purpose of 
asking Coxinga if he was really planning to attack Taiwan.305 Coxinga who 
was currently enjoying the fruits of his victory over the Manchus 
categorically denied fostering any plan to attack Taiwan but, even after 
receiving this reply, Governor Coyet still did not give the fleet permission to 
sail to Macao. When Joan van der Laan abandoned the Macao expedition and 
departed from Taiwan to return to Batavia on 27 February 1661, six of the ten 
vessels in the support fleet had already left to undertake different duties.306            
This more or less coincided with the time Coxinga again planned to 
invade Taiwan.307 In December 1660, Coxinga had dispatched his best troops 
to the Ch’ao-chou area to purchase or levy rice. Since he had shifted his 
trading base to T’ai-chou on the Chê-chiang coast in the early summer of 
1658 and had set about preparing the proposed expedition to the Nanking 
area, Coxinga’s force on Nan-ao Island had maintained a truce with Su Li’s 
local naval force stationed in Ch’ao-chou. During this truce, the Amoy 
merchants still frequently purchased rice from this area and probably 
Coxinga gave Su Li some leeway to share his foreign trade in 1659. A nasty 
surprise was in store. The Manchu officials had taken advantage of this truce 
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to consolidate their ground troops around the bastions on the Jung River, 
which allowed them gradually to expand their control over Ch’ao-yang and 
Chieh-yang districts. Coxinga’s troops had not made any approach on 
Chieh-yang city since 1657. In the winter of 1660, the Manchu officials in 
Ch’ao-chou successfully managed to keep Coxinga’s troops away from their 
richly provisioned rice storehouses inside the city walls.308 Without a steady 
rice supply from the Ch’ao-chou area, Coxinga and his Court ran the risk of 
running out of food. 
Although all his Defence Commands were reluctant to invade Taiwan, 
Coxinga insisted on having his project executed.309 He could not afford to 
suffer any further defeat in the Ch’ao-chou area where some of his Defence 
Commands had proved to be disloyal during the last battle there.310 Any 
failure would cut off his food supply and he would be deprived of the means 
to keep his officers and troops together. Once his force had been reduced, Su 
Li’s naval force could easily mount an attack on Amoy and Quemoy by sea. 
If Coxinga could no longer guarantee the security of his soldiers’ families and 
property, the whole army would eventually collapse. Although the attack on 
Taiwan would not guarantee adequate supplies, even if he were defeated by 
the Dutch Coxinga could at least keep his soldiers away from China and 
prevent them from going over to the Manchus.      
Once resolved in his purpose, on 21 April Coxinga sailed from Quemoy 
with 300 junks carrying 30,000 soldiers and landed on the shores of Taiwan 
on 30 April 1661. A long siege of nine months followed. On 1 February of 
1662, Governor Frederick Coyet surrendered to Coxinga, conceding the 
whole fort, including the cannon, muskets and gunpowder, provisions, 
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commodities and cash, amounting to 1,200,000 guilders311 This victory came 
at an enormous cost as a large number of Coxinga’s soldiers had died of 
starvation.312 As expected, Coxinga’s garrison on Nan-ao surrendered to the 
Manchus in April or May 1662.313 Coxinga himself might also have fallen 
victim to his harsh lifestyle. He gained Taiwan but died suddenly on 23 June 
1662, without even leaving clue about how he intended to perpetuate his 
maritime enterprise.314  If passion is an obsession which constantly drives 
someone on relentlessly to achieve a goal, it would be right to say that 
Coxinga was heavily afflicted by the passion of a merchant prince.  
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BY THE KINGS 
1663-1667 
The rift between the Taiwanese and the Amoy merchants 
On 1 February, 1662, after enduring a nine-month siege, Governor Frederick 
Coyett surrendered Fort Zeelandia in Taiwan to the Chinese invader, 
General-in-Chief, Coxinga (Cheng Ch’eng-kung), who had transported his 
army over from his posts on Amoy and Quemoy. The bulk of Coxinga’s 
soldiers were regrouped along the west coast of Taiwan to be ready to counter 
the expected engagement with the Ch’ing army, which had been successfully 
blocked from crossing the Taiwan Strait. 1  Making shrewd use of this 
situation, Coxinga was able to dissipate the crisis menacing his command, 
although a shortage of food almost incited a mutiny among his adherents. By 
moving most of his subjects from Amoy and Quemoy to Taiwan, he could 
turn these port cities into vanguard posts confronting the newly established 
Ch’ing Empire, the vast territory now under Manchu control. These two 
islands were transformed into part of a frontier area he could either occupy 
from the sea if need be or just as easily desert if this seemed the only viable 
option. As long as his Taiwan base remained inaccessible to the Ch’ing army, 
Coxinga could effectively exert his strategic advantage over the whole coast 
of China at any time he wanted. During his long-range expedition to Nanking 
in 1659, to his satisfaction, he had demonstrated that his army had the 
strategic capacity to harass any part of the coastal area in which a river 
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system debouched into the sea.2 As the parvenus Manchus were still busy 
conquering the whole of what had been the Ming Empire, as much by 
forming strategic alliances with Chinese allies as by feats of arms, the 
Emperor had still not ruled out granting the Cheng clan various privileges 
such as a trade monopoly along the coast of China in exchange for its 
obedience.3   
This issue would have been simpler had not some Fu-chien merchants 
conspired with the Dutch—who had lost their factory in Taiwan—to make a 
grab for the lucrative Japan trade. The Amoy merchants, by then under the 
Ch’ing, expected that their business with Japan would be able to proceed as 
usual, and their Dutch allies planned to crush the Cheng naval force in 
exchange for permanent free-trade privileges to be granted by the Manchu 
Emperor.4 By making a pre-emptive strike before the Manchu Emperor had 
been able to build a loyal armada of his own, whoever commanded the 
Chinese coast would become Coxinga’s successor and to him would fall the 
spoils of the prosperous monopolistic trade with Japan. While he still lived, 
the towering stature of Coxinga’s military reputation made it impossible for 
either the Amoy merchants or the Dutch to interfere in the negotiations 
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between Coxinga and the Manchu Emperor. However, Coxinga suddenly 
passed away in the summer of 1662, at the age of only thirty-nine. The most 
compelling reason for hopes of successful negotiations between the Manchu 
Emperor and Coxinga had been the Emperor’s determined drive to establish a 
consistent, solid military organization, backed up by a sophisticated maritime 
logistic network under one leader—and this reason now suddenly 
disappeared. What seemed to herald the impending erosion of the Cheng 
regime allowed the two above-mentioned challengers to gain some room to 
manouevre which would allow them to aspire to gaining privileged status in 
the Sino-Japanese trade.  
When the Cheng army and its families were transported to Taiwan, the 
trading fleet remained behind on the islands of Amoy and Quemoy. The 
Governor of these two islands was Cheng T’ai , who was also the Official of 
Revenue (Hu Kuan) in charge of Sino-Japan trade under Coxinga and fief 
negotiator with the Manchu court in Peking between 1662 and 1663. In the 
growing uncertainty, since his father had passed away without leaving any 
official testamentary disposition, Coxinga’s elder son, Cheng Ching , decided 
to stake his claim to his legal right to the throne by force. The Official of War 
(Ping Kuan), Hung Hsü, and Regional Commander, Chou Ch’üan-pin, 
supported him, so all three of them set work to prepare the ground by 
pacifying the disgruntled army units in Taiwan during the autumn and winter 
of that same year.     
Cheng T’ai probably did not share the full details of his negotiations 
with the Ch’ing court with his courtesy-nephew Cheng Ching. Sensing he 
was holding something back, Cheng Ching, began harbour suspicions about 
Cheng T’ai’s reliability, especially because upon Coxinga’s sudden death, 
Cheng T’ai had not paid immediate homage to his son. 
Whatever the real story might have been, desperately in need of funds, 
the young heir decided to execute his courtesy-uncle, Cheng T’ai ,and 
confiscate his property to finance the Cheng army and navy. Apprised of this, 
Cheng T’ai’s younger brother, Cheng Ming-chün , persuaded the rest of the 
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family to surrender their junks and trading capital to the Ch’ing government 
and, in June of 1663, Cheng Ming-chün and his followers abandoned 
Quemoy. The true damage lay in the fact that these deserters were precisely 
the coterie of experienced merchants who had run the Sino-Japanese trade 
expertly for years.5 
The upshot was that unity crumbled and the Cheng merchants were 
split into two opposing parties. As representatives of the ruler of China, the 
Ch’ing authorities immediately made use their newly acquired junks by 
mounting an expedition to drive Cheng Ching’s force out of Amoy and 
Quemoy. With the assistance of the Dutch fleet, in November 1663 they 
targeted Cheng Ching’s armada, but the latter successfully avoided the 
engagement, and was able to preserve most of his junks by retreating to 
Nan-ao, an island lying off the southern border between Fu-chien and 
Kuang-tung.6  
Cheng T’ai’s adherents’ desertion to the Ch’ing camp in July 1663 took 
place almost at the end of the southwest monsoon season, when the junks 
traditionally sailed northwards to Japan. The news about the split in the 
Cheng regime disturbed those Chinese traders who had already arrived in 
Nagasaki, because they realized that they would have to take sides upon 
returning to China. Six of the junks were from An-hai. During the truce 
required by Cheng T’ai as a condition for peace negotiations, these junks had 
loaded their goods at Ch’üan-chou, a city under the Ch’ing.7 Most of the 
captains under the Cheng regime found it hard to reach any decision it was 
difficult to come by reliable information in Japan. By the end of the northeast 
monsoon season, around 1 January, eight junks set sail on course for Amoy 
but the crews of the thirteen to fourteen other junks could not make up their 
                                                          
5 Wills,‘ Maritime China from Wangchih to Shih Lang ’, 228-9. 
6 Wills, Pepper, Guns, and Parleys, 68-75. 
7 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 77. 13, 15, 17, 24, 26, July, 1663. 
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minds which destination to choose.8 According to Dutch records, ten junks 
eventually announced that they were intending to sail to An-hai.9 Owing to 
the lack of records kept by the Cheng side, it is hard to estimate how many 
junks did eventually decide to go over to the Ch’ing. What happened is that 
in the following southwest monsoon season, about half (15 of 33) of the 
Chinese junks from Kuang-tung Province or its surrounding areas—probably 
Kao-Lei-Lien or Chieh-shih - returned to Japan, as will be explained below. 
Given the fact that the Cheng frequently purchased rice on Nan-ao, on the 
border of Kuang-tung Province, and that rice was rather scarce in Japan 
during the winter of 1663, it is plausible to infer that most of these Chinese 
junks rejoined the Cheng forces on Nan-ao in order to purchase rice.10  
On the other hand, in August 1663 eager to seek revenge for the 
damage caused by Coxinga, the Dutch fleet had swept the northern Cheng 
harbour of Sha-ch’eng clear of any junks, an action which cut off the primary 
Cheng route for collecting silks in Chê-chiang Province.11 Henceforth the 
coast from Nanking to Amoy was secured by the Dutch fleet from the sea and 
by Ch’ing troops on land. Quite apart from this major setback, some of the 
Cheng’s most senior soldiers surrendered to the Ch’ing on Nan-ao in March 
                                                          
8 VOC 1247, Missive van de opperhoofden te Nangasacki aen den gouverneur 
generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, Japan, 1 Jan. 1664, fo. 32. 
9 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 90-2; 94. 19 Nov. (3 junks); 1, 9, 10, 28 
Dec. 1663 ;1, 21 Jan. 1664. 
10 VOC 1247, Missive van de opperhoofden [Willem Volger et al.] te Nangasacki aen 
den gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, Japan, 1 Jan. 1664, 
fo. 28. 
11 VOC 1243, Appendix op seeckere missive dato 5 November 1662 door den Ed. 
commandeur Balthasar Bort voor Tinghaij aen haer Eds.[Joan Maetsuijcker] tot 
Batavia geschreven [Appendix in certain letter dated on 5 Nov. 1662 written by 
commander Balthasar Bort at T’inghai to gouvernor general Joan Maetsuijcker at 
Batavia], Canton, 7 Jan. 1663, fo. 74v. 
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1664.12 The Cheng resident forces in several other harbours near Fu-chou 
soon followed suit. 13  As a consequence, neither Amoy nor Fu-chou 
merchants had to live any longer in fear of Cheng raids. Now the 
Ch’ing-allied Fu-chien merchants could safely purchase raw silk in 
Chê-chiang for shipment to Nagasaki when the new raw-silk season opened 
in April of 1664.   
The merchants who had deserted to An-hai also celebrated the occasion. 
In the southwest monsoon season of 1664, a junk from Fu-chou arrived in 
Japan loaded with ‘the richest goods that had ever been seen in thirty years’. 
The value of its cargo was estimated at roughly 900,000-1,000,000 guilders, 
or 315,000-350,000 taels. 14   In a letter written by the Dutch officials 
residing in An-hai, there is confirmation that this big junk was owned by the 
Count of T’ung-an (T’ung-an Po), the title of nobility borne by Cheng T’ai’s 
younger brother, Cheng Ming-chün .15 This trade was obviously in breach of 
the edict pronounced by Manchu K’ang-hsi Emperor in 1662. The imperial 
edict stipulated not only the prohibition of foreign trade, it also contained the 
decree that all inhabitants living within the range of 30 Chinese li (about 15 
km) from the coast should forsake all their fields, houses and so on, and 
                                                          
12 VOC 1248, Missive van den residenten in China [Ernst van Hogenhouck] aan den 
oppercoopman en opperhooft Willem Volger en sijn raet in Japan geschreven [Letter 
Written by Those Residing in China to Chief-Merchant Willem Volger and His 
Council in Japan], China, 3 May 1664, fo. 2580. On 20 March, the most important 
commander under Cheng Ching, Chou Ch’üan-pin, deserted to the Ch’ing side from 
Nan-ao, taking with him 6,000 experienced soldiers and 100 junks.. 
13 Wills, ‘Maritime China from Wangchih to Shih Lang ’, 228-9. 
14 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 116. 25 June 1664. Because the record 
of 23 Jan. 1665 counted 20 tons of gold as equivalent to 700 chests of silver, 1 ton of 
gold should equal 35 chests of silver. 1 chest of silver referred to 1,000 taels. 
15 VOC 1248, Missive van den residenten in China aan den oppercoopman en 
opperhooft Willem Volger en sijn raet in Japan geschreven, 3 May 1664, fo. 2582; 
VOC 1248, Missive van de residenten te Nangasacki aen den gouverneur generaal 
Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, 22 Oct. 1664, fo. 2401. 
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move inland behind the newly fortified frontier. The Ch’ing government 
believed that this prescription would eradicate the Cheng commercial 
network and ruin its financial base. However, its real effect was to assign the 
Provincial Navy Commander (Shui-shih Ti-tu) full authority over the areas 
evacuated. This arrangement was also confirmed by the Governor-General of 
Fu-chien, Li Shuai-tai, in his report to the Emperor on 24 March, 1664.16  
Although the Ch’ing Provincial Navy Commander, Shih Lang, should 
have had enough vessels at his disposal to invade Taiwan during the summer 
of 1664, he and his officers excused themselves from launching the invasion 
by asserting that a series of typhoons had severely damaged their vessels and 
had consequently rendered the invasion impossible.17 It seems to me that 
related lucrative trade opportunities must have had something to do with this 
postponed expedition.  
This sudden change of mind expressed in the delaying tactics of the 
Ch’ing navy was very unreasonable in the eyes of its Dutch allies, who had 
dispatched a fleet to the Taiwan Strait from Batavia during the southwest 
monsoon season of 1664. They had crushed the Cheng fortifications on the 
Pescadores Islands before arriving in Fu-chou in July and had also 
re-occupied Chi-lung, on the northern tip of Taiwan, which might have 
provided the Ch’ing army a secure landing point in the event of an invasion.18 
As a foothold on which the Ch’ing army could land on Taiwan had now been 
                                                          
16 Li Shuai-tai , ’ T’i wei shui-lu kê hsün-ti fang-shou shih-pên [ A Report on the 
Defences in the Different Strongholds along the Coast] 3 June 1664‘, in CKTI (ed.), 
Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien, TWH, I, no. 8, 74. 
17  Liang Ching-piao,’ T’i wei cho-p’ai shih-lang kung-ch’ü t’ai-wan shih-pên 
[Considerations for Dispatching Shih Lang to Conquer Taiwan] 16 Sept.1664’, in 
CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien, TWH, 
I no. 8, 91. 
18 VOC 1248, Resolutie van China genomen door de commandeur Balthasar Bort en 
de raad te Hoksieuw [Resolution by Commander Balthasar Bort and the Council in 
Fu-chou], Fu-chou, 16 Oct. 1664, fo. 2675-2678. 
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prepared, it seemed to them to be no reason to postpone the engagement. 
Their confidence strengthened by their private trade in Japan, the Fu-chien 
authorities still dallied but tried to make amends by building a warehouse in 
which the Dutch could store their tropical trade goods. Twisting the meaning 
of the Emperor’s edict, the Fu-chien authorities used the Emperor’s 
permission to provide his Dutch allies with victuals prior to the Taiwan 
expedition as an excuse to dodge the prohibition on foreign trade with the 
Dutch.19 According to information later reported to the Japanese authorities, 
the VOC had been able to sell 50,000 taels’ worth of pepper, sandalwood and 
cloves in Fu-chien. In their turn, the Dutch purchased large quantities of 
goods, including 500 piculs of Chinese white silk. Moreover, the Fu-chien 
authorities recommended that the Emperor give the Dutch presents soon after 
their fleet arrived in Fu-chou in 1663. The gift-giving would imply that the 
Dutch might be in line for some more trade with China at a later date.20       
The joint Ch’ing-Dutch fleet set sail on 27 November, 1664, but it 
seems that, shortly thereafter, the weather deteriorated. Seeking shelter, the 
armada returned to Wei-t’ou Bay where they celebrated folk festivals and 
amused themselves by watching some theatre. Even though the Dutch sailors 
                                                          
19 Mingandali, ‘ T’i-ch’ing chun-yü hê-lan-kuo chia-pan ch’uan mai-wu mai-mi 
shih-pên [Petition to Allow the Dutch Fleet to Trade Goods for Provisional Rice 
Supplies] 22 Nov. 1664’, in CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu 
man-wên tang-an i-pien, TWH, I no 8, 117. 
20 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 136. 26 Jan. 1665. Rumours spread in 
Nagasaki that, in China the Dutch had sold goods valued at about 50,000 taels; Sha 
Ch’eng, ‘ T’i-pao hê-lan-kuo chia-pan-ch’uan ti-min chu-kung shih-pên [Report of the 
Arrival of the Allied Dutch Fleet](10 Nov. 1683)’, in CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u 
chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien, TWH, I, no. 8, 48. The Fu-chien 
authorities sent their recommendation to the Emperor on 2 October, 1663. The 
Minister of Ritual,Sha Ch’eng, replied to Emperor K’ang-hsi suggesting that the court 
should not give more than 300 pieces of satin and 1,000 taels to the Dutch as presents, 
and that the presentation could only take place after the joint Dutch-Ch’ing forces had 
defeated the Cheng force. 
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had almost caught sight of the coastline of Taiwan during the voyage, they 
had no option but to return to Wei-t’ou Bay because the Ch’ing armada had 
decided to withdraw to the coast of China, remaining in the bay for a whole 
month until December 24. Only then did Provincial Navy Commander , Shih 
Lang, attempt to sail across the Taiwan Strait a second time. The expedition 
was again terminated when several war-junks collided with Dutch vessels 
just outside the harbour.21 
In the meantime, on 2 December two more junks departed from 
Fu-chou and set course for Japan. Not surprisingly, these richly laden trading 
junks were the property of Keng Chi-mao, the highest military commander in 
Fu-chien Province, whose title was the Ching-nan Viceroy. They left just 
before two other junks, which belonged to the T’ung-an Count and the 
Hai-ch’êng Duke also carrying a rich cargo, returned from Japan.22 The two 
junks on course to Japan entered Nagasaki Bay on the 21 and the 23 January 
respectively in the company of another smaller junk from Fu-chou. The 
Japanese valued the total cargo of those three junks at about 700,000 taels, or 
2,000,000 guilders.23 Considering that the Manchu Emperor’s prohibition on 
foreign trade must have lowered the purchasing prices of silk goods in China, 
while demand in the Japanese market remained constant, the profits on the 
sale of the cargo in Nagasaki must have been enormous.   
Admittedly,owing to the very bad weather conditions that winter, it 
would have been difficult to lead a fleet of 400 junks across the Taiwan Strait 
                                                          
21 VOC 1249, Missive van d’Ed. Balthasar Bort en den raat aen haer Eds. tot Batavia, 
Canton 3 Jan. 1665, fos. 183-186. 
22 VOC 1252, Missive van seigneur Nobel [Constantijn]en raadt tot Hocksieu aen 
haer Eds.[ gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker][Letter from Sir Constantijn Nobel 
and the Council at Fu-chou to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker], Canton, 28 Feb. 
1665, fo. 200. The T’ung-an Count’s junk is recorded to have arrived on the 25 June 
1664, but the Hai-ch’êng D uke’s junk is not mentioned in this record. 
23 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 136. 21;22;23 Jan. 1665. 
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for an invasion, but it is also not beyond the bounds of possibility that the 
strictly prohibited Nagasaki trade generated such lucrative profits for the 
Fu-chien authorities, they would have been very reluctant about pursuing 
their military mission. They excused themselves from this duty by asserting 
that undertaking co-operative missions with the Dutch was compounded by 
the difficulties arising from navigation in foul weather. Therefore they 
respectfully submitted that the Emperor should reject any further offers of 
Dutch assistance. These views were never made known to the Dutch. 
Although the Fu-chien authorities promised the Dutch that they would try to 
persuade the Emperor to grant privileges for free trade, they actually used the 
Dutch fleet only as a protector and, thereby, reduced the risk of their junks 
falling prey to the Cheng force.  
 
The merger between the Taiwanese and Kuang-tung merchants 
According to the Dutch records, during the southwest monsoon season of 
1664 twelve junks from Kuang-tung arrived in Japan. Assuming that the 
crews of those junks were still sailing under the flag of the Cheng when they 
departed, how did they behave in Kuang-tung between February and May 
1664? Prior to the summer of 1663, the Kuang-tung merchants under Ch’ing 
rule had been involved in the rice trade with the Cheng troops residing at 
Amoy and on Nan-ao. At least six different reports written by the Kuang-tung 
authorities accused the naval forces detailed to the eastern border of 
Kuang-tung of allowing the transportation of paddy to the Cheng camps at 
Amoy and on Nan-ao.24 For example, around May 8, 1663, some seventy 
                                                          
24 Minandali, ‘T’i-fu yang yü-ming wei hsü-lung têng wei-chin yü tsê t'ung-shang 
shih-pên [Letter in Reply to Yang Yuming Detailing How Hsü Lung Traded with 
Privateers without Permission] 2 Dec. 1663’, in CCTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u 
chêng-ch’êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien, TWH, I no. 7, 55-61. 
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junks loaded with rice sailed to Amoy from the eastern part of Kuang-tung.25 
During the sea battle between the fleets of the Cheng and the Ch’ing navies 
off Nan-ao on 30 June, 1663, the Ch’ing naval captains witnessed how their 
Regional Commander of Chieh Shih, Su Li, deliberately let the Cheng junks 
escape their encirclement.26 Like the naval force stationed at Amoy, the fleet 
under Su Li anchored off Chieh Shih Island was located outside the new 
boundary defined in the Evacuation Edict, but Su Li’s fleet was also 
prohibited from conducting any trade. Of the Kuang-tung junks arriving in 
Japan in 1664, two declared themselves to be subject to Su Li. The Japanese 
estimated the value of the cargo of these two junks at 700,000 guilders.27 
Although the Dutch journal kept on Deshima does not mention the precise 
nature of the cargo, on the basis of the evidence that there was another junk 
from Kuang-tung which had brought raw silk and silk goods, it is likely that 
the junks were loaded with silk goods smuggled from Chê-chiang. 28 
Unquestionably Su Li had a shrewd understanding of how he too could 
benefit from the maritime prohibition policy. The goods must have been 
smuggled through unsupervised gaps along the long coastline of Kuang-tung. 
Some rumours of what was going on reached the Dutch in Fu-chou: ‘ We 
have been informed that Hung Hsü, who is the person closest to Coxinga’s 
son, has deserted him and fled to Kuang-tung.’29 This information implies 
that Hung Hsü might also have been involved in smuggling activities in 
Kuang-tung. There is another point worth noting about these Kuang-tung 
                                                          
25  Minandali, ‘Wei shih-ma têng-ti ch'ao-tsê ch'ing-hsing pên [Report on the 
Suppression of the Privateers on Shihma] 28 June 1663’, in CKTI (ed.), Ch'ing-ch'u 
chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien, TWH, I no. 7, 454. 
26 Minandali, ‘Wei chin-ch’ao nan-ao shih-pên [ Report on the Expedition to Nanao] 
10 Sept. 1663, in CKTI (ed.), Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên 
tang-an i-pien, TWH, I no.8, 24-25; 28. 
27 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 117,121. 2 July 1664; 11 Aug. 1664. 
28 Ibidem, 124. 9 Sept. 1664. 
29 VOC 1249, Missive van d'Ed. Balthasar Bort en den raat aen haer Eds. [Joan 
Maetsuijcker] tot Batavia, Canton, 3 Jan. 1665, fo. 187. 
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junks: two had departed from the Kao-Lei-Lien (Colira[D.]) areas.30 These 
were the three different prefectures situated on the Lei-chou Peninsula which 
had been excluded from the compulsory evacuation along the Kuang-tung 
coast. From the Lei-chou Peninsula, it was possible to have complete control 
of the sea route between Kuang-tung and the northeastern part of Vietnam. 
Records exist which say that some local people resisted the compulsory 
evacuation and even retaliated against it by attacking Kuang-chou City with a 
naval force in 1663.31 Other sources also indicate that the people who 
inhabited the Kao-Lai-Lien areas co-operated with the Cheng force.32  
While the Kuang-tung junks lay anchored in Nagasaki Bay during the 
autumn of 1664, the Ch’ing focused their attention on Su Li. On 1 October, 
the Kuang-tung authorities sent troops to attack Su Li’s castle in the 
Chieh-shih. He was subsequently defeated and decapitated but his 10,000 
subjects surrendered and were spared.33 News of this was probably brought 
by the above-mentioned junks of the Ching-nan Viceroy which sailed to 
                                                          
30 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 117, 120. 7 Aug. 1664; 8 Aug. 1664. 
31 Tu Chên , Yüeh-min hsün-shih chi-lüeh [The Commissioner’s Journey through 
Kung-tung and Fu-chien Provinces ] 6 vols, (Shang-hai: Shang-hai ku-chi bookstore, 
1979), I, 12. The Manchu court established the naval station at Shun-tê to counter the 
raids of two privateers/ pirates, Chou and Li. 
32 Chao Erh-hsün, Ch'ing-shih kao[Draft of Chinese History in the Ch’ing Dynasty],
（Taipei: Ting Wen, 1981, 9413.’ Chou-yu, originally a person of lowly origin living 
on the junks, proclaimed himself general of the liberation army of Kuang-tung. He led 
several hundred junks, with three sails and eight rudders which moved rapidly on 
water. They were skilled mariners. When the Coxinga’s junks arrived, they assisted 
them in their their piracy. ’ 
33 TWYH(ed.), Ch’ing-shih-tsu shih-lu hsüan-chi, 24. The governor of Kuang-tung, 
Lu, reported ‘ Pingnan Wang and the commander led the army to attack the base of 
Chieh-shih’s privateers, decapitated the leader, Su Li, and captured more than 10,000 
people.’ This implies that most of his subjects had been pardoned by the Kuang-tung 
authorities, even though they had violated the maritime prohibition edict. 
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Nagasaki.34 Unlike the Fu-chien authorities, who were charged with the 
conquest of Taiwan, the Kuang-tung authorities now confined themselves 
scrupulously to executing the edict which prohibited maritime trade and 
required the evacuation of the coastal provinces to the letter. The top military 
commander, the Ping-nan Viceroy, Shan Ke-hsi, had already made an attempt 
to load two junks with silk goods for Japan in 1661, but before they could set 
sail the civil authorities in Kuang-chou City confiscated the vessels citing the 
the prohibition as their grounds for this action.35 Despite the fact Su Li lost 
his life, the rest of the Kuang-tung junk traders somehow managed to 
continue their activities under his colleague, Hsü Lung (Colion, Corion, 
Colien[D.]). The pilot of a Macao-based Portuguese ship which arrived in 
Malacca in the spring of 1665 reported:  
‘Although the Emperor of China has issued an order that he must wage 
war against those in Taiwan with all the Chinese residing along the coast and 
with the whole navy financed by him, there are still some people living on a 
large, elongated piece of land near Macao who are unwilling to obey this 
directive.’36  
During the southwest monsoon season of 1665, only four junks 
departed from Kuang-tung en route to Japan. All belonged to Hsü Lung.37 
Furthermore, the Dutch in Ligor heard about some ‘long-haired’ Chinese 
merchants, that is people who had not submitted to the Manchu rulers, who 
had visited Siam during 1666. These Chinese merchants were said to 
originate from an island under Su Li’s rule. It turned out that merchants 
originally based on Chieh Shih Island had escaped and had regrouped in 
                                                          
34 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 136. 23 Jan. 1665. 
35 VOC 1236, Missive door den koopman Hendrick Baron aen haer Eds.[Joan 
Maetsuijcker] tot Batavia, 13 Nov. 1661, fo. 853. 
36 VOC 1252, Missive van d'edele [Jan van] Riebeecq en raadt aen haer Eds.[Joan 
Maetsuijcker], Malacca, 20 Feb. 1665, VOC 1252, fol. 75. 
37 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 155. 19 July 1665. 
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Japan before sailing to Siam. They were still planning to check the current 
situation on their island in June of that year. 38  Evidently Kuang-tung 
merchants, or the local junk traders, had gradually begun to participate in the 
trade of the Cheng regime based in Taiwan after they had found themselves 
barred from their harbours on the Chinese coast by the promulgation of the 
Ch’ing policy of compulsory evacuation.   
After 7 September, 1664, when the K’ang-hsi Emperor formally 
ordered the wresting of Taiwan from the hands of the Cheng, Shih Lang was 
expected to accomplish this mission without delay. This time something 
extraordinary happened. On 31 May, 1665, on its way across the Taiwan 
Strait, the armada was lying at anchor off the Pescadores Islands when it was 
engulfed by a typhoon of enormous proportions.39 The Dutch chief merchant 
on Deshima heard from a Fu-chou junk:  
‘…our fleet and that of the Manchus had run into a heavy storm off the 
Pescadores last November. One of our ships and most of the Manchu fleet 
(which consisted of at least 400 junks) has been destroyed. Time will tell if the 
report is true.’40  
                                                          
38 VOC 1264, Rapport van den koopman Adriaen Lucasz. wegens sijne verrichtinge 
op Ligoor overgegeven aen de heer Balthasar Bort president en commandeur van de 
stadt en Forteresse Malacca[Report Written by Merchant Adriaen Lucasz about his 
Activities in Ligor to the President and Commander of the City and Castle Malacca 
Balthasar Bort ], Ligor, 22 Nov. 1666, fo. 208r-v. 
39  Shih Lang, ‘Fu-chien shui-shih t’i-tu shih-lang t’i wei chou-shih chin-kung 
t’ai-wan t’u-tz’u pei-fêng p’iao-san ni k’ê-ch’i fu-chêng shih-pên[Report Written by 
the Naval Commander of Fu-chien, Shih Lang, Recounting How the Fleet Was Struck 
by a Typhoon on Its Way to Taiwan and Being Fitted out for Depart Again]’, in CKTI, 
Sha-mên ta-hsüeh t’ai-wan yen-chiu-so[Taiwan Research Institute XMU] (eds), 
K’ang-hsi t’ung-i t’ai- wan tang- an shih-liao hsüan- chi[Selections of Historical 
Material concerning the Conquest of Taiwan during the K’ang-hsi Period], (Fu-chien: 
Fu-chien jên-min publisher, 1983), 50. 
40 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 152. 18 June 1665. 
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This calamity represented a tremendous loss for the Fu-chien authorities, 
because they had paid for the construction of most of the vessels from their 
own private purses. Two hundred and fifty junks belonged to the Provincial 
Navy Commander , Shih Lang, and the Hai-ch’êng Duke, and another 100 
were owned by the Ch’ing-nan Viceroy. The remainder were the property of 
various Fu-chien officials.41 This pattern of ownership might explain why 
the subsequent suggestions of these Fu-chien officials that Emperor 
K’ang-hsi should seek conciliation with Taiwan gained a largish following 
and why the Emperor decided to call a halt to any further expeditions.  
This heaven-sent gale which struck the Pescadores in the early summer 
of 1665, enabled the Cheng regime to release its Taiwan-based troops from 
the unproductive duty of defending the island. The merchants who lived 
under the Cheng regime immediately poured their energy into maritime trade 
activities and resumed their monopoly over the trade. The first thing they 
intended to accomplish was to secure their share in the Japan market and, in 
particular, to repair the damage to the weakened Chinese silk export business.    
Between 1664 and 1665, as the Ch’ing Fu-chien authorities were 
beginning to dispatch silk-laden junks to Japan, the Cheng regime in Taiwan 
sought the co-operation of  the disaffected elements in Kuang-tung, either 
privateers or rebels. As the Dutch had destroyed their commercial harbour at 
Sha-ch’eng, the Cheng junk traders had to try to find some alternative port 
along the Chê-chiang- Fu-chou route at which they could obtain Nanking silk. 
Now that virtually the entire coast of China had been sealed off, the 
intermediate land route via Vietnam emerged as viable alternative. If the 
border between Vietnam and China was opened, then it would be possible to 
transport the Nanking silks overland and then channel them to Japan via 
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North Vietnamese ports. Ever since the beginning of the Manchu invasion, 
opposing bands had been cruising the coastal waters between China and 
Vietnam. The Dutch had also seen how about 1,200 ‘long-haired’ resistance 
fighters had occupied the most westerly harbour at Longmen in September 
1661.42 After the Manchu force had driven these intruders away in 1662, 
they probably sought refuge in Tonkin. 43  As mentioned before, as a 
consequence of Hung Hsu’s contacts in Kuangtung they had connections with 
the Cheng regime in Taiwan. Certainly, the Cheng trading fleet did dispatch 
junks to Vietnam from Japan and, in the spring of 1663, a Cheng junk 
carrying 100 armed men arrived in Tonkin (Hanoi). It was said that she had 
come from Japan and was loaded with pepper, lead, rattans and the like, 
which the Dutch suspected of being the booty plundered from Dutch Fort 
Zeelandia in Taiwan.44 Just before this armed junk arrived in Tonkin, dozens 
of Chinese merchants residing there advised the resident Dutch merchant 
there to encourage the border trade. He reported the following to Batavia  
‘In Lung-chou (Loctjouw[D.] ) and Chiao-chou (Caatcjouw[D.]) we 
met more than ten Chinese merchants who had been travelling for 
twenty-seven days on a journey from Nanking (Nanquin[D.]) to Lung-chou. If 
they had not reached this border (near Lung-chou) by way of Chiang-hsi 
(Kiancij[D.]) Province and, further along, by way of the entire province of 
Hu-kuang (Huquam [D.]), and have headed straight to Kuang-chou 
(Canton[D.]) City, they would have had to travel the entire length of 
Chiang-hsi Province. Kuang-tung Province is situated about 60 Dutch miles 
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(450 km) away, eastwards from here by the sea. Because Kuang-chou City 
(and especially Macao) is situated on a geographical promontory stretching 
eastwards, it seems that Kuang-chou City is farther from Nanking than 
Lung-chou is.’45  
These Chinese merchants did their best to convince the Dutch 
merchants in Tonkin that the land route (via the river systems) was now more 
convenient than the sea route via Kuang-chou or Macao. In fact, the Dutch 
had heard rumours of this plan from local Chinese merchants as early as 
1661.46 What the advisors failed to mention was that the difficulties at 
present upsetting Kuang-chou City were caused by both the evacuation and 
the prohibition on martime trade. As the Chinese merchants Tonkin hailed 
from Nanking, it can be reasonably inferred that their bulk commodities were 
silk goods. The land route they were advocating so enthusiastically passed 
through the Cheng-nan Gate (nowadays Friendship Gate), where was the 
official gate the Ch’ing court received the ambassador from Vietnam (Tonkin) 
pay homage to the Manchu Emperor, K’ang-hsi. As they approached the gate, 
the merchants could choose to visit other border cities in Kuanghsi province 
namely: Lung-chou, P’ing-shiang (Pingkang[D.]), Ssu-ming-fu (Siminfoe[D.]) 
and T’ai-ping-fu (Theibinfoe[D]). Notoriously the King of Tonkin had 
handed over the last royal descendant of the Ming dynasty to the Ch’ing 
authorities via this route in May 1662.47 After this event, the officials of the 
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two countries gradually secured the Chengnan Gate against any illegal 
intrusions.  
On January 24, 1664, a junk left Nagasaki bound for Tonkin.48 It 
probably belonged to an independent Chinese merchant by the name of Wei 
Chiu-kuan.49 Having first called at Cambodia this junk made good time to 
Tonkin.50 She sailed into Tonkin on February 3, carrying a cargo worth 
200,000 taels, and she returned to Japan in the summer of 1664.51 However, 
as early as May 1663, Dutch ships had received orders to intercept any 
Chinese vessel sailing to Japan.52 In August 1664, Dutch vessels noted that 
two Chinese junks, each worth 100,000 to 200,000 guilders, were leaving the 
harbour.53 Assuming that one of them belonged to Wei Chiu-kuan, it is fairly 
safe to conclude that the other junk was operating under the orders of the 
Cheng regime. The trading mission of the two ships was abortive and they 
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never reached Japan because of the Dutch interception.54 The blockade 
elicited strong reactions from the authorities both in Tonkin and in Japan, 
who suffered great losses because of what they had invested in this venture. 
In the aftermath of this incident, in the summer of 1665 the VOC 
administration finally lifted its blockade order against Tonkin.55 Soon, Japan 
was once again witnessing the safe arrival of junks from Tonkin.56  
Although the joint pressure exerted by both the Japanese and Tonkin 
authorities compelled the Dutch to lift their blockade, the smuggling scheme 
hatched by the Kuang-tung rebels collapsed because it had run up against 
other obstacles.  
When official diplomacy between China (the Ch’ing court) and 
Vietnam (the Thrinh Court) gradually moved on to a more stable footing after 
1662, the Thrinh king suddenly issued radical measures which forced the 
Chinese within his borders to assimilate to Vietnamese culture. On 27 
September, 1663, the king promulgated a placard declaring that, if they 
wished to remain in Vietnam, all foreigners should immediately tie up their 
hair, dye their teeth and go bare-footed according to the Vietnamese fashion. 
The placard also declared that, with the exception of the Dutch, all foreigners 
should move outside the city walls of Tonkin.57 These requirements signalled 
that Chinese ‘long- hair resistance fighters’, who preserved their Chinese 
identity, could be easily distinguished from Vietnamese and it would be 
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simple to keep them under surveillance. According to the Kuang-tung 
governor’s report, sometime before April 1665 a group of resistance fighters 
had seized a port in Kuang-tung.58 While the Tonkin assimilation policy was 
in force, this group, which had retreated to Tonkin in 1662, must have had 
inklings that the Tonkin authorities would no longer give them refuge if the 
Manchu court declared them fugitives. As expected, the Ch’ing court did 
indeed demand that the King of Tonkin (the Thrinh king) should extradite 
those rebels. It sent an official letter to the Thrinh king, threatening him with 
war if he failed to hand over the fugitives in Vietnam.59 For unknown 
reasons, the Thrinh court did not feel obliged to obey. Consequently, tensions 
on the border worsened. Not long after this demand had been made, four 
Chinese junks visited Tonkin whey they offered pepper and sandalwood at 
reduced prices. Their prices were so competitive they even lured Ch’ing 
merchants across the border. The good might have been cheap but the taxes 
collected by the Thrinh king were heavy, so in order to circumvent them, the 
merchants from Manchu China and the merchants under the Cheng regime 
choose to conduct their trade in a remote village near the border. However, 
when the king eventually discovered this rendezvous, he gave immediate 
orders that all trade should be confined to a certain site where it would be 
under the supervision of appointed officials and guarded by 1,000 soldiers to 
see that there were no defaulters. The site designated lay cross the river from 
Tonkin City.60       
During the early summer of 1665, when the mood in Tonkin was 
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gradually turning inimical towards the Chinese maritime merchants, a 
typhoon damaged the armada under the Ch’ing Admiral Shih Lang in the 
Taiwan Strait. Delivered from a strong Ch’ing naval presence by the weather, 
the ties between Cheng Ching’s force in Taiwan and the Kuang-tung 
privateers became tighter, especially after Hsü Lung (the successor of Su Li 
who trades with Cheng force in serect) had had to withdraw from the coast in 
obedience to the Imperial Order in 1666.61 Their mutual interests encouraged 
the two parties to consider developing a new corridor for the Sino-Japan trade. 
It would involve the joint forces exploiting their mastery of the Kuang-tung 
waters, either to smuggle Nanking silks from the Kuang-tung coast or to 
secure a sea route by which silks from Tonkin could be safely shipped. After 
the summer of 1666, this project gradually began to lose its appeal as it ran 
into obstacles created by both the VOC fleet and the Ch’ing court. Despite 
this disappointment, after the Fu-chien competitors retreated from the strait, 
the Cheng regime in Taiwan had the opportunity gradually to recoup its 
strength and revive its maritime trade. The joint forces of Taiwan and the 
Kao-Lai-Lien areas now turned their attention to their only competitor in 
these waters, namely the Dutch East India Company.  
 
Suppression of Fu-chou, desertion of Siam and a focus on Cambodia 
The Dutch merchants in Japan heard that, while bound for Japan in the late 
summer of 1665, a Chang-chou Junk (loaded with riches and probably 
belonging to the Hai-ch’êng Duke and the T’ung-an Count) had been seized 
by Cheng war-junks based in Taiwan.62 The Dutch merchants residing in 
Fu-chou claimed the junk was loaded with 600 piculs of white raw silk. They 
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also reported that, during the same season, the Cheng naval force had 
captured three other extremely valuable junks during their voyage to Japan.63 
These captures marked the turning point after which the Cheng naval forces 
had definitely taken the upper hand, helped by the fact a typhoon had 
devastated the Ch’ing armada in May 1665. Not very long after (October 
1665), seizing the day the Cheng authorities resident in the southwestern 
plain of Taiwan decided to dispatch six vessels to Tamsuy, a harbour on the 
northwestern tip of Taiwan facing the Taiwan Strait. Seventy armed soldiers 
repaired the redoubt (lain unoccupied since deserted by the Dutch in 1661) 
and fortified the area with gun emplacements for several cannon.64 Since 
their invasion of Taiwan in 1661, the Cheng forces had not considered 
stationing a garrison in that part of the island, and apparently this small fort 
was seen  as a counterweight to the Dutch garrison in Chi-lung on the 
northeastern tip of the island.    
In the spring of 1666, the Cheng reinforced the Tamsuy garrison, 
bringing the total strength up to between 700 and 800 soldiers. They lived in 
some bamboo huts in a camp protected by a wooden palisade.65 Cheng 
Ching sent a delegate from An-ping to Tamsuy to open peace negotiations 
with the Dutch in Chi-lung. On 2 March, 1666, the Dutch captain received 
them officially in Fort Noord Holland in Chi-lung.66 Cheng Ching offered 
the Dutch a piece of the sandbar called Pei-Hsien-Wei (Baxemboy[D.]) near 
Fort Zeelandia, on which the VOC merchants could build a lodge and, as a 
reciprocal gesture, the Dutch would have to agree to trade peacefully with the 
Cheng regime. Eager to have his enemies out of northern Taiwan, Cheng 
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Ching required that the Dutch withdraw from Chi-lung and cease their 
hostilities against all junks affiliated with the Cheng regime. After his 
proposal was rejected, a few months later, in May, Cheng Ching dispatched 
6,000 soldiers to attack the fort at Chi-lung, but the Dutch managed to 
repulse the attackers after 10 days of fighting, in which time the Cheng army 
suffered some 1,000 casualties.67 At this point, the Cheng troops had to 
adopt another tactic and tried to cut off the food supply the aborigines were 
providing the Chilung garrison. They then simply sat back and kept a watch 
on the Dutch in Chi-lung.  
During these expeditions, at least twenty junks were needed to 
transport the Chinese soldiers back and forth between Tamsuy and Chi-lung. 
As there were only one or two Dutch yachts transporting supplies to Chi-lung 
from Fu-chou, the 300 Dutch soldiers in the fort were more or less helpless 
and, after the events of 1666, the Cheng junks could go and come the Strait as 
they pleased, safe in the knowledge that their vessels far outnumbered those 
of the Dutch. Finally, after the Ch’ing court had unconditionally rejected their 
petition for free trade, the Dutch deserted their fort on 6 July, 1668.68 Hence, 
Cheng Ching finally realized his strategic goal of securing the trade route 
through the Taiwan Strait, but as this was only one part of the whole trade 
route, Cheng Ching now needed to secure the ports on the Cochin-China 
Peninsula.  
As mentioned earlier, after what happened in 1663 securing the silk 
trade between China and Japan must have been the first priority for the 
Cheng regime. Since the autumn of 1663, the Amoy merchants who had 
defected to the Ch’ing had become the main rivals, but, owing to the Dutch 
blockade, the merchants under the Ch’ing still did not feel free to send their 
junks to all the harbours around the South China Sea. The strategy of the 
VOC was to try to block the harbours of Tonkin, Cambodia, Siam, anywhere 
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in fact where the Dutch residents had enough authority to press the local 
rulers to expel Cheng Ching’s merchants.  
Not unnaturally, this heavy-handed tactic rebounded on the Dutch. It 
certainly stirred up resentment at the Siamese court, where King Narai was 
poised to expand his royal trade with Japan and China. If and when the 
Siamese King entered into the trade, previously monopolized by the Chinese 
and the Dutch merchants, it stands to reason that the percentage of the trade 
allocated to the Dutch must invariably shrink to compensate for the Siamese 
King’s newly created share. Moreover, for over a decade, ever since the 
1650s in fact, the Dutch had frequently leveled accusations against Coxinga’s 
adherents, saying that they were infringing the privileged Dutch monopoly on 
the export of animal skins (especially deerskins).69 Coxinga’s invasion of 
Taiwan cutting them off from one of the best sources of supply, forced the 
Dutch to employ tougher tactics to protect their rights. A notable example of 
this occurred on 16 August, 1661, when a VOC ship intercepted a Siamese 
crown junk sailing from Tonkin to Japan and justified her interception on the 
grounds that the junk was being manned by Chinese and Portuguese.70 The 
news of the seizure spread in Siam during March 1662 and exacerbated the 
resentment felt by the local Chinese community against the Dutch residents. 
About 800 Chinese people gathered around the Dutch trading-post in 
Ayutthaya shouting that they would cut off the ears and noses of the Dutch.71 
Encouraged by this, King Narai lost little time in demanding that the VOC 
compensate him for the seizure of the junk (and her cargo) valued at 84,000 
guilders. To express his people’s feelings of contempt for the Dutch, the 
Siamese King not only personally received the envoy and accepted the gifts 
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sent by Coxinga in the spring of 1662, he reciprocated and dispatched an 
envoy bearing gifts and goods on the junk of Coxinga’s envoy on her return 
voyage to Taiwan. The Siamese King also insisted that the Dutch factory 
issue free passes to all his junks sailing to China and Japan, including that of 
the envoy.72  
Aware that the VOC could not reasonably expect to obtain valuable 
commodities under these conditions, the Dutch in Ayutthaya closed down 
their office in November 1663 and, following the orders issued by Batavia, 
began to patrol the coastal waters in the vicinity of the Chao Phya estuary.73 
They decided to take this step about this time that Cheng Ching’s adherents 
left Amoy and Quemoy, re-establishing themselves first on Nan-ao and, later 
(1664), totally withdrawing from all the islands along the China coast.  
No junk from either Taiwan or Japan visited a Siamese harbour 
between 1664 and 1665. The Cheng authorities in Taiwan must have got 
wind of the Dutch blockade in the Gulf of Siam. After the Dutch seized a 
Siamese crown junk homeward bound from Japan off the coast of Cambodia, 
the Siamese court capitulated. In the peace treaty concluded between the 
Siamese King and the Dutch, the former agreed in principle not to employ 
any Chinese on his trading junks, irrespective of their destination or port of 
departure.74 Although the Dutch merchants requested the Siamese King 
banish all local Chinese merchants from his kingdom, he baulked at such a 
demand, claiming that all the resident Chinese (numbering about 1,000) were 
his own subjects, not those of the Cheng regime. To strengthen his assertion, 
the Siamese King pressed the local Chinese merchants to declare their 
allegiance to the Siamese crown.  
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Unlike the situation in Tonkin and Siam, the Dutch outposts did not 
have any formal relationship with Quinam which, perhaps as a consequence, 
was disposed to provide the Chinese merchants with shelter. Four junks 
departed to Japan from Quinam during the summer of 1664, even though 
Dutch ships were patrolling the Gulfs of Tonkin and Siam. However, 
although disposed to be friendly, Quinam could not provide the Cheng junk 
traders with deer- and rayskins, which were the key commodities in the 
strategy devised by the Cheng regime to preserve its Japanese trade.  
While Coxinga was laying siege to the Dutch in Fort Zeelandia from 
1661 to 1662, political conditions in Cambodia had degenerated into chaos. 
After a sixteen-year long rule (1642-1658) by his brother, the Muslim Sultan 
Ibrahim, who had usurped the throne, the legitimate heir (Prince Nacpra 
Boemton) rose in revolt, principally because Ibrahim had introduced a radical 
Islamic movement into Cambodia. The legitimate prince demanded that the 
Cambodian people reinstitute traditional Buddhist worship and expel all the 
Malay high officials appointed by the Sultan.75 When the revolt broke out, 
the prince took his mother’s advice and asked the Quinam court for military 
support , a request acceded to in October 1658. The Quinam army invaded 
Cambodia, captured the Sultan and his family, and plunged into an orgy of 
plundering so fierce that it even caused the new Cambodian court to flee to 
the mountain areas. Instead of being a brother-in-arms, the Quinam army 
became the new oppressor. It plundered one big Chinese junk when she took 
shelter on the Mekong River after running into a typhoon on her voyage from 
Japan to Siam.76 This was the straw which broke the camel’s back, finally 
driven to react to this invasion, the Siamese King announced he would 
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intervene and lead 100,000 soldiers and 1,000 vessels on a mission to expel 
the Quinam invaders.77 
News of his declaration caused the Quinam army to withdraw in 
1659.78 By the beginning of 1663, economic conditions in Cambodia had 
begun to recover. For example, that same year, a Chinese junk belonging to 
Wei Chiu-kuan exported 39,350 deerskins from Cambodia.79 Two other 
junks carried a total of 53,360 deerskins to Japan.80 The cargo of two other 
Chinese junks arriving in Nagasaki from Siam did not fare very well in 
comparison as they carried only 13,087 deerskins.81 It is important to note 
that, at this time, the Dutch blockade of Ayutthaya had just commenced and 
that, caught up in the throes of their crisis with Siam, the VOC merchants 
received an invitation from the new Cambodian king, Nac Boeton.82 
Trade negotiations officially commenced in February of 1665. The 
Dutch laid thirteen conditions before the King and his counsellors for their 
consideration, including the proviso that the Chinese should be totally 
excluded from the deerskin trade and the Dutch should be given the authority 
to patrol the Mekong River delta so as to be able to enforce their demands. 
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The King baulked at this and stated that the Dutch could confront the Chinese 
junks only after they had left the coastal waters.83 As a sop to Cerberus, he 
was willing to grant the Dutch an exclusive twenty-year privilege on the 
export of deerskins to Japan.84 
On 8 March, 1665, Merchant Pieter Ketting urged the Shabandar and 
several Cambodian grandees to announce that the VOC had been granted the 
exclusive right to export the skins; hence, all the local skin collectors were 
warned not to sell any of their wares to Chinese junks because any of these 
commodities sold in this manner would be liable to confiscation.85 The 
Chinese deerskin traders immediately drew up a petition to the King, stating 
that 
‘Last year we advanced a considerable capital sum which our friends 
invested in purchasing and collecting of deerskins. We shall be able to supply 
those investors with the deerskins if Your Majesty permits us to keep one-third 
of the deerskins [to dispose of as we please]. Moreover, the Dutch do not 
have enough cash to pay for all the skins. Therefore, we shall find ourselves 
in a precarious position should the unsold deerskins remain in our 
warehouses, not able to be traded for the sizable sums of cash which the big 
                                                          
83 Dijk, Neêrlands vroegste betrekkingen, 346; VOC 1252, Missive van seigneur 
[Pieter ]Ketting [ende J. van Wijkersloot te Cambodia] aen haer Eds.[Joan 
Maetsuijcker], Cambodia, 12 Feb. 1665, fos. 101; 109. The boundaries of the 
territorial waters were defined as from the hook of Sinque Jaques in the north, to Pulo 
Obi in the south, and Pulo Candore in the east. 
84 Dijk, Neêrlands vroegste betrekkingen, 344. 
85 VOC 1254, Daghregister gehouden bij den coopman Pieter Ketting wegens het 
voorgevallene omtrent 's compagnies saecken in 't rijck van Cambodia, beginnende in 
dato 12 Februarij 1665 dat den commissaris Jan de Meijer naer Batavia vertrock ende 
eijndigende den 12 November 1665 [Diary Kept by Merchant Pieter Ketting about the 
Company Business in the Kingdom of Cambodia, Beginning on 12 Feb. 1665 When 
Commissioner Jan de Meijer Departed for Batavia and Ends on 12 Nov. 1665], 
Cambodia, 8 March. 1665, fo. 1322. (Hereafter cited as ‘Diary of Cambodia’) 
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junks will bring.’  
In their submission, the skin collectors asked the King to reduce the 
term of the Dutch privilege from twenty to ten years, and that he cut the 
annual export of skins from Cambodia by one half. The upshot was that the 
King did allow the Chinese to export one-third of the total number of the 
animal skins exported annually. The Dutch merchants did not raise any 
objections at this point, because Cambodian grandees told them that the order 
was only an expedient measure to appease the Chinese skin collectors in this 
one particular year.86 
Between March and April 1665, two Chinese junks arrived carrying 
silver coins, copper and some porcelain from Japan to Cambodia.87 On 
24April, another junk arrived in Cambodia from Nanao. 88  These 
junks—perhaps under the aegis of the joint forces of Kuangtung privateers 
and the Cheng regime in Taiwan—were commanded by captains who must 
have noticed the deteriorating conditions in the deerskin trade in Siam. 
Intense rivalry flared up between the Chinese junk traders and the Dutch 
residents as soon as the Chinese junks arrived in Cambodia from Japan. At 
the beginning of May, the VOC merchants sought an audience with the king, 
urging him to force the Chinese collectors to sell their supplies of deerskins 
to the Dutch. The equivocal answer of the court was that the Chinese 
collectors had not built up a significant supply of deerskins on account of the 
shortage of copper coins.89   
                                                          
86 VOC 1252, Rapport van den coopman Johan de Meijer wegens sijn verrichtingh in 
Cambodia, Cambodia [Report Written by Merchant Johan de Meijer about His 
Activities in Cambodia], 10 March. 1665, fos 118-9. 
87 VOC 1254, Diary of Cambodia, Cambodia, 27 Mar 1665, Fol. 1332; 23 Apr. 1665, 
fo. 1341. 
88 Ibidem, 23 Apr. 1665, fo. 1341. The diary mentions that this junk from Nanao was 
actually a Quinam junk. 
89 Ibid., 8 May 1665, fo. 1346. ‘some copper had been brought [by the Chinese junks], 
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The Dutch refused to be palmed off with such prevarication and 
demanded that the King order all Chinese traders to deliver forthwith 
whatever number of deerskins they already had in store to the Dutch Factory . 
The King ordered one of his courtiers, Nacpra Theeportioen, to write a short 
memorandum in the King’s name, declaring that the Dutch demand be 
fulfilled.90 On 26 June, the news spread that a Chinese junk was preparing to 
depart from the Cambodian capital Phnom Penh. When it came to his ears, 
the Dutch chief merchant requested permission to inspect her holds before it 
set sail on the high seas.91 After he had obtained permission and a search 
warrant, he took Nacpra Theeportioen and some inspectors to investigate the 
junk in question,92 but when the Chinese vigorously resisted their attempts to 
do so, the inspectors allowed the junk to set sail. Nacpra Theeportioen was 
indignant, but later, the Chinese mandarin, Tjauponia Sisermoth, declared 
that the inspectors had been wise to let the junk leave, because the King had 
issued another pertinent order in which he said that the junk should be left 
unharmed. Eventually the truth was out, namely that the King had purchased 
Japanese copper for casting cannons from the nachoda of the Chinese junk, 
and had paid the nachoda in deerskins.93 As this pertained to the King’s own 
private trade, the junk was inviolate. The long and short of it is that the Dutch 
residents in Cambodia failed miserably to enforce their privilege, because 
later that year, in the southwestern monsoon season, three junks loaded with 
deerskins departed from Cambodia to Japan.94 To add insult to injury, the 
deerskins which the junks transported to Nagasaki yielded the Cheng more 
                                                                                                                             
with which he [the Cambodian King] had cast coins here in order to purchase and 
collect deerskins and some other sorts of goods. With this money, the Chinese would 
be ready to pay [and to collect the deerskins].’ 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., 26 June 1665, fo. 1352. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., fo. 1354. 
94 Ibid., 13 July 1665, fo. 1358. One of the junks would sail to Naoao first. 
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silver than the Dutch were able to make.95  
 
The arrival of the ‘Taiwanese Chinese’ force under Piauja 
As mentioned above, after a typhoon had wrought havoc with the Fu-chien 
armada in the early summer of 1665, the balance of maritime power in the 
Taiwan Strait gradually fell into Cheng Ching’s hands. Along the Kuang-tung 
coast, the evacuation policy implemented by the Ch’ing court created a 
vacuum which was eagerly being filled by roaming Kuang-tung 
privateers/pirates. They became particularly active after the fall of Su Li in 
1664. Although some of the Kuang-tung privateers/pirates had attempted to 
set up an alternative silk trade route from Vietnam, they failed because of 
obstacles thrown in their path by the Ch’ing, Tonkin and the Dutch. At this 
stage of the game, as the Siamese King had declared his preference for the 
Dutch to the Cheng traders, the Cheng regime sensed the importance of the 
Cambodian deerskins and urgently recognized the necessity to cut the Dutch 
out of this trade. 
One of the victims of the 1663-1664 Dutch blockade of Tonkin was the 
Chinese privateer/pirate Piauja. He had his revenge as later he was to play an 
important role in the Chinese raid on the Dutch factory in Cambodia. His 
own recorded recollections reveal that the Dutch had put him in custody on a 
VOC ship while they blockaded the Gulf of Tonkin. His summary custodial 
sentence cost him most of his property, reducing him to the level of a humble 
soldier instead of his former glory as a rich merchant.96 On 20 February, 
                                                          
95 VOC 1253, Missive door den koopman Jacob Gruijs [en den raat ten comptoir 
Nangasackij] aen haer Eds.[Joan Maetsuijcker], Japan, 19 Oct. 1665, fo. 1589. 
96 VOC 1265, Rapport van den ondercoopman Jacob van Wijkersloot gedaen aen den 
Ed. Daniel Sicx coopman en opperhooft mitsgaders den raedt over 's Comps. 
swaerwightigen handel int keijser reijck van Japan omme in tijde en wijle haere Eds. 
[Joan Maetsuijcker] op Batavia bekent te maken den droevigen toestant in 's Comps. 
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1666, he arrived in Cambodian waters with a fleet of eight or nine 
Kuang-tung junks. He and his adherents sailed up the Mekong Delta and 
robbed seven or eight Malay vessels anchored there. Piauja and his men even 
captured a ship bound for Macao with a Portuguese priest on board. Later, he 
loaded four Kuang-tung junks with booty from the raids and sailed away, 
announcing that they were bound for Taiwan and that a bigger force of 
compatriots would return during the next northeast monsoon season. Four of 
his junks remained behind in Mekong River.97 
The Dutch Chief Merchant in Phnom Penh, two hundred kilometres up 
river, Pieter Ketting, was still insisting on claiming the exclusive privilege to 
any deerskins. However, his fortunes were about to take a turn for the worse. 
The most important Cambodian merchant on whom he relied died suddenly 
and his protector, Naval and River Master Occenja Calahon, got married and 
was absent from his post. Bereft of their protection, he was unable to prevent 
the Chinese traders from exporting deerskins to Japan.98 At the end of this 
monsoon season, Ketting could purchase only about 6,262 taels’ worth of 
goods for Japan, and could do nothing when the Chinese sent five junks to 
                                                                                                                             
voorgevalle saecke en ongehoorde proceduren int rijck van Cambodia aldaer 's Comps. 
ministers door den Chinesen rover Piauja aengedaen als mede het affloopen en 
verbranden der loges mitsgaders het droevigh vermoorden van 't opperhooft seigneur 
Pieter Ketting als 'tgene andersints daer voorgevallen en gepasseert is [Report Written 
by Junior Merchant Jacob van Wijkersloot to Chief Merchant Daniel Six and Council 
in Japan and in Due Course His Excellency in Batavia about the Incidents and the 
Outrageous Happenings in the Cambodian Kingdom Committed by the Chinese Pirate 
Piauja Who Burned Down the Lodge and Grievously Murdered Chief Merchant Pieter 
Ketting, As Well As What Has Happened Since ], [on the yacht the Schelvis], 19 
Aug.1667, fo. 793v. [Hereafter cited as ‘Report by Jacob van Wijkersloot from 
Cambodia’] 
97  VOC 1264, Missive door den koopman Pieter Ketting aen de edele heer 
gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker en heeren raden van India, Cambodia, 5 
Dec.1666, fos. 101v-102r. 
98 Ibid., fo. 101r. 
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Japan loaded with more than 70,000 pieces of skin.99 The writing was on the 
wall, the presence of Piauja and his people in the Mekong Delta was exerting 
a strong influence on the attitude of the Cambodian court towards the Dutch. 
On 15 February, 1667, the Chinese privateer sailed upstream from the 
mouth of the Mekong River to Phnom Penh in a small vessel. Not long 
before, on 16 January, two Chinese junks arrived in from Japan, carrying 
some 600 soldiers taken aboard in Taiwan.100 Having joined forces with 
Piauja’s men, in the king’s name these soldiers massacred almost all the 
Quinnam people living in the vicinity of the Mekong River.101The Dutch 
suspected that the Cambodian King was behind this action, for they described 
him, in essence, as a wolf dressed in sheep’s clothing.102 The massacre 
resulted in the deaths of almost 1,000 local Quinam people.103  
Piauja’s influence at the Cambodian court underwent a sudden growth 
spurt after the King’s official acknowledgment of his loyal service. He now 
commanded three junks and five local war-vessels, and was in the process of 
having another five war-vessels constructed.104 Feeling that they were in a 
very precarious position, the Company servants in the Pnom Phenh factory 
were afraid, and consulted their Cambodian adviser Tjuponja Zam. Through 
                                                          
99 Generale missiven, III 1655-1674, 537-8. 25 Jan.1667. 
100 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 225. 10 Aug. 1667. 
101 VOC 1265, Report by Jacob van Wijkersloot from Cambodia, Cambodia, 19 Aug. 
1667, fol. 793r. The manuscript is very hard to read. The author appreciates Dr Hugo 
s’Jacob’s assistance in translating the text. 
102  VOC 1264, Missive door den koopman Pieter Ketting aen de edele heer 
gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker en heeren raden van India, Cambodia, 12 Mar. 
1667, fo. 104r. 
103 VOC 1265, Report by Jacob van Wijkersloot from Cambodia, Cambodia, 19 Aug. 
1667, fol. 793r.  
104  VOC 1264, Missive door den koopman Pieter Ketting aen de edele heer 
gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker en heeren raden van India, Cambodia, 12 Mar. 
1667, fo. 104v. 
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him, Pieter Ketting got in touch with the court mandarin Tjauponja Tesemot, 
whom he asked to deliver Piauja 1,000 taels on his behalf in exchange for the 
safe conduct of the Dutch people out of Phnom Penh. Piauja turned down this 
proposal, suggesting that instead Ketting should give him a pass for two of 
his junks to sail to Batavia to enable his adherents to collect the debt a 
Chinese inhabitant of that city owed Piauja. The Dutch rejected this request 
as arrant nonsense. A little later their advisor was reduced to engaging in a 
shouting match with Tjauponja Tesemot. In March, the Dutch merchants 
were forced to call for help when the Chinese quarter in Phnom Penh 
mobilized 300 armed men, supported by heavy weapons. Chinese junks now 
also sailed into the river where they carried out patrols.105  
On 20 June, Piauja led between 170 and 180 armed soldiers to the 
Dutch trading-post in Phnom Penh. They entered through the palisade and 
delivered a letter translated from Chinese into Portuguese demanding the 
extradition of Pieter Ketting. Piauja took the Chief Merchant and some of his 
men hostage, and ordered the other Dutchmen to collect a ransom of 4,873 
taels of silver. After the money had been handed over, the crisis seemed to 
abate. 
On 25 June, when a VOC yacht from Batavia sailed into the Mekong 
River, Pieter Ketting in Phnom Penh asked the Cambodian King for 
protection, assuring him that Dutch reinforcements and a rich cargo were on 
their way to his kingdom. The yacht brought with it a cargo of piece goods 
which could be traded for deerskins. But, before the trade could begin, on 9 
July Piauja suddenly raided the Dutch trading-post at midnight.106 Earlier 
that day, Piauja’s men had captured two Dutch sailors from the yacht on their 
way to visit a friend in the Spanish quarter of Phnom Penh, with whom they 
                                                          
105 VOC 1265, Report by Jacob van Wijkersloot from Cambodia, Cambodia, 19 Aug. 
1667, fo. 794v. 
106 VOC 1261, Missive door d'overheden van 't jacht de Schelvis uijt de revier van 
Cambodia na Malacca geschreven, [on the yacht the Schelvis], 11 July 1667,fo. 359r. 
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intended to spend the night. When the two captives informed Piauja that no 
further aid could be expected from Batavia, he decided to attack the Dutch 
trading-post that same night.107     
Eighty Chinese soldiers broke through the palisade and took the VOC 
servants who were still asleep by surprise. Although the yacht was anchored 
nearby, the low water level made it impossible for the sailors and gunners 
aboard to fire on the factory, which was situated on high ground. Watching 
from the bloody massacre in the trading-post which was soon engulfed in 
flames, from afar, the crew dared not go ashore. The killing went on until 
dawn.108  
All acknowledged by the kings 
This unequivocal use of force and violence by the ‘Taiwanese Chinese’ 
presents a picture of Cheng power around the South China Sea. The incident 
has remained almost completely outside the scope of Chinese records 
because, after seizing Taiwan from the Cheng regime in 1683, the Manchu 
government destroyed most of its official documents.  
The tangled history of Chinese merchants pursuing revenue from the 
Japan trade and the military operations of the Taiwan-based Cheng regime 
bear a close similarity to the overseas adventures of Japanese samurai 
adventurers like Yamada Nagamasa in Ligor and Hamada Yahyoe in Taiwan 
several decades earlier.  
                                                          
107 VOC 1269, Verbael van drie Nederlanders uijt Cambodia gevangen te Macassar 
aengebraght, nopende haer wedervaren geduijrende haere gevanckenisse aldaer 
[Report Written by Three Netherlanders Who Were Captured in Cambodia Recounting 
Their Imprisonment There], Macassar, 17 Jan. 1670, fo.701r-v; The Deshima 
dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 226. 19 Aug. 1667; VOC 1265, Report by Jacob van 
Wijkersloot from Cambodia, Cambodia, 19 Aug. 1667, fo. 769r-v. 
108 VOC 1265, Report by Jacob van Wijkersloot from Cambodia, Cambodia, 19 Aug. 
1667, fo. 797v. 
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This overview of the military operations directed by the Cheng regime 
between 1666 and 1667 reveals how it ran the Tung-ning ( that is, the realm 
of the Cheng regime in Taiwan) as an entrepôt where goods, information and 
military resources could be exchanged. The Cheng merchants and soldiers 
were organized so that they could react quickly and flexibly to preserve their 
strategic advantage. Even though quite a few senior Cheng military officers 
and soldiers surrendered to the Ch’ing in 1663, most of the vessels remained 
at the disposal of the Cheng navy.109 After the Cheng moved its commercial 
base from Amoy to Taiwan, they also established concealed bases along the 
coast of Kuang-tung in 1664, and the typhoon which had wreaked havoc on 
the Shih Lang armada in 1665, enabled the Cheng regime to gain control of 
the waters between Fu-chou and Tamsuy. The Dutch succeeded in keeping 
control of the export of Siamese deerskins in 1666 and again in 1667, but 
when they also tried to butt in and secure the deerskin market in Cambodia, 
they met with strong Chinese opposition.      
Undoubtedly the most important driving force behind these events was 
the Japanese demand for deerskins. Ever since the middle of the sixteenth 
century, Japan had been exporting silver to the areas around the East and 
South China Seas. By issuing the proclamation that no Chinese vessels 
should be harmed in the waters between China and Japan, the Japanese 
authorities spread a de facto protective umbrella over the trading junks of the 
Cheng regime, keeping them safe from Dutch attacks.110   
Although the fleets of the Dutch East India Company could still 
blockade any harbour, such an action would do it little good if the local rulers 
                                                          
109 Shih Weich’i,’ Shih Weich’i mi-t’i t’ai-wan chêng-shih t’ung-yang ch’ing-hsing 
ping-ch’ên ch’ao-fu chi-i shih-pên [Secret Report about the Trading Activities of the 
Cheng Regime and Suggestions about How to Defeat It]14 Aug 1668’, in CKTI (et al 
eds), K’ang-hsi t’ung-i t’ai- wan tang- an shih-liao hsüan- chi, 82. 
110 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 95. 1 Feb. 1664. The Shogun issued a 
direct order that no Dutch vessels might attack any Chinese junks sailing to Japan. 
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could not be pressed to keep their promises. The VOC could not afford to 
lose its supply of silver from Japan. In the case of Cambodia, the Dutch could 
not effectively blockade the waters around the Mekong Delta because the 
capital, Phnom Penh, was located 200 kilometres inland. 
Therefore, they were unable to keep an eye on the individual local 
vendors and ascertain their credit sources. Furthermore, the VOC could never 
collect the commodities it required without the assistance of the local rulers. 
Too weak to dominate the native market, the Company could not enforce its 
privileges effectively. 
The 600 Cheng soldiers who were landed in Phnom Penh were far 
more seasoned fighters than the Dutch merchants. With the consent of the 
Cambodian king, the Cheng Chinese of Taiwan was free to ransack the Dutch 
trading-post. In 1663, the Siamese king chose to make peace with the VOC, 
fearing Dutch retaliation on the sea routes, but in 1667 the Cambodian king 
allied with the Cheng side because he did not expect sufficient aid on land 
from the VOC. The new ties between the Cambodian and Taiwanese rulers 
were built on an acknowledgement of mutual interests. The King of Taiwan 
assisted the King of Cambodia in expelling the Quinam enemy, and the 
Shogun of Japan guaranteed that the Taiwanese traffic between his country 
and Cambodia would be free of interference from the VOC.  
Cheng Ching actually completed the trading system designed both by 
his grandfather, Iquan, by fending off the European competitors on the 
overseas markets, and his father, Coxinga, by building trading relationships 
with overseas rulers based on military alliances. What he could not foresee 
was the decline in the silver exports from Japan and Manila, which were just 
beyond the horizon. When this did become palpable he was forced to look for 
new markets. How the changing patterns in the Asian maritime trade 
eventually led to the decline and fall of the merchant princes of Taiwan will 







Reorganizing the trading network 1663-1670 
When a typhoon left the Manchu armada in shambles in the early summer of 
1665, Cheng Ching’s navy seized the opportunity again to obtain a maritime 
advantage over its adversaries. At more or less the same time, his captains 
captured three Fu-chou junks and another one from Chang-chou loaded with 
a total of 600 piculs of white silk.1 Now that the Kuang-tung exports were 
controlled by his new partners in Kao-lei-ran, Cheng Ching found himself in 
the auspicious position of being able to keep a tight grip on the China trade. 
He also found out that the defectors led by Cheng Tai’s brother, Cheng 
Ming-chun, were trying to withdraw the remaining money from Cheng Tai’s 
account in Nagasaki. Wasting no time, in a swift manoeuvre, he stepped in 
and claimed the money, said to amount to 500,000 taels, first in 1663.2 
Although the Shogunal court handed down a judgement stating that Cheng 
Tai’s successor was the rightful owner of this capital, Cheng Ching’s 
delegates refused to relinquish their claims, throwing the Japanese authorities 
into a quandary about to whom they should hand over the money.   
Cheng Ching also had to tread a chary path because, if his men sold the 
captured goods from these four junks in Japan, this would violate the 
Shogun’s edict that no harm should befall any vessel bound for Japan. To 
avoid this accusation, Cheng Ching had to find another party to whom he 
could sell these looted goods. As Japan was ruled out for the reasons stated 
                                                          
1 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670,159-60. 30 Aug. 1665; VOC 1253, 
Missive door den koopman Jacob Gruijs [en den raat ten comptoir Nangasackij] aen 
haer Eds.[ Joan Maetsuijcker], 19 Oct. 1665, fos. 1584-1585. 
2 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 168-9. 26 Nov. 1665. 
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above, the Spaniards in Manila offered the next best market, but Cheng 
Ching’s father, Coxinga, had once demanded the Manila authorities pay him 
tribute after he conquered Taiwan in 1662. That aggressive gesture had sown 
panic amongst the Manila authorities and had resulted in a bloody massacre 
in 1662, in which 2,000-3,000 Chinese people were slaughtered and their 
property confiscated.3  Later, Coxinga’s sudden demise and the ensuing 
disputes over his succession had delayed the earlier declaration of war 
against Manila. After Cheng Ching eventually succeeded in legitimating his 
right of succession, he took control of Amoy, Quemoy and Taiwan in the 
spring of 1663.4 However, when he had taken this step but was faced by a 
bad harvest and subsequent food shortages, he cannily reversed his father’s 
hostile plans and chose instead to propose a mutually beneficial trading plan 
to Manila.5 His ambassador, the Jesuit father Victorio Riccio, commented: 
‘The primary concerns [of the treaty] were that a great amount of property 
and silver owing them [the Chinese citizens] in Manila [ should be 
returned].’6 In May 1663, a peace treaty was concluded and the trade was 
re-opened the following year.7    
                                                          
3 VOC 1243, Missive door d'Ed. Enoch Poolvoet en sijn raet aen haer Eds.[Joan 
Maetsuijker] tot Batavia geschreven, Siam, 25 Feb. 1663, fos. 594-595; for the 
records of Spanish side C.F. José Eugenio Borao Mateo, et al. (eds), Spaniards in 
Taiwan, II 1642-1682, 600-8; Mauro Garcia; C.O. Resurreccion (eds), Focus on Old 
Manila: A Volume Issued to Commemorate the Fourth Centenary of the City of 
Manila, (Manila: Philippine Historical Association, 1971), 212-5.  
4 Yang Yün-p’ing, Nan-ming yen-chiu yü T’ai-wan wên-hua[Studies on the Southern 
Ming and the Culture of Taiwan], (Taipei: T'ai-wan fêng-wu, 1993 ), 431-9. 
5 VOC 1253, Missive van seigneur [Constantijn Nobel] en raad tot Hocksieuw aen 
haer Eds.[Joan Maetsuijcker], Fu-chou, 31 Oct. 1665, fos. 1855-1856; José Borao, 
Spaniards in Taiwan, II 1642-1682, 617-8.  
6 José Eugenio Borao Mateo, Pol Heyns, Carlos Gómez, Anna Maria Zandueta 
Nisce(eds.), Spaniards in Taiwan, 2 vols (Tapei, SMC Publisher, 2002), II 1642-1682, 
617. 
7 Borao, Spaniards in Taiwan, II1642-1682, 617; VOC 1264, Missive door den 
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Table 13-1: Chinese Junks Visiting Manila during 1663-1670 









Source: Chaunu, Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques, 148-60. 
Table 13-2: Raw Silk Exports from China and Taiwan to Manila 






1664 650 4.9 3,185
1665 450-400 27.5 11,675
1666 400 11.8  4,720
1668 500-450  3.4  1,640
1670 400 22 8,900
Source: AGI Philipinas 64, Vol. I, re-cited from Fang Chên-chên, Ming-mo Ch'ing-ch'u T'ai-wan 
yü Ma-ni-la tê Fan-ch’uan Mao-i (1664-1684)[The Junk Trade between Taiwan and Manila 
during the Transition from the Ming to the Ching Dynasty], (Taipei: Tao-hsiang, 2006), 191-2. 
Appendix II; Id, Fang Chên-chên, ‘Ming-ch’ao chung-yeh fu-chien chang-chou yüeh-kang tê 
hsing-ch’i yü fu-chien tê hai-wai i-min: 1657-1686[The Silk Trade between China, Taiwan and 
Philippines 1657-1686]’, in: Tang Shi-yeoung(ed.), Chung-kuo hai-yang-shih fa-chan 
lun-wên-ch, Vol. X, 267-328 at 320-3. Table 2.   
As the above table bears witness, a regular shipping link was restored 
between Taiwan and Manila, but only very small quantities of raw silks were 
                                                                                                                             
coopman [Constantijn] Ranst ende den raet aen haer Eds. de gouverneur generael Joan 
Maetsuijker en heeren raden van India, Tonkin 25 Oct 1666, fo. 117v. 
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actually exported to Manila. The silk seized from the Manchu junks did not 
after all go to Manila as the Dutch had conjectured. In fact, as the Japanese 
authorities were not irritated by Cheng Ching’s action, the price 
differentiation between Nagasaki and Manila was the ultimate determinant of 
where the loot went:   
Table 13-3: Raw Silk Price in Japan during 1668-1670 






1670** (480) 600 
Source: * The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 259, 298, 287. 19 June 1668; 19 Jan.1669, 
4 May 1669 ;** Chang Hsiu-jung , The English Factory in Taiwan 1670-1685, 69; The estimated 
value is given in brackets according to following standard: 1 tael = 70 stuivers (after 1666) 
(Voc-glossarium: 112);1 rial= 56 stuivers (VOC 11207, Uijtrekening van de Goude en Silvere 
Munts waardye, 12) 
During 1664-1670, the raw silk price in Nagasaki climbed from 550 
rials to 600 rials, while in Manila it declined even more markedly from 650 
to 400 rials. In other words, although Cheng Ching was developing new 
connections with Manila, most of the silk he got hold of was still sold in 
Japan. As the table below shows, from 1646, the Sino-Manila trade declined 
to 30 per cent of the amount traded at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century. Yet, the proportion of Chinese goods in the total imports of Manila 
was still 40-50 per cent in the period 1661-1670. The importance of these 
wares explains why both sides were willing to reconcile in the summer of 
1663.    
Table 13-4: The Tariff Revenues of Manila  
Year The tariff revenues 
of Chinese goods  
in Manila  
(rial) 
Percentage  
of Chinese goods  









1646-1650  9,991 69.8
1651-1655  4,905 65.05
1656-1660  2,786 41.7
1661-1665  2,501.8* 51.5
1666-1670  1,581* 40.16
Source: Chaunu, Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques(XVIe,XVIIe,XVIIIe siècles ), 
200-19 ; * the tariff revenues of Taiwanese goods are included in; ** the percentage includes the 
tariff revenues of goods imported from Macao. 
After the English merchants had been invited to establish a trade 
factory at Taiwan, they described how Cheng Ching’s junks circulated 
between Japan, Taiwan and Manila as follows: 
‘The King (Cheng Ching) had five or six junks that went yearly to Manila in 
January and returned in April or May, then fitted out for Japan, where they 
usually went from June onwards until about 12th, 14th July or later and 
returned here again in November or December.’8   
This is corroborated by the following table. 
Table 13-5:Taiwan Junks Visiting Japan and Returning from Japan 
 Junks from Taiwan in Japan Junks from Japan to Taiwan 
                                                          
8  Simon Delboe and Council at Taiwan to the East India Company in London, 16 
Sept. 1672 (O. S.) in: Chang Hsiu-jung, Anthony Farrington, i.a. (eds), The English 
factory in Taiwan: 1670-1685, (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1995), 151. The 
text has been revised for more proper English style. 
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1665.6-1666.6 89 1510 
1666.7-1667.6 1211 712 
1667.7-1668.7 713 >514  
1668.7-1669.6 >815 1316 
1669.7-1670.6 1017 >1018 
1670.7-1671.5 1019 820  
1671.6-1672.5 1321 1622 
                                                          
9 VOC 1253, Rapport van de seigneur [Jacob] Gruijs [aan gouverneur generael Joan 
Maetsuijker][report from chief merchant Jacob Gruijs to gouvernor general Joan 
Maetsuijcker], Japan, 9 December 1665, fo. 1912. 
10 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 168, 171, 175. 26 Nov. 1665; 23 Dec. 
1665; 24 Dec. 1665; 31 Jan. 1666. 
11 Ibidem, 192-5; 209-10. 11 July 1666; 15 July 1666; 2 Aug. 1666; 6 Aug. 1666; 11 
Aug. 1666; 15 Jan. 1667. 
12 Ibid., 205-6. 2 Nov. 1666 ; 5 Nov. 1666; 24 Nov. 1666. 
13 Ibid., 224, 237. 25 July 1667, 26 July 1667, 28 July 1667; 1 Aug. 1667, 3 Aug. 
1667; 23 Nov. 1667. 
14 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 239; 242-4. 6 Dec. 1667; 16 Dec. 1667; 
22 Jan. 1668; 31 Jan 1668; 11 Feb 1668.  
15 Ibid., 262-4;267-8. 6 July 1668, 12 July 1668, 20 July 1668, 12 Aug. 1668, 20 Aug. 
1668, 24 Aug. 1668. 
16 Ibid., 281, 284. 30 Nov. 1668; 15 Dec. 1668. 
17 Ibid., 307, 310. 21 July 1669; 17 Aug. 1669; 21 Aug. 1669. 
18 Ibid., 319, 321. 9 Nov. 1669; 13 Nov. 1669; 15 Nov. 1669; 18 Nov. 1669; 25 Nov. 
1669; 18 Dec. 1669. 
19 Ibid., 341-4;346; 353  5 July 1670; 16 July 1670; 17 July 1670; 25 July 1670; 1 
Aug. 1670; 20 Aug. 1670; VOC 1278, Daghregister gehouden int comptoir 
Nangasackij bij 't opperhooft Francoijs de Haze vant voornaemste inde negotie op de 
Jedose hoffreijsen voorgevallene, Japan, 30 Jan. 1671, fo. 1770v; 6 Apr. 1671, fo. 
1788r.  
20  VOC 1283, Japans daghregister gehouden bij het opperhooft Martinus 
Caesar[Diary of Japan kept by the chief merchant Martinus Caesar], Japan, 24 Nov. 
1670; 26 Nov. 1670, fo. 1763v; 29 Nov. 1670; 1 Dec. 1670, 2 Dec. 1670, fo. 1764r-v; 3 
Dec. 1670, fo. 1765r. 




Since 1663 most of the Taiwanese junks had been carrying sugar and 
deerskins to Japan. Ellis Crisp, English merchant, described this trade as 
follows: 
‘The deerskins are a commodity that belongs solely to the King and annually 
provide 200,000 pieces. If it pleased him, he could have had even half as 
much again. This island produces 50,000 piculs of sugar annually.’23  
As the Dutch records show, the English merchant might have been 
slightly deceived by his Chinese informant. Before the Coxinga occupied 
Taiwan, about 16,000 piculs of sugar were produced each year.   
 
Table 13-6: Sugar Production in Taiwan 1659-1661 
 
 Sugar produced in Taiwan 
(picul) 
1659 17,50024 
1660    15,00025 
1661 <8,00026 
From 1663, Japan imported most of its sugar from Taiwan and other 
                                                                                                                             
12 July 1671, fo. 1793r; 18 July 1671, 19 July 1671, 20 July 1671, fo. 1794r; 22 July 
1671, 23 July 1671, fo. 1795r, 11 Aug. 1671, fo. 1802v, 7 Sept. 1671, fo. 1809r. 
22 VOC 1290, Japans Daghregister, 30 Nov. 1671, fo. 326r; 31 Dec. 1671, fo. 328v; 31 
Jan. 1672, fo. 333v. 
23 Ellis Crisp at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 22 Oct. 1670 (O.S.), 
in Chang Hsiu-jung (ed.), The English factory in Taiwan, 65. The original text has 
been revised for more modern English style. 
24 Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 464. 
25 Ibid., 482. 
26 Daghregister Batavia, 1661, 65.  
MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683 
 420 
places in Southeast Asia because the Manchu Emperor forbade any sugar 
exports from China. At no time did the amount imported exceed 26,000 
piculs annually.  
 
Table 13-7: Sugar Imports from Taiwan 1663-1665 
 Sugar carried to Japan by 
Chinese junks  
(picul) 
1662.10-1663.10 21,045.327   
1664 23,902.128 
1665  25,631.7129 
In 1663, only 10,790 piculs of the sugar imported to Japan came from Taiwan, 
an amount which was not very different from the 10,112.82 piculs of sugar 
carried to Japan by the Taiwanese junks in 1682.30 However, in 1641 the 
Chinese junks had carried as many as 57,269 piculs sugar from China and 
other places around South China Sea to Japan. Crisp’s testimony might only 
represent a vague estimate of Cheng’s commerce. The English later 
determined that about 10,000 piculs of sugar were produced in Taiwan 
                                                          
27 Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 1637--1833-nen, 13. However, as 
counted in the Dutch records in the Daghregister van Batavia it was 1,9811.1 piculs of 
white and black sugar in total.C.f. Dagregister Batavia, 1663, 649. 
28 Iwao Senchii, ‘Kinsei Nisshi Boeki in kansuru suryoteki kosatsu[A Quantitative 
Study of the Sino-Japanese Trade in the 17th Century]’, Shigaku zasshi[Journal of 
Historical Science] 62 (1931), 31. re-cited from Innes, The Door Ajar, 506. Table 32. 
It is accounted as 23,915 piculs. 
29 Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 1637--1833-nen, 346. Innes, The 
Door Ajar, 506. Table 32. 
30  Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 91-5;98-100. Both numbers 
include candied sugar. 
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annually, an amount which would tally with our estimate.31        
While the highest number of deerskins ever exported by the Dutch amounted 
to 151,010 items in 1638, according to an English report of 1663 the junks of 
Cheng Ching exported about 300,000 pieces,32 But this total number of 
deerskins included those from Siam and Cambodia as well.   
Table13- 8:Deerskins Carried to Japan by Chinese Junks 
 Total From Taiwan From Cambodia
1663 348,08133 117,20034  92,71035 
1664 234,34236  128,00037 
                                                          
31 Innes, The Door Ajar, 506; Simon Delboe and Council at Taiwan to Henry Dacres 
and Council at Bantam, 15 Nov. 1672 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung (et al. eds.), The 
English factory in Taiwan, 159. 
32 Nakamura Takashi, Hê-lan shih-tai t’ai-wan-shih yen-chiu [Studies about the 
History of Taiwan under the Dutch], comp. and trans. Wu Mi-tsa and Ang Ka-im, 2 
vols, (Taipei: Pan-ch'iao, 1997-2002), I, 109. 
33 Daghregister Batavia, 1663, 648-9. 9 Dec. 1663; Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin 
sūryō ichiran, 345. 
34 Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 91-95. The deerskins exported 
from An-hai were also included. Most of An-hai deerskins would have been purchased 
in Taiwan  
35 VOC 1243, Missive van Hendrick Indijck en raad aen haer Eds. [ gouverneur 
generael Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia geschreven int jacht Calff voor de baij van 
Nangasacqui [Letter Written by Hendrick Indijck and Council on the yacht the Calff 
to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker in Batavia], Japan, 21 Oct 1663, fos. 
1956-1957. It records that about 100,000 deerskins were exported to Japan from 
Cambodia; Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 91-95. 
36 Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 345. 
37  Pieter van Dam, Beschrijvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie, 7vols., ed. 
Frederik Willem Stapel and Carel Wessel Theodorus van Boetzelaer, (’s-Gravenhage : 
Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, 1927-54), Boek II, Deel I, 429. 
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1665 148,16838   (a lot)39 
1666   70,00040 
In 1667 Cheng Ching joined forces with a group of Kuang-tung 
privateers/pirates and wiped out the Dutch trade factory in Cambodia in order 
to get hold of Cambodian deerskins. His intention was to obtain 100,000 
deerskins from there each year.41  
Even when the Manchu court strictly enforced the maritime prohibition 
policy, the import figures of Chinese junks sailing to Japan remained steady. 
Table 13- 9:The Chinese Trade Accounts in Japan and Manila from 1663 
to 1672. (Tail) 









1663 1,108,976.8 541,100  
1664 2,084,075.3 1,666,400  
1665 1,269,057   804,200 >9,035.5 
1666 1,309,970.4   723,600 >2,626.2 
1667 1,015,422   454,700 >3,634.5 
1668 1,754,147.7 
 (280,000)42 
  341,500 >16,166.5 
1669 1,640,836.1    29,600     0 
                                                          
38 Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 346.  
39 VOC 1253, Missive door den koopman Jacob Gruijs [en den raat ten comptoir 
Nangasackij] aen haer Eds.[Joan Maetsuijker], Japan, 19 Oct. 1665, fo. 1589. 
40 Generael Missiven, III 1655-1674, 538. 25 Jan. 1667. 
41  VOC 1264, Missive door den koopman Pieter Kettingh aen de edele heer 
gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker en heeren raden van India, Cambodia, 5 Dec. 
1666, fo. 101v.  
42 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 267-8. 24 Aug. 1668.The private 
capital of the Tonkin private merchant Itchin was estimated to be 280,000 taels.  
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1670 1,528,203.7    39,500 >28,411.5 
1671 1,442,611.5    95,000  >3,197.4 
1672 1,508,217. 896,400 >8,644.4 
Source: Innes, The Door Ajar, 410;**Von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune,227. Table 21; ***Fang 
Chên-chên, Ming-mo Ch’ing-ch’u T’ai-wan yü Ma-ni-la tê Fan-ch'uan Mao-i (1664-1684), 200. 
Table 5.23. 
The rial was converted to tael according to the following standard: 1 
tael = 70 stuivers(after 1666) (Voc-glossarium:112);1 rial = 56 stuijvers 
(VOC 11207, Uijtrekening van de Goude en Silvere Munts waardye, 12). 
Therefore 1 rial = 0.8 tael 
The silver exports from Japan rapidly declined after 1667, after the 
Shogunal court had grown alarmed about the continuous drain of silver and 
took measures to reduce the amount exported. The Japanese authorities also 
lifted the ban on the export of gold in 1664, hoping to balance the trade 
accounts after the prohibition of silver exports. The Dutch were quite 
sanguine about this change of policy because they could obtain sufficient 
Spanish silver in Europe and also had recourse to Persian silver. The Japanese 
gold could be invested on the Coromandel Coast, replacing the Chinese gold 
that they used to obtain from Coxinga.43 Consequently, this new Japanese 
export policy also weakened the motivation of the VOC either to regain 
Taiwan or to establish another trading station in China. When the maritime 
prohibitions failed to damage Cheng Ching’s trading network, the Manchu 
court sent an official delegate, K’ung Yün-chang, with a letter inviting Cheng 
Ching to surrender in 1667. Cheng Ching’s reply expressed no hostile 
feelings towards the Manchu court:    
                                                          
43 Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 658. 19 Dec. 1668; Femme Gaastra, ‘The Dutch 
East India Company and Its Intra-Asiatic Trade in precious metals’, in Wolfram 
Fischer, R. Marvin McInnis and Jürgen Schneider (ed.), The Emergence of a World 
Economy 1500-1914, ( Stuttgart: Steiner-Verlag-Wiesbaden-GmbH, 1986 ), 97-112 at 
103-104. 
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‘…. Tung-ning (Taiwan) lies in the ocean, it has never been part of 
Chinese territory. From here we trade eastwards with Japan, and southwards 
with Manila. The population is growing and business is prosperous. I sit on 
the throne here legitimately, and our government shall endure forever.     
… If Your Excellency will consider allowing these coastal inhabitants [of 
China] to live in peace, I shall gladly conclude peace with Your 
Excellency. …. Please send a delegate to visit us and arrange the opening of 
trade between us.44 ….’  
In 1667 Cheng Ching was eventually successful in reorganizing a 
trading network which was based on a monopoly of the sugar and deerskin 
trade. In 1668, the remaining Fu-chienese fleet was ordered to abandon its 
position on the coast and the Provincial Navy Commander, Shih Lang, was 
summoned to Peking to consult with Emperor K’ang-hsi about how best to 
tackle the problem of Cheng Ching.45 From 1669, the Emperor abandoned 
any idea of dispatching more expeditions and ignored Cheng Ching’s 
proposal to set up formal trading relations. In other words, both sides ceased 
fire, but for different reasons.46   
   
The struggle to maintain momentum 1670-1678 
During 1667-1669, while official peace talks were proceeding, the 
administration of the maritime prohibition strictly according to the letter of 
                                                          
44 Cheng ching , ‘Chêng-ching fu k’ung-yüen-chang shu [Chêng-ching’s Reply to 
K’ung Yüen-chang ]12 Aug. 1667’ , in CKTI (et al. eds.), K’ang-hsi t’ung-i t’ai-wan 
tang-an shih-liao hsüan-chi, (Fu-chien: fu-chien jên-min publisher, 1983), 70. 
45 Shih Wei-ch’ing, Shih-lang P’ing-ch’uan (A Commentated Biography of Shih 
lang), (Amoy: The University of Amoy, 1987), 88.     
46 K’ang-hsi, ‘Ch’ih-yü ming-chu, ts’ai-yü-jung têng [The Emperor’s Words to Ming 
Chu and Ts’ai Yü-jung ] Oct. 1669’, in CKTI (et al eds.), K’ang-hsi t’ung-i t’ai-wan 
tang-an shih-liao hsüan-chi, 85. 
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the law was slackened, and Cheng Ching’s merchants immediately again 
attempted to gain a foothold on the Chinese coast and obtain goods for trade 
by smuggling. 
Table 13-10: Chinese Junks Visiting Japan from Chinese Coastal Areas  




Junks departing from Japan  
to 
Fu-chou/P’u-t’o-shan/Nanking 
1665.6-1666.6 247 148 
1666.7-1667.6 - (9-10 to coast of China)49 
1667.7-1668.7 650  >651 
1668.7-1669.5 452  853 
1669.6-1670.6 1254 >255 
1670.7-1671.6 756  457 
                                                          
47 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 152,158. 18 June 1665; 17 Aug. 1665. 
48 Ibidem, 175. 31 Jan. 1666. 
49 Ibid., 207. 11 Dec. 1666. 
50 Ibid., 223, 241. 16 July 1667; 29 Dec. 1667.  
51 Ibid., 243-4; 257-8; 262. 2 Dec. 1667; 31 Jan. 1668; 11 Feb. 1668; 23 May 1668; 4 
July 1668. 
52 Ibid., 281, 284, 298. 29 Oct. 1668; 15 Dec. 1668; 15 May 1669.  
53 Ibid., 273-4; 284, 300. 26 Sept. 1668; 30 Dec. 1668; 30 May 1669.  
54 Ibid., 303, 310, 319; 322-3;326, 337-8;340. 7 July 1669; 19 Aug. 1669; 23 Aug. 
1669; 9 Nov. 1669; 9 Jan. 1670; 12 Feb. 1670; 17 May 1670; 1 June 1670; 18 June 
1670. 
55 Ibid., 319. 25 Nov. 1669; VOC 1278, Missive vant opperhooft Francoijs de Haes 
uijt het comptoir Nangasackij aenden generael ende raden geschreven, Japan, 9 Jan. 
1670, fo. 1857r; The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 326, 337. 12 Feb. 1670; 
17 May 1670.  
56 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 344, 350, 21 July 1670; 8 Aug. 1670; 
VOC 1278, Daghregister gehouden int comptoir Nangasackij bij 't opperhooft 
Francoijs de Haze vant voornaemste in de negotie op de Jedose hoffreijsen 
voorgevallene, Japan, 10 Feb. 1671, fo. 1171v; 13 Feb. 1671, fo. 1789r; 25 Apr. 1671, 
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1671.7-1672.5 358  159 
1672.6-1673.3 160 261 
 
Just over a fortnight after the Manchu delegates returned to Amoy from 
Taiwan on 10 December 1667, a Manchu smuggling junk arrived in Nagasaki 
on 29 December 1667.62 Cheng Ching had also dispatched trading junks to 
Fu-chou, which arrived in Japan on 15 March 1668 with 2,300 taels silver 
because they had not been able to spend that sum under the strict surveillance 
of Manchu Coastal Defence. When they sailed, these junks had left some 
goods and merchants behind on the coast of Fu-chou to await any new 
trading opportunities which might arise. On 2 April 1668 another two 
Fu-chou junks belonging to the same group of Taiwan merchants arrived in 
Japan laden with many silk goods.63 On 29 October 1668 a small Fu-chou 
junk arrived, carrying silk goods worth about 135,000 taels and she was 
followed another one on 15 December. 64  Junks from Nanking and 
P’u-t’o-shan ( located on the Chê-chiang coast) also began to arrive, although 
it cannot be said with any certainty to which camp they belonged. Whatever 
                                                                                                                             
fo. 1789v; 27 June 1671, fo. 1791v. 
57 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 362-3, 26 Sept. 1670; 2 Oct. 1670; 
VOC 1278, Daghregister gehouden int comptoir Nangasackij, 1 Dec. 1670, fo. 1764v.  
58 VOC 1290, Japans daghregister, 18 Dec. 1671, fo. 327v; 14 May 1672, fo. 344v. 
59 VOC 1290, Japans daghregister, 14 May 1672, fo. 344v. 
60 VOC 1294, Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus 
Caesar, Japan, 24 Nov. 1672, Fol. 567r. 
61 VOC 1290, Japans Daghregister, 24 Oct. 1672, fo. 364r; 30 Oct. 1672, fo. 365r. 
62 Tsu Tsê-p’u.’Tsu Tsê-p’u t’i wei k’ung yüen-chang ch’u-yang i-hui ping ch’a-yen 
hui-ch’uan shih-pên [Report Written by Tsu tsê-p’u about K’ung yüen-chang’s 
Mission Abroad and His Return] 25 Dec. 1667’, CKTI (et al eds.), K’ang-hsi t’ung-i 
t’ai-wan tang-an shih-liao hsüan-chi, 75; NFJ 81, Dagregister van ‘t Comptoir 
Nangasackij, Japan, 29 Dec. 1667; 3 Jan. 1668, not Foliated. 
63 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 257-8. 23 May 1668. 
64 Ibid., 281, 284. 29 Oct. 1668; 15 Dec. 1668. 
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the case, the fact remains that during 1667-1668 six junks engaged in this 
smuggling business sailed to and from Japan. 
In 1669, the Manchu Emperor K’ang-hsi called a halt to hostilities and 
replaced the strict evacuation policy with a more relaxed surveillance. This 
easing of the strictures allowed peasants to return to their forsaken fields and 
fishermen to sail to the nearby fishing grounds. However, the maritime 
prohibition was still in force and it was still forbidden to live near the 
seashore.65 Accordingly, in the summer of 1669, the number of smuggling 
junks climbed to fourteen, more than double the number in the previous 
season. One junk from Taiwan carried silk and silk goods worth about 
185,000 taels,66 indicates patent clue that Taiwanese merchants were playing 
a large part in this smuggling.  
Occasionally the smugglers were caught by the coastal patrols. One 
Chinese junk from P’u-t’o-shan carrying silk and silk goods worth about 
71,600 taels arrived in Nagasaki on 10 February 1670, and reported that two 
of its companions had been captured en route.67 Perhaps to provide some 
counterweight, some of Cheng’s warships were also cruising around these 
smugglers’ haunts. Because of their presence, two Ch’ing Junks had to slip 
their anchors in order to avoid capture one of them at P’u-t’o-shan.68 
Another two Ch’ing junks returning to P’u-t’o-shan on 26 September 1670 
fled back to Nagasaki, after they unexpectedly met Cheng Ching’s fleet near 
                                                          
65 Sun Êrh-chun, TWYH (ed.), Fu-chien t’ung-chih t’ai-wan-fu [Taiwan Prefecture in 
the General Gazette of Fu-chien Province], TW no. 84, 432. ‘In 1669, an edict was 
proclaimed which allowed inhabitants to fish in coastal waters.’; 957. ’ In 1669… an 
edict was proclaimed which allowed people to build houses and farms outside the 
border, within a range of five li.’  
66 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 310. 17 Aug. 1669. 
67 VOC 1278, Daghregister gehouden int comptoir Nangasackij bij 't opperhooft 
Francoijs de Haze vant voornaemste inde negotie op de Jedose hoffreijsen 
voorgevallene, Japan, 10 Feb. 1670, fo. 1945r. 
68 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 338. 1 June 1670. 
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Fu-chou.69 Eventually, in May of 1670, the anachodas of five Ch’ing junks 
were obliged to submit a petition to the governor of Nagasaki pleading to be 
allowed to remain until the arrival of the north monsoon. They did not dare to 
return to Fu-chou or P’u-t’o-shan after they had been informed that Cheng’s 
ships had appeared on the scene there.70 The presence of Cheng’s fleet on the 
Chinese coast was also reported by the English merchants in Taiwan: 
‘Although they trade on the borders of China, it is only with stealth, 
being not yet at peace with the Manchus who are governing China. But he 
[King Cheng Ching] has settled people on islands near China called Amoy, 
Quemoy and P’o-t’u-shan.71  
…To the last of these, [they] have sent the pepper that went on the [English] 
pink [ship].’72  
On the Chinese coast, the Chengs did business selling pepper and other 
tropical goods which have been supplied to them firstly by the English and 
others. In fact, this trade did not commence until 1666 when three of Cheng 
Ching’s junks loaded with pepper with a course set for the coast of China ran 
into a typhoon and drifted off to Quinam.73 In 1667, three Taiwanese junks 
                                                          
69 Ibidem, 362. 26 Sept. 1670; VOC 1283, Japans daghregister gehouden bij het 
opperhooft Martinus Caesar, Japan, 20 Nov. 1670, fo. 1763r; 23 Nov. 1670, fo. 
1763r-v. 
70 VOC 1278, Daghregister gehouden int comptoir Nangasackij, 28 June 1670, fo. 
1961v.  
71 Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to the East India Company in London, 20 
Dec. 1670(O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, The English factory in Taiwan, 74. The 
original text has been modified to facilitate modern readers. That Amoy and Quemoy 
were occupied by Cheng Ching’s force is also confirmed by a Dutch source: VOC 
1290, Memorie van eenige Nouvelles uijt d Eijlanden van Macao [door Abraham Wijs 
opt Jacht de Valck], [19 Jan. 1673], fo.19r-v. 
72 Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to the East India Company in London, 20 
Dec. 1670(O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, The English factory in Taiwan, 74 
73 VOC 1264, Missive door den resident Ocker Ockerse tot Bantam aen Joan 
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from Japan arrived in Patani and another junk visited Johor en route from 
Siam, apparently in order to purchase pepper and other tropical goods.74 
Eventually the quantities provided by these means were not enough. The 
flourishing smuggling on the Chinese coast demanded ever greater quantities 
of pepper from the Taiwanese merchants, especially after the silver export 
from Japan was restricted in 1668. In 1670 the English merchants reported 
that only 3,000 piculs of pepper of the rich booty captured by Coxinga when 
he conquered Zeelandia Castle remained in Taiwan 75  Taking into 
consideration that Coxinga had purchased the amounts of 16,000 and 11,000 
piculs of pepper from the Dutch in 1655 and 1657, the amount cited above 
would certainly not have been sufficient to satisfy the market.76 Therefore, in 
response to market pressure, the Taiwanese merchants were even obliged to 
purchase pepper and other tropical goods like sandalwood and putchuck from 
the VOC in Nagasaki in 1669.77 The following year, although the English 
merchants had carried these tropical goods to Taiwan from Bantam, this 
                                                                                                                             
Maetsuijker gouverneur generael en raaden van India [Letter from Ocker Ockerse in 
Bantam to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker in Batavia], Bantam, 12 Mar. 1667, 
fo. 696. 
74 VOC 1265, Missive aan de heer Joan Maetsuijcker gouverneur generael en d'Ed. 
heeren raaden van Nederlants India door de commandeur Balthasar Bort en den raadt 
tot Malacca [Letter Written by Commander Balthasar Bort in Malacca to 
Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker and the Council of the Indies], Malacca, 27 Aug. 
1667, fo. 820v. 
75 Ellis Crisp at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 22 Oct. 1670(O. S.) 
in Chang Hsiu-jung, The English factory in Taiwan, 66. 
76 VOC 1216, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Malacca aen den 
gouverneur Jan Thijsen, Taiwan, 26 Nov. 1655, fo. 405r-v; VOC 1222, Missive van 
Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 19 Nov. 1657, fo. 35v.  
77 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 319. 15 Nov. 1669; VOC 1278, 
Missive vant opperhooft Francoijs de Haes uijt het comptoir Nangasackij aenden 
generael ende raden geschreven, Japan, 9 Jan. 1670, fo. 1857v. The source does not 
record any direct contact between Cheng merchants and the factory on Deshima, 
therefore the exchange must have been mediated by the local merchants.  
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practice still persisted.78       
After Coxinga took over Taiwan, in April 1662, March and September 
1663, and April 1664 the Manchu court dispatched mandarins to the coast to 
supervise the proper administration of the evacuation policy.79 Its terms was 
very strictly enforced and resulted in Su Li’s defection. His followers and 
their fleet went over to Cheng Ching as mentioned earlier. However, the 
enforcement of the policy eased after peace talks between the Manchus and 
the Taiwanese were begun in 1667. In May 1668, the Kuang-tung Grand 
Co-ordinator proposed a relaxation of the evacuation policy, subject to the 
Emperor’s approval.80 Before the year 1670, most of the evicted inhabitants 
were allowed to return to their fields in the vicinity of the coast of 
Kuang-tung.81  
The Portuguese in Macao were also almost expelled as a consequence 
of the evacuation policy. Under its stipulations, all the Portuguese should 
have also been obliged to move to the hinterland of Kuang-tung, but even 
after the maritime prohibition had been imposed, Macao continued to 
welcome some country traders sailing between Manila, Johor and Macao 
carrying Chinese coarse wares.82 The man in charge of the evacuation policy 
                                                          
78 VOC 1283, Japans daghregister gehouden bij het opperhooft Martinus Caesar, 
Japan, 2 Dec. 1670, fo. 1764v-1765r . 
79  Ch'ü Ta-chün, Kuang-tung hsin-yü[Novel Notes about Kuang-tung], 3 vols 
(Yang-chou: Kuang-ling shu-shê, 2003), I, 30-31. 
80 Ch’ü, Kuang-tung hsin-yü, I, 31-32. 
81 Chang I-mei, Hui-lai hsien-chih[Local Gazette of Hui-lai County], KKCP no.178. 
36. Chêng-chün, Hai-k'ang hsien-chih[Local Gazette of Hai-k’ang County], KKCP no. 
184, 264. 
82  VOC 1229, Missiven door d'Ed. Pieter de Goijer en raet na Batavia [aan 
gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] geschreven, Jambi, 31 Jan. 1659, fol. 368r; 
VOC 1229, Missiven door d'Ed. Joan Thijsz. en raet naer Batavia[aan gouverneur 
generael Joan Maetsuijker] geschreven, Malacca, 24 Mar. 1659, fo. 441v; VOC 1229, 
Missiven door d'Ed. Joan Thijsz. en raet naer Batavia[aan gouverneur generael Joan 
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the Governor-General of Kuang-tung, Lu Ch’ung-chün, had proposed 
expelling the Portuguese inhabitants from Macao and consequently had 
ordered them return home in 1663, but the Manchu Court in Peking decided 
to allow them to remain.83 Perhaps having heard about the peace talks 
between the Taiwanese and Manchus or simply because of the plight in 
which they found themselves, the Maccanese pleaded with the Vice-Roy in 
Goa to dispatch an envoy to the Chinese court to petition for the opening of 
trade. Ambassador Manuel de Saldanha arrived in Macao on 4 August 1667. 
84 In the same summer, four Chinese junks arrived there as well, claiming 
that they represented a Siamese embassy which intended to pay tribute to the 
Manchu Court and the Emperor. However, the District Magistrate of 
Hsiang-shan (who supervised business in Macao), Yao Ch’i-shêng, noticed 
that half of the cargoes in the three Siamese junks were the property of a 
Fu-chien merchant Wang Wei-chung, and that one junk carried goods 
belonging to Wang’s son. He therefore questioned whether they were proper 
ambassadors with credentials or just transgressors of the maritime prohibition 
gambling on a main chance. Although the official capacity of the Siamese 
                                                                                                                             
Maetsuijker] geschreven, Malacca, 10 Apr. 1659, fo. 441v. 
83  Lu Ch’ung-chün, ‘Kuang-tung tsung-tu lu-ch’ung-chün t’i-i hsiang-shan-ao 
his-yang-jên pu-i chun-liu pên [Suggestion Written by the Governor of Kuang-tung 
about not to Allow the Portuguese to Reside in Macao continually] 9 Apr. 1665’, in 
CKTI (et al eds.), Ming-ch’ing shih-ch’i ao-mên wên-t’i tang-an wên-hsien hui-pien, I, 
48; Ch’i Ch’ê-pai, ‘Li-pu shang-shu ch’i-ch’ê-pai têng t’i-ch’ing chiang 
hsiang-shan-ao his-yang-jên ch’ü-liu chih-shih jêng ch’ih ping-pu tsou-i pên 
[Suggestion Written by the Minister of Rituals about Consulting the Ministry of War 
about Deciding on Whether or Not to Allow the Portuguese to Remain in Macao] 17 
June 1665’, in CKTI (et al eds.), Ming-ch’ing shih-ch’i ao-mên wên-t’i tang-an 
wên-hsien hui-pien, I, 55. 
84 John Elliot Wills Jr., Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese envoys to 
K'ang-hsi, 1666-1687, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 193-236; 
Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 584. 5 Oct. 1667. 
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ambassadors was repudiated, the trade went ahead covertly.85 Besides these 
officially problematic junks, five vessels returned to Macao from Makassar, 
Cambodia, Malacca, the Lesser Sunda Islands, and Indragiri. Altogether the 
nine vessels brought about 735 piculs of pepper besides all kinds of other 
tropical products. These were traded under the eyes of the Kuang-tung 
authorities, who pretended to confiscate all the cargoes.86According to the 
Dutch records, the Siamese King did indeed dispatch an ambassador to 
Kuang-chou and, in their eyes, the Kuang-tung authorities’ repudiation of the 
genuine ambassador was rather puzzling. 87 Although this semi-disguised 
smuggling did not guarantee Macao its old prosperity, it did attract more 
country traders to venture to sell their cargoes in this port. In the year 1669, 
eleven vessels from Southeast Asian ports arrived in Macao: three from Siam, 
two from Cambodia, two from Quinam and three from Timor, Manila, and 
Batavia respectively, plus one Portuguese vessel which had returned from 
Batavia. It was reported that they: ‘All did their trade secretly with the 
Portuguese and the Chinese at night, …and were forbidden to trade in town 
publicly on pain of death.’88 After the Portuguese ambassador had been 
detained in Macao for three years, he was ordered to proceed to Peking on 4 
January 1670.89 Grasping this chance of actually reaching the Imperial court, 
the Macao governor dispatched a small vessel to Bantam which carried a 
                                                          
85 Lu Hsing-tsu, ‘Lu hsing-tsu so-ch’êng hsiang-shan-hsien chih-hsien yao-ch’i-shêng 
huo-tan hui-tan shên-ta-kuo ch’ing-chieh-ts’ê [Inquisition Initiated by Lu Hsing-tsu to 
Investigate the Administrator of Hsiang-shan County,Yao Ch’i-shêng appending 
Invoices and List of Bribes] 14 Oct. 1667’, in Chung-shan-shih tang-an-chü [Archival 
Bureau of Chungshan County], CKTI (eds.), Hsiang-shan ming-ch'ing tang-an chi-lu 
[Compilation of Archives referring to Hsiang-shan County during the Ming and 
Ch’ing Dynasties], ( Shang-hai: Shang-hai ku-chi, 2006), 158. 
86 Ibid. 
87  VOC 1272, Missive van den ondercoopman Jan van der Speijck aen den 
[gouverneur] generael [Joan Maetsuijker]en raden, Siam, 12 Jan. 1669, fo. 1096v. 
88 Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 712. 15 Dec. 1669. 
89 Wills, Embassies and Illusions, 193-236. 
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priest as his ambassador.90 He was clearly eager to procure pepper directly 
from Bantam. The Dutch merchants in Tonkin reported that: ‘ Macao was 
suffering from a scarcity of silver and therefore was selling all Chinese goods 
off cheaply.’91 In 1671, the junk of the Siamese King with its Chinese crew 
returned to Siam from Macao via Japan, accompanied by two other 
Portuguese vessels, carrying a rich cargo of Chinese commodities like silk 
goods, radix China, zinc and all kinds of coarse goods.92 The Chinese 
merchants in Batavia also smelled a profit and equipped six junks to sail to 
Macao in the summer of 1671, and all except one which was lost in a 
typhoon returned with similar goods. Their report reveals that the pepper 
price had risen to 13 Rixdollars (= 16.25 rials) per picul.93 This fleet is proof 
that the Batavian Chinese merchants had claimed their place as new agents in 
the Sino-Japan trade via Macao, and hence had become the competitors of 
the Taiwanese merchants who were operating the Sino-Japan trade via 
P’u-‘to-shan.       
Therefore, just as Cheng Ching was struggling to overcome his 
problems in supplying greater quantities of pepper and tropical goods just at a 
time that the smuggling by his competitors was expanding, his peace talks 
                                                          
90 Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to George Foxcroft and Council at Madras, 7 
Apr. 1670 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, The English factory in Taiwan, 51. 
91 VOC 1283, Missive van den coopman en opperhooft Cornelis Valckenier en den 
raet in Toncquin aen den [gouverneur] generael [Joan Maetsuijker] en raden van 
Indien, Tonkin, 14 Oct. 1671, fo. 1724v. 
92 VOC 1283, Missive van den coopman en opperhooft Nicolaes de Roij en den raet 
aen den [gouverneur] generael [ Joan Maetsuijker] en raden, Siam, 31 Oct. 1671, fo. 
1706r-v. 
93 Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 810. 31 Jan. 1672; VOC 11207, Uitrekening 
van de Goude en silver munts waardije inhout der maten en swaarte der gewigten, in 
de respective gewesten van Indien[intrinsic value of gold and silver coins according to 
its size and weight at different regions around East and Southeast Asia]. 1 rijksdallar= 
60 light stuivers; 1 rial= 48 stuivers.  
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with the Manchus had resulted the re-opening of the Macao Sino-Japan trade. 
These privileged merchants, sailing under the flag of the Siamese King and 
the Dutch authorities, would have no difficulty providing tropical goods. In 
return, the Kuangtung merchants were quite willing to offer silk goods at a 
cheaper price than that asked on those from Chêchiang province.   
The astute Cheng Ching will have realized he needed to open up new 
supply channels to obtain tropical goods. Therefore in 1668 or 1669, through 
his merchants he sent invitations to urge ‘ all the merchants in general to 
trade in the parts under His Majesty’s jurisdiction.’94 It was a public letter, 
saying: 
‘From the son of Coxin, whose father has passed away, for us [English] or 
any other that would trade there, declaring that he intended to give great 
encouragement to trade in his ports.’ 
The declaration ‘was done by public writings, dispersed to several 
adjacent ports and places’.95 In reply, in May 1670 the English East India 
Company factory in Bantam fitted out a pink and a sloop under the command 
of Merchant Ellis Crispe to initiate the trade with Taiwan.96 Cheng Ching 
also passed this message to the VOC in Batavia through the Shabandar of 
                                                          
94 Henry Dacres at Bantam to Iquan, ’King’ of Taiwan, May 1670 (O. S.), in Chang 
Hsiu-jung, The English factory in Taiwan, 52-3. Here I change ‘your Majesty’ to’his 
Majesty’ for reader’s benefit. 
95 Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to the East India Company in London, 27 Oct. 
1670 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, The English factory in Taiwan, 71.Original text: 
‘ About a month before wee were fitted came hither an invitation from the King of 
that place, vidzt. From the son of Coxin, his father being dead, for us or any other that 
would trade ther, declaring that hee intended to give great incouragement to trade in 
his ports,& this was done by publique writeings disperced to severall adjacent ports & 
places, one whereof wee procured & sent with them.’ 
96 Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to Gerald Aungier and Council at Surat, 16 
Aug. 1670 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, The English factory in Taiwan, 55. 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
 435 
Bantam, who was a Chinese, expressing his wish to conclude peace with the 
Dutch.97 A leading Bantam merchant, Kea-nabby, fitted out a junk to visit 
Taiwan that year but she was struck by a typhoon and seized by the Amoy 
garrison under the Cheng regime as a foundered vessel.98 By some means or 
other Cheng Ching managed to solve this misunderstanding and engaged in 
the trade with Ki Nabbi (Kea-nabby[E.], Keijnebe Secredana[D.]), probably 
prompted by the fact that the junk of the Sultan of Bantam arrived shortly 
afterwards.99 In March 1672, two Taiwanese junks visited the coast of East 
Java. Ki Nabi tried to apply for four passes from the VOC under his own 
name, but his secret dealings were disclosed by the Shabandar.100 Cheng 
Ching also ordered a junk to be built in Rembang in Java on Ki Nabbi’s 
account.101 He planned to use this newly built junk to carry Ki Nabbi’s cargo 
to Taiwan under the protection of the EIC.102  
The Amoy merchants under Coxinga had been involved in the Siamese 
trade since the 1650s. However, when the war between Coxinga and the VOC 
broke out, the Siamese King chose the VOC as his ally. As mentioned earlier, 
the Siamese-Dutch treaty persuaded the Cheng merchants to up sticks and 
                                                          
97 Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 747. 2 Sept. 1671. 
98 Ellis Crisp at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 22 Oct. 1670 (O. S.), 
in Chang Hsiu-jung, The English factory in Taiwan, 65-66. 
99 Commission and instructions from Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to James 
Arwaker, Ellis Crisp and Charles Frith, 30 June 1671 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, The 
English factory in Taiwan, 94.   
100 VOC 1290, Missive van den resident Willem Kaaff aen de hoge regeringe van 
India, Bantam, 23 Mar. 1672, fo. 40r-v; VOC 1290, Missive van den resident Willem 
Kaaff aen de hoge regeringe van India, Bantam, 26 Mar. 1672, fo. 43r. 
101 VOC 1290, Missive van den resident Willem Kaaff aen de hoge regeringe van 
India, Bantam, 15 June 1672, fo. 66v.  
102 VOC 1290, Missive van den resident Willem Kaaff aen de hoge regeringe van 
India, Bantam, 28 June 1672, fo. 70r-v. The junk was captured by the Dutch ship and 
detained for a while. Therefore, it missed the departure of the English ship and was 
later sold in Bantam.  
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move to Quinam and Cambodia in 1665. When the tension between the 
Manchus and the Cheng lessened after 1667, the Taiwanese merchants made 
yet another attempt to open trade with Siam. Some of these Japan-bound 
junks from Siam might also have called at Taiwan, as the English merchants 
witnessed in 1670, but the best solution open to them was to bypass the main 
harbours of Siam and sail to Ligor instead.103 The grandees there were 
entrusted by the Siamese king with bartering the locally produced tin for 
copper on the Siamese King’s account. Ligor was a vassal state and paid an 
annual tribute to the Siamese King as a token of its allegiance. Because then 
as now, it is located on the southern shore of the Gulf of Siam, the Taiwanese 
junks could avoid the blockade of the VOC ships around the estuary of the 
Chao Phraya River. The Ligor tin export was estimated at to 8-900 bahar (= 
2,400-3,600 piculs) .104 In addition to this metal, it also produced about 500 
bahar (= 1,500 piculs) of pepper.105 Several Taiwanese junks visited Ligor in 
1666, selling silk goods, a large amount of porcelain and Japanese gold 
kobang and Japanese copper. In Japan, one kobang was valued at 6 tael 8 
maas of silver, and sold in Ligor for 7 tael, which gave a negligible profit of 2 
per cent. The same went for copper which was valued in Japan at 12 taels 4 
maas and in Ligor at between 15 taels 5 maas and 16 taels. In that case the 
profit was only 25 to 29 per cent.106 The tin was purchased at 20 taels per 
                                                          
103 Ellis Crisp at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 22 Oct. 1670(O. S.), 
in Chang Hsiu-jung, The English factory in Taiwan, 64. 
104 Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 543. 25 Jan. 1667. 
105 VOC 1264, Rapport van den koopman Adriaen Lucasz. wegens sijne verrichtinge 
op Ligoor overgegeven aen de heer Balthasar Bort president en commandeur van de 
stadt en Forteresse Malacca, Ligor, 22 Nov. 1666, fo. 208v; VOC 11207, Uitrekening 
van de Goude en silver munts waardije inhout der maten en swaarte der gewigten, in 
de respective gewesten van Indien.  
106  Nachod, Die Beziehungen der Niederländischen Ostindischen Kompagnie, 
appendix, ccvii. Table D. VOC 1264, Rapport van den koopman Adriaen Lucasz. 
wegens sijne verrichtinge op Ligoor overgegeven aen de heer Balthasar Bort president 
en commandeur van de stadt en Forteresse Malacca, Ligor, 22 Nov. 1666, fo. 208v. 
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bahar (=6.6 taels per picul) in Ligor, but could be sold for 15 taels per picul at 
Fu-chou in 1667, therefore generating a handsome profit of 127 per cent, 
assuming the Taiwanese could obtain about the same price as the VOC.107 In 
1666, it looked as if the Taiwanese merchants were set to become serious 
competitors of the Dutch in Ligor, as the latter could only purchase about half 
the amount they had hoped for.108 After the Japanese court reduced the 
export of silver in 1668, the importance of the Ligor trade to the Cheng 
regime in Taiwan grew more crucial because Japanese gold and copper were 
not very profitable in Cambodia.109 In February 1668, one Cheng junk 
visited Ligor carrying gold, silver, copper and porcelain, which was bartered 
for 900 piculs of tin and 450 piculs of pepper.110 In 1669, Cheng junks 




Table 13-11: Pepper and Tin purchased by Cheng merchants 
 ( in piculs) 
 Pepper Tin Visiting Merchants 
                                                          
107 Ibidem, fo. 209r-v; VOC 1264, Memorie voor den coopman David Harthouwer 
verblijvende als opperhooft over des Ed. Comps. negotie ende ommeslagh in 
Hoczieuw om hem daer naer te reguleren door Constantijn Nobel en David 
Harthouwer[Memorandum Given by Constantijn Nobel and David Harthouwer to 
David Harthouwer Resident at Fu-chou as Chief Merchant to Arrange All the 
Company Business], Fu-chou, 19 Jan. 1667, fo. 163r. 
108 Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 543. 24 Jan. 1667. 
109 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 310. 21 Aug. 1669. 
110 Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 666. 31 Jan. 1669. 
111 Ibid., 686. 17 Nov. 1669. 
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1666 (a lot)112 (Under Cheng regime) 113 
1668  450114 900115 (Chinese from Japan) 116 






(Chinese from Japan over 
Canton) 122 
1672 600123 Two junks from Taiwan124 
 
The Dutch merchants asked the Siamese king to grant them the sole 
purchasing rights for the tin in Ligor, but after this was eventually approved 
in 1670, aware that they were at a safe distance from Ayutthaya, the grandees 
of Ligor and the King’s factor, Oija Phraklang, still turned a blind eye to 
smuggling. The VOC was nonetheless satisfied with the king’s supply of tin 
                                                          
112 VOC 1264, Rapport van den koopman Adriaen Lucasz. wegens sijne verrichtinge 
op Ligoor overgegeven aen de heer Balthasar Bort, president en commandeur van de 
stadt en Forteresse Malacca, Ligor, 22 Nov. 1666, fos. 208v-209r. 
113 Ibid., fo. 206v; Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 543. 25 Jan. 1667. 
114 Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 666. 31 Jan. 1669. 
115 Ibidem. 
116 Ibid., 666. 31 Jan. 1669. 
117 Ibid., 686. 17 Nov. 1669. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 VOC 1290, Missive van d'heer gouverneur Balthasar Bort en den raet aen haer 




123 VOC 1290, Missive van de Ligoorse residenten Joannes Brakel en Joannes 
Zachariuszoon aen haer Eds. [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker], Ligor, 17 Dec. 
1672, fo. 279r. 
124 VOC 1290, Rapport van den coopman Nicolaes de Roij [aan gouverneur generael 
Joan Maetsuijker], Siam, 20 Nov. 1672, fo. 240v. 
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because the Batavian High Government believed that seizing ‘ the Taiwanese 
junks visiting Ligor annually’ would only stir up more ‘hatred, hostility, and 
quarrels’ than benefits.125       
In 1672, when two Taiwanese junks again visited Ligor to purchase tin, 
the Dutch were very keen on keeping their sole rights and put pressure on the 
local grandees who still wished to trade with the Cheng merchants and had 
asked whether the Dutch were still at war with Coxinga’s people.126  
In the meantime, King Narai of Siam had successfully restored the 
direct trade relations between Siam and Japan, which had been interrupted 
owing to the usurpation of the throne by his father, King Prasat Thong.127 In 
1667 King Narai dispatched a tributary envoy to China who was detained for 
a few consecutive years with the Portuguese ambassador in Macao. 
According to Chinese records, the Siamese tributary envoys finally reached 
Peking in January of 1671.128 As a result of this audience, the interrupted 
Sino-Siamese trade at Kuang-chou (Canton) was restored. Not only were the 
Batavian Chinese replaced on the Macao-Japan route but the Siamese King 
Narai and the Sino-Thai merchants who protected by him were also active on 
the Siam-Macao-Nagasaki route. The ruler of Kuang-tung province, the 
Pingnan viceroy, was also eager to participate in the Sino-Japan trade in the 
light of this reconciliation and invested in new ship-building.129    
                                                          
125 Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 869. 31 Jan. 1673. 
126 VOC 1290, Rapport van den coopman Nicolaes de Roij [aan gouverneur generael 
Joan Maetsuijker], Siam, 20 Nov. 1672, fo. 240v-241r; 244v. 
127 Iwao,‘Reopening of the diplomatic’, 2-7.   
128  Wang Chih-ch’un, Kuo-ch’ao jou-yüen-chi[Chronicle of Chinese Foreign 
Diplomacy during Ch’ing Dynasty], ( Taipei: T’ai-wan hsüeh-shêng shu-chü, 1975), 
95. 
129 VOC 1304, Daghregister ofte dagelijckse aanteeckeningh van ’t voornaamste 
gepasseerde ten Comptoire tot Nangazackij in Japan gehouden bij den opperkoopman 
Joan s’Camphuijs opperhooft over ‘s Compagnies negotie ende verderen ommeslagh 
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1670.7-1671.6 1132 3133 4134 
 
1671.7-1672.6 1135 3136 (4)137 
                                                                                                                             
aldaar aanvanck nemende den 29 October 1673 ende eijndigende 19en October 1674 
[below is cited as ‘Daghregister ten Comptoire tot Nangasackij’], Japan, 1 Dec. 1673, 
fo. 60r.  
130 VOC 1278, Missive vant opperhooft Nicolaes de Roij aen den [gouverneur] 
generael [Joan Maetsuijker] en raden, Siam, 20 Oct. 1670, fo. 1873v-1974r; The 
Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 302-3; 309-10. 4 July 1669, 3 Aug. 1669, 17 
Aug. 1669. 
131 VOC 1278, Missive vant opperhooft Nicolaes de Roij aen den [gouverneur] 
generael [Joan Maetsuijker] en raden, Siam, 20 Oct. 1670, fo. 1873v-1974r. It returned 
from Japan. 
132 Ibidem; The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 350. 9 Aug. 1670; VOC 1283, 
Missive van den coopman en opperhooft Nicolaes de Roij en den raet aen den 
[gouverneur] generael [Joan Maetsuijker] en raden, Siam, 31 Oct. 1671, fo. 1706r-v. 
133 Ibidem.  
134 Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 778. 19 Dec. 1671; VOC 1283, Missive van 
den coopman en opperhooft Nicolaes de Roij en den raet aen den [gouverneur] 
generael [Joan Maetsuijker] en raden, Siam, 31 Oct. 1671, fo. 1706r-v. One returned 
from Japan, three returned from China. 
135 VOC 1283, Missive van den coopman en opperhooft Nicolaes de Roij en den raet 
aen den [gouverneur] generael [Joan Maetsuijker] en raden, Siam, 31 Oct. 1671, fo. 
1706r-v; Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 778. 19 Dec. 1671; VOC 1283, Japans 
daghregister gehouden bij het opperhooft Martinus Cesar , Japan, 26 July 1671, fo. 
1795v. 
136 Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674,778. 19 Dec. 1671. 
137 VOC 1290, Rapport van den coopman Nicolaes de Roij [aan gouverneur generael 
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Joan Maetsuijker], 20 Nov. 1672, fol. 247v; VOC 1290, Daghregister [gehouden door 
Johannes Camphuijs], Japan, 12 July 1672, fo. 348r. Four king’s junks intended to 
visit Canton. One of them was on her homeward-bound voyage from Japan to Siam.  
138 VOC 1290, Missive van d'edele [Johannes] Camphuijs en raet aen haer Eds.[ Joan 
Maetsuijker] te Batavia, Japan, 23 Oct. 1672, fol. 320v. This junk might have returned 
from Canton; VOC 1290, Daghregister [gehouden door Johannes Camphuijs], Japan, 
12 July 1672, fo. 348r. 
139 VOC 1294, Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus 
Caesar int rijck van Japan, Japan, 28 Feb. 1673, fo. 580v. One junk sailed to Siam 
from Japan, but there is no indication given that she belonged to the Siamese king. 
140 VOC 1294, Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus 
Caesar int rijck van Japan, Japan, 28 Aug. 1673, fo. 609r. On her voyage to Japan, she 
had called at Taiwan. 
141 VOC 1311, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck en raat in Siam aan haar 
Eds.[ gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia, Siam, 10 Dec. 1674, fo. 302r; 
304r. One junk returned from Japan, the other two had sailed back from Canton. 
142 Generale Missiven, IV 1675-1685, 4. 31 Jan. 1675. 
143 VOC 1314, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck ende den raedt aen haer 
Eds. [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia, 30 Nov. 1675, fol.14r. The 
Siamese King dispatched two junks to Amoy and one junk to Canton. 
144 VOC 1322, Missive van het opperhooft Dirck de Jongh en raedt geschreeven uijt 
Siam aen haer Eds.[gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia, Siam, 14 Nov. 
1676, fo. 1203r. Two King’s junks returned from Japan. 
145 Ibidem. 
146 VOC 1332, Daghregister gehouden ten comptoire Nangasackij in Japan, Japan, 3 
Jan. 1678, fo. 640v. Assuming this returning Siam junk had arrived previous summer. 
147  VOC 1339, Notitie van aengecomene en vertrocken vreemde scheepen en 
vaertuijgen in en uijt Siam zedert 14 October 1677 tot 11 September 1678, Siam, 22 
Feb. 1678, fo. 458v; 13 Apr. 1678, fo. 459r. Two Siamese royal junks returned from 
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In 1671 King Narai sent another envoy to collect the Chop granted by the 
Manchu Emperor as symbol to confirm the restoration of relations.148 In 
order to share in the benefits of the trade by expanding it into a 
Sino-Siamese-Japanese triangle trade, the junks of King Narai usually 
participated in the Sino-Japanese trade via Macao. But the Siamese King was 
not the only monarch to restore a direct link with the Manchu court.  
The Ryūkyū (Liu-ch’iu[C.]) Kingdom, which had played an 
instrumental role as middleman between the Far East and Southeast Asia in 
the early Ming period, also again put itself forward to act as go-between in 
the Sino-Japan trade at a time in which it was paying tribute to the Tokugawa 
Shogunate via the daimyo of Satsuma.149 Before Taiwan opened negotiations 
with Peking in 1667, in 1663 and 1665 the King of Ryūkyū had already 
dispatched envoys to the Ch’ing court via Fu-chou in the traditional 
manner.150 The Manchu Emperor granted him the right to trade in Fu-chou 
once every three years. However, after the Manchu Emperor refused to 
continue the peace talks with Cheng Ching in Taiwan in 1670, the latter sent 
ships to the coast of Fu-chou to capture the Ryūkyū tributary junk and had 
her brought to Taiwan. This was the forcible strategy adopted by Cheng 
Ching to curb any attempt by other parties to build a Sino-Japanese trade link 
in which he was not involved. As some crew members of the Ryūkyū junk 
                                                                                                                             
Japan. 
148 Wang, Kuo-ch’ao jou-yüen-chi, 97-98; VOC 1311, Missive van den coopman Jan 
van der Spijck en raat in Siam aan haar Eds. [gouverneur generael Joan 
Maetsuijker]tot Batavia, Siam, 10 Dec. 1674, fo. 302r. The Chop was eventually 
received in Siam in 1674. 
149 Ronald P. Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan : Asia in the 
development of the Tokugawa bakufu, ( Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 
1984), 45. 
150 VOC 1252, Missive van seigneur [Constantijn] Nobel en raadt tot Hocksieu aen 
haer Eds.[gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker], Fu-chou, 28 Feb. 1665, fo. 200; 
Wang, Kuo-ch'ao jou-yüen-chi, 69. 
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managed to flee home, the news was revealed to their protector the daimyo of 
Satsuma, who thereupon claimed damage from the Shogun’s court in 1672. 
As a consequence, three rich junks belonging to Cheng Ching were detained 
in Nagasaki in lieu of the losses.151 A fine at 30,000 taels had to be paid 
before they were released.152  
After 1669 Cheng Ching as adopted the pose of a peaceful trader 
and the Chinese merchants under the Dutch, Siamese and Ryūkyū flags all 
tried to ease their way into the China trade. Meanwhile the Chinese trade 
with Manila did not expand as expected because the Spanish silver galleons 
from Mexico did not show up either in 1670 or in 1671.153 Cheng Ching is 
said to have been thinking of launching a surprise attack against Manila with 
15,000 soldiers, but as the governor of Philippines dispatched an envoy, Don 
Francisco Arriki de Lorade, to visit him in the summer of 1672, this might 
have prevented Cheng Ching carrying out his plan.154  
                                                          
151 VOC 1294, Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus 
Caesar int rijck van Japan, Japan, 2 Dec. 1672, fo. 586r-v; Li-tai Pao-an, Ts'ai Do 
comp., (Taipei, National Taiwan University: 1972), 15 vols, I, 205-6. ‘Li-pu Wei 
Liu-ch’iu-kuo chü-piao chin-kung fang-wu-shih’[The Report of the Ministry of 
Rituals regarding to the Tribute from the Ryūkyū Kingdom Composed of tributary 
letter (Piao) and Gifts](18 Oct. 1671). It mentions a Ryukyu junk was captured by 
‘pirates’ which departed at 1670. 
152 VOC 1294, Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus 
Caesar int rijck van Japan, Japan, 14 Jan. 1673, fo. 572r;VOC 1294, Missive van het 
opperhooft Martinus Caesar en den raet tot Nangasacki aen den gouverneur generael 
[Joan Maetsuijker] en raden van Indien geschreven, Japan, 31 Jan. 1673, VOC 1294, 
fos. 538v-539r. 
153 Ellis Crisp at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 22 Oct. 1670(O. S.), 
in Chang Hsiu-jung, The English factory in Taiwan, 67; Henry Dacres and Council at 
Bantam to the East India Company in London, 30 Jan. 1671, in Chang Hsiu-jung (et 
al eds.), The English factory in Taiwan, 81. 
154 Simon Delboe and Council at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 12 
Feb. 1673(O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung (et al. eds.), The English factory in Taiwan, 171; 
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By that time, Cheng Ching had grown conscious of the fact that rival 
merchants were making use of his peaceful overtures to the Manchu 
government and saw in them a opportunity to join the Sino-Japan trade. 
Therefore, offended that his junks had been fined by the Shogunal 
administration in Nagasaki, Cheng Ching decided to use force against those 
rivals who were intent on undermining his monopoly. In the spring of 1673 
he declared a blockade of all junks sailing to Japan.155 Not only did he 
withhold all his junks from any voyages to Japan, he even dispatched a war 
fleet to the coast of Kuangtung. When four junks bound for Japan were 
intercepted on the high seas, one managed to escape.156 
Cheng Ching also warned King Narai of Siam about his blockade. A 
Taiwanese junk arrived in Siam in April of 1673 which delivered a letter from 
Cheng Ching to King Narai, explaining why he would order his war-junks to 
patrol the waters around Japan for the express purpose of capturing trading 
junks to compensate for his losses. Since the Siamese king was keeping the 
peace with Cheng Ching, the junks under Siamese flag would be spared.157 
Indeed, a junk of the Siamese King did arrive safely in Japan via Taiwan in 
the summer of 1673.158 
                                                                                                                             
Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 781. 31 Jan. 1672; 813. 31 July 1672 ; VOC 1290, 
Memorie van eenige Nouvelles uijt d Eijlanden van Macao, [Bantam], 29 Sept. 1672, 
fo. 19r. 
155 VOC 1294, Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus 
Caesar int rijck van Japan, Japan, 9 July 1673, fo. 598r; 18 Aug. 1673, fo. 608r.  I 
156 VOC 1294, Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus 
Caesar int rijck van Japan, Japan, 6 July 1673, fo. 595v. 
157 VOC 1295, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck en raet in Siam aende 
heer gouverneur generael Joan Maatsuijker ende d'Ed. heren raden van Nederlants 
India tot Batavia, Siam, 26 Dec. 1673, fo. 788v-789r. 
158 VOC 1294, Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus 
Caesar int rijck van Japan, Japan, 28 Aug. 1673, fo.609r. On her journey to Japan, she 
had called at Taiwan. 
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On 28 August 1673, an envoy of Cheng Ching sailed on a junk 
carrying silk and silk piece goods valued at 250,000 taels to Japan. As a sign 
of his good intentions, he was also bringing along several Japanese shipwreck 
victims.159 While Shogun and the council of elders were deliberating on how 
to deal with this unforeseen challenge from Cheng Ching, the Sino 
(Manchu)-Ryūkyū trade and the Sino (Manchu)-Siamese trade came to an 
abrupt end. In the spring of 1674 the Siamese King’s junk on her way back 
from Kuang-tung delivered the news that the three southern provinces 
(referring to Yün-nan, Kui-chou, Ssu-ch’uan) under the P’ing-hsi vice-roy 
(Wu San-k’uei) had risen in rebellion. The same source also reported that 
Cheng Ching had dispatched 200 junks to the coast of China when news of 
this uprising came to his ears.160 The outbreak of the rebellion was a warning 
that Siamese king should not venture into the direct trade with Kuang-chou. 
The Ching-nan vice-roy of Fu-chien refused to facilitate the 
Ryūkyū envoys’ trading activities (with Peking) any longer because he 
decided to throw in his lot with the rebels.161 Hence, as a consequence of 
unforeseen circumstances, in the spring of 1674, the crisis in Cheng Ching’s 
monopoly of the Sino-Japan trade was suddenly relieved. Under these 
circumstances, Cheng Ching also ceased hostilities against Japan and again 
dispatched trading junks from Taiwan to Japan. Since the losses of the 
Ryūkyū merchants had been compensated, the Shogun remained neutral and 
adopted a detached attitude about this matter.  
                                                          
159 VOC 1294, Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus 
Caesar int rijck van Japan, Japan, 20 Sept. 1673, fo. 615r. 
160 VOC 1311, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck en raat in Siam aan haar 
Eds. tot Batavia, Siam, 10 Dec. 1674, fo. 304r. 
161 Li-tai Pao-an, Ts’ai Do (comp), (Taipei, National Taiwan University: 1972), 15 
vols, I, 322-8 at 325 ‘Fu-chien têng-ch’u Ch’êng-hsüan-pu-chêng-shih-ssu 
wei-fang-hsün ch'ing-ch'ao-shih,’ [A letter of the provincial governors in Fu-chien. 
about consultancy with the Ch’ing court (20 Aug 1677)]. 
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The rebellion of the Ching-nan viceroy in Fu-chou created the 
opportunity for open competition in the Sino-Japan trade. This statement is 
supported by the shipping movements in the year that followed. The Fu-chou 
merchants might have had been able to make a better assessment of the 
Nanking silk goods than the Taiwanese merchants who operated the 
smuggling trade via P’u-t’o-shan and Amoy. The Fu-chou junks enjoyed the 
protection of both the Japanese court and the VOC ships and therefore the 
risks in this trade were alleviated. An anachoda of a Fu-chou junk declared 
that the Ching-nan viceroy had informed local Chinese merchants that the 
maritime prohibition was no longer in effect in Fu-chou and that the trade 
could proceed free of all restrictions in 1674.162 Although the Ching-nan 
vice-roy had asked Cheng Ching for assistance because he was worried that 
the local forces might not join him when he proclaimed his independence of 
the Manchu court at the beginning of 1674, he soon realized he had been 
overly concerned and he regretted having given Cheng Ching too many trade 
concessions.163 The latter promptly reacted by mounting a blockade when 
the promises turned out to be empty. 
Cheng Ching now sent about 200 junks to the Chinese coast in an effort 
to keep his advantage against the Fu-chou merchants.164 Through mediation 
by the Pinghsi viceroy, the Chingnan viceroy agreed to ally himself with 
Cheng Ching again in the winter of 1674, which meant that the Taiwan 
merchants were allowed to visit Fu-chou.165 In 1675, the Ching-nan viceroy 
sent a pass to the English merchants who had followed Cheng Ching and 
taken up residence in Amoy and bade them welcome to trade at Fu-chou. He 
                                                          
162 Kai hentai, 3 vols., ed. Hayashi Harukatsu and Hayashi Nobuatsu, (Tōkyō : Tōyō 
Bunko, 1958-1959 ), I, 97-8. The report of the junk no. 22 from Fu-chou. 
163 Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu, 46-7. 
164 VOC 1311, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck en raat in Siam aan haar 
Eds. tot Batavia, Siam, 10 Dec. 1674, fo. 304r. 
165  Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu, 47-8; VOC 1314, Daghregister van Japan 
[gehouden door Johannes Camphuijs], Japan, 14 Nov. 1674, fo. 166v. 
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also dispatched two Chinese merchants to Batavia to declare that Fu-chou 
was a free harbour for the Dutch as well.166 In a counter-measure, Cheng 
Ching now proclaimed that all merchants from other places were welcome to 
trade in Amoy and would be exempted from paying customs duties for a 
period of three years. 167  Moreover, he dispatched a Chinese war-junk 
manned with all soldiers clad in full body armour to the Siamese court in 
March 1675. When they arrived in Ayutthaya, a quarrel broke out between 
them and some Dutch sailors. The 150 soldiers would almost have torn the 
Dutch factory apart if the King’s factors and their anachoda had not 
intervened.168 This same junk also carried eight Chinese sailors from Batavia, 
who had been blown off course by a typhoon to Taiwan on their voyage to 
Manila. The Anachoda requested a pass from the Dutch merchants in Siam, 
saying that Cheng Ching was preparing to send an envoy to Batavia in the 
following spring to open the peace talks with Governor-General Joan 
Maetsuijker.169 This gesture could be seen as an attempt to gain equal status 
with the Fu-chou merchants, because the Dutch ships were now allowed to 
trade in that port again. As well as Cheng Ching’s junk, one belonging to the 
Ching-nan viceroy also showed up in Siam in April. King Narai dispatched 
two junks to Kuang-chou (Canton) and Amoy respectively once he had 
understood that these two ports were now in the hands of two different 
camps.170 For one reason or another Cheng Ching’s envoys never set sail to 
                                                          
166 John Dacres, Edward Barwell and Samuel Griffith at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and 
Council at Bantam, 22 Dec. 1675 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, The English factory in 
Taiwan, 223; Generale Missiven, IV 1675-1685, 89. 7 Feb. 1676. 
167 John Dacres, Edward Barwell and Samuel Griffith at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and 
Council at Bantam, 22 Dec. 1675 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung (et al. eds.), The 
English factory in Taiwan, 219. 
168 VOC 1311, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck en raat in Siam aan haar 
Eds. [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia, Siam, 21 Oct. 1675, fos. 
316v-317v. 
169 Ibidem, fo. 317v. 
170 VOC 1314, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck ende den raedt aen haer 
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Batavia, but the Ching-nan viceroy’s messengers did and traded there 
successfully.171 
Although the Fu-chou merchants dreamed of grasping their own share 
in the Sino-Japan trade after the maritime ban was lifted, the new frontline 
between Fu-chien and Che-chiang obstructed their access to the silk 
production area in Chiang-nan.172 
However, Cheng Ching solved the problem of access in a different way, 
besides maintaining a smuggling network along the Chê-chiang coast, he was 
successfully running his business from the Kuang-tung coast. In July 1674, 
two Chinese junks arrived in Nagasaki from Canton carrying 1,200 piculs of 
silk which were sold at 300 taels per picul.173 It is reasonable to assume that 
they both belonged to Cheng Ching because his army had just defeated the 
local troops of the Ping-nan viceroy near the eastern border of Kuang-tung 
province in June 1674. 174  In the following summer, the Regional 
Commander of the Kao-chou, Tsu Tse-ch’ing, joined the rebellion against the 
Kuang-tung authorities, which associated the Kao-Lei-Lien area with Cheng 
Ching.175 As the tangible result of this Amoy- Kao-Lei-Lien axis, the four 
                                                                                                                             
Eds. tot Batavia, Siam, 30 Nov. 1675, fo. 14r. 
171 Generale Missiven, IV 1675-1684, 89. 7 Feb. 1676.  
172 Kai hentai, 3 vols., ed. Hayashi Harukatsu and Hayashi Nobuatsu, (Tōkyō : Tōyō 
Bunko, 1958-1959 ), I, 133-5 at 134. The report of the junk no. 1 from Fu-chou; 
105-107 at 106. The report of the junk no. 28 from Fu-chou. 
173 VOC 1304, Daghregister ten Comptoire tot Nangasackij, Japan, 13 July 1674, fo. 
84v. 
174  Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu, 48-9; VOC 1314, Daghregister van Japan 
[gehouden door Johannes Camphuijs], Japan, 14 July 1675, fo. 196v.  
175 Ch’ien I-chi, Pei-ch’uan hsüan-chi[Selections from Inscriptions], TW no.220, 
224.‘ the rebellious commander Tsu Tsê-ch’ing occupied Kao-chou, and led his party 
to capture Lei-chou and Lien-chou prefectures and the Tê-ch’ing, K’ai-chien and 
Tien-pai districts.’ ; Chiang Liang-ch’i, Tung-hua-lu hsüan-chi [Selections of 
Documents Preserved by the Historical Bureaus within the Tung-hua Gate], TW, no. 
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Cantonese junks which visited Nagasaki in 1676 carried 1,282.29 piculs of 
silk.176 In April 1676, the Pingnan viceroy (residing in Kuang-tung) also 
threw in his lot with the rebellion.177 Consequently, Cheng Ching was able to 
join forces with the authorities in Fu-chou and Kuang-chou, which helped to 
assuage the hostility between Cheng Ching and the VOC.178      
Once the Kuang-tung authorities joined the rebellion and had allied 
themselves with Cheng Ching’s force, all the coastal areas in the southeast 
were connected. But, even though Cheng Ching’s naval force controlled the 
coastal areas from Ch’üan-chou to Canton, and an abundance of tropical 
goods was being transported to China, he was still thwarted in his attempts to 
exchange these import items for silks from Chiang-nan area (Nanking) for 
the simple reason that the roads were cut off. The troops of the Ping-hsi 
viceroy’s force were fighting the Manchu army in Hu-nan, while the 
Ching-nan viceroy was engaged in battling the Manchus in Chiang-hsi 
province. These two battlefields cut off both the routes from Kuang-tung to 
the silk-producing areas around Nanking.179 Cheng Ching’s expansion along 
the coast inevitably required him to hire more soldiers to guard his territory, 
which increased his financial burden.      
In October 1676, the Chingnan viceroy’s army collapsed on the 
frontlines in both Chiang-hsi and Chê-chiang provinces and he was forced to 
surrender to the Manchu General-in-Chief, Imperial Prince Kang (of the 
                                                                                                                             
262, 201.  
176 Generale Missiven, IV 1675-1684,87-88 7 Feb. 1676. A Tonkin junk dare not sail 
to the Gulf of Tonkin because of the rising might of the Kuang-tung ‘pirates’.  
177 Li, Chüeh Huo-lu, 1250. 
178 VOC 1322, Japans daghregister [gehouden door Johannes Camphuys], 12 Jan. 
1676, fo. 1464r-v. 
179 Kai hentai , I, 133-5 at 134. The report of the junk no. 1 from Fu-chou; 105-107 at 
106. The report of the junk no. 28 from Fu-chou. 
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blood of the first degree) (Hê-shih Kang Ch’in-wang), Chieh-shu. 180 
Knowing that Fu-chou had surrendered to Manchus again, the Regional 
Commander of the Coastal Defence, Chu T’ien-kuei, chose to surrender to 
Cheng Ching with his fleet.181   
Table 13-13: The Exports of Japan on Chinese Junks between 1673-1684 




1675 ( 1,670,687.6)  
1676    739,988.
1677    959,988.2
1678   1,277,997.7
1679    956,820.9
1680   1,142,857.
1681    147,756.
1682    952,940
1683    486,929.1
1684    418,184.9
Source: Innes, The door ajar, 416. Table 23. 
In November 1676, Cheng Ching’s force of 20,000 soldiers was 
defeated by the joint forces of the Manchus and the Ching-nan viceroy, who 
had about 30,000 soldiers under his command.182 That winter the Ch’ing 
army slowly pushed Cheng Ching’s forces out of most of the cities he had 
                                                          
180  P’êng, Ching-hai chih, 80-1. VOC 1330, Dagregister van 't voornaamste 
gepasseerde ten comptoire Nangasaki in Japan gehouden bij den oppercoopman Dirck 
de Haas opperhooft wegens 's compagnies negotie en verderen ommeslaegh aldaer, 
Japan, 5 Aug. 1677, fo. 1138r. 
181 P’êng, Ching-hai chih, 81; Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu, 50. 
182 P’êng, Ching-hai chih, 81; Edward Barwell and Council at Amoy to the President 
and Council at Surat, 2 Nov. 1677, in Chang Hsiu-jung (et al eds.), The English 
factory in Taiwan, 287.  
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occupied. His main forces retreated to Amoy and several other coastal spots 
which controlled Fu-chou Harbour and the sea routes to Kuang-tung.183 As 
Table 13 shows, although these events caused a slowdown in the Sino-Japan 
trade, the Kuang-tung-Siamese trade profited as a result.  
Table 13-14: Junks from the China coast visiting Siam 
Year Arrivals  
1674 2184 From Japan 
One via Macao 
1675 1-2185  
1676 6-7186 3 from Kuang-tung 
1 from Fu-chou 
2 from Amoy 
1677 5187 3 from Amoy,  
(2 belonging to Siamese ) 
2 from Kuang-tung  
(1 belonging to Siamese ) 
1678 7188 1 from Fu-chou 
                                                          
183  P’êng, Ching-hai chih, 83; VOC 1330, Dagregister van 't voornaamste 
gepasseerde ten comptoire Nangasaki in Japan gehouden bij den oppercoopman Dirck 
de Haas opperhooft wegens 's compagnies negotie en verderen ommeslaegh aldaer, 
Japan, 21 June 1677, fo. 1134v; Edward Barwell and Council at Amoy to the President 
and Council at Surat, 2 Nov. 1677 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung (et al. eds.), The 
English factory in Taiwan, 287.  
184 VOC 1311, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck en raat in Siam aan haar 
Eds. [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia, 10 Dec. 1674, fo. 302v. 
185 VOC 1314, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck ende den raedt aen haer 
Eds. [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia, Siam, 30 Nov. 1675, fo. 
13v-14r. 
186 VOC 1322, Missive van het opperhooft Dirck de Jongh en raedt geschreeven uijt 
Siam aen haer Eds. [gouverneur general Joan Maetsuijker]tot Batavia, Siam, 4 Nov. 
1676, fo. 1198r-v. 
187  VOC 1330, Notitie van aengecomen en vertrocken vreemde en inlantsche 
scheepjes en vaertuijgen uijt Siam sedert December 1676 tot October 1677, Siam, fos. 
691-692. 20 Oct. 1677; 8 Feb. 1677; 20 Feb. 1677; 7 Mar. 1677; 20 Apr. 1677. 
188  VOC 1339, Notitie van aengecomene en vertrocken vreemde scheepen en 
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2 from Amoy 
(1 belonging to Siamese ) 
3 from Kuang-tung  
(1 belonging to Siamese ) 
1 belonging to Chinese in Siam 
1679 1189 From Amoy 
1680 3190 2 junks from Amoy;  
1 from Kuangchou 
(All belonging to Chinese in Siam)
Because the alliance between the rulers of Fu-chou, Amoy and Canton 
opened the way for all their junks to visit Siam, the profits declined. In 1677, 
Cheng Ching also tried to invest in Tonkin silk as a means to obtain silver 
from Japan, but because that year’s harvest was poor owing to bad weather, 
the silk exports to Japan had to be reduced.191 Chinese merchants from 
Yün-nan province who were trading under the flag of the Pinghsi viceroy 
were also not immune to competition. During the civil war, the Ping-hsi 
viceroy had been busy transporting copper to Tonkin and these copper 
exports inevitably reduced the profits made on Japanese copper exported on 
Cheng Ching’s junks.192 Under the prevailing Japanese trade policy, the silk 
                                                                                                                             
vaertuijgen in en uijt Siam zedert 14 October 1677 tot 11 September 1678.Notice of 
all junks arrived Siam, Siam, fos. 458r-462v. 23 Feb. 1678; 1 Mar. 1678; 7 Mar. 1678; 
12 Mar. 1678; 14 Mar. 1678; 27 Mar 1678; 20 Apr. 1678. 
189 VOC 1341, Missive door den E. Aernout Faa en den raet uijt Siam geschreven aen 
den gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijker] ende raden van Indien, Siam, 18 Feb 
1679, fo. 845v. 
190 VOC 1362, Notitie der aengecomene en vertrocken schepen en vaertuijgen et 
cetera tot en uijt Siam sedert primo October 1679 tot primo October 1680, Siam, fos. 
990v-992v. 26 Feb. 1680; 1 Apr. 1680. 
191 VOC 1330, Dagregister van 't voornaamste gepasseerde ten comptoire Nangasaki 
in Japan gehouden bij den oppercoopman Dirck de Haas opperhooft wegens 's 
compagnies negotie en verderen ommeslaegh aldaer, Japan, 17 Aug. 1677, fo. 1142r-v. 
192 VOC 1330, Missive van den coopman Jan Besselman en den raet in Toncquin nae 
Batavia, Tonkin, 13 Oct. 1677, fo. 703v-704r. The vice-roy of Tonkin tried to forbid 
any further exchange in silver for copper coins from Chinese border; VOC 1348, 
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price had also been reduced to as low a level as 290 taels per picul.193 Only 
when the battle line shifted from Fu-chou to Chang-chou in 1678, did the 
smuggling route by sea from Amoy to Fu-chou, which benefited from the 
support of Chu T’ien-kuei, gradually prove its worth.194 On 19 July 1678, 
one Taiwan junk alone carried goods worth about 151,952 taels to Japan.195 
Again on 31 October 1678, another Fu-chou junk arrived in Japan carrying 
goods worth 97,000 taels. These data attest to the fact that smuggling was 
still going strong in this period. 
 
Losing competiveness 1677-1683 
By October 1678, all the rebellions against the Manchus on the Chinese 
mainland had been suppressed.196  After a new building programme of 
war-junks had been launched, the Manchu General-in-Chief, Imperial Prince 
of Kang, Chieh-shu, returned to Peking in September 1679.197  On his 
recommendation, the evacuation policy was also rescinded by the Emperor in 
                                                                                                                             
Missive van den coopman Jan Besselman en raet in Toncquin aan Gouverneur 
Generaal Rijcklof van Goens, 1 Feb. 1679, fo.798r.Generale Missiven, IV 1675-1684, 
380. 13 Mar. 1680. The copper coins dropped in price because of imports from 
‘Bauland’, which designated the border between Vietnam and Yünnan province in 
China. The VOC merchants in Tonkin seized it as an opportunity to avoid competition 
from Taiwanese merchant as the latter also imported large amounts of copper coins 
from Japan as payment for silk goods. 
193 VOC 1330, Dagregister van 't voornaamste gepasseerde ten comptoire Nangasaki 
in Japan gehouden bij den oppercoopman Dirck de Haas opperhooft wegens 's 
compagnies negotie en verderen ommeslaegh aldaer, Japan, 23 Sept. 1677, fo. 1151v. 
194 Generale Missiven, IV 1675-1684, 220. 15 Feb. 1678; Kai hentai , III, 2997-9 at 
2998. The report of the junk no. 1 from Fu-chou. 
195  VOC 1332, Daghregister gehouden [door Albert Brevinck] ten comptoire 
Nangasackij in Japan, Japan, 19 July 1678, fo. 677v. 
196 P’êng, Ching-hai chih, 87. 
197 Sun, Fu-chien t’ung-chih t’ai-wan-fu, 983.    
MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683 
 454 
November 1679.198 According to Dutch records, in September of the same 
year Cheng Ching had sent an envoy to the Imperial Prince of Kang ( before 
he had left for Peking) respectfully submitting that he … ‘conclude a treaty 
for a truce and free traffic with this kingdom (China). Under the terms of this 
treaty the Manchu Emperor would recognize Cheng Ching as the King of 
Formosa, Amoy and Quemoy, in other words that Cheng Ching be recognized 
as a free and sovereign monarch.’199      
Imperial Prince of Kang refused to receive the envoy and insisted that 
before he did so Cheng Ching should return all the territories he occupied on 
the mainland to the Emperor. Despite this sign of imperial disapproval, the 
envoy was nonetheless received by the Governor-General of Fu-chien, Yao 
Ch’i-shêng, before he returned to Amoy on 3 October. 200 As soon as the 
new war-junks were completed in March 1680, the Manchu fleet sailed out of 
Fu-chou Harbour for the express purpose of attacking Chu T’ien-keui’s fleet 
in Tin-hai.201 The Manchu authorities knew that Cheng Ching had always 
doubted Chu T’ien-kuei’s loyalty because he was a former subject of the 
Ching-nan viceroy, and therefore had deliberately spared Chu’s junks.202 
Some of Cheng Ching’s junks fled to Amoy after this battle, which caused 
Cheng Ching mistakenly to believe that Chu had betrayed him and had joined 
                                                          
198 Sun, Fu-chien t’ung-chih t’ai-wan-fu, 983.  
199 VOC 1350, Repport schrifftelijck gestelt en aande Ed Hr gouverneur generael 
Rijckloff van Goens ende De Heeren raden van India overgeleverd door het operhooft 
den coopman Jacob van der Plancken met sijn verschijninge uijt Hockzieuw op 
Batavia int jacht den Alexander ter rheede Batavia, Batavia, 16 Dec. 1679, fo. 576.  
200 VOC 1350, Repport schrifftelijck gestelt en aande Ed Hr gouverneur generael 
Rijckloff van Goens ende De Heeren raden van India overgeleven door het operhooft 
den coopman Jacob van der Plancken met sijn verschijninge uijt Hockzieuw op 
Batavia int jacht den Alexander ter rheede Batavia, Batavia, 16 Dec. 1679, fo. 576. 
201 Wang Tê-I, Shih-chung chi-chi[Notes on Deliberations within the Army], TWH, II 




forces with the Fu-chou navy. Eventually, on 26 March 1680, Cheng Ching 
decided to abandon Amoy and Quemoy and take all his people to Taiwan.203   
After his return to Taiwan, Cheng Ching again focused his attention on 
Kuang-tung and in collaboration with the Ping-nan viceroy dispatched two 
junks worth about 290,000 taels from there to Japan.204 According to Dutch 
records, he ordered his admiral, Liu Kuo-hsüan, to lead a ‘respectable’ 
number of junks to occupy several islands in the vicinity of Macao, where 
they prepared to sell the salt from Taiwan. The Portuguese fitted out two 
ships to repel them but it was to no avail. They continued to occupy the 
islands after the Portuguese ships had left.205                 
Cheng Ching’s shipping network, which connected Cambodia, Ligor 
and Manila so as to be able to provide the Japanese and Chinese market with 
goods and to maintain the prosperity of Taiwan, became hard to sustain after 
1679. The Siamese King’s direct trade with Japan and Canton had resumed, 
and a civil war had erupted in Cambodia.206 Attempts to build a direct link 
with Bantam were thwarted by the VOC. Meanwhile, the Chinese merchants 
in Bantam and Batavia, once possible allies, also gradually began to 
participate in the Japanese trade under the protection of the EIC and the VOC. 
                                                          
203 Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu, 58. 
204 Generale Missiven, IV 1675-1684, 381. 13 Mar. 1680. Since the Cheng force 
allowed the Ping-nan viceroy’s junks to depart to Japan, I assume that this was the 
result of their collaboration. 
205 VOC 1369, Missive van den coopman Jurriaen de Munninck en ondercoopman 
Albert Bruijningh aen haer Eds. [gouverneur generael Rijcklof van Goens]tot Batavia 
geschreven in dato 20 November nevens een post scriptum van 26 November 1681 
leggende geanckert onder 't eijlant Maserican [Letter written by Merchant Jurriaen de 
Munninck and Under Merchant Albert Bruijningh to Governor-General Rijcklof van 
Goens in Batavia on 20 Nov. 1681, with a postscript written on 26 Nov. 1681 when 
anchored off Maserican Island just off Canton], Canton, 20 Nov. 1681, fo. 775r-v. 
206 Generale Missiven, IV 1675-1684, 381. 13 Mar. 1680; Kai hentai, I, 301-302 at 
302. The report of the junk no. 16 from Amoy.  
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In 1678, the Sultan of Bantam even dispatched a junk valued at 10,000 
rixdollars to Japan under the English flag.207 The need of the VOC for gold 
to spend on the Indian market had been satisfied by Japan since 1668, and 
there was a steady supply of Mexican silver dollars coming in via Europe. 
Consequently, the VOC was willing to tolerate the participation of Batavian 
Chinese merchants in the Japanese trade, especially as this would be to the 
detriment of the Cheng Ching’s trade with Nagasaki. 
Table 13-15: Export of Precious Metal from Europe and Japan by the 
VOC (in guilders) 
Year from Europe from Japan
1640-1649   8,800,000 15,188,713
1650-1659   8,400,000 13,151,211
1660-1669  11,900,000 14,549,133
1670-1679  10,980,000 11,541,481
Source: Gaastra,’ The Dutch East India Company and Its Intra-Asiatic Trade in Precious Metals’, 
104. Table 2. 
Another of the reasons which prevented Cheng’s junks from taking a 
large share in the trade of the South East Asian ports lay in the expansion of 
the Indian Ocean trade. This trade had been making marked progress since 
the 1670s. As it expanded, more and more Surat merchants were tempted to 
try their luck in the Southeast Asian trade208 and extended their networks to 
                                                          
207 Generale Missiven, IV 1675-1684, 303. 13 Feb. 1679.  
208  Gopal Surendra,’ Gujarati shipping in the Seventeenth Century’, in Indian 
Economic and Social History Review, 8 (1971), 36; Femme Gaastra, ‘Merchants, 
Middlemen and money: Aspects of the trade between the Indonesian archipelago and 
Manila in the 17th Century’, in Gerrit Jan Schutte, Heather Amanda Sutherland (eds.), 
Papers of the Dutch-Indonesian Historical Conference, held at Lage Vuursche, the 
Netherlands, 23-27 june 1980, (Leiden: the Bureau of Indonesian Studies, 1982), 
301-314 at 307. 
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Bantam in West Java.209 The Batavian authorities did not welcome Indian 
shipping in the roadstead of the Company headquarters and this negative 
policy backfired by making neighbouring Bantam ’great, bold and 
rich.’(groot, stout en rijk) .210 The waxing prosperity of Bantam made it 
possible for this sultanate henceforth also to carve out a niche for itself in the 
Chinese and Japanese trade. 
The expansion of the Indian trade also had an impact on the Manila 
trade. As the provider of Mexican silver in the Malay Archipelago and Siam, 
Manila became a popular destination of the Indian country traders in search 
of more direct trading links. Consequently, the Manila trade with ports in 
India steadily increased after 1670 as the following table shows:    







Junks from the 
Indonesian 




1660-1669 65 15 21 1 
1670-1679 53 15 17 10 
1680-1689 87 8 4 43 
1690-1699 169 17 9 38 
Source: Chaunu, Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques, 200-19. 
 
Table 13-17: The Percentage of the Tariff of Manila Contributed from 
Different Origins. 






1666-1670 42.46 11.18 12.6  
                                                          
209 Gaastra, ‘Merchants, Middlemen and money’, 309.  
210 Generale Missiven, IV 1675-1684, 15 Feb 1678, 234. 
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1671-1675 20.81 2.27 7.91 27.37 
1676-1680 37.17 3.88 11.57 19.74 
1681-1685 33.35 0.87 2.13 28.73 
Source: Chaunu, Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques, 148-60. 
The above data tally with the observations of George White who was 
residing in Ayutthaya in 1679: 
 
‘… The places, where this country [Siam] has been supplied with silver, 
are Japan and Manila. The former, [by]its emperor [means: shogun] have 
been prohibited to export for some years ago, and the trade with the latter 
was declining a lot since the ships from Coromandel sailed to there directly. 
Silver-bar became very scarce here. Because of desire to hoard cash, the 
commercial contract has been altered to barter which is very 
inconvenient.’211 
To lay its hands on more Mexican silver, the Batavian administration 
also tried to conclude a contract with the Spaniards in Manila, offering terms 
under which the Dutch would provide spices in exchange for the right to 
acquire Mexican silver in Manila. The negotiations failed in 1668, foundering 
on a clause in the peace treaty in 1648 had decreed that no Dutch ship would 
be allowed to visit Spanish harbours in the East. 212  Instead of even 
contemplating allowing local traders from the Spice Islands to exploit the 
indirect trade between the Dutch and the Spaniards, the VOC authorities 
preferred to leave this business in the hands of Chinese traders in Batavia.213 
It seems plausible to assume that, because the Batavian Chinese could share 
the Indonesian Archipelago – Manila trade under the protection of the VOC, 
this freedom also curbed Cheng’s Taiwan-Manila trade.  
                                                          
211 George White at Ayutthaya to Robert Parker and Council at Bantam, 15 Nov. 1679 
(O. S.), in Anthony Farrington, Dhiravat na Pombejra(eds.), The English Factory in 
Siam 1612-1685, (London: The British Library, 2007), vol. I., 513. 
212 Gaastra, ‘Merchants, Middlemen and Money’, 304-306. 
213 Ibidem, 307. 
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All these circumstances contributed to the unhappy fact that the 
Taiwanese merchants were gradually losing their share in the luxury trade in 
Manila, Siam, the Malay Archipelago and Bantam after 1678 and had no 
option but to give way to local Chinese merchants sheltering under the 
protection of the European Companies or local rulers. Nevertheless, against 
all the odds, after Cheng Ching had led his troops back to Taiwan in 1680, he 
still managed to keep a firm hand on the Sino-Japanese smuggling. He lost 
this advantage when, on 26 March 1681, the K’ang-hsi Emperor agreed to 
rescind the coastal evacuation decree so that the population could return 
home.214 Permanent Ch’ing garrisons were established in Amoy and Quemoy, 
but the strictest surveillance of the maritime ban was carried out by the newly 
constructed fleet of the Governor-General of Fu-chien, Yao Ch’i-shêng , led 
by the Naval Regional Commander, Chu T’ien-kuei, who had joined 
Manchus just three days after Cheng Ching had announced that he would 
return to Taiwan.215 The upshot of these decisions was that the Sino-Japanese 
trade dropped 87 per cent compared to what it had been the previous year. 
Cheng Ching passed away suddenly on 17 March 1681 and was 
succeeded by his second son, Cheng K’e-shuang.216 From the moment he 
took over the reins the Cheng administration began to unravel. In a quandary 
about what to do for the best, an attack on either Hai-nan or Macao was toyed 
with as a diversionary tactic which would hopefully ward off the threat of a 
Manchu invasion of Taiwan and regain lost advantages in Southeast Asian 
trade.217 In April 1681, Regional Commander Yang Yen-ti did indeed mount 
a raid on Hai-nan, but his fleet was soon dispersed by the Kuang-tung Coastal 
                                                          
214  TWYH(ed.), Ch’ing-tai kuan-shu chi ming t’ai-wan chêng-shih 
wang-shih[Records in Official Documents Referring to the Annihilation of the Cheng 
Regime during the Ch’ing Dynasty], TW no. 174, 19. 
215 Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu, 58. 
216 Ibidem, 59. 
217 Generale Missiven, IV 1675-1684, 489. 28 Dec. 1681. 
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Defence Fleet, after which the plan to conquer Macao was postponed.218 In 
August of 1681, the Taiwanese regime mobilized all its resources to defend 
the Pescadores against an imminent attack by the Manchu fleet.219 As it 
happened, this threat still did not materialize as the Manchu authorities were 
still hesitating, debating about whether they should really launch an 
expedition against Taiwan.220 In Taiwan, the sudden decline in trade since 
1681 caused a shortage of daily necessities, because the population there had 
grown rapidly as many new immigrants had poured in when Cheng Ching 
retreated from mainland China. According to Dutch sources, 35,000 soldiers 
were transported to the island which swelled the total population to 
500,000-600,000 people. The fields in Taiwan were pushed to their limits in 
food production.221 In order to provide rice for its subjects, the Cheng regime 
postponed paying its soldiers and used the money to purchase rice from Siam 
                                                          
218 Chen, ‘The migration of the Cheng Partisans to South Vietnam (Part I)’, 444-5; 
VOC 1377, Missive van den resident Leendert de Moij en Johannes Sibens aan haer 
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219 John Chappell and Council at Taiwan to Edward Barwell and Council at Bantam, 
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Johannes Leeuwenson Chief Merchant at Fu-chou to Governor-General Rijcklof van 
Goens about His Activities, Delivered via Macao after His Departure from Fu-chou, 




instead.222 In the spring of 1682, six junks were dispatched to Siam for rice 
and returned fully laden.223  At this point most of southern China and 
northern Vietnam were afflicted by a drought which caused twenty-five junks 
from different places to arrive in Siam in a quest for rice.224 The Cheng 
authorities again had to dispatch another four junks to Siam for rice in the 
spring of 1683.225 In the following summer, Liu Kuo-hsüan’s fleet lost a sea 
battle off the Pescadores on 16 July 1683.226 After deliberating for two 
weeks, the Cheng authorities finally decided to surrender to the Manchus. 
According to two English merchants, Thomas Angeir and Thomas 
Woolhouse, who witnessed the whole event at Taiwan: 
‘His Majesty and his grandees here had observed the continual 
grumbling of the poor people and his army in want of rice. And there was 
about ten days in this time of distress in which no grain was brought until 
they had sold (what remained) at an extremely dear price, so that the poor 
people could not stuff their bellies unless they mixed rice with potatoes. If the 
supply from Siam and Manila would not arrive, some of the subjects must die 
in pain. Therefore they decided, after the loss of the Pescadores, now it is not 
possible to subsist and retain the prerogatives of his predecessors, for without 
a trade this country cannot be kept and without the Pescadores it is 
impossible for them to manage any commerce with foreigners.’227  
                                                          
222 Daghregister van Batavia, 1682 Deel I, 438. 3 Apr. 1682. 
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The crisis brought on by the food shortage and the loss of the 
Pescadores were the last straw. To make matters even worse, the rice junks 
had to be unloaded on the Pescadores when it was discovered that alluvial 
deposit had made the bay of An-ping too shallow to enter. The coup de grace 
for the internal crisis came when any chance of external aid was cut off by 
the Manchu fleet. The rice trade, which had raised the Cheng lineage from 
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DEFENSIVE AND AGGRESSIVE MONOPOLIES 
Unquestionably social turbulence in the southeastern coastal regions of China 
lay at the heart of the rise of the seaborne empire of the Cheng lineage. This 
maritime mercenary power group in the Min-nan area founded its powerbase 
on the skillful exploitation of foreign trade and by claiming the monopoly on 
violence. In origin it was the offshoot of the agriculture-rooted tax 
administration of the Ming dynasty which did not obtain enough revenue to 
pay for the maintenance of a permanent naval fleet to defend the coastal 
regions precisely in a period of change and foreign intrusion when this was 
so desperately needed. Forced to look elsewhere, the provincial government 
of Fu-chien had no option but to exploit the revenues it derived from 
maritime trade to secure the coastal frontier. By the expedient of promising 
the trading revenues to the maritime mercenaries, the local authorities 
conceded them a substantial autonomy to act as they pleased, on condition 
that they kept stable order in coastal waters to the satisfaction of the imperial 
court in Peking.    
Historians generally consider the Edict issued by the Chinese Ming 
court in 1568 which partly lifted the Hai-chin or maritime prohibitions in 
southern Fu-chien to mark a milestone in the protracted struggle of local 
merchants and sailors to obtain a profit from the bounties of overseas trade. 
This exceptional ‘privilege’ permitted overseas trade from one local harbor, 
Yüe-kang, a port in the Haich’êng district of Chang-chou prefecture. It seems 
to have been devised to serve two purposes: it undercut piracy by offering 
unemployed sailors job opportunities, and it guaranteed the presence of a 
sea-going fighting force for the coastal defence, on call all the time. By any 
standards it would seem to have been a well-calculated decision but recent 
research reveals that, instead of being a well-devised move by the imperial 
court which would allow it to gain control of the overseas trade, it was 
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actually no more than an ad hoc arrangement to secure the survival of the 
commercial shipping whose existence was continuously under threat from 
local piracy. In short, the measure resembled the ‘Macao Formula’ under 
whose terms the Ming court allowed the Portuguese to remain in Macao.  
The implementation of this policy to pacify the coastal waters and 
combat piracy as effectively as possible laid the financial foundation for 
being able to maintain a coastal defence force. Under the circumstances, the 
relationship between the coastal defence troops and the junk owners and their 
skippers who could now sail to overseas destinations with official permission 
evolved as a flexible arrangement.  
The onus of getting the priorities right was placed fairly and squarely 
on the shoulders of the coastal defence troops. The coastal defence troops, or 
rather their leaders, were faced with many choices. Should they simply escort 
the trading junks to protect them, charging high prices for their services? 
Should they actively harass and arrest pirates and ordain a scorched earth 
policy on nearby islands to prevent them being used as basses by pirates and 
smugglers? Or would it be better for them to neglect these onerous duties and 
exploit their own trading junks and pursue a more forward-looking strategy? 
The share in the trading revenues collected was used for the upkeep of the 
coastal defence depended on the judgement of the provincial authorities, 
principally the Grand Co-ordinator who was in charge of the budget of the 
province. 
The rise and decline in the number of maritime mercenaries was 
closely related to the barometer of fear of foreign aggression. At this early 
stage of globalization, the Grand Co-ordinators of the coastal provinces of 
China in the Ming period did not have the advantage of a comprehensive 
knowledge of what was happening in international waters. The more terrified 
the Ming court grew of the threat posed by maritime invaders, whether 
Chinese or Japanese pirates or Dutch privateers, the more strongly it 
supported the local monopoly rights in the seaborne trade of the maritime 
mercenaries, who were supposed to keeping the peace along the coast. As a 
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consequence of their fairly impregnable position, this ‘defensive monopoly’ 
policy, as I call it, made a strong contribution to the increase in trade 
revenues.  
Just at this juncture, when the Japanese civil war was drawing to an end 
at the end of the sixteenth century and Toyotomi Hideyoshi and his successor, 
Tokugawa Ieyasu, unified the country, Japanese piracy on the Chinese coast 
was also declining. Japanese traders, provided with passes from the Shogun, 
sought to reconnect their links with the China coast intent on engaging in 
peaceful, legal trade, but their pacific ambitions were obstructed by the 
imperial prohibition on trade with Japan, which had not been repealed . 
In 1617, a merchant, a member of the local gentry in Chang-chou, 
Chao Ping-chien, was recruited by the Coastal Defence force of Fu-chien 
province when rumours began to spread about impending Japanese attempts 
to move to the nearly island of Taiwan. As he was covertly involved in 
trading with Sino-Japanese smugglers, he was happy to make use of his 
official position to exclude all other smugglers from this trade. When the 
Japanese ‘threat’ did not materialize, the provincial authorities decided to get 
rid of Chao Ping-chien and executed him once they no longer had any need 
of him. Likewise, the famous Japan-based smuggler Li Tan, who mediated 
between the Ming coastal defence troops and the Dutch who occupied the 
Pescadores between 1622 and 1624, had also been a low-ranking officer in 
the coastal defence force before he began organizing his smuggling network 
between China and Japan. Li Tan tried to regain a central position in the 
coastal defence by mediating between the Chinese court and the VOC, but he 
passed away before his plans could come to fruition1 His death left the way 
open for Cheng Chih-lung, alias Nicolas Iquan, a former member of Li Tan’s 
                                                          
1 Élie Ripon, Voyages et aventures du capitaine Ripon aux grandes Indes: journal 
inédit d’un mercenaire 1617-1627 [Voyages and Adventures of Captain Ripon in 
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(Thonon-les-Bains, Haute-Savoie: Éditions de l’Albaron, 1990), 113. 
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smuggling network, to join the coastal defence with his followers in 1629, 
after he had briefly collaborated with the VOC as a mercenary. 
After the Dutch had occupied Taiwan in 1624 and continued to press 
the Fu-chien authorities to open up trade relations, the power of the Fu-chien 
coastal defence forces under Iquan reached unprecedented heights during the 
1630s. Trade with Japan, first the smuggling via the Dutch in Taiwan and 
later the direct trade with Nagasaki, contributed immensely to the 
development of Iquan’s ‘defensive monopoly’. In effect he remained a 
maritime mercenary while assuming the guise of serving as a high officer in 
the coastal defence troops. He was helped out in his ambitions by a 
succession of Grand-Co-ordinators who realized that inevitably they would 
have to make concessions in exchange for coastal security and prosperity. 
Iquan’s ‘defensive monopoly’ reached its zenith in the 1640s when the Ming 
court was facing the menace of the Manchu troops at the northeastern border 
of the empire. At this time, the Grand Co-ordinators of Fu-chien virtually 
openly tolerated his illegal trade with Japan because the prolonged war 
against the Manchus had exhausted the treasury. This all happened at the 
wrong moment for the Dutch. The rapid expansion of Iquan’s foreign trade 
monopoly emerged as an uncompromising threat to the VOC trade on the 
Sino-Japan route just when the Dutch were expecting to be able to step in and 
replace the Portuguese after their expulsion from Japan in 1639. When Iquan 
arranged for the establishment of a restored Southern Ming court in Fu-chien 
province in 1646, he hit on the perfect way to develop a crown trade under 
the guise of the tributary system which would allow him to contest the 
trading privileges of the VOC in Siam, Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula and 
Cochin-China. Realizing that his chance had come, Iquan grasped the sole 
authority over all coastal maritime activities in China and ironically grabbed 
the power to execute a maritime ban and turn it in to an ‘aggressive’ weapon. 
After Iquan’s son Cheng Ch’eng-kung, alias Coxinga, succeeded in becoming 
the leader of the Fu-chien coastal mercenaries in 1653, he also employed the 
maritime prohibition as a weapon to bargain for more profits as he dealt with 
his various trading partners or competitors including the Japanese, Dutch and 
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Spaniards. All his military actions were concentrated on the sites on which 
his maritime network relied most. The last two full-scale attacks he waged 
against Nanking and Taiwan were designed to protect the rich silk trade with 
Japan and to launch into the gold trade with India. The attacks waged by his 
successor, Cheng Ching, against the Dutch still holed up in Chi-lung in 
Formosa and Phnom-Penh in Cambodia, ran along the same lines and 
represented an aggressive monopoly enforcement, which consistently tried to 
secure its own trading networks by force. Even during the implementation of 
the maritime ban and the evacuation policy imposed by the Manchu court in 
the years 1663-1670 (in Fu-chien until 1684), secure in its position, the 
Cheng regime in Taiwan was still able to continue to trade with China by 
exchanging contraband cargo at various footholds along the coast.   
The occupation of Taiwan by Coxinga in 1662 provided the Cheng 
lineage with a stronghold from which to negotiate its relations with the 
Chinese Ch’ing Empire. At the beginning of the seventeenth century Taiwan 
had been a ‘stateless’ space between China and Japan. The VOC occupation 
in 1624 upset this arrangement, which was further thrown out of kilter in 
1636 when the Japanese adopted their own Sakoku or ‘locked country’ policy 
under the newly established Tokugawa Shogunate. Originally the maritime 
mercenaries in the Min-nan area did no more than serve as middlemen 
between China and Japan at their bases on the Pescadores and in Taiwan, but 
this situation changed radically in the 1630s when Iquan actually became an 
intermediary between China and the VOC in the An-hai- Taiwan axis. Later, 
in the 1650s, Coxinga widened his network to include Siam and Japan. The 
dramatic change in the geo-political conditions in China contribute greatly to 
the reinforcement of Coxinga’s ‘aggressive monopoly.’ It threw such a 
spanner in the works of local trade, it prompted the VOC to seek an alliance 
with the Ch’ing naval forces in the period 1663-1665. Having weighed up 
their options in the area, the Dutch decided that their best course would be to 
seek a solid relationship with the Ch’ing court, on the basis of their mutual 
interest in toppling the Cheng regime.  
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When new rebellions by Ming loyalists against the Ch’ing court 
erupted in the southern provinces in 1673, they threw the competition in 
foreign trade between the Cheng regime and the rulers of the rebellious 
provinces of Fu-chien and Kuang-tung wide open. As the Cheng regime was 
not in a position to wage war against its Fu-chien and Kuang-tung erstwhile 
allies, its ‘aggressive monopoly’ ebbed away. It was reduced to being only 
one of many competitors in the Sino-Japanese trade. After the Fu-chien rebels 
surrendered to the Manchu court in 1677, the new Fu-chien coastal defence 
troops originally posted to guard the southern coastline of China by the 
Ch’ing court gradually began to recoup the status they had lost in earlier 
struggles with the Cheng and adopted a ‘defensive monopoly’ in which they 
depicted the Cheng regime as a threat to the common cause.  
One of Iquan’s former followers, Admiral Shih Lang, seized this 
opportunity to take command of the coastal defence troops in Amoy and 
attack the Cheng regime in Taiwan. His decision was ill-timed as his personal 
position became uncertain when, in its efforts to secure the coast, the Manchu 
court considered evacuating the whole littoral, a decision which would have 
made the defence troops superfluous. If Shih Lang was not to see everything 
he had fought for and planned for so long collapse, he had to eliminate the 
Cheng regime as soon as possible. However, he was only partially vindicated. 
After he destroyed the Cheng naval force off the Pescadores and accepted its 
surrender in Taiwan, the maritime threat, the principal reason for maintaining 
a ‘defensive monopoly’, also evaporated. Determined to preserve his 
hard-won position, Shih Lang plotted to lure the VOC into coming back to 
Taiwan again so that he could parade it as foreign threat to be reckoned with.2 
Times had changed and the VOC was not very willing to fall in with his 
plans. It had already withdrawn from the direct trade with Fu-chou in China 
                                                          
2 Cheng Wei-chung, ‘Shih Lang t’ai-wan kui-huan hê-lan mi-i[Admiral Shih Lang’s 
Secret Proposal for Returning Taiwan to the VOC]’, T’ai-wan wên-hsien[Taiwan 
Historica], 61:3, (2011), 35-74. 
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and even more importantly Japan had ceased to export silver, which it needed 
for its intra-Asian trade. Faced with the fact that Chinese goods were 
gradually becoming less profitable in Japan, the Dutch re-evaluated the ever 
worsening ecological conditions in the harbour in the Bay of An-ping 
(Taijouan) and judged that the port had become too shallow for Dutch ships. 
When all the conditions had been weighed up, in 1685 Governor-General 
Johannes Camphuijs in Batavia decided that the Company no longer had any 
use for a settlement in Taiwan, unless it could obtain the sole right of free 
trade with China from there.3 On its part, as it felt itself fairly secure on the 
Dragon Throne, the Manchu court judged that no more foreign threats could 
be expected from the sea and decided to open up all the coast to the Chinese 
overseas trade. The upshot was that the military budget was uncoupled from 
the monopolistic trading revenues. This radically affected the character and 
purpose of the coastal defence troops as there would no longer be any real 
need for other maritime mercenaries in the years to come.  
In the long history of China, it has not been unusual for local warlords 
to rise and make bids for power whenever the might of the central 
government declined. The late East Han, the late Tang and even the late 
Ch’ing dynasty as well as Southern Ming period are good examples, not to 
mention the fall of the Ch’ing dynasty just a century ago. The common 
foundation for this phenomenon was the implementation of certain expedient 
measures by the court to enable local defence forces to pacify local rebellions 
when the court itself was no longer able to do so. For example, the Yellow 
Turban Rebellion (AD 184), the An-Lu-shan Rebellion (AD 755) and the 
Tai-ping Rebellion(AD 1850) were all the result of the rise of warlords and 
the demise of the power of the central government. Viewed from this 
perspective, the rise of the Cheng lineage is not much different from other 
local warlords under the Southern Ming Emperors. The feature which 
                                                          
3 Generale Missiven, IV 1675-1685, p. 722-3; VOC 700, Resolutie van Batavia, 
Batavia, 8 May 1685, fos. 214-5. 
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distinguishes the Cheng from the other Chinese warlords was its maritime 
capability which gave it its monopoly access to overseas trading revenues 
which provided it with generous funding for carrying out its plans. Instead of 
relying on the agricultural revenues plus military forces on land, it relied on 
its capability to secure maritime trade routes and a steady stream of useful 
commodities. The birth of the maritime mercenary was a creation of the 
newly emerged oceanic contacts as a consequence of the new wave of 
globalization. The way the Cheng regime dealt with its overseas trading 
partners, whether they were East Asians or Europeans, had more in common 
with the polities found in the Malay port principalities than Sino-centric 
tributary system of the Ming court. 
Taken at the flood, the decline of Chinese central power coincidentally 
allowed the formation of this port principality but, as did so many others, it 
withered largely because of the effects of changes in oceanic trade and the 
competition of other coastal polities, rather than because of the embargo of 
the Chinese empire. However, in the long history of the Chinese maritime 
frontier, it stands out as an exception. It seems it was the outstanding 
leaderships characteristics shown by its first two rulers which made it the sole 
exceptional instance in which a coastal region almost escaped the control of 





Table A: the cargo of the junk from Quinam bound for Chang-chou, 






 ( Rial) 
Silver coins 3,266 pieces 1 3266 
Pepper 411 1/2 picul 13 5349.5 
Long pepper    7  picul 10    70 
Ambergris 1.625 catty(26 taels) 25    40.625 
Merstoff (sic.)   1/4 catty (4 taels)  
Rhinoceros horn 210 pieces 1   210 
Elephant tusks  40 1/2 picul 50  2025 
Ebony 187 1/4 picul 2   374.5 
Sandalwood 15.7 picul 20   314 
Sappanwood 50 picul  3   150 
Dragon’s blood  15 picul  30   450 
Cardamom   12 picul  20   240 
Copper  53 picul  10   530 
Tjeddwock(sic.)  44 picul   2    88 
Horsehair  4.7 picul  50   235 
Agelhout (sic.) 
(Eaglewood) 
 22 picul   4    88 
Bird’s nests    4 bags  50/pl   
Tortoiseshell  0.54 picul  80     43.2 
Ox hides  50 picul 1/4 stux     12.5 
Rice  1/2 last    15 
Camphor 
166 taels (=10.375 
cattij)
 25   259.375 
Total < 45.2 last
 
<13760.7  
Source: VOC 1109, Inventaris vande goederen ende comptanten becomen uijt een joncque van 
Quinam tendeerende naer Chincheu bij ‘t schip Bredamme onder Lamaphe adij 15en Auguste 





Table B: The cargo of the junk from Quinam captured around Cape of 
the Good Hope1 on 17th Aug. 1633 
Cargo 






Ebony  1,200 picul 2  2400 
Rice    88 last 30  2640 
Tamberijn    38 baijlen (bales) unknown  
Deerskins     8 items unknown  
2 iron 1 pond canon unknown   
Total < 148 last=185 ton  < 3040 
Source: Inventaris vande goederen bevonden in een jonck bij ‘t jacht Broukerhaven op 17en 
August anno 1633 ontrent Caep de Goede Hoop verovert, comende van Coutchinchina willende 
naer de rivier Chincheo, Cape of good hope, fo. 291r. 
Table C: The cargo of the junk from Quinam captured near Lampecao 
on 17 Aug. 1633 
Commodities Quantities 




Silver nuggets 141 taels(1.12 last) 1.37  193.17
Spanish rials 22 1/2 pieces 1   22.5
Elephant tusks 3.65  picul 50  182.5
rice 1 1/4 last 30   37.5
Veruwen(sic.)  3 pots
Copper bowls  18 items 2   36
Total >2.378 last  471.67
 Source: VOC 1109, Bij ‘t jacht Broeckerhaven uijt een joncque comende van Quinam ontrent 
Lamophece verovert, Lang Pai-chiao, fo. 292r.            
 
 
                                                          
1 Ch’ien-ao, see Picture 3. 
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pepper 760  picul 13 9880 
Long pepper  10  picul 10  100 
Elephant tusks 25.66 picul 50 1283 
Beuijanoij (sic.)(Benzoin) 8.28  picul 15 124.2 
Gommalack(sic.) 1.35  picul 20   27 
Copper  61  picul 10 610 
Sappanwood 480  picul  3 1440 
Sandalwood 7 1/2  picul 20  150 
Calmbac wood   46  picul - - 
Craen oogh(sic.)  1.4  picul - - 
Rompen(sic.)  0.5  picul 20 10 
Bird’s nests   1.2  picul 50   60 
Tjeddeback(sic.)    5  picul 2   10 
Cane  A lot  
Total >70.39 last 13694.2 
Source: VOC 1109, Inventaris van de coopmanschappen bevonden in twee joncquen, ander de 
stadt Tongsoa op de wal sittende ende op Aug. anno 1633 aengehaelt ande voor een goede prijse 
verclaert, Tongshan, fol. 291r.  
 
Table E: the Value of Rial and Tael in stuivers at Taiwan and Batavia 
1624-1661 
Year Rial Chinese tael Japanese tael
1625 702
1629 513 (42)4
                                                          
2 Generale Missive, 27 Jan. 1625, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 44. 
3 H.T. Colenbrander, Jan Pietersz Coen, V, 159. 










1644 5215 7116 59.817
1645 5218/5619 7120
                                                                                                                             
1958), 54-5.  
5 Generale missiven, 6 Jan. 1632, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 96. 
6 Glamann, ibid. The numbers in brackets mean that they do not indicate directly the 
situation in Taiwan but generally in the areas under the VOC control. 
7 Glamann, ibid. 
8  VOC 1123, Missive van Johan van der Burch governeur van Taijouan naer 
Gouvernor Generaal Antonio van Diemen in Batavia, 5 Oct. 1636, fo. 697r. 
9 Glamann, ibid. 
10 Daghregister Batavia, 1637, 34. 10 Feb. 1637.  
11 VOC 1188, Extract uijt ’t Generale brieffsboeck, berustende ter secretarie generael, 
gerocken uijt de Missive door den Gouverneur Gener- ende de Raaden van India, aen 
de E Heeren Zeventhiene geschreven, 18 Dec, 1639, fo. 218v.  
12  VOC 1188, Extract uijt Generale resolutieboeck van Batavia berustene ter 
secretarie Generale getrocken, 10 Mar. 1640, fo. 219v.  
13 VOC 1222, Memorie der quantiteijt en reductie van het becomere Taijouanse 




17 VOC 1155, Missive door den gouverneur Francois Caron aen den Ed. heer 
gouverneur generael Antonio van Diemen in Taijouan, 15 Feb. 1645, fo. 594r. It 
reported 1 Japanese tail would be counted equal to 1.15 rial. Given the rial was 
counted as 52 stuijvers, the Japanese tail was 59.8 stuijvers. 
18 VOC 1222, Memorie der quantiteijt en reductie van het becomere Taijouanse 
Schuijt goudt seedert anno 1642, 25 Feb. 1657, fo. 15v.  






                                                                                                                             
gouvernor Pieter Anthoniszoon Overtwater inTaiwan, 22 April 1648, fo. 83v. The 
letter ordered the Taiwan authority to end the old fashion of the values in rials, neither 
52 nor 56 stuijvers would be counted. However, since when Taiwan authority began to 
count one rial in 56 stuijvers was unknown; VOC 1176, Advijs van weesmeesteren 
des eijlants Formosa nopende het invorderen van der weeskinderen gelden, 17 Sept. 
1650, fo. 795v. According to this petition, 1 rial was counted as 56 stuijver when it 
was circulated since 1644 in Taiwan.  
20 Ibid; VOC 1155, Missive door den gouverneur Francois Caron aen den Ed. heer 
gouverneur generael Antonio van Diemen, 15 Feb. 1645, fo. 594r. 
21 VOC 1222, Memorie der quantiteijt en reductie van het becomere Taijouanse 
Schuijt goudt seedert anno 1642, 25 Feb. 1657, fo. 15v.  
22 VOC 872, Missive van Governor Generaal Conelis van der Lijn in Batavia naar 
gouvernor Pieter Anthoniszoon Overtwater inTaiwan, 22 April 1648, fo. 83v. The 
letter ordered the Taiwan authority to end the old fashion of the values in rials, neither 
52 nor 52 stuijvers would be counted. However, since when Taiwan authority began to 
count one rial in 56 stuijvers was unknown; VOC 1176, Advijs van weesmeesteren 
des eijlants Formosa nopende het invorderen van der weeskinderen gelden, 17 Sept. 
1650, fo. 795v. According to this petition, 1 rial was counted as 56 stuijver when it 
was circulated since 1644 in Taiwan.  
23 Generale Missiven, II 1639-1655, 289. 21 Dec. 1646.  
24 VOC 1163, Factura der goederen gescheept ende geladen door ordre van d’Ed. 
president Pieter Antonisz. Overtwater voor Batavia, in ’t Casteel Zeelandia, 19 Jan. 
1647, fo. 332r; VOC 1169, Factura’s [van ’t geladene in ’t jacht de Drommedaris voor 
Cormandel en van ’t gescheepte in de fluijt den Cooninck Davidt voor Suratta en 
Persia], 21 Nov. 1647, fo. 412v; VOC 1171, Missive door de heer Pieter Anthonisz. 
Overtwater en raad in Taijouan aan de gouverneur Arnold Heussens gouverneur in 
Palliacatta, 15 Dec. 1648, fo. 417v . (Check the fol number again) 
25 VOC 872, Missive van Gouvernor General Cornelis van der Lijn in Batavia naar 
gouvernor Pieter Anthoniszoon Overtwater in Taiwan, 22 April, 1648, fo. 83v; VOC 
1170, Resolutie van Taijouan, 18 June 1648, fo. 526v. 
26 VOC 1171, Missive door de heer Pieter Anthonisz. Overtwater en raad in Taijouan 








                                                                                                                             
(Check the fol number again) 
27 VOC 872, Missive van gouvernor generaal Cornelis van der Lijn in Batavia naar 
gouvernor Pieter Anthoniszoon Overtwater in Taijouan, 22 April 1648, fo. 83v; VOC 
1170, Resolutie van Taiwan, 18 June 1648, fo. 526v. The rial used to be circulated 
among Chinese in 56 stuijvers, but the order of Batavian authority claimed it to be 60 
stuijvers. 
28 VOC 1222, Memorie der quantiteijt en reductie van het becomere Taijouanse 
Schuijt goudt seedert anno 1642, 25 Feb. 1657, fo. 15v. During 1649 to 1652, the rial 
was circulated in 60 stuijvers 
29  VOC 1176, Advijs van weesmeesteren des eijlants Formosa nopende het 
invorderen van der weeskinderen gelden, 17 Sept. 1650, fo. 795v.During 1649 to 1650, 
one Japanese tail was circulated in 69 stuijvers. 
30 VOC 1222, Memorie der quantiteijt en reductie van het becomere Taijouanse 
schuijt goudt seedert anno 1642, 25 Feb. 1657, fo. 15v. 
31  VOC 1176, Advijs van weesmeesteren des eijlants Formosa nopende het 
invorderen van der weeskinderen gelden, 17 Sept. 1650, fo. 795v.During 1649 to1650 
one Japanese tail was circulated as 69 stuijvers; VOC 1176, Missive uijt gouvernour 
Nicolaas Verburgh in Taijouan aen den gouverneur generaal Cornelis van der Lijn 
ende raden van India, 31 Oct. 1650,fo. 892v. 
32 VOC 1222, Memorie der quantiteijt en reductie van het becomere Taijouanse 
schuijt goudt seedert anno 1642, 25 Feb. 1657, fo. 15v. 
33  VOC 1183, Factura's van ’t gescheepte in de fluijten Coninck David en 
Hillegaersberg te Taiwan[naar Batavia], 24 Oct. 1651, fo. 582r. 
34 VOC 1222, Memorie der quantiteijt en reductie van het becomere Taijouanse 
schuijt goudt seedert anno 1642, 25 Feb. 1657, fo. 15v. 
35 VOC 1197, Missiven [aen haer Ed. governeur generaal Carel Reniers te Batavia 
door den gouverneur Nicolaas Verburgh en raedt te Taijouan], 29 Dec. 1652, fo. 775r. 
36 VOC 1222, Memorie der quantiteijt en reductie van het becomere Taijouanse 
schuijt goudt seedert anno 1642, 25 Feb. 1657, fo. 15v. 





1657 (51)41 6942 (57)43
1658 (48)44
1660 (48/60)45
1 Siamese Tail= 6 F= 120 stuivers46  
1 Tonkin tail= 4.125F= 82.5stuivers47 
                                                                                                                             
aen den gouverneur generaal Joan Maetsuijcker ende raden van India, 5 Dec. 1653, fo. 
134v.  
38 VOC 1222, Memorie der quantiteijt en reductie van het becomere Taijouanse 
schuijt goudt seedert anno 1642, 25 Feb. 1657, fo. 15v. 
39 VOC 1218, Missive aen de Ed. heer Joan Maetsuijker gouverneur generael ende de 
Ed. heren raden van India in dato 20 November Missive van gouverneur Frederik 
Coyett te Taijouan naar Batavia, 20 Nov. 1656, fo. 36r. 
40 VOC 1218, Missive aen de Ed. heer Joan Maetsuijker gouverneur generael ende de 
Ed. heren raden van India in dato 20 November Missive van gouverneur Frederik 
Coyett te Taijouan naar Batavia, 20 Nov. 1656, fo. 36r. 
41 The Deshima dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 330-1. 10 Nov. 1657. 
42 Generale Missive, 6 Jan. 1658, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 442. 
43  VOC 1222, Resolutie van Taiwan, 22 Sept. 1657, fo.115r; The Deshima 
dagregisters, XII 1650-1660, 330-1. 10 Nov. 1657. 
44 VOC 1228, Factura van poijerzuijkeren naer Batavia verscheept van Taijouan, 2 
Mar. 1658, fo. 669r. 
45 VOC 678, Resolutie van Batavia, 9 July 1660, fo. 76. The light (slecht) rial is 48 
stuijvers while the heavy (sware) rial is 60 stuijvers in Batavia; VOC 872, Instructie 
voor gouverneur Pieter Antonioszoon Overtwater en raed te Taijouan van Batavia, 3 
Aug. 1648, fo. 207r. The rial “in spetie” is 60 stuijvers while the rial ”courant” is 48 
stuijvers. 
46 VOC 1125, Missive bij Jeremias van Vliet tot Siam aen president Nicolaes 
Couckebacker tot Firando, 29 June 1637, fo. 558v. 
47 VOC 1248, Missive door den coopman Constantijn Ranst ende den raet aen haer 
Eds. de gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker en heeren raden van India, 25 Oct. 




The Ming Grand Coordinators of Fu-chien 
王士昌 Wang Shih-ch’ang 1 Feb. 1618  
商周祚 Shang Chou-tso 12 Feb. 1621 2 Mar. 1623 
南居益 Nan Chi-i 15 Mar. 1623 21 May 1625 
朱欽相 Chu Ch’in-hsiang 5 June 1625 29 Oct. 1626 
朱一馮 Chu I-fêng 14 Dec. 1626 21 Aug. 1628 
熊文燦 Hsiung Wên-ts’an Apr. 1628 Mar./ Apr. 1632 
鄒維璉 Tsou Wei-lien Mar./ Apr. 1632 8 May 1639 
沈猶龍 Shên You-lung 1635  
蕭亦輔 Hsiao I-fu 16 Feb. 1639 23 Sept. 1642 
張肯堂 Chang K’ên-t’ang 7 Nov. 1642  
Source: Wu, Ming tu-fu nien-piao, 514-517. 
 
The Ming Supreme Commander of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi 
何士晉 Hê Shih-chin 19 Apr. 1624 May 1625
商周祚 Shang Chou-tso 5 June 1625 9 Feb. 1627
李逢節 Li Fêng-chieh Feb./Mar. 1627 Aug. 1628
王尊德 Wang Tsun-tê 21 Aug. 1628
王業浩 Wang Yeh-hao Oct./Nov. 1631
熊文燦 Hsiung Wên-ts'an Mar./Apr. 1632
張鏡心 Chang Ching-hsin 10 June 1637 9 Jan. 1642
沈猶龍 Shên You-lung 1644
丁魁楚 Ting K’uei-ch’u 1644








The Governor Generals of the VOC 
Pieter Both 19 Dec. 1610
Gerard Reijnst 6 Nov. 1614
Laurens Reaal 19 June 1616
Jan Pietersz. Coen 21 Mar. 1619
Pieter de Carpentier 1 Feb. 1623
Jan Pietersz. Coen 30 Sept. 1627
Jacques Specx 24 Sept 1629
Hendrik Brouwer 7 Sept. 1632
Antonio van Diemen 1 Jan. 1636
Cornelis van der Lijn 19 Apr. 1645
Carel Reyniersz 26 Apr. 1650
Joan Maetsuijcker 18 May 1653
Rijcklof van Goens 4 Jan 1678
 
The Ch’ing Governor-generals of Chê-chiang and Fu-chien 
張存仁 Chang Ts’un-jên 1646
陳錦 Ch’ên Chin 1648
劉清泰 Liu Ch’ing-t’ai 
佟代 T’ung Tai 1655
李率泰 Li Shuai-t’ai 1656
張朝璘 Chang Ch’ao-lin 1666
祖擇傳 Tsu Tsê-ch’uan 1667
趙廷臣 Chao T’ing-ch’ên 1668
劉兆麟 Liu Chao-lin 1668
劉斗 Liu Tou 1670
范承謨 Fan Ch’êng-mo 1673
郎廷相 Lang T'ing-hsiang 1676
姚啟聖 Yao Ch’i-shêng 1678
Source: Hao Yü-lin, Fu-chien T’ung-chih [The General Gazette of Fuchien] , Ching-yin 




Ching-nan viceroy [in Fu-chien] 
耿繼茂 Keng Chi-mao 1661 
耿精忠 Keng Ching-chung 1670-74
Source: Hao Yü-lin, Fu-chien T'ung-chih, vol. 28. 
 
The Ch’ing Governors of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi 
佟養甲 T’ung Yang-chia 1646
李率泰 Li Shuai-t’ai 1654
李棲鳳 Li Ch’i-fêng 1657
王國光 Wang Kuo-kuang 1663
盧崇峻 Lu Ch’ung-chün 1664
盧興祖 Lu Hsing-tsu 1668
周有德 Chou You-tê 1670
金光祖 Chin Kuang-tsu 1673
吳興祚 Wu Hsing-tso 1682













An-ch’a-shih 按察使 Surveillance Commissioner  
An-nan Chiang-chün 安南將軍 General of Annan 
Ch’in-i Pa-tsung/ Ch’in-tsung 欽依把總/欽總 National Squard Leader 
Chien-ch’a yü-shih 監察御史 Investigating Censor 
Chün-mên 軍門 Provincial Military Commander 
Ch’ien-chün Tou-tu 前軍都督 Supreme Chief Military Commisioner 
Chêng-nan Ta-chiang-chün To-lo Pei-lê 征 南 大 將 軍 多 羅 貝 勒 
General-in-Chief of the Southern Expedition the To-lo Prince  
Ching-nan 靖南 
Chao-ming-yeh 昭明爺 Marquess of Chao-ming 
Chê-min tsung-tu 浙閩總督 Governor-general of Chê-chiang and Fu-chien 
Chêng-ch’in-wang shih-tzu 鄭親王世子 Heir of the Imperial Prince of Cheng 
Chu-shou Hu-kuan 居守戶官 Official of Revenue residing in Amoy and 
Quemoy 
Chu T’ien-kuei 朱天貴 
Daimyo[J.]大名 
Daikan[J.]代官 
Fu 府 prefecture 
Fên-hsün Ping-pei-tao 分巡兵備道 the General Surveillance and Military 
Defence Circuit  
Fu-i You-chi 撫夷遊擊 Commander of the Barbarian-deterrent Mobile Corps 
Hsün Fu 巡撫 Grand Coordinator  
Goshuin [J.] 御朱印 Vermillion seal  
Hai-ch’eng Duke 海澄公 
Hai-fang t’ung-chih 海防同知 Assistant Coastal defense Circuit.  
Hai-tao 海道 Coastal Defense Circuit 
Hê-shih Kang Ch’in-wang)和碩康親王 Imperial Prince Kang (of the blood of 
the first degree) 
Hsieh Tsung 協總 Assistant Squadron Leader  
Hsien 縣 District 
Hsien-ling 縣令 District Magistrate 




Hsün-an 巡按 Regional Inspector  
Kung-k’ê kei-shih-chung 工科給事中 Palace Steward at Office of Scrutiny of 
Work 
Mei-Lê Chang-ching 梅勒章京 Banner Vice Commander in Chief 
Ming-sê Pa-tsung 名色把總 Provincial Squadron Leader  
Muromachi Bakufu [J.] 室町幕府 
Nanan-po 南安伯 Earl-Pacifier of South 
Pa-tsung 把總 Squadron Leader  
Ping-pu 兵部 Ministry of War  
Pu-chêng Shih 布政使 Provincial Administration Commissioner of Fuchien 
Shui-shih Ti-tu 水師提督 Provincial Military Commander of Naval force 
P’ing-hsi 平西 
Shui-shih Tsung-ping 水師總兵 Navy Commander  
Shui-shih Ssu-chên 水師四鎮 The Fourth Command of Naval Force 
Shui-shih Ti-tu 水師提督 Provincial Navy Commander 
Shou-pei 守備 Defender 
Shogun [J.] 將軍 
Shao-kuan 哨官 Sub-Squad Leader   
Ta Chiang-chün 大將軍 General in Chief 
T'ai-tzu T'ai-shih 太子太師 Grand Preceptor of the Heir Apparent 
Ta-ming tsung-ping t'ai-shih ting-yüen-hou’ 
大明總兵太師定遠侯[The Ming Regional Commander, Grand Preceptor of 
the Heir Apparent, the Marquis-pacifier of Far frontier  
Teibing, Thunbingh, Thseij-souw Tingwanhouw[D.]  
Ting-kuo-kong 定國公 Sikokon[D.] 
Ti-tu 提督, Provincial Military Commander  
Tou-ssu 都司 Regional Military Commission 
Tou-tu 都督 Commissioner in Chief  
Ts’an- chiang 參將 Assistant Regional Commander  
Tsung-ping 總兵 Regional Commander 
Tsung-tu 總督 Supreme Commander [Ming]/ Governor-general [Ch’ing] 
Tu-k’un 都閫 Brigade Commander 
Tu-hsiang-kuan 督餉官 Tax Levying Official 
T’ung-an Po 同安伯 Count of T’ung-an 





You-chi 游擊 Mobile Corps Commander 
 
Personal names in Chinese characters 
Akashi Michitōmo[J.] 明石道友 
A-Kê-shang  阿格商 
Ashikaga Yoshimitsu[J.]  足利義滿 
Chao Ping-chien 趙秉鑒 
Chao T’ing 趙廷 
Chang Chia-ts’ê 張嘉策 
Chang Ching 張經 
Chang Hsieh 張燮 
Chang Hsueh-sheng 張學聖 
Chang Jen-teng 張延登 
Chang Yün-fei  章雲飛 
Chang Yung-ch’an, 張永產 
Cheng Ch’eng-kung 鄭成功 
Cheng Chih-lung 鄭芝龍 
Cheng Ching 鄭經 
Ch’ên Chin 陳錦 
Cheng Chih-pao 鄭芝豹 
Cheng Chih-wan 鄭芝莞 
Cheng Hung-k’uei 鄭鴻逵 
Cheng Lien 鄭聯 
Cheng Ming-chün 鄭鳴駿 
Ch’en P’eng 陳鵬 
Cheng T’ai 鄭泰 
Cheng Ts’ai 鄭彩 
Ch’êng Tsai-i 程再伊 
Ch’êng Ying-lin 程應麟 
Ch’ên Tzu-chên 陳子貞 
Chia-ching 嘉靖 
Chi Ch’i-kuang 戚繼光 
Chi-êrh ka-lang,濟爾噶朗 
Chieh-shu 傑書 
Chin Sheng-huan 金聲桓 
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Chou Ch’üan-ping 周全斌 
Chou Hsing-ju 周性如 
Chu Ch’in-hsiang, 朱欽相 
Chu I-fêng  朱一馮 
Ch’ung-chên 崇禛 
Chu Yan-ji 朱儼戢 
Ch’u Ts’ai-lao 褚彩老 
Chung Pin 鍾斌 
Chu Ch’in-hsiang 朱欽相 
Chung Ling-hsiu 鍾凌秀 
Chieh-shu 傑書 
Ch’ien Su-t’u 錢肅圖 
Chi-tu 濟度 
Chung-chên[C.]忠振 Kingingh[D.] 
Ebiya Shiōemon [J.] 海老屋權右衛門 
Fang Yü  方輿 
Hamada Yahei 濱田彌兵衛 
Han Chung-yung  韓仲雍 
He T’ing-ping 何廷斌 Pinquan[D.] 
Hidetada[J.] 秀忠  
Honda Masazumi[J.] 本多正純 
Hosokawa[J.] 細川 
Hsieh Ping 謝彬 
Hsiung Wên-ts'an 熊文燦 
Hsü I-min 徐一鳴 
Hsü Hsin-su 許心素 
Hsü Kuang-ch'i 徐光啟 
Hsü Lung 許龍 Colion, Corion, Colien [D.] 
Hu Mei 胡美 
Huang Ch’eng 黃程 
Huang Chêng-ming 黃徵明 
Huang Ch'êng-hsüan 黃承玄 
Huang K’ai 黃愷 
Huang Shu 黃澍 
Hung-kuang 弘光 
Hung Hsü 洪旭 
Huang Wu  黃梧 
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Hu Tsung-hsien 胡宗憲 
Juan Min-his  阮旻錫 
K’ang-hsi 康熙 
Keng Chi-mao 耿繼茂 
Keng Ching-chung 耿精忠 
K’ung You-tê 孔有德 
K’ung Yuen-chang 孔元章 
Liang T'ien-chi 梁天奇 
Li Ch’eng-tung 李成棟 
Li Ch’i-fêng 李棲鳳/李栖鳳 
Li K’eui-ch’i 李魁奇 
Lin Ch’a 林察 
Lin Chin-wu 林錦吾、林謹吾 ＝Lin Chün-wu 林均吾 
Li Shuai-tai  李率泰 
Lin Fêng 林鳳 
Lin Tao-ch’ien 林道乾 
Li Shuai-tai 李率泰, 
Li Tan  李旦 
Li Tzu-ch’êng 李自成 
Li Ting-kuo 李定國 
Liu Ch’ing-tai 劉清泰 
Liu Hsiang 劉香 
Liu Kuo-hsüan 劉國軒 
Lu Chên-fei 路振飛 
Lu Ch’ung-chün 盧崇峻 
Lu Hsing-tsu 盧興祖 
Lung-wu 隆武 
Ma Chin-pao 馬進寶 
Ma Te-kung 馬得功 
Mingandali 明安達禮 
Ming Yüeh 明岳 
Murayama Tōan[J.] 村山等安 
Nan Chü-I 南居益 
Oda Nobunaga[J.] 織田信長 
Ouchi[J.] 大內 





Rōjū [J.]老中  
Satsuma[J.]薩摩 
Shang Chou-tso 商周祚 
Sha Ch’eng 沙澄 
Shên T'ieh 沈鐵 
Shên Yen 沈演 
Shih Lang 施琅 
Shun-chih 順治 
Su Ming-kang 蘇鳴崗 
Suetsugu Heizō[J.] 末次平藏 
Su Li 蘇利 Soulacq[D.] 
Su Nahai 蘇納海 
Sun Chia-chi 孫嘉績 
Su Yen 蘇琰 
Takanobu Matsuura[J.] 松浦隆信 
Tasu 達素 
T’an Lun 譚綸  
Thrinh[V.] 黎 
Ts'ai Hsien-ch'ên  蔡獻臣 
T’sai Shan-chi 蔡善繼 
Ts’ao Lu-tai 曹履泰 
Ts’êng Ying 曾櫻 
Ts’êng I-pên 曾一本 
Tsou Wei-lien 鄒維璉 
Ts’ui Chih 崔芝 
Tsu Tse-ch’ing 祖澤清  
Tokugawa Ieyasu[J.] 德川家康 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi[J.] 豐臣秀吉 
T’ung Kuo-ch’i 佟國器 
Tung Po-ch’i 董伯起 
T’ung Yang-chia 佟養甲 
T’u Tsê-min 涂澤民 
Tu Yung-he 杜永和 
Wang Kuo-kuang,王國光 
Wang Liang-hsiang 王良相 
Wang Mêng-hsiung 王夢熊 
APPENDIX 
 487 
Wang Shih-ch’ang  王士昌 
Wang Wei-chung 王位中 
Wei Chiu-kuan 魏九官 
Wu P’ing 吳平 
Wu San-kuei 吳三桂 
Yamada Nagamasa 山田長政 
Yang Yen-ti 楊彥迪 
Yao Ch’i-sheng 姚啟聖 
Yeh Ta-ching 葉大經 
Yen Chi-tsu 顏繼祖 
Yen Erh-kuan 顏二官, Giequa[D.] 
Yi Hon[K.]  李琿  
Yi Kong[K.] 李昖  
You Fêng-hsiang 游鳳翔 
Yüan Chin  袁進 
Yung-li (永曆) 
Yü Ta-you 俞大猷 
Yü Tzu-kao 俞咨皋 
 
Place names in Chinese characters 
Amoy 廈門 
An-hai 安海 












Chên-hai  鎮海 
Cheng-nan 鎮南 




Chiao-chou 交州 Caatcjouw[D.] 
Chia-tzu 甲子 
Chieh-shih 碣石/Chieh-shih [Guard] 碣石衛，Kitsjehoij[D.] 
Chieh-yang 揭陽 
Ch’ien-ao 錢澳 





Ching-hai T’ou 靖海頭/ Ching-hai-so 靖海所 Wierings bay 
Ch’ing-yuan 清遠 
Ch’i-t’ou-p’u 崎頭舖 
Chiu-lung River 九龍江 
Chou-shan  舟山 
Ch’üan-chou 泉州 
Ch’ung-ming 崇明 

















Hsing-hua 興化 Ginwa[D.] 
Hsin-tu 新渡 
Hsi Yang 西洋 
Hsüan-chung 懸鐘 
Hui-chou 惠州 







Ikura  伊倉[J.] 


























Nanking 南京 Nanquin[D.] 
Nan-t’ou 南頭 
Ning-po 寧波 
Ning-te District 寧德縣 Lintekwan[D.] 
Okinawa[J]琉球 
Pai-sha  白沙 Peswaa[D.] 
Pai-sha-hu 白沙湖 





P’ing Hai 平海/P’ing-hai-so 平海所 = Haarlems bay 

















Shên-ch’üan 神泉  
Ssu-ming-fu 思明府 Siminfoe[D.] 
Ssu-ch’uan 四川 
Su-chou 蘇州 
Ta-hsing 大星 /[Island of Ta Hsing]Pedro Branco 
Tai-chou 台州 Tjoetiauw[D.] 
T’ai-ping-fu 太平府 Theibinfoe[D] 
T’ai-wu 太武/ Ta-wu 大武 
Ta-kang 大港 Twakan[D.] 
Tamsuy 淡水 
Tien-pai  電白 
T’ien-wei 田尾 
T’ien-wei-yang  田尾洋 
Tsushima[J.]對馬 





Tung Yang  東洋 
Wankang 魍港 




Wei-t’ou 圍頭 Erasmus Bay 
Wen-chou 溫州 






Other special terms in Chinese characters 
Chao 照 
Chiao-p’iao 交票 
Ch’in-ming chen-shou fu-chien têng-ch’u ping chê-chiang chin-wên ti-fang 
tsung-pingp-kuan, t’ai-tzu t’ai-shih, ch’ih-tz’u mang-i nan-an-pa 欽命鎮守福
建等處並浙江金溫地方總兵官，太子太師，敕賜蟒衣南安伯 
Fang Ch'ien-tsung [C] 方千總 Hongsintson[D] 
Goshuisen boeki 
k’an-ho[J.]勘合 
Pao-shui  報水 
Piao, Pau[J.] 表 
Sakoku 鎖國 





* [C.] = Chinese 
* [D.] = Dutch  
* [J. ] = Japanese 
* [K.]= Korean 
* [V.]= Vietnamese 
 
**All the Chinese terms are transcripted through Wade-Giles system to 
mandarin. Some common known personal names and place names are not 
applied to it strictly. The Chinese terms recorded in Dutch are usually 





VOC archives in the National Archives, the Hague 
I. De archieven van de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, 1602-1795 [The 
archives of the Dutch East India Company, 1602-1795](abbr. VOC), 
1.04.02 
 
Kopie-resoluties van gouverneur-generaal en raden[resolutions of the 
Governor General and the council](15 vols):  
661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 677, 678, 668, 669, 671, 672, 677, 678. 
 
Batavia’s uitgaand briefboek [Letters and Papers sent](4 vols): 
869, 870,878, 880,  
 
Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren [Letters and Papers received] (96 vols) 
 
1077, 1083, 1087, 1085, 1090, 1092, 1093, 1094, 1096, 
1098, 1101, 1102, 1103, 1105, 1109, 1111, 1113, 1114 , 
1116, 1119, 1120, 1123, 1125, 1127, 1128, 1131, 1132, 
1133, 1134, 1136, 1139, 1140, 1144, 1151, 1157, 1160, 
1161, 1164, 1170, 1175, 1176, 1180, 1183, 1187, 1194, 
1197, 1202, 1206, 1207, 1209, 1212, 1214, 1216, 1218, 
1219, 1222, 1223, 1226, 1228, 1229, 1233, 1235, 1236, 
1241, 1243, 1244, 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249, 1252, 1253, 
1254, 1258, 1261, 1264, 1265, 1267, 1269, 1272, 1278, 
1283, 1290, 1294, 1295, 1304, 1311, 1314, 1322, 1330, 
1339, 1341, 1350, 1362, 1369, 1377.  
 
 
Afzonderlijk gehouden stukken (Separate volums )  
VOC 11207, Uijterekening Van de Goude en Silvere Munts Waardye, 
Inhout der Maten en Swaarte der Gewichten, in de respective Gewesten 
van Indiën[Calculation of the Value of the Gold and Silver, Content of 
Weights and Measures in Different Regions of East India], (Middelburgh: 
Johannes Meertens, 1691) 
 
II. Het archief van de Nederlandse factorij in Japan, 1609-1860[The archive 
of the Dutch factory in Japan 1609-1860] (abbr. NFJ), 1.04.21 
 
Dagrregisters van de factorij te Hirado en te Deshima,[Dairy of Hirado and 
Deshima](3 vols) 




Ingekomen brieven en uitgaande brieven [Letters and Papers sent and 
received](10 vols) 
282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289,290, 291,  
Ingekomen brieven van diverse buitenkantoren.[Letters and Papers received 
from diverse factories](3 vols) 
350, 351, 353 
 
Published archival sources 
 
I. In Dutch and in English: 
 
Diary of Richard Cocks, Cape-merchant in the English Factory in Japan, 
1615-1622 : with correspondence, 2 vols., ed. Edward Maunde Thompson 
(London : Whiting and Co., 1883) 
Daghregister gehouden int Casteel Batavia vant passerende daer ter plaetse 
als over geheel Nederlands India[ Diary kept in castle Batavia concerning 
circumstances happened all over the East India area], 31 vols., ed. J.A. 
van der Chijs, H. T.Colenbrander, J. de Hullu, F. de Haan and W. 
Fruin-Mees (Batavia and The Hague: Ministerie van Koloniën, 
1888-1931) 
Generale Missiven van gouverneur-generaal en raden aan Heren XVII der 
Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, 11 vols., ed. Willem Philippus 
Coolhaas, J. van Goor and J. E. Schooneveld-Oosterling (‘s-Gravenhage: 
Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, 1960-2004) 
De dagregisters van het kasteel Zeelandia: Taiwan 1629-1662[The diary of 
the castle Zeelandia], 4 vols, ed. Leonard Blussé; Margot E. van Opstall, 
Ts’ao Yung-ho, Wouter. E. Milde, ('s-Gravenhage : Nĳhoff, 1986-2000) 
The Deshima dagregisters : their original tables of contents[hereafter cited as 
‘the Deshima dagregisters’], 12 vols, trans end eds. Cynthia Viallé, and 
Leonard Blussé, ( Leiden : Institute for the History of European 
Expansion, 1986-2005)  
The English factory in Taiwan: 1670-1685, eds. Chang Hsiu-jung 張秀蓉, 
Anthony Farrington, Huang Fu-san 黃富三, Ts’ao Yung-ho[Ts’ao Yung-he]
曹永和, Wu Mi-tsa 吳密察, Cheng hsi-fu, Ang Ka-in 翁佳音(Taipei: 
National Taiwan University, 1995) 
Spaniards in Taiwan : documents, 2 vols, ed. José Eugenio Mateo Borao; Pol 
Heyns, Carlos Gómez, Anna Maria Zandueta Nisce (Tapei: SMC 
Publisher, 2002) 
Dutch Formosan Placard-book Marriage, and Baptism Records, ed. Pol 
Heyns, Cheng Wei-chung 鄭維中, (Taipei: SMC Publish, 2005) 
De Missiven van de VOC-gouverneur in Taiwan aan de Gouverneur-generaal 
te Batavia[Letters by the governor of Taiwan sent to governor general in 




The English Factory in Siam 1612-1685, 2 vols., ed, Anthony Farrington, 
Dhiravat na Pombejra, (London: The British Library, 2007) 
 
II. In Chinese and in Japanese: 
 
Tsūkō ichiran 通航一覽[Overview of all Foreign Communications], 8 vols, 
comp. Hayashi Fukusai 林復齋, (Tōkyō : Kokusho kankōkai, 1912-1913) 
Kai Hentai 華夷變態[The Change of Dynasty from Ming to Ch’ing], 3 vols, 
eds.Hayashi Gaho 林春勝, Hayashi Nobuatsu 林信篤, Ura Renichi 浦廉
一, ( Impressum Tokyo: Toyo bunko, 1958)  
Chêng-shih kuan-hsi wên-shu 鄭氏關係文書 [[Documents concerning the 
Cheng Family], ed. T’ai-wan yin-hang ching-chi yen-chiu shih[TWYH, 
The economic research department of the Bank of Taiwan ] 臺灣銀行經
濟研究室 , T’ai-wan wen-hsien ts’ung-k’an 臺灣文獻叢刊 [Taiwan 
Historical Documentary Collectanea, hereafter TW] no. 69, (Taipei: 
TWYH, 1960) 
Ming-chi Hê-lan-jên ch'in-chü P’êng-hu ts’an-tang 明季荷蘭人侵據彭湖殘
檔[Remaining archives about the Dutch invasion of the Pescadores in 
Ming dynasty],id., TW no. 154, (Taipei: TWYH, 1962) 
Chêng-shih shih-liao ch'u-pien 鄭氏史料初編[The First Compilation of 
Historical Documents referring to the Cheng Family], id., TW, no. 
157,(Taipei: TWYH, 1962) 
Chêng-shih shih-liao hsü-pien 鄭氏史料續編[The Second Compilation of 
Historical Documents referring to the Cheng Family], id., TW, No. 168, 
(Taipei: TWYH, 1962) 
Chêng-shih shih-liao san-pien 鄭氏史料三編 [The Third Compilation of 
Historical Documents referring to the Cheng Family], id., TW no. 175, 
(Taipei: TWYH, 1963) 
Ch’ing-shih-tsu shih-lu hsüan-chi 清世祖實錄選集[Selection of the Veritable 
Records of Shün-shih Emperor], TW no. 158, (Taipei: TWYH, 1963) 
Ch’ing shêng-tsu shih-lu 清聖祖實錄[Selection of the Veritable Records of 
Kanghsi Emperor], Comp. Hua-wên shu-chü, (Taipei: Hua Lien, 1964). 
Ming shih-lu min-hai kuan-hsi shih-liao[Historical materials about 
Fuchienese waters selected from the veritable Records of the Ming]明實
錄閩海關係史料, id., TW no. 296, (Taipei: TWYH, 1971) 
Li-tai pao-an 歷代寶案[Tributary Documents Preserved in Liu ch’iu], 15 
vols, comp.,Ts’ai To 蔡鐸, (Taipei, National Taiwan University: 1972) 
K’ang-hsi t’ung-i t’ai- wan tang- an shih-liao hsüan- chi 康熙統一臺灣檔案
史料選集[Selections of Historical Materials concerning the conquest of 
Taiwan during the K’ang-hsi Period], comp., Chung-kuo ti-i li-shih 
tang-an-kuan pien-chi-pu 中國第一歷史檔案館編輯部 [the editorial 
center of the Chinese first archive], Sha-mên ta-hsüeh t'ai-wan 
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yen-chiu-so 廈門大學台灣研究所[Taiwan research institute XMU] , 
(Fu-chien: Fu-chien jên-min publisher, 1983) 
Ming-ch’ing shih-ch’i ao-mên wên-t’i tang-an wên-hsien hui-pien 明清時期
澳門問題檔案文獻匯編[Compilation of Official Documents concerning 
Macao during the Ming and Ch’ing Dynasties], 6 vols, eds. Chung-kuo 
ti-i li-shih tang-an kuan 中國第一歷史檔案館 [The first archives of 
China(Hereafter cited as CKTI )], Ao-mên chi-chin hui 澳門基金會 [the 
foundation of Macao] and Chi-nan ta-hsüeh ku-chi yen-chiu-so 暨南大學
古籍研究所 [The research institute for ancient documents in Chi-nan 
university], ( Peking: Jên-min ch’u-pan-shê, 1999) 
Hsiang-shan ming-ch'ing tang-an chi-lu 香山明清檔案輯錄 [Compilation of 
Archives referring to Hsiangshan County during the Ming and Ch’ing 
Dynasties], ed. Chung-shan-hsieh tang-an-chü 中山縣檔案局[archival 
bureau of Chungshan county] ; CKTI , ( Shang-hai: Shang-hai ku-chi, 
2006) 
Ch’ing-ch’u chêng-ch'êng-kung chia-tsu man-wên tang-an i-pien 清初鄭成
功家族滿文檔案譯編[Compilation of the Manchu Archives Referring to 
the Cheng Family during the Early Period of the Ch’ing dynasty], ed. 
CKTI , T’ai-wan wên-hsien hui-k’an 台灣文獻匯刊 [Collectanea of 
Taiwan Historical Document, hereafrer TWH] I, no. 6-8. (Peking: 
Chiu-chou, 2004) 
Ming-ch’ing t’ai-wan tang-an hui-pien 明清臺灣檔案彙編[The compliation 
of historical documents during the Ming and Ch’ing dynasties], 110 
vols,ed. T’ai-wan shih-liao pien-chi wei-yüen-hui 臺灣史料編輯委員會
[Editorial committee of Taiwan historical materials] (here after cited as 
TWSL), (Taipei, Yüen-liu Publisher: 2004), I 1621-1644 
Ming-ch’ing Kung-ts’ang t’ai-wan tang-an hui-pien 明清宮藏臺灣檔案匯編
[Compilation of archives in Ming and Ch’ing Court relating to Taiwan], 
230 vols, comp., Ch’ên Yün-lin陳雲林, CKTI, Hai-hsia liang-an ch’u-pan 
chiao-liu chung-hsin 海峽兩岸出版交流中心[The Center of Cross Strait 

















Anonymous, Lung-wu chi-lüeh 隆武紀略[Simplified Chronicle of the Reign 
of the Lung-wu Emperor], TWH, I no 1. 
----Nan-ming yeh-shih 南明野史 [Unconventional historical accounts of 
southern Ming], TW no. 85.  
----Ssu-wên ta-chi 思文大紀[Simplified Chronicle of the Reign of the 
Ch’ung-chên Emperor], TW no.111 
---Shêng-an pên-chi 聖安本紀[ biography of Lungwu Emperor], TW no. 183 
----Hsing-tsai yang-ch’iu 行在陽秋[Events at the Yung-li Emperor’s Court], 
TW no. 234 
---Ch’ung-chên shih-lu 崇 禎 實 錄 [Court records during the rule of 
Ch’ung-chên Emperor ], TW no. 294 
Ch’a Chi-tso 查繼佐, Tsui-wei-lu hsüan-chi 罪惟錄選輯[Selections from the 
the book caused punishment], TW no. 136 
Chang Hsieh 張燮, Tung-hsi-yang k’ao 東西洋考[ Authenticated Knowledge 
of Eastern and Western Oceans], （ Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 
1981/1618） 
Chang I-mei 張珆美 Hui-lai hsien-chih[local gazette of Hui-lai district]惠來
縣志, ed. The Palace Museum Committe, Ku-kung chên-pên ts'ung-k'an
故宮珍本叢刊[Collectanea of Rare books in Palace Museum] (Hereafter 
cited as KKCP) no.178 
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The objective of this research is to examine the rise and fall of a 
prominent 17th century Chinese maritime power: the Cheng lineage. It 
elucidates how, due to the consequences of specific historical circumstances 
at a crucial moment in time, the Ming imperial administration initially 
tolerated a group of Chinese smugglers as a nominal coastal defense 
detachment. With the help of the local gentry, a substantial number of these 
mercenaries gradually transformed into the backbone of the defense force of 
Fu-chien province and became the main protectors of Chinese commercial 
interests in the East and South China Seas. Wrestling with other maritime 
competitors, the Cheng clan and their followers were dragged into a 
whirlpool of power struggles with the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and 
English in the China Sea region during the early stages of globalization. The 
fall of the Ming Empire allowed the Cheng lineage to create an independent, 
but short-lived seaborne regime in China’s southeastern coastal provinces.  
The rise of the first leader of the Cheng clan, Cheng Chih-lung, 
otherwise known as Nicolaes Iquan, can be attributed to the split between the 
Chinese and Japanese world orders and the convergence of the silver flows 
from Japan and Mexico in China by the beginning of the 17th century. Ming 
China was already in decline when the armies of Japanese warlord Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi invaded Korea, weakening the dynasty further. The Ming court 
was then forced to concentrate its financial resources on thwarting another 
threat: the southward expansion of the Manchu’s at the North border. The 
silver flows from Japan and North America that entered China via its 
southeastern coastal ports were soon completely expended in order to pay for 
the defense efforts in the north. It was from the shady world of the overseas 
bullion trade that the residing head of the Cheng regime, Cheng Chih-lung, 
alias Nicholas Iquan, emerged. 
Chapter One traces the institutional origins of the Chinese privateers 
(or maritime auxiliary force) in the later phase of the Wo-k’ou (Japanese 
SUMMARY 
 510 
pirates) raids on the southeast coast of China during the latter half of 16th 
century. The Chinese Court initially hired mercenaries to resist these raids, 
but this infantry was not able to fight the pirates on the water. The Grand 
Coordinators (hsün-fu) of Fu-chien province discovered that the sea-faring 
smugglers and traders provided better troops than the officially recruited 
mercenaries. In 1617, when the Japanese traders requested that the Chinese 
authorities legalize trade with Japan, the Grand Coordinator of Fu-chien 
recruited a group of maritime mercenaries from local sea-faring traders and 
equipped them with war ships and weaponry strong enough to prevent 
possible Japanese aggression.    
Chapter Two illustrates that the revival of the maritime mercenary 
system in Fu-chien and the prohibition of overseas trade was the Grand 
Coordinators’ response to the Dutch occupation of the Pescadores in 1622. 
This chapter then explains how Cheng Chih-lung, a trader in the illegal 
Sino-Japanese transit trade, was recruited by the Dutch East India Company 
(VOC) to participate in privateering against the Spaniards in Manila. Even 
after the Dutch moved to Taiwan, the deadlock between the provincial 
Fu-chien authorities and the Dutch continued. However, when a drought hit 
Fuchien in 1626 and maritime prohibitions put a stop to the seasonal succor 
of Ch’ao-chou rice, Cheng Chih-lung sailed to the Chinese coast and took the 
lead in breaking through the maritime prohibitions with the tacit aid of the 
VOC in Taiwan. 
Chapter Three examines how, after Cheng Chih-lung surrendered to the 
Chinese authorities, he obtained a position in the coastal defense force, and 
was able to finance his troops by smuggling goods from his local base at 
An-hai. The shallow waters of the An-hai harbor prevented rival junks from 
approaching. By 1631, Cheng Chih-lung had eliminated all Chinese 
competition in overseas trade.  
Chapter Four examines the overseas trade of An-hai from an 
international perspective and shows how Cheng Chih-lung benefited from the 
sudden changes in the Sino-Japanese trade. Since the Japanese court ceased 
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trading with the Portuguese in Macao, the An-hai smugglers under Cheng 
Chih-lung’s leadership could monopolize the Sino-Japanese trade and 
accumulate their capital while expanding their trade with the VOC in Taiwan.  
Chapter Five examines the conflicts of interest between Cheng 
Chih-lung and the VOC, which resulted in the naval battle of Liao-lo near the 
island of Quemoy in the summer of 1633. The Dutch suffered a decisive 
defeat, and in his new influential position, Cheng Chih-lung urged the Ming 
court to legalize Chinese trade with the Dutch in Taiwan.  
Chapter Six demonstrates how the An-hai merchants rebuffed 
challenges from other Chinese traders after Chih-lung defeated his rival Liu 
Hsiang from Kuangtung province. The victory enabled Chih-lung to expand 
his influence as far as the mouth of the Pearl River. After obtaining access to 
large supplies of tropical commodities in Kuangtung, the An-hai merchants 
intended to extend their networks to all Southeast Asian ports bordering on 
the South China Sea. 
Chapter Seven examines the expansion of the Anhai trade network to 
Taiwan, Siam and Manila and the early stages of its close cooperation with 
the VOC in trading with Japan.  
Chapter Eight highlights the dramatic rupture of the cooperation 
between the Cheng lineage and the VOC in 1640. The Dutch looked to 
purchase silk outside of China and found markets in Vietnam and India. Since 
the company’s expanding commerce with India required large supplies of 
Chinese gold, relations with Cheng Chih-lung, who was able to provide this 
bullion at a favorable price, were restored.  
Chapter Nine explores how the downfall of the Ming court and the 
change of regime in 1644 impacted the An-hai merchants’ monopoly in 
Sino-Japanese trade. After he was taken hostage by the new Manchu rulers, 
Cheng Chih-lung was replaced by his son Cheng Ch’eng-kung, alias Coxinga. 
Cheng Ch’eng-kung gained the loyalty of the maritime mercenaries who had 
been previously led by his father. He then declared himself loyal to the Ming 
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court, which had by then moved to the south. 
Chapter Ten explores the attempts of An-hai traders to expand into the 
Siamese market to the detriment of the VOC trading interests there. When the 
Siamese and Cambodian king sent envoys to Cheng Ch’eng-kung’s 
headquarters at Amoy in 1653, the latter began to consolidate his power and 
restarted political negotiations with the Manchu courts and the VOC. 
Chapter Eleven aims to present the consistency of the activities 
completed by Cheng Ch’eng-kung after he became the undisputed leader of 
the maritime mercenaries and protector of the sea-faring traders. The 
Manchus attempted to seal off the coast again in order to defeat the Ming 
forces in the south, but to no avail: Cheng Ch’eng-kung had gained control of 
all the important emporia along the coast. 
Two large battles embodied Cheng Ch’eng-kung’s strategic designs on 
the Manchu court in Peking and the Dutch in Taiwan. Firstly, by attacking 
Naking on the Yangtse River in 1659, Cheng Ch’eng-kung attempted to 
capture Ch’ung-ming island and secure the Chiang-nan area where exported 
silk was produced. After the failure of this expedition Cheng Ch’eng-kung 
decided to invade Taiwan and lay siege on the VOC’s island headquarters, 
Zeelandia castle, which he was eventually forced into surrender on February 
1, 1662. What his further aims were – did he really plan an attack on Spanish 
Manila, the opening of the direct trade with India, or extend power to the 
Spice islands? – will never be known, because he died shortly after his 
conquest of Taiwan.  
Chapter Twelve provides a general overview of the Chinese overseas 
trading network after the sudden demise of Cheng Ch’eng-kung in 1662. 
Cheng Ch’eng-kung’s eldest son, Cheng Ching, however, soon consolidated 
his grip on the Cheng regime in Taiwan.  Through cooperation with 
privateers from the Kuang-tung and Kuang-his coastal provinces he restored 
the trading network of his father between China, Japan, Cambodia and 
Philippines after 1667.  The Siamese King Narai had turned his back on the 
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Cheng regime when it nearly collapsed after the death of Cheng Ch’eng-kung. 
Without that support, the Cheng Ching and his followers no longer sought to 
compete with the Dutch in the Siamese trade. 
Chapter Thirteen analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of Cheng 
Ching’s trading network and also explains its final decline. The network had 
once extended as far as the Malay-peninsula and Sumatra for the purchase of 
tin and pepper, and with the support of the English East India Company, it 
even formed a connection with Batavia’s great rival on Java, the port of 
Bantam. When the Japanese government issued a ban on the silver export in 
1667, the silver flows from abroad gradually came to a stop.  
Simultaneously, the Manchus issued new maritime prohibitions. Although 
this policy largely backfired because it caused the coastal provinces to join 
the so-called three feudatories’ rebellion between from 1674 to 1681, these 
developments inevitably took their toll on the trading fortunes of the Cheng 
merchants in Taiwan. In 1683, the maritime power of the Cheng lineage was 
effectively terminated by the invasion of the Qing admiral Shih Lang, a 
former ally of Cheng Chih-lung. As a result, the maritime trade from Taiwan 
lost its competitiveness in the trading world of China’s seas.  
The final chapter, Chapter Fourteen, tackles the complexities of the rise 
and fall of Cheng rule in the coastal province of Fuchien and Taiwan. The 
case of the Cheng lineage may be seen as a precedent to the self-proclaimed 
warlords in the border regions during the Chinese Republican period. As a 
trade-oriented polity, Cheng-ruled Taiwan showed many features of the port 
principalities scattered along the coasts of the South China Sea. Whatever the 
case may be, the temporary secession from central imperial rule by the Cheng 
and their followers in Fu-chien and nearby Taiwan during the seventeenth 
century amounts to an exceptional moment in the history of China’s coastal 





Het doel van dit onderzoek is om de opkomst en ondergang van een 
prominente zeventiende eeuwse Chinese maritieme ‘mogendheid’ te 
beschouwen, aangevoerd en bestuurd door drie generaties van de Cheng 
familie. Verklaard wordt  hoe het keizerlijk bestuur van de Ming dynastie, 
als gevolg van bepaalde historische ontwikkelingen op een cruciaal moment, 
groepen Chinese smokkelaars in dienst nam onder het mom van 
‘kustverdediging’s detachementen’. Met de hulp van de lokale gentry werden 
niet weinig huurlingen geleidelijk aan getransformeerd tot de ruggengraat 
van de defensiemacht van de provincie Fu-chien. Zo groeiden de aanvoerders 
daarvan uit tot de beschermheren van de Chinese commerciële belangen in de 
Oost- en Zuid Chinese Zee.  
Strijdend met rivalen, werden de Chengs en hun volgelingen 
meegesleurd in de maalstroom van de machtsstrijd met de Spanjaarden, 
Portugezen, Hollanders en Britten tijdens het beginstadium van de 
globalisering. De val van het Ming keizerrijk maakte het de Chengs mogelijk 
kortstondig een zelfstandig, maar labiel maritiem regime te vestigen in 
China’s zuidoostelijke kustprovincies.  
 
De opkomst van de eerste leider van de Cheng clan, Cheng Chih-lung 
alias Nicolaes Iquan, kan worden toegeschreven aan de spanningen die 
onstonden als gevolg van het schisma tussen de Chinese en Japanse 
wereldorden en de convergentie van de zilverstromen uit Japan en Mexico in 
China aan het begin van de 17e eeuw. Ming China was al in verval toen het 
binnenvallen van de legers van de Japanse krijgsheer Toyotomi Hideyoshi in 
Korea de dynastie nog meer verzwakte. Het keizerlijke hof zag zich daarop 
gedwongen om alle financiële bronnen aan te wenden om weer een andere 
dreiging af te wenden: de zuidwaartse expansie van de Mantjoes. De 
zilverstromen uit Japan en Zuid Amerika die binnenkwamen via de havens in 
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de zuidoostelijke provincies werden al snel volledig benut om de verdediging 
in het noorden te financieren. Het was vanuit deze troebele wereld van 
overzeese handel dat het Cheng regime, Cheng Chih-lung, alias Nicolaes 
Iquan, opkwam.  
 
Hoofdstuk één verdiept zich in de oorsprong van de Chinese 
gelukzoekers (of maritieme hulptroepen) in de latere fase van de Wo-k’ou 
(Japanse piraten) aanvallen op de zuidoostelijke kust van China tijdens de 
tweede helft van de 16e eeuw. Het Chinese hof had aanvankelijk huurlingen 
ingehuurd om deze aanvallen het hoofd te bieden, maar deze infanterie was 
niet bij machte om de piraten te bestrijden op zee. De gouverneur (hsün-fu) 
van de provincie Fu-chien ontdekte dat de zeevarende smokkelaars en 
handelaren betere troepen leverden dan de officieel gerekruteerde huurlingen. 
Toen in 1617 de Japanse handelaren de Chinese autoriteiten verzochten om 
de legale handel met Japan te openen, rekruteerde de Gouverneur van 
Fu-chien huurlingen van plaatselijke zeevarende handelaren en voorzag hen 
van oorlogsschepen en bewapening, sterk genoeg om mogelijke Japanse 
agressie te voorkomen. 
 
Hoofdstuk twee laat zien dat de herleving van het maritieme huurlingen 
systeem in Fu-chien en het verbod op de overzeese handel het antwoord was 
van de provinciale Gouverneur op de Nederlandse bezetting van de 
Pescadores in 1622. Dit hoofdstuk verklaart hoe Cheng Chih-lung, een 
makelaar in de illegale Chinees-Japanse doorvoerhandel werd gerekruteerd 
door de Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie (VOC) om deel te nemen in de 
kaapvaart tegen de Spanjaarden in Manila. Zelfs nadat de Hollanders naar 
Taiwan waren vertrokken, bleef de impasse tussen de provinciale autoriteiten 
van Fu-chien en de Hollanders bestaan. Maar toen in 1626 een droogte de 
provincie Fu-chien teisterde en de zeeverboden de toevoer van Ch’ao-chou 
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rijst onmogelijk maakten, zeilde Cheng Chih-lung naar de Chinese kust en 
nam daar de leiding om het zeeverbod te doorbreken met de stilzwijgende 
hulp van de VOC in Taiwan. 
 
Hoofdstuk drie beschouwt hoe Cheng Chih-lung na zijn overgave aan 
de Chinese autoriteiten een positie verkreeg in de kustverdediging en hoe hij 
door smokkelhandel vanuit zijn thuisbasis in An-hai zijn troepen kon blijven 
financieren. De ondiepe wateren van de An-hai haven voorkwamen dat de 
jonken van zijn rivalen dichterbij konden komen. In 1631 had Cheng 
Chih-lung zich ontdaan van al zijn Chinese concurrenten in de overzeese 
handel. 
 
Hoofdstuk vier analyseert de overzeese handel van An-hai vanuit een 
internationaal perspectief en toont hoe Cheng Chih-lung profiteerde van de 
plotselinge veranderingen in de Chinees-Japanse handel. Omdat het Japanse 
keizerlijke hof de overzeese handel met de Portugezen in Macao had 
opgeschort, konden de An-hai smokkelaars onder het leiderschap van Cheng 
Chih-lung nu de handel met Japan monopoliseren en hun kapitaal 
verveelvoudigen terwijl zij tegelijkertijd hun handel met de VOC in Taiwan 
uitbreidden. 
 
Hoofdstuk vijf onderzoekt de belangentegenstellingen tussen Cheng 
Chih-lung en de VOC, die resulteerden in de zeeslag van Liao-lo bij het 
eiland Quemoy in de zomer van 1633. Nadat hij de Hollanders een 
verpletterende nederlaag had toegebracht, spoorde Cheng Chi-lung vanuit 
zijn nieuwe machtige positie, het Ming hof aan om de handel met de 




Hoofdstuk zes toont hoe de kooplieden van An-hai aanvallen van 
andere Chinese handelaren afwendden, nadat Cheng Chih-lung zijn rivaal Liu 
Hsiang uit de provincie Kuang-tung verslagen had. Deze overwinning zorgde 
ervoor dat hij zijn invloed uit kon breiden tot aan de mond van de Pearl rivier. 
Nu zij de smaak te pakken kregen van de grote voorraden aan tropische 
producten die zij in Kuang-tung aantroffen, wilden de An-hai handelaren hun 
netwerk uitbreiden tot aan alle havens in Zuidoost Azië . 
 
Hoofdstuk zeven analyseert de expansie van het An-hai handelsnetwerk 
naar Taiwan, Siam en Manila en de beginfase van de nauwe samenwerking 
van Cheng Chih-lung met de VOC in de handel met Japan. 
 
Hoofdstuk acht benadrukt de dramatische breuk in de samenwerking 
tussen de Chengs en de VOC in 1640. De Hollanders zagen nu uit naar 
andere markten dan China voor de inkoop van de zijde voor Japan en zij 
vonden die in Vietnam en India. Omdat de toenemende handel van de 
Compagnie met India grote leveringen van Chinees goud vereiste, werden de 
relaties met Cheng Chih-lung, die dit edelmetaal tegen een redelijke prijs kon 
leveren, weer hersteld. 
 
Hoofdstuk negen toont aan hoe de val van het Ming hof en de 
verandering van regime in 1644 de monopoliepositie van de An-hai 
koopmannen in de Chinees-Japanse handel in gevaar bracht. Nadat hij in 
gijzeling was genomen door de nieuwe Mantsjoe leiders,volgde zijn zoon 
Cheng Ch’eng-kung, alias Coxinga, hem op. De troepen die eerder onder 
leiding van de vader stonden verklaarden zich nu loyaal aan de zoon. Cheng 





Hoofdstuk tien onderzoekt de pogingen van de An-hai handelaren om 
de Siamese markt te veroveren ten koste van de handelsbelangen van de 
VOC aldaar. Toen de Siamese en Cambodjaanse koning afgezanten stuurden 
naar het hoofdkwartier van Cheng Ch’eng-kung in Amoy in 1653, begon 
deze laatste zijn macht te consolideren en hervatte hij de onderhandelingen 
met zowel het Mantsjoe hof als de VOC. 
 
Hoofdstuk elf beoogt het consistente beleid van Cheng Ch’eng-kung’ 
aan te tonen toen hij eenmaal de onbetwiste leider van de maritieme 
huurlingen en beschermheer van de zeevarende handelaren geworden was. 
De Mantsjoes probeerden de kust weer af te sluiten om de Ming troepen in 
het zuiden te verslaan, maar dit was tevergeefs: Cheng Ch’eng-kung kreeg 
controle over alle belangrijke handelsknooppunten langs de kust. Twee grote 
gevechten belichaamden Cheng Ch’eng-kung’s strategie ten opzichte van het 
Mantsjoe hof in Peking en de Hollanders in Taiwan. Allereerst viel hij in 
1659 de Yangtse rivier opvarend Nanking aan. Met deze aanval trachtte 
Cheng Ch’eng-kung het eiland Ch’ung-ming te veroveren en zich zo van de 
Chiang-nan regio te verzekeren waar de export zijde werd geproduceerd. Na 
het mislukken van deze expeditie besloot Cheng Ch’eng-kung naar Taiwan 
over te steken en het VOC hoofdkwartier op dit eiland, Fort Zeelandia, te 
belegeren. Op 1 februari 1662 dwong hij de VOC tot overgave. Wat zijn 
verdere plannen waren - was hij echt voornemens Spaans Manila aan te 
vallen, wilde hij de directe handel met India openen, of wilde hij zijn macht 
uitbreiden naar de Specerijen Eilanden? - zal nooit bekend worden omdat hij 
kort na zijn verovering van Taiwan stierf. 
 
Hoofdstuk twaalf geeft een overzicht van het Chinese overzeese 
handelsnetwerk na het plotselinge heengaan van Cheng Ch’eng-kung in 1662. 
Diens oudste zoon, Cheng Ching, maakte zich snel meester over het bestuur 
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van het eiland. Door de samenwerking aan te gaan met gelukzoekers uit de 
kustprovincies Kuang-tung en Kuang-his, herstelde hij na 1667 het 
handelsnetwerk van zijn vader tussen China, Japan, Cambodja en de 
Filipijnen. De Siamese koning Narai keerde echter het Cheng regime de rug 
toe. Cheng Ching en zijn volgelingen lieten nu hun wens varen om met de 
Hollanders te concurreren in de Siamese handel. 
 
Hoofdstuk dertien analyseert de sterke en zwakke punten van Cheng 
Ching’s handelsnetwerk en verklaart ook de uiteindelijke teloorgang. Het 
netwerk strekte zich uit tot aan het Maleise schiereiland en Sumatra voor de 
inkoop van tin en peper, en met de steun van de Engelse Oost Indische 
Compagnie, reikte het ook tot aan Bantam, de grootste rivaal van Batavia op 
Java. Toen de Japanse overheid een uitvoerverbod uitvaardigde op de export 
van zilver in 1667, droogde de zilverstroom uit het buitenland geleidelijk op. 
Tegelijkertijd stelden de Mantsjoes nieuwe zeeverboden in. Hoewel dit beleid 
grotendeels mislukte omdat de kustprovincies zich in reactie hierop aansloten 
bij de zogenoemde ‘drie vazallen rebellie’ tussen 1674 en 1681, eisten deze 
ontwikkelingen toch hun tol. In 1683 werd de maritieme macht van het 
Cheng geslacht effectief beëindigd door de invasie van de Qing admiraal 
Shih Lang, een voormalige bondgenoot van Cheng Chih-lung. Als gevolg 
hiervan verloor Taiwan zijn positie als geduchte handelsmogendheid in de 
Chinese wateren. 
 
Het laatste hoofdstuk, hoofdstuk veertien, behandelt het complexe 
fenomeen van de opkomst en teloorgang van het Cheng regime in de 
kustprovincie Fu-chien en Taiwan. Het  Cheng regime kan als voorloper 
gezien worden van de zelfverklaarde “warlords” in de grens regio’s tijdens de 
Chinese Republikeinse periode. Als handelsregime toonde Taiwan onder de 
Chengs vele kenmerken van de Maleise havenvorstendommen in het zuiden. 
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Hoe dan ook, de tijdelijke onafhankelijkheid van de Chengs en hun 
volgelingen in Fu-chien en het nabije Taiwan tijdens de 17e eeuw is een 
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What set Cheng Chih-lung apart from his peers in the overseas trade were his 
prominent military skills and practical mentality rather than his cosmopolitan 
character.  
Cf. Charles Ralph Boxer, ‘The Rise and Fall of Nicholas Iquan (Cheng Chilung)’, 
T’ien Hsia Monthly, Apr.-May (1941), 1-39.   
   
II 
Cheng Chih-lung’s headquarters at An-hai harbour were because of the 
shallow waters difficult to approach for the large heavily armed ships of his 
rivals. Yet An-hai could closely control the island of Amoy, the only deep 
water harbour for overseas trading junks in south Fu-chien. It was the 
strategic position of An-hai rather than the skills of its merchants that made 
the difference. 
Cf. Lin Jen-ch’uan, Ming-mo ch’ing-ch’u Ssu-jen hai-shang mao-i [Private Trade 
during the Late Ming and Early Ch’ing Dynasty], (Shang-hai: Hua-tung shih-fan ta- 
hsüeh, 1987), 158-60      
 
III 
The personal contradictions between Cheng Chih-lung and Cheng 
Ch’eng-kung should not make us ignore that under their successive effective 
leaderships the maritime mercenaries continued to expand the overseas 
empire of the Cheng. The Oedipous complex explanation misses the point. 
Cf. Ralph C. Croizier, Koxinga and Chinese nationalism : history, myth, and the hero , 






The wars raged by Cheng Ch’eng-kung against his adversaries aimed to 
remove hindrances of his commercial expansion. The expedition to Nanking 
aimed to facilitate the trade between Chiang-nan and Japan. The occupation 
of Taiwan was to served as a springboard to enlarge Sino-Indian trade on the 
one hand, and to seek (via Manila) access to the Spice Islands.  
 
Cf. John E. Wills Jr., ‘Maritime China from Wangchih to Shih Lang’, in Jonathan D. 
Spence and John E. Wills Jr (eds.), From Ming to Ch’ing, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1979), 223-8.   
 
V 
The maritime history of the China Seas should not closed up in the ‘sprouts 
of Chinese Capitalism’ or the ‘periphery history of China’ debates. It should 
be positioned on the interface and the overlapping zones of international 
trade and geo-politics.     
 
VI 
A synthesis of the fragmental pieces of evidence collected from the VOC 
archives, can effectively create an overview of the overseas trading network 






Although the overseas Chinese hardly identified themselves with Chinese 
authorities, the term ‘overseas Chinese history’ implies a concealed cultural 
identity with China. As a result the Chinese abroad have often unintentionally 
become victims of the Sino-centric perspective. 
 
VIII 
Compared with the far flung activities of the European East India Companies, 
the Chinese maritime activities in Asian waters may have been moderate, but 
as cultural and material brokers, the overseas Chinese have contributed to 




The experience of comparing diverse sources from the standpoints of 
different cultural backgrounds is almost like watching a movie with sub-titles 
in different languages. They are adapted to local contexts while trying not to 
distort too much what is shown on the screen. 
